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Exploring the challenges from a child rights, 
public international human rights law perspective
International Commercial Surrogacy (ICS) has emerged over
the  past  decade  as  a  modern  method  of  family  formation.
ICS is unregulated internationally and domestic laws are
struggling to keep pace with ICS. However, a child is at the
centre of every ICS arrangement, and children conceived and
born through ICS are at a heightened risk of their rights being
infr inged.
Comprised of a collection of articles written over the course
of time when ICS has been rapidly developing, this book
explores why and how the child's rights are at risk in ICS, and
seeks to apply the standards and norms of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child to the ICS context.
This book proposes approaches for balancing the competing
rights and interests of the child and other par ties in ICS. It
presents a framework for protecting  the  r ights  of  children
born  through  ICS,  i l lustrating that this is achievable in
practice, in the absence of international consensus on ICS as
a phenomenon. 
This book is relevant for child r ights practitioners and
academics, and useful for policy-makers, leg islators and
national and international decision-makers grappling with the
children’s and human r ights issues presented by this 21st
century human rights challenge.
This is a volume in the ser ies of the Meijer s Research Institute and
Graduate School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This
study  is  par t  of  the  Law  School’s  research  programme  ‘Effective
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‘We may at the outset point out that a lot of legal, moral and ethical
issues arise for our consideration in this case, which have no precedents
in this country. We are primarily concerned with the rights of two new
born innocent babies, much more than the rights of the biological
parents, surrogate mother, or the donor of the ova.’
– Jan Balaz vs Anand Municipality and 6 ors, 20091
1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AS A 21ST CENTURY PHENOM-
ENON
International Commercial Surrogacy (ICS) has developed over the past decade
as a distinct method by which to have a child. Prior to this, it would have
been hard to fathom the possibility – let alone the practical reality – of a child
being born using an embryo created from the sperm of an anonymous Scandi-
navian donor and the egg of an anonymous Ukrainian donor, implanted into
an Indian surrogate mother, intended for the care of ‘commissioning parents’
living in New Zealand. Now however, families are being built in new ways,
and those wishing to become parents may turn to ICS to do so. For some
commissioning parents, (such as those who have been unable to conceive via
other assisted reproductive technology (ART) methods), ICS is an option of last
resort. For others though (such as same-sex couples and persons without a
partner), it is sometimes viewed as an attractive first option. The observation
of the Gujarat High Court quoted above in its judgment in Jan Balaz v. Anand
Municipality and 6 ors highlights the unprecedented nature of the scenarios
arising through ICS, and emphasises the people who are at the heart of all ICS
situations: the children conceived and born this way. Children conceived and
born through ICS are rights holders,2 like all other children. They are entitled
to the full range of rights guaranteed under the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and as such are owed special protection by states
1 Jan Balaz v. Anand Municipality and 6 ors, AIR 2010 Guj 21, Gujarat High Court, 11 November
2009, at [9].
2 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14 on the right of the child to





and other duty-bearers, such as parents.3 However, conception and birth
through ICS can lead to this group of children facing particular challenges to
their rights. This study therefore focuses on this subject and how to address
these challenges, to protect and uphold child rights in ICS.
ICS can be defined as the practice of a person or persons (‘commissioning
parents’) living in one state paying to have a child who is intended for them
upon birth, and who is conceived (usually in-vitro) and born in another state4
to a woman acting as a surrogate. It is distinctive in its cross-border nature
and the reality that commissioning parents are highly likely to intend to bring
up the child in their own home state,5 commissioning parents often wanting
to remove the child from his or her state of birth shortly following birth. As
Bromfield and Robati note, ICS arrangements are “almost always gestational
surrogacy arrangements”,6 meaning that it is unlikely the surrogate mother
is genetically related to the child she bears. The Permanent Bureau of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law (Permanent Bureau) provides
a simplified description of international surrogacy arrangements as being “any
surrogacy arrangement involving more than one State, either as a result of
the differing residences (and usually, nationalities) of the intending/commis-
sioning parents and surrogate mother, or otherwise.”7
The Permanent Bureau’s definition of international surrogacy arrangements
does not refer to the presence of a commercial element. In practice however,
many international surrogacy arrangements have a commercial element beyond
what might be seen to be ‘reasonable costs’ associated with a surrogacy in
a traditional, altruistic sense.8 It is for this reason that this study focuses on
ICS,9 with altruistic surrogacy falling out of scope. ICS leverages off globalisa-
3 R. Hodgkin and P. Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, (3rd ed.), UNICEF, 2007, at 1.
4 The ‘supply-side state’.
5 The ‘demand-side state’.
6 N.F. Bromfield and K.S. Rotabi, ‘Global Surrogacy, Exploitation, Human Rights and Inter-
national Private Law: A Pragmatic Stance and Policy Recommendations’, (2014) 1(3) Global
Social Welfare, at 124.
7 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Private Inter-
national Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising From
International Surrogacy Arrangements (Preliminary Document No 11 of March 2011 for
the attention of the Council of April 2011 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference),
(2011), at 3 fn 1.
8 In some states in which commercial surrogacy is illegal but which allow altruistic surrogacy,
intending parents are permitted to compensate altruistic surrogates for reasonable costs
associated with the surrogate’s pregnancy. E.g. Section 7, Surrogacy Act 2010, New South
Wales (Australia); Section 14(4), Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004, New
Zealand; Section 11, Surrogacy Act 2010, Queensland (Australia); Section 54(8) Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, United Kingdom.
9 Indeed, e.g. in the UK, despite the standard of ‘reasonable expenses’ for altruistic surrogacy
under UK legislation, the Family Division of the High Court has retrospectively authorised




tion, technological advances, and cheaper ART and surrogacy services offered
by ‘supply states’ which have predominantly grown in less-developed states
in the past decade (existing alongside the availability of ICS in some states of
the United States of America,10 the cost of which is markedly greater11). ICS
has also developed as a reaction to the reality that even in states where al-
truistic, non-commercial surrogacy is legal, it is still difficult to find women
who are willing to act as surrogates purely on a gift-relationship basis.12 These
various factors have combined with attitude shifts about how we build and
form families and what ‘family’ means in the 21st century. Indeed, creating
a family through alternative methods such as ICS has become increasingly
acceptable in some societies. It is in the context of 21st century connectivity
and globalisation that the broader growth of medical tourism and the out-
sourcing of labour have also occurred and are broadly accepted; more people
than ever before cross international borders for medical procedures far from
home13 and labour is increasingly outsourced to locations and people geo-
expenses, and where there was a clear commercial element involved: in J v. G [2013] EWHC
1432, a payment of USD $56,750 was authorised (at [14]). Mrs Justice Theis held that the
payments “were not so disproportionate to expenses reasonably incurred that the granting
of an order would be an affront to public policy.” (at [22(1)]); in Re X (Foreign Surrogacy
– Child’s Name) [2016] EWHC 108 (Fam), a payment of USD $48,332.49 was authorised,
with Mrs Justice Theis holding that “In the circumstances of this case the payments made
other than for expenses reasonably incurred should be authorised by the court.” (at [28])
10 For discussion of the approaches of different states in the United States, see J.L. Watson,
‘Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers be Com-
pensated for Their Services?’, (2007) 6(2) Whittier Journal of Child and Family Advocacy, 532-
539.
11 For discussion of the comparative costs between surrogacy in the United States and other
countries such as India, see: N. Grether and A. May, ‘Going global for a family: Why
international surrogacy is booming’, Al Jazeera America, 12 May 2014, available at: http://
america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2014/5/12/going-global-fora
familywhyinternationalsurrogacyisbooming.html (accessed 16 July 2016); D. Cunha, ‘The
Hidden Costs of International Surrogacy’, The Atlantic, 22 December 2014, available at:
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-hidden-costs-of-international-
surrogacy/382757/ (accessed 16 July 2016). For discussion of the comparative payments
received by surrogates in the United States and India, see R. Deonandan, ‘Recent trends
in reproductive tourism and international surrogacy: ethical considerations and challenges
for policy’, Risk Management and Healthcare Policy (2015), available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4544809/ (accessed 16 July 2016).
12 E.g. in New Zealand, as discussed in: M. Duff, ‘Who is my egg mother?’, The Dominion
Post, 12 October 2014, available at: http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/culture/106074
36/Who-is-my-egg-mother Tombleson also argues that “The prohibition of commercial
surrogacy is largely responsible for reproductive travel as it reduces the number of women
within the domestic sphere willing to partake in the practice.” A. Tombleson, Contracting
the New Delhi Belly: Responding to the Practice of International Surrogacy, dissertation submitted
in partial fulfilment of a Bachelor of Laws (Honours) degree, Faculty of Law, University
of Otago, October 2012, 5.
13 For comprehensive discussion regarding the growth of medical tourism, see J. Connell,




graphically distant from the customer or end user.14 The nature of this supply
and demand relationship, with demand flowing predominantly from the more
developed world to the supply-side located in the less developed world can
create underlying power imbalances and issues around relative ability to access
services.15 A number of factors motivate people to engage the services offered
through medical tourism, including but not restricted to competitive pricing,
on-demand availability, and to circumvent restrictive laws and policies of the
state in which they reside and access procedures not available there.
The last of these factors is particularly significant regarding ICS, as commis-
sioning parents often turn to ICS when they have exhausted all options for
family building in their home state and when that state does not allow com-
mercial surrogacy. Moreover, in instances where one or both commissioning
parents are able to provide gametes for use in the ICS arrangement, the op-
portunity of creating a child with whom they will share a genetic link is a
strong motivator towards ICS. Therefore, ICS can be viewed as a very specific
subset of the wider growth in medical tourism, markedly different from other
procedures accessed through medical tourism, because ultimately, it leads to
a child.
It is the child – who is at the centre of all ICS arrangements – with whom
this study is concerned, from a human rights perspective. Over the course
of this study (between 1 January 2012 and 31 July 2016), ICS has continued
emerging as a dynamic and multifaceted 21st Century human rights challenge.
This is despite some significant changes having occurred in the ICS landscape
since work on this doctoral study commenced. For example, some states –
such as Thailand – have come full-circle with ICS during this time, having
emerged as a primary ICS supply state and then legislated to outlaw and
criminalise ICS within its jurisdiction.16 Other major ICS states – such as India –
have banned ICS in practice through issuing policy directives,17 while draft
legislation to effect such a ban in law awaits final legislative approval and
assent.18 Many other states – on both the supply and demand sides of ICS –
are continuing to grapple with the challenges arising from ICS, including the
situation of children born through ICS arrangements. Therefore, this study is
highly relevant to the present-day context around the world. As has been
14 I. Bantekas and L. Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice (2013), at 703-705.
15 Ibid, at 703.
16 See Protection for Children Born From Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act, B.E. 2558
(2015), available at http://www.senate.go.th/bill/bk_data/73-3.pdf ; unofficial translation
available at https://tinyurl.com/yc2pgrra
17 The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs issued a directive on surrogacy in November 2015
stating that foreign nationals are not allowed to commission surrogacy in India. See http://
boi.gov.in/content/surrogacy (accessed 29 July 2016).
18 See The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2016 (India, Bill No. 257 of 2016), available at http://
www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Surrogacy/Surrogacy%20(Regulation)%20Bill,%202016.





demonstrated through ICS situations which have come to light through
domestic courts, regional human rights courts and the media, children con-
ceived and born through ICS remain particularly vulnerable. Such cases have
involved children being left stateless, discriminated against, trafficked and
sold, abandoned without a family environment, without legal parentage, and
unable to preserve their identity. This study explores the child’s rights
impacted by these realities and the associated implications for the child’s best
interests, whilst acknowledging the “indivisible, interdependent and inter-
related nature of children’s rights.”19
2 AIMS OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study proceeds from the hypothesis that children are particularly vulner-
able to having their rights endangered as a result of being conceived and born
through ICS. Despite the fact that all ICS arrangements are centred on producing
a child, when work on this study commenced, no academic scholarship existed
focusing on the child in ICS from a predominantly child rights perspective.
Now, at the time of writing this Introduction to the study in 2016, ICS has
received increased academic attention drawing on the international human
rights and child rights framework, albeit often through a different legal lens,
for example comparative law,20 private international law,21 and European
law.22 The work presented in this study has therefore been at the forefront
of considering the situation of children in ICS from a child rights perspective
under public international human rights law, and is a fresh and novel body
of work in this respect.
The aims of this study are four-fold: first, to place focus on the child and
their rights in ICS, and thereby contribute to filling the gap identified in scholar-
ship; second, to explore and better understand the ways in which the child
is vulnerable and how child rights are at risk and endangered in ICS; third,
to provide insight into how the public international human rights law frame-
19 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14 on the right of the child to
have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para 1), CRC/C/GC/14,
2013, at [16(a)].
20 E.g., see M. Wells-Greco, The Status of Children Arising from Inter-Country Surrogacy Arrange-
ments (2015).
21 Y. Margalit, ‘From Baby M to Baby M(Anji): Regulating International Surrogacy Agreements’
(2015), available at: http://portal.idc.ac.il/he/lawreview/conferences/documents/2015-
margalit.pdf (accessed 13 July 2016); and S. Mohapatra, ‘Adopting an International Conven-
tion on Surrogacy – A Lesson from Intercountry Adoption’, (2016) 13(1) Loyola University
Chicago International Law Review, 25.
22 N. Koffeman, Morally sensitive issues and cross-border movement in the EU: The cases of reproduct-
ive matters and legal recognition of same-sex relationships (2015); and K. Trimmings and P.
Beaumont, ‘Parentage and Surrogacy in a European Perspective’, in J.M. Scherpe (ed.),




work, especially the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC)23 provides a protective framework for children conceived and born
through ICS, and how this can be harnessed to ensure children can exercise
and enjoy their CRC rights, regardless of their conception and birth through
ICS; and fourth, to provide practical suggestions for how the child and their
rights can be better protected in ICS. The research questions addressed in this
study are as follows:
Main research question
What is the role of international human rights law (especially the norms
and standards established by the CRC) in protecting and reinforcing the
rights of children in ICS, and how should the rights of children involved
be understood and approached from a public international human rights
law, child rights perspective in relation to other ICS parties and rights-
holders?
Subsequent research questions
a) How does ICS present a challenge to children’s rights?
b) What rights of the child are most at risk in ICS?
c) How can international human rights law norms and standards (es-
pecially those established by the CRC) be utilised to protect the rights
of children in ICS situations?
d) How should the various competing rights and interests of children and
others in ICS situations be balanced using an approach consistent with,
and drawing on, public international law human rights norms and
standards?
3 RATIONALE FOR A FOCUS ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
As already noted, this thesis seeks to fill a gap in scholarship on ICS by placing
a clear focus on the child in ICS, from a child rights perspective. The hypothesis
that the child is particularly vulnerable in ICS deserves in-depth exploration
and analysis – as provided in this thesis – in order to understand why the
child is vulnerable and the nature of that vulnerability from a rights perspect-
ive. As Biggs and Jones observe, “Vulnerability may stem from particular types
of social disadvantage, based on factors such as young or old age, illness,
disability and poverty. [Vulnerability is] experienced differently according
to each individuals’ personal circumstances. Vulnerability is therefore defined




in a variety of ways depending on the context.”24 The contextual nature of
vulnerability is certainly apparent in ICS, with each and every ICS arrangement
presenting different circumstances depending on factors such as which states
are involved on the supply and demand sides (and therefore, what domestic
laws and policies apply), the genetic make-up of the child, and the actions
of the commissioning parents and surrogate. However, the very fact of a child’s
deliberate conception and birth through ICS does raise a number of potential
risks to their rights, thereby heightening their vulnerability regardless of the
nuances of the specific contextual factors at play in any one ICS arrangement.
Children conceived and born through ICS appear to fit within Diver’s concept
of being potentially “uniquely disadvantaged”25 by virtue of their conception
and birth via this method of family building (Diver uses the concept of unique
disadvantage to describe genetically kinless persons). Therefore, a specific focus
on the child and their rights situation is necessary and warranted, especially
as children are continuing to be born through ICS and therefore born into
situations of heightened vulnerability. This underscores the continuing rel-
evance of this study and its findings and recommendations.
Although placing its central focus on the child and their rights in ICS, this
study acknowledges the potential vulnerability of other parties involved in
ICS, such as the women who act as surrogates and the commissioning parents.
In the less-developed states where ICS supply has emerged over the past decade
(for example, India), it is often economic impoverishment that drives their
involvement in ICS due to a lack of economic alternatives.26 This also opens
them to the possibility of being taken advantage of by political and market
forces and the associated demands of commissioning parents.27 Surrogates’
vulnerability to having their rights and interests endangered is touched on
at various points throughout this thesis, within the context of and in relation
to the child’s rights situation. Therefore, this study is intended to be comple-
mentary to pre-existing research and literature concerning the rights of other
parties to ICS arrangements. The primary focus rests on the child and their
rights given the child’s absolute lack of personal agency in comparison to other
parties to ICS arrangements, owing to their stage of life. This is especially the
case for children in their infancy in the months and years immediately follow-
ing their birth through ICS, when many actions and decisions concerning their
24 H. Biggs and C. Jones, ‘Legally Vulnerable: What is Vulnerability and Who is Vulnerable?’,
in M. Freeman, S. Hawkes and B. Bennett (eds.), Law and Global Health: Current Legal Issues
(2014), Vol. 16, at 133-134.
25 A. Diver, A Law of Blood-ties: The “Right” to Access Genetic Ancestry (2014), at 83.
26 E.g. see A. Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India, (2014), at
9; and N. Witzleb and A. Chawla, “Surrogacy in India: Strong Demand, Weak Lives”, in
P. Gerber and K. O’Byrne (eds.), Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights (2015), at 189.
27 For discussion, see S. Allan, “The Surrogate in Commercial Surrogacy: Legal and Ethical





rights are taken which have a potential life-long impact for them as they grow
up and reach adulthood. By placing central focus on the child’s rights at stake
in ICS, this study serves to highlight the situation of the child in ICS.
4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND SCOPE
This study has been conducted between 01 January 2012 and 31 July 2016.
This study focuses on the child’s situation in ICS through a public international
law framework, taking a child rights, legal theory based approach. This
approach has been selected to ensure attention is adequately placed on the
child’s rights in ICS, in relation to the international human rights standards
and norms established under the CRC and other relevant international human
rights law instruments. Although private international law issues are briefly
touched on throughout the thesis (out of necessity, given the conflict of
domestic laws arising in ICS), this study does not take a private international
law, family law or contract law lens to the child’s situation in the ICS context.
Doing so would detract from the aims of the study and the core focus on the
child’s human rights situation and the focus on public international human
rights law norms and standards as the foundational, underpinning protection
framework for approaching the child’s situation in ICS. It is for this reason
that this study does not focus on legal parentage as a central issue and this
thesis does not have a chapter focussing solely on legal parentage in ICS, given
that legal parentage is predominantly a private international law matter in
this context. However, legal parentage is dealt with from a child rights per-
spective where relevant throughout the thesis, given its interface with the
child’s rights situation in ICS.
The CRC is the most widely ratified international treaty, with near universal
coverage.28 Like other public international human rights law treaties,
realisation of the rights of rights-holders (in the case of the CRC, children’s
rights) is reliant on CRC duty-bearers fulfilling their associated duties and
obligations.29 Although States Parties are the principal CRC duty-bearers, the
responsibilities and obligations for exercising duties under the CRC are not
limited to States. Making the CRC real in practice for children also relies on
other non-state actors, such as parents, families, communities, civil society
and private actors fulfilling their responsibilities and obligations under the
28 At the time of writing, the United States of America is the only state that has not ratified
the CRC. See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en (13 July 2016).
29 For discussion, see J. Tasioulas, ‘Protecting Human Rights: On the Role and Duties of Duty-




CRC, as secondary duty-bearers.30 The CRC is, however, as Detrick explains,
“unique, because it protects the broadest scope of fundamental human rights
ever brought together within one treaty – economic, social and cultural, and
civil and political”.31 The CRC is the public international law instrument form-
ing the backbone of the legal framework that this study utilises as its main
point of departure, as well as referring to other public international sources
of law (both hard and soft) where relevant. The study draws on the work of
the CRC Committee and other human rights treaty bodies, existing legal aca-
demic scholarship generally relating to children’s rights, as well as scholarship
specifically dealing with international surrogacy (an emerging body of scholar-
ship over the period of time this study has been undertaken), and relevant
reports and media publications regarding ICS. Although classical legal research
forms the primary methodology of this study, multidisciplinary sources have
been consulted where relevant, including from the disciplines of anthropology,
social work and psychology. The legal, jurisprudential and other sources on
which this study is based have been accessed via extensive research through
digital platforms and databases, and by working with a range of texts in
research libraries primarily in the Netherlands and New Zealand (with some
research also conducted in research libraries in wider Europe, Australia and
the United States). The study is also generally informed by the author’s own
professional experience as a lawyer working on cases of ICS in New Zealand32
and through engaging in and presenting papers at expert dialogues, confer-
ences and workshops on international surrogacy around the world throughout
the course of this study.33 Undertaking this study as a thesis by articles
(explained further in Section 6 of this introductory chapter) has enabled the
chapters which are now presented in this doctoral thesis to be relevant and
30 For a useful overview, see European Commission, EU Commitments in the Field of Child
Rights: Rights Holders and Duty Bearers, https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/sites/default/files/
learning/Child-rights/2.8.html.
31 S. Detrick (ed.), The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the
“Travaux Préparatoires” (1992), at ix.
32 Including for the New Zealand Government as in-house legal counsel for the Ministry of
Social Development.
33 International Workshop: National Approaches to Surrogacy, University of Aberdeen,
Scotland, August-September 2011; Reconstructing and Deconstructing ‘Mother’ Workshop,
Columbia University, United States of America, April 2012; World Social Work and Social
Development Conference, Sweden, July 2012; International Adoption and Surrogacy
Conference, New Zealand Law Society, New Zealand, April 2014; Global Forum on Stateless-
ness, UNHCR and Tilburg University, The Netherlands, September 2014; International
Conference on Surrogacy and Human Rights, School of Law, ITM University, India, Novem-
ber 2014; 25 Years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Conference, The
Netherlands, November 2014; Crossing Boundaries: Reproductive Travel in Asia, La Trobe
University & La Trobe Asia, Australia, December 2014; Redefining Family Conference:
Growing Families Through Adoption, Donor Conception and Surrogacy, Auckland Univer-




have a practical application and influence in ‘real-time’, over the course of
time that the study has occurred.
As ICS is a phenomenon with a global dimension, a global perspective is
important when examining it from a child rights, legal perspective. Therefore,
this study takes a wide-ranging, international approach to the cases of ICS it
highlights, while choosing to focus particularly on a) ICS cases occurring in
jurisdictions where ICS supply has developed rapidly over the past decade
in the context of little or no domestic legislation or policy governing ICS; and
b) ICS case law that has emerged in response over the past decade in domestic
courts in ICS demand jurisdictions. The selection of case law focused on
throughout the thesis is restricted, for practical reasons, to cases where English
judgments or case reports in English have been available. It should also be
noted that given the dynamic and emerging nature of ICS as a phenomenon,
over the course of the study, the pace at which ICS case law has developed
in different jurisdictions has varied. Recognising this reality, in order to remain
responsive, relevant and engaged with the limited number of leading ICS cases
which have emerged over the course of this study, some leading cases outside
of the primary selection criteria are dealt with in the thesis. Case law analysis
throughout the thesis elucidates particular child rights issues and challenges
in ICS, intended to provide a sense of the issues both domestic and regional
courts are contending with in practice when dealing with ICS, and the
jurisprudential approaches adopted.
In the absence of being able to directly incorporate the voices of children
born through ICS given their current young age, this study aims to bring a
strong child-centred perspective to the study of ICS by maintaining a clear focus
on the rights of the child most at risk in ICS, to highlight them so that they
can be addressed through future approaches to ICS at the legislative and policy
levels, both internationally and domestically.
From a methodological and scope perspective, this study does not explore
in-depth whether ICS amounts to the sale of children. The definition of the
sale of children is broad under international human rights law, established
under Article 2(a) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child porno-
graphy.34 Therefore, it is important to acknowledge at the outset of this study
that strong arguments exist that in some instances, ICS amounts to the sale
of children under this definition. Indeed, some scholars argue that the only
valid approach to ICS under public international human rights law is to ban
the practice, given its incompatibility with human rights law standards and
34 2001, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children,




norms.35 While acknowledging these arguments and the arguable jus cogens
status of the sale of children,36 to date however, no international consensus
has been reached as to whether ICS amounts to the sale of children.37 Indeed,
given the complex moral and philosophical aspects to this issue, it is likely
to be a long time until states reach a broad consensus on this matter, and it
is one of the reasons why reaching international agreement on how to regulate
ICS is so fraught. Moreover, given the various fact scenarios and constructions
of ICS in any individual ICS arrangement, it cannot be said with certainty that
all instances of ICS amount to the sale of children.
As already noted, the question of whether and in what circumstances ICS
does amount to the sale of children is largely outside the scope of this doctoral
study. The decision to delimit the scope of the present study in this way has
been taken for a number of reasons, namely:
- out of recognition that children are being born through ICS and following
birth, are, in some instances, experiencing challenges to their exercise and
enjoyment of their rights;
- to maintain a central focus on the rights of children born through ICS, given
that these children are entitled to exercise and enjoy their rights regardless
of whether or not they have been sold through ICS;
- to explore how the rights of children born through ICS can be better pro-
tected, even if they were sold through ICS;
- the question of whether or not ICS amounts to the sale of children (and
in what instances ICS can be said to be tantamount to the sale of children)
35 E.g. see J. Tobin, ‘To Prohibit or Permit: What is the (Human) Rights Response to the
Practice of International Commercial Surrogacy?’, (2014) 63(2) International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, 317; A. Gallagher, ‘International surrogacy is dangerous and unfair’, Sydney
Morning Herald, 5 August 2014; and D. Smolin, “Surrogacy as the Sale of Children: Applying
Lessons Learned from Adoption to the Regulation of the Surrogacy Industry’s Global
Marketing of Children”, (2015-2016) 43 Pepperdine Law Review, 265.
36 Jus cogens are defined as “a peremptory norm of general international law”, meaning “a
norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted”: Article 53, 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. Bassiouni cites the international crimes of aggression,
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices,
and torture as having the status of jus cogens: M.C. Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus
Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’, (1996) 59(4) Law and Contemporary Problems, at 68. Ar-
guably, Articles 35 and 3 CRC and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography indicate
that the sale of children has reached jus cogens status. For further discussion in the context
of international surrogacy, see Y. Ergas, ‘Thinking ‘Through’ Human Rights: The Need
for a Human Rights Perspective With Respect to the Regulation of Cross-border Reproduct-
ive Surrogacy,’ Chapter 27 in Trimmings and Beaumont (eds.), International Surrogacy
Arrangements (2013), 432-435.
37 For a discussion refuting the characterisation of compensated surrogacy as sale of children,
see P. Gerber and K. O’Byrne, “Souls in the House of Tomorrow: The Rights of Children





merits separate legal research, solely focused on that question (for example,
it could be the subject of a separate doctoral study); and
- to fully answer the question of whether ICS amounts to the sale of children
and in what instances, ideally field research and investigation is needed,
in order to satisfactorily explore the nuances of the different ways in which
the sale of children might occur in ICS. Such research and investigation
may be suited to being undertaken through the expert mandate of the
Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child
pornography, for example through country visits.
The fact remains that children continue being born through ICS. As long as
this continues to be the case, children’s rights will be placed at risk. Therefore,
rather than exploring whether ICS amounts to sale of children, this study is
concerned with the practice of ICS as it is currently occurring, and its implica-
tions for the rights of children conceived and born through ICS. This study
takes a pragmatic approach to the practical reality of ICS, placing focus on ICS
as a contemporary method of family building that is creating children who
are placed at a heightened vulnerability to rights violations. Given this reality,
this study focuses on exploring what those children’s rights violations are and
how they can be guarded against.
This study therefore takes the view that as long as the practice of ICS
continues, attention must be given to protecting the rights of children con-
ceived and born this way. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of
work taking place concurrently to attempt to reach international consensus
as to the broader approach to be taken regarding ICS, in order to protect those
who it makes vulnerable – not least children. Such work should necessarily
consider the question of whether ICS amounts to the sale of children. Indeed,
such discussions are already underway and continue under the leadership
of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law38 and the International Social Service,39 and there is scope for the UN
Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child porno-
graphy to continue deepening her leadership role on exploring the particular
issue of sale of children in the ICS context.40
Significantly too, despite having some commonalities with intercountry
adoption (such as both being cross-border in nature and both being an alternat-
ive method of family formation), ICS is distinct from and different to
intercountry adoption, and this study treats it as such. The most crucial differ-
38 See https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy (accessed
13 July 2016).
39 See http://www.iss-ssi.org/index.php/en/what-we-do-en/surrogacy (accessed (13 July
2016).





ences to acknowledge are firstly that intercountry adoption is a measure
primarily aimed at providing a family environment for an existing child who
is in need of care and protection,41 while ICS is not a care and protection
measure. Whereas adoption concerns existing children, ICS is a way of creating
new children, responding to the desires of commissioning parents to become
parents or add children to their families. Secondly, whereas intercountry
adoption is premised on safeguarding against the illegal movement of children
across borders and is in no way intended to be commercial in nature,42 ICS
arrangements always involve a financial transaction of some nature occurring
before commissioning parents receive a child. However, it is also important
to note that both intercountry and domestic adoption orders have been used
(and in some instances are continuing to be used) as a method of regularising
and creating legal relationships between commissioning parents and children
born through ICS.
Finally from a methodological and scope perspective, it is important to note
that this doctoral study takes as its point of departure that:
- ICS is a method of family formation that is occurring despite questions
regarding its legality/illegality and whether or not the practice is in the
public interest;
- children are continuing to be born through ICS; and
- in some instances, children’s rights are being infringed as a result of their
birth through ICS.
Therefore, the scope of this study is confined to focusing on this contemporary
reality, in order to:
- analyse how children’s rights in ICS can be protected, promoted and upheld
by implementing in practice the relevant standards and norms established
under international human rights law (especially those established by the
CRC); and
- explore how children’s rights can be appropriately balanced with the rights
and interests of the other core parties in ICS when they directly compete.
This means that the question of whether or not ICS is a method of family
formation which is generally in the public interest is a question falling largely
out of scope of the present study.
41 The preamble to the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption includes the following statements: “Recognising that
the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow
up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding”, and
“Recognising that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family
to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin”.
42 See Articles 1(b), 4(c)(3) and 4(d)(4) 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and




Limiting the scope of this doctoral study in this way is not to say that
public interests arguments which exist for and against the practice of ICS are
not important. On the contrary, the author acknowledges that in reaching
future policy and legal positions and agreements on ICS at both the domestic
and international levels, public interest considerations will be important for
legislators and policy-makers to contend with. Indeed, the choice of whether
to outlaw or permit ICS at the domestic and international levels will, to an
extent, turn on the positions states choose to adopt regarding the challenges
pertaining to public morals and ethics in ICS, and what is seen to be in the
general interests of the public.
However, the practical reality remains that ICS as a method of family
formation has developed despite the existence of public interests questions,
and that even where ICS markets have been shut down (for example in states
such as India and Thailand), new ICS markets have developed in other states
(such as Cambodia43) to service the ongoing demand for ICS. In light of this
practical reality, it is necessary and timely to explore the role that existing
international human rights law standards and norms can play to protect the
rights of those whose rights are made vulnerable in ICS (especially the rights
of children born through ICS), and to guide the balancing of competing interests
in ICS. This is what this study addresses.
5 THE PLACE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY IN THE EXISTING LEGAL
BODY OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
SURROGACY
This thesis is made up of a collection of articles, which have been written over
a course of time through which ICS has been emerging and rapidly developing
as a phenomenon. Over this time, a small body of legal scholars and institu-
tions have been engaging with ICS from differing legal perspectives (and this
body has increased over time). Work led by Beaumont and Trimmings com-
mencing in 201044 was a forerunner to legal research which has taken place
since focusing on ICS. The aim of Beaumont and Trimmings’ project was “to
examine private international law problems that arise in cases of cross-border
surrogacy arrangements and to propose a global model of regulation of such
arrangements.”45 As part of this project, a workshop was convened at the
University of Aberdeen (which the author of this doctoral thesis participated
in) bringing together legal specialists from 22 jurisdictions to discuss the
43 See V. Muong and W. Jackson, ‘The Billion Dollar Babies’, The Phnom Penh Post, 02 January
2016, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/post-weekend/billion-dollar-babies (accessed 13
July 2016).
44 See http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/regulation-international-surrogacy-arrangements
(accessed 13 July 2016).





current (at the time) snapshot of the domestic and private law approaches to
surrogacy in their jurisdictions. Beaumont and Trimming’s project culminated
in the publication of an edited book,46 drawing together their findings, includ-
ing from the Aberdeen workshop.47
The Hague Conference on Private International Law has been the inter-
national legal institution directly engaging with ICS matters consistently since
2010, since the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference
acknowledged “the complex issues of private international law and child
protection arising from the growth in cross-border surrogacy arrangements”.48
Following this, the Special Commission on the practical operation of the Hague
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption (17-25 June 2010) noted that “the number
of international surrogacy arrangements is increasing rapidly. [It expressed]
concern over the uncertainty surrounding the status of many of the children
who are born as a result of these arrangements. [It viewed] as inappropriate
the use of the Convention in cases of international surrogacy.”49 Since, the
Hague Conference has published a number of preliminary documents, notes
and reports on international surrogacy arrangements as part of its “Parentage/
Surrogacy Project”,50 which studies “the private international law issues being
encountered in relation to the legal parentage of children, as well as in relation
to international surrogacy arrangements more specifically.”51 In 2015, the
Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference decided to
convene an Expert’s Group to explore the feasibility of advancing work con-
cerning the private international law issues surrounding the status of children,
including issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements.52 The
work of the Expert’s Group on Parentage/Surrogacy is continuing and to date
has largely focused on legal parentage matters.53
46 K. Trimmings and P. Beaumont (eds.), International Surrogacy Arrangements (2013).
47 This includes a chapter focussing on surrogacy law and practice in New Zealand, written
by the author of this doctoral thesis. See C. Achmad, ‘New Zealand’, Chapter 18 in K.
Trimmings and P. Beaumont (eds.), International Surrogacy Arrangements (2013), 295-310.
48 Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council (7-9 April 2010), at 3.
49 Special Commission on the practical operation of the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993
on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (17-25
June 2010), at [25].
50 A full listing is available at https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parent-
age-surrogacy




52 Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council (24-26 March 2015), at [5].





Over the course of the present doctoral study, a number of other significant
legal studies have also been undertaken which engage with ICS. These include
a doctoral study by Koffeman examining reproductive matters and same-sex
legal recognition in European jurisdictions,54 and a doctoral study by Wells-
Greco examining the status of children arising from inter-country surrogacy
arrangements through a comparative legal perspective.55 A collection edited
by Gerber and O’Byrne brought together for the first time a series of articles
on domestic and international surrogacy in its contemporary context from a
human rights law perspective.56
At the wider international level too, two other developments are important
to acknowledge. The first is to note that the United Nations Committee on
the Rights of the Child has, over the course of this doctoral study being under-
taken, made its first comments relating to surrogacy in Concluding Observa-
tions issued under the CRC reporting cycle.57 Although its comments to date
concerning surrogacy in its Concluding Observations remain limited and do
not directly address ICS, given that surrogacy has remained a topic which the
Committee has largely steered clear of engaging with previously, this signals
a shift and indicates the Committee is viewing surrogacy as an issue of concern
from a child rights perspective.
The second development worth noting at the international level is the work
convened by International Social Service (ISS) concerning international
surrogacy and the protection of children. In 2013, ISS issued an international
call for action on international surrogacy,58 followed by a second call for
action in 2016.59 Both calls for action focused on the need to protect the child’s
rights and best interests in all cases of international surrogacy. To support
the advancement of this work, in 2015 ISS convened an International Experts
Group to develop ‘Principles for better protection of children’s rights in cross-
border reproductive arrangements, in particular international surrogacy’.60
The drafting of these principles is on-going, and the author of this doctoral
54 N. Koffeman, Morally sensitive issues and cross-border movement in the EU: The cases of reproduct-
ive matters and legal recognition of same-sex relationships (2015).
55 M. Wells-Greco, The Status of Children Arising from Inter-Country Surrogacy Arrangements
(2015).
56 P. Gerber and K. O’Byrne (eds.), Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights (2015).
57 See Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Israel, 04
July 2013, CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, at [33] and Committee on the Rights of the Child, Conclud-
ing observations regarding India, 07 July 2014, CRC/C/IND/CO/3-4, at [57](d) and [58](d).
58 International Social Service, International Surrogacy and Donor Conceived Persons – Preserving
the Best Interest of Children: Call for action by the International Social Service Network, July 2013,
available at http://www.iss-ssi.org/images/Surrogacy/Call_for_Action2013_ANG.pdf
(accessed 13 July 2016).
59 International Social Service, Call for Action 2016: Urgent need for regulation of international
surrogacy and artificial reproductive technologies, January 2016, available at http://www.iss-





study is a member of the Core Expert Group responsible for drafting the
principles. The work of the ISS International Expert’s Group is complementary
to, but distinct from the work of the Hague Expert’s Group on Parentage/
Surrogacy, given that the ISS work takes a human rights perspective, first and
foremost grounded in the standards and norms established by the CRC, and
recognition of the need to protect and uphold the rights of children who are
born through international surrogacy.
The study presented in this doctoral thesis adds to the existing legal body
of knowledge on ICS by intentionally focusing in on the rights of children born
through ICS, to explore how the CRC can be harnessed to protect their rights
in practice. In doing so, this doctoral thesis is distinct from many of the other
existing legal studies and initiatives concerning the phenomenon of ICS, because
it makes practical recommendations for ways in which the CRC can be imple-
mented in ICS to protect children’s rights. It is the first comprehensive scientific
legal research focusing on the child in ICS from a child rights perspective under
international human rights law, placing attention on the rights of the child
most at risk in ICS. As such, it raises new ways of thinking about the situation
of children conceived and born through ICS, and offers practical and relevant
insights and guidance for those making decisions affecting children in ICS
situations, such as policy-makers, government decision makers at the executive
level, and judicial decision-makers. The study presented in this doctoral thesis
is also distinct as it proceeds from the recognition that despite the live nature
of questions of whether or not the practice of ICS is in the public interest and
the overall legality or illegality of ICS, children are continuing to be born
through ICS, and as a result in some instances are facing infringements of their
rights. Therefore, by proceeding from this reality, this thesis presents recom-
mendations as to how infringements on and violations of the child rights
shown to be most at risk in ICS situations may be avoided, by implementing
the CRC in practice.
6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
This study has been undertaken as a thesis by articles, which are largely
already published elsewhere. This is reflected in the structure of the thesis.
The decision to choose to undertake this doctoral study as a thesis by articles
is premised on the following reasons:
- The substantive topic of the study is, by nature, dynamic and emerging;
- Given the nature of the substantive topic of the study, a thesis by articles
provides flexibility, enabling contributions to be made to contemporary
debate and discourse, and for the work undertaken throughout the study





- A desire on the part of the author to contribute to the growing body of
scholarship on ICS as it emerges over time, in order to make a scientific
contribution highlighting the child rights problems in ICS and to pose
potential solutions, grounded in international human rights law standards
and norms (in particular, the CRC).
Undertaking this doctoral study as a thesis by articles has meant that:
- Chapters of the thesis which have been published to date have been rel-
evant to contemporary developments and have raised novel issues at the
time of writing and publication;
- Aspects of the study have been cited in other scholarly works,61 and as
such have had an influence on the legal discourse concerning ICS as it has
developed over time; and
- Bringing the various articles which comprise the doctoral study together
in the body of work presented in this thesis highlights the journey the
study has taken over time, from a point in time at which ICS was a topic
which was largely ‘under the radar’, to a point in time where ICS is more
widely recognised as a contemporary method of family formation, raising
human rights and legal challenges.
All of the substantive chapters appearing in this thesis have a central thread
running through them – namely a focus on children’s rights in ICS and the
role of international human rights law in protecting and upholding children’s
rights. All the chapters have either been published or submitted for publication
as articles in academic journals or edited legal or multidisciplinary collections
(except for Chapter Ten which has not been submitted for publication). The
title of each chapter, its principal focus, as well as its publication status is
summarised in the following schematic outline of the structure of the thesis.
61 E.g. J. Pascoe, ‘State of the Nation – Federal Circuit Court of Australia’, (FMCA) [2014]
FedJSchol 21; J. McCrossin, ‘Babies Without Borders’, Law Society of NSW Journal, No. 9,
Mar 2015: 40-43; S. Bassan, ‘Shared Responsibility Regulation Model for Cross-Border
Reproductive Transactions’, 37 Mich. J. Int’l L. 299 (2015-2016); R. Scherman, G. Misca, K.
Rotabi and P. Selman, ‘Global commercial surrogacy and international adoption: parallels
and differences’, Adoption and Fostering, Vol 40 (2016) Issue 1, 20 – 35; Ilaria Anro, Surrogacy
from the Luxemourg and Strasbourg Perspectives: divergence, convergence and the chance for future




Ch. Title Key focus Publication status
1 Introduction Provides an overarching intro-
duction to the doctoral thesis.
Published as part of the doctoral
thesis.
2 Contextualising a 21st
Century Challenge: Part One
– Understanding Inter-
national Commercial
Surrogacy and the Parties
whose Rights and Interests
are at Stake in the Public
International Law Context
Introduces ICS as a twenty-first
century human rights
challenge and examines the
parties whose rights and
interests are at stake in the
public international law
human rights context. These
parties are focused on
throughout the following
chapters of the thesis.
Published in New Zealand Family
Law Journal, Vol. 7, Part 7,
August 2012, 190-198.
3 Contextualising a 21st
Century Challenge: Part Two
– Public International Law
Human Rights Issues: Why
Are the Rights and Interests
of Women and Children at
Stake in International Com-
mercial Surrogacy
Introduces the rights and inter-
ests most at stake in ICS for the
two most vulnerable parties
from an international human
rights law perspective: the
women acting as surrogate
mothers and the children con-
ceived and born through ICS.
Provides a foundational basis
for closely examining
children’s rights in ICS in later
chapters of the thesis.
Published in New Zealand Family
Law Journal, Vol. 7, Part 8, De-
cember 2012, 206-216.
4 Multiple ‘Mothers’, Many
Requirements for Protection:
Children’s Rights and the
Status of Mothers in the
Context of International
Commercial Surrogacy
Analyses the complexities of
the relationship between the
child in ICS and their multiple
‘mothers’ (genetic, biological,
legal, social). Presents dis-
cussion of the child’s rights in
relation to the rights and inter-
ests of these women, and ex-
amines how the rights and
interests of the child can be
balanced with those of their
multiple ‘mothers’.
Published in Y. Ergas, J. Jensen
and S. Michel (eds), Reassembling
Motherhood: Procreation and Care




Rights: Babies, Borders, Re-
sponsibilities and Rights
Building on earlier chapters,
argues that the child is the
locus of vulnerability in ICS.
Presents discussion of the
ethics and economics of ICS in
relation to children; assesses
jurisprudential trends and
non-judicial responses to ICS in
selected demand-states, in
relation to relevant inter-
national child rights legal
norms and standards. Presents
arguments regarding the need
to harness and implement the
CRC, so that children born
through ICS can exercise and
enjoy their rights.
Published in New Zealand Law
Society, International Adoption
and Surrogacy – Family Formation




Ch. Title Key focus Publication status
6 Unconceived, Unborn, Un-
certain: Is Pre-Birth Pro-
tection Necessary in Inter-
national Commercial
Surrogacy for Children to
Exercise and Enjoy Their
Rights Post-Birth?
Identifies and examines how
preconception and prenatal
decisions and actions in ICS
can result in challenges to the
child’s rights once born. Makes
recommendations for safe-
guards to be implemented
before the child’s conception,
during the child’s gestation
and following the child’s birth,
to better protect and promote
the child’s rights in ICS in a
holistic manner.
Accepted for publication in The
International Journal of Children’s
Rights, Issue 1, 2018.
7 Securing children’s right to a
nationality in a changing
world: the context of Inter-
national Commercial
Surrogacy
Focuses on the child’s Art. 7
CRC right to a nationality as a
child right most significantly
at risk in ICS. Examines the
ways in which children can
end up stateless in ICS and
recommends practical
measures to implement the
CRC and other relevant inter-
national human rights law
standards, so that children
born through ICS can secure
their nationality right.
Published in in L. Van Waas
and M. Khanna (eds) Solving
Statelessness (2016) Wolf Legal
Publishing, at 191-224.
8 Answering the “Who am I?”
Question: Protecting the
Right of Children Born
Through International Com-
mercial Surrogacy to Preserve
Their Identity Under Article
8 of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the
Child
Focuses on the child’s Art. 8
CRC right to identity preserva-
tion as a child right most sig-
nificantly at risk in ICS. Argues
that protecting this right is of
central importance for children
born through ICS, given the
lifetime impact of not being
able to exercise and enjoy their
Art. 8 right. Makes recommen-
dations for how Art. 8 can be
upheld for children in ICS.
Submitted for publication in
Human Rights Law Review.
9 Case Analysis: Children’s
Rights to the Fore in the
European Court of Human
Rights’ First International
Surrogacy Judgments
Presents a child rights, legal
analysis of Mennesson v. France
and Labassee v. France, land-
mark judgments in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights
concerning ICS. Draws out
linkages with the child rights
discussed in Chapters 7 and 8
of the thesis, and the import-
ance of the CRC in judicial
decision-making in ICS pre-
viously discussed in Chapter 5
of the thesis.
Published in European Human





Ch. Title Key focus Publication status
10 Multiple Potential Parents
But a Child Always at the
Centre: Balancing the Rights
and Interests of the Parties to
International Commercial
Surrogacy Arrangements
Drawing on earlier chapters
findings, presents a rights
balancing analysis of the
balancing of children’s rights
and interests with those of
surrogates, genetic donor
parents and commissioning
parents in ICS. These are the
practical rights balancing ex-
ercises necessary between the
parties throughout ICS arrange-
ments. Argues that in balanc-
ing competing rights and inter-
ests in ICS, once a child is
born, his or her rights and best
interests should be accorded
priority.
Published as part of the doctoral
thesis (not submitted for publi-
cation elsewhere).
11 Conclusion Provides an overarching con-
clusion to the doctoral thesis,
drawing on the main findings
of previous chapters. Presents
a framework of recommenda-
tions for protecting children’s
rights in ICS applicable to the
contemporary context, pro-
posed as the basis of a UN
Committee on the Rights of
the Child General Comment
on children’s rights in ICS.
Published as part of the doctoral
thesis.
Some explanatory text as to the nature of ICS as a phenomenon and how it
impacts on children’s rights has been necessary to include in a number of the
articles which are now presented as chapters in this thesis. This means that
some repetition appears throughout the thesis, as a by-product of the fact that
at the time which the individual articles which make up the chapters of the
thesis were written (especially in the early part of the study), ICS was a topic
which had received limited scholarly attention from an international human
rights legal and child rights perspective.
At the time each chapter in this thesis was written, it was relevant to the
real-time, contemporary developments in ICS. It is also noted that in some
instances, the information concerning ICS which appears in some of the chapters
of the thesis is now out-of-date, given the fast-paced development of ICS as
a phenomenon. However, the combination of newer and older chapters pre-
sented in this thesis is illustrative of how the phenomenon of ICS has developed
over time, and how this doctoral study has sought to engage with these
developments as they have occurred, from a child rights perspective under
international human rights law. The contextual commentary included as part
of the overviews appearing before each chapter of the thesis highlight the




in ICS since that time; and the continued relevance of the arguments and main
findings presented in the chapter.
From a structural perspective, the doctoral thesis is tied together by the
central focus on children’s rights in ICS, and this introductory chapter to the
thesis; the brief chapter overviews appearing at the start of each chapter; and
the conclusion to the overall study (Chapter Eleven). The conclusion to the
study (Chapter Eleven) further draws the strands of the study together by
presenting a comprehensive framework of recommendations proposed to form
the basis of a Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment on the
rights of the child in ICS. The Conclusion to this study underscores the relev-
ance and application of this doctoral study to the contemporary children’s
rights context up to the present day.
7 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
This thesis is presented through nine chapters, along with this Introduction
to the study (Chapter One) and a Conclusion to the study (Chapter Eleven).
Chapters Two62 and Three63 introduce ICS as a 21st century human rights
and child rights challenge. These initial chapters provide an overview of the
phenomenon of ICS through a public international law, human rights lens.
These chapters are important to set the scene for understanding the complex,
multifaceted nature of ICS, and serve to contextualise the discussion in later
chapters which hones in more closely on the particular situation of the child
and their rights in ICS, including their rights most at risk.
Chapter Two discusses the emergence and development of the ICS market
and predominantly focuses on introducing the parties whose rights and
interests are at stake in ICS, the ‘core parties’ to ICS arrangements, namely the
child, the surrogate and the commissioning parents. The core bioethical and
moral challenges raised by ICS are briefly touched upon and provide important
background context to the legal, child rights focus of this thesis. This Chapter
also foreshadows some of the issues triggered in ICS by the existence of compet-
ing rights and interests of the core parties to ICS arrangements.
Chapter Three then extends the discussion begun in Chapter Two, by
focussing in on the main human rights law challenges arising through ICS
under public international law. The main question explored is ‘why and how
are the rights and interests of women and children at stake in ICS?’. Primary
emphasis is placed on the rights of the child at stake, with a secondary focus
on the rights of surrogate women in ICS. When this Chapter was written (2012),
no academic scholarship existed which comprehensively examined how ICS
62 Originally published in New Zealand Family Law Journal, Vol. 7, Part 7, August 2012, 190-198.





impacts on the child’s rights. Therefore, this Chapter filled an existing gap
in scholarship at the time, and argues that ICS should be recognised as an
international human rights challenge to the rights of the child. Central
challenges to the child’s rights in ICS are identified and discussed, in the context
of and with reference to the relevant provisions of the CRC. This begins build-
ing a picture of the potential negative impacts of conception and birth through
ICS on the rights of children. This Chapter then acknowledges that at the time
of writing, much of the existing scholarship regarding ICS focused on the
situation of women acting as surrogates (often from the perspectives of anthro-
pology, documentary-making and sociology). In order to draw on this pre-
existing body of literature and to place it within the context of the current
study, Chapter Three provides an overview of some of the key human rights
issues pertaining to women in the ICS context, and discusses some of the
human rights challenges common to both surrogate women and children in
ICS, namely the risks of commodification and human trafficking. In doing so,
this highlights the broader human rights picture at play, again emphasising
the intersecting nature of many of the rights and interests at stake in ICS.
Chapter Four64 builds on the close links between children and women
in ICS, through an examination of child rights in relation to the status of the
multiple potential ‘mothers’ in ICS. This Chapter brings a unique focus from
a rights perspective to one of the central relationships in all ICS arrangements,
between the child and their potential multiple ‘mothers’. It discusses the
construct of ‘mother’ as inherently related to ‘child’, and analyses the different
‘mothers’ involved in ICS: surrogate (the only person with a foetal-maternal
link through the biological act of carrying to term and giving birth to the
child); genetic (the only woman with a DNA link with the resulting child); and
commissioning (where a woman is involved, the woman or women who
want(s) to parent the child). This discussion illustrates that establishing the
status of the various potential mothers in ICS is both socially and legally
complex. In doing so, this Chapter draws attention to the contestable nature
of the notion of ‘mother’ in ICS and traverses the corresponding implications
for the rights of children.
Chapter Five65 deepens the focus on the child’s rights in ICS and develops
the idea of the child as the locus of vulnerability in ICS arrangements. As part
of this analysis, this Chapter presents an extended discussion of the ethics and
economics of the commercialisation of the conception of children. Specific CRC
rights which are at the most significant risk in ICS are highlighted: to national-
ity and to preserve identity, to grow up in a family environment, and to
64 Originally published in in Y. Ergas, J. Jensen and S. Michel (eds), Reassembling Motherhood:
Procreation and Care in a Globalised World, Columbia University Press, 2017.
65 Originally published in New Zealand Law Society, International Adoption and Surrogacy –




education, health and social security. This Chapter also highlights juris-
prudential trends (through case law analysis) and non-judicial responses (es-
pecially national guidelines/government guidance as quasi-policy approaches
to ICS) in three ICS ‘demand’ states (Australia, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom). These are examined in relation to the child rights framework, in
order to assess the extent to which child rights are being promoted, protected
and upheld through these responses to ICS. This Chapter illustrates that the
clash of rights involved in ICS between the child and the other core parties
is difficult to avoid, but that increased efforts and measures to place the child’s
rights and best interests at the heart of the practice of ICS is both necessary
and possible.
Chapter Six66 deals with an issue that must be contended with in order
to present a holistic consideration of the child’s rights in ICS. This is the ques-
tion of whether any protection of the future child’s rights is necessary prior
to the child being conceived and before the child’s birth, in order to ensure
the child is able to exercise and enjoy their CRC rights once born. This Chapter
explores the hypothesis that due to the intentional, planned nature of ICS and
the involvement of multiple parties, protection of particularly at-risk child
rights is required preconception and pre-birth in the specific context of ICS.
It does so by analysing the legal context of the future child’s rights both pre-
conception and pre-birth; identifying the child’s rights which are placed at
risk through actions and decisions occurring pre-conception and pre-birth in
ICS; and analysing the potential impacts of these actions and decisions on the
child’s rights once born. This Chapter is, therefore, an important backdrop
to the chapters of the thesis that follow after it, which focus on the child’s
specific rights most at risk in ICS. As part of the discussion presented in Chap-
ter Six, the CRC is closely examined to establish whether it provides a basis
for preconception and prenatal protection of the child’s rights, and relevant
domestic and regional jurisprudential approaches to the unborn child are
analysed to extract lessons for ICS. In dealing with this subject, this Chapter
also contributes to the wider body of child rights legal scholarship concerning
pre-natal rights and the situation of the unborn child. Practical measures are
suggested, aimed at protecting the future child’s rights pre-conception and
pre-birth in ICS in order to preserve the child’s opportunity to exercise and
enjoy their rights in the event that they are born.
Chapters Seven67 and Eight68 hone in on two of the child rights most
significantly at risk in ICS and in doing so provide in-depth analysis of how
these rights are at risk and how they can be better protected. Chapter Seven
is a close analysis of the challenge of securing the child’s right to a nationality
66 Accepted for publication in The International Journal of Children’s Rights, Issue 1, 2018.
67 Originally published in in L. Van Waas and M. Khanna (eds) Solving Statelessness (2016)
Wolf Legal Publishing, at 191-224.




under Article 7 CRC in ICS. Children born through ICS are sometimes born
stateless and stranded in their birth state. This Chapter provides an overview
of the child’s Article 7 right and discusses why and how child statelessness
arises in ICS, and highlights the wider child rights implications of statelessness
in ICS. Here, the intersecting nature of the child’s right to a nationality with
other CRC rights is made clear. As well as drawing attention to state responses
to the issue of child statelessness in ICS, jurisprudence dealing with child
nationality and ICS is discussed. This Chapter proposes practical solutions to
the problem of child statelessness in ICS, to prevent further children from being
precluded from enjoying their right to a nationality.
Intersecting with the discussion in Chapter Seven, Chapter Eight closely
analyses the child’s right to preserve their identity under Article 8 CRC in the
ICS context. As well as providing an overview of the child’s Article 8 right
and related key regional human rights jurisprudence, this Chapter examines
the three elements of identity most at risk in ICS: genetic and biological (includ-
ing the health rights implications for the child); personal narrative; and cul-
tural. It makes clear that the child’s Article 8 CRC right is precarious in ICS and
argues that the child’s Article 8 right is the central child rights challenge in
ICS. It makes the case that in instances where this right is not protected and
upheld, it will have a lifetime impact on the child. This is illustrated with
reference to case examples in which children conceived and born through ICS
have had their Article 8 right endangered, and in some cases, violated. Along
with the public international law human rights framework, key lessons from
donor-conception, adoption and domestic surrogacy are drawn on to propose
practical measures of implementation of Article 8 CRC in the ICS context, to
make this right real for children conceived and born through ICS. This Chapter
makes clear that safeguarding the right to identity preservation must be treated
as a matter of central importance for all children conceived and born through
ICS.
Chapter Nine69 presents a case analysis of the landmark European Court
of Human Rights cases of Mennesson v. France70 and Labassee v. France.71
These cases are significant in the context of this study given they were the
first judgments concerning ICS issued by a regional human rights court; further-
more, they warrant analysis as they indicate an approach to ICS emphasising
the rights of the children involved. Despite dating from 2014 and the fact that
the European Court of Human Rights has dealt with other applications con-
cerning ICS since,72 the Court’s reasoning in Mennesson and Labassee continues
69 Originally published in European Human Rights Law Review (2014), Issue 6, 638-646.
70 Mennesson v. France, Application No 65192/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 June 2014.
71 Labassee v. France, Application No 65941/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 June 2014.
72 The most significant being the judgment of the Grand Chamber in Paradiso and Campanelli
v. Italy, Application no. 25358/12, Judgment, 24 January 2017, overturning the earlier




to provide insight and context from a child rights perspective. This Chapter
analyses the rights situation of the children concerned in the two cases, outlines
the main arguments in the European Court of Human Rights and analyses
the judgments. This Chapter serves to further place the preceding two Chapters
concerning the child’s rights to nationality and preservation of identity in
context, given that the Mennesson and Labassee judgments emphasise the
importance of protecting these child rights in ICS arrangements, and impacts
experienced by children when this does not occur. This Chapter also comments
on the broader future implications of the Mennesson and Labassee judgments
for the rights of children in ICS. An Addendum to Chapter Nine is included,
providing a brief analysis from a child rights perspective of the first ICS judg-
ment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, given
the landmark nature of the judgment.
With the previous chapters having covered the rights of the child most
significantly at risk in ICS and presenting concrete recommendations for the
promotion and protection of these rights, Chapter Ten deals with balancing
the rights of the child with the rights and interests of the other core parties
to ICS (surrogates, genetic donor parents and commissioning parents). This
is important because ICS arrangements often raise a clash of competing rights
and interests.73 However, this Chapter argues that the child’s rights and best
interests must always be central to any rights balancing exercise in ICS. The
child’s rights must be protected and prioritised wherever possible, consistent
with their best interests, unless this would result in a violation of the rights
of another party to the ICS arrangement which outweighs the protection of
the child’s rights. Furthermore, in some instances where the rights of an adult
party would be negated by protecting the child’s rights in ICS, it is argued
that on balance, this may be necessary.
Chapter Eleven presents the conclusion to this study. It unites the overall
picture of child rights in ICS provided by the preceding chapters and comments
on the steps to be taken to better protect the rights of children conceived and
born through ICS. As well as commenting on the future of ICS and associated
developments in family formation, the Conclusion comprehensively outlines
the recommendations made throughout this thesis by presenting a framework
for a Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment on the rights
of children in International Commercial Surrogacy. This framework is
grounded in the standards and norms established by the public international
human rights law framework, in particular the CRC, and tailored towards
protecting the child’s most at-risk rights in ICS. The proposed framework is
73 As Gerber and O’Byrne observe, “Viewed from a human rights perspective, the interests
of the child born via surrogacy may compete with the interests of other participants in
the surrogacy arrangement.” P. Gerber and K. O’Byrne, “Souls in the House of Tomorrow:
The Rights of Children Born via Surrogacy”, in P. Gerber and K. O’Byrne (eds.), Surrogacy,




intended as practical guidance for a broad range of actors in ICS, able to be
implemented regardless of the persistent lack of international agreement on
the practice of ICS generally, and regardless of the lack of cohesive and compre-
hensive legislative and policy measures governing ICS at the domestic level
in some states.
Therefore, the framework proposed in the Conclusion to this study is aimed
at responding to the need in practice (demonstrated throughout the main
chapters of this study) to ensure that the rights of children who are being born
through ICS are prioritised and actively protected and safeguarded in ICS. As
such, the Conclusion makes clear that the findings and recommendations of
this study are of immediate relevance and practical application for the range
of actors contending with the child and human rights challenges arising from
ICS, including states and their governments around the world. If the Committee
on the Rights of the Child issues guidance based on this framework and it
is implemented by a range of actors involved in ICS, it will mean that children
conceived and born through ICS are not prevented from exercising and enjoying






2 Contextualising a 21st Century Challenge:
Part One
Understanding International Commercial Surrogacy
and the Parties whose Rights and Interests are at Stake
in the Public International Law Context
Abstract
International commercial surrogacy (ICS) has developed over the past decade
as an alternative method of family formation at the intersection of science and
technology, globalisation and changing social patterns, raising profound human
rights, legal and ethical questions. This Chapter introduces ICS as a twenty-first
century human rights challenge and provides a comprehensive examination
of the parties whose rights and interests are at stake in the public international
law context. In doing so, it provides a solid contextual foundation to frame
the analysis and arguments presented in the later chapters of this study con-
cerning the person at the centre of all ICS arrangements: the child.
Main Findings
- ICS arrangements are often factually complex, owing to the involvement
of multiple parties and the fact that the ICS market has grown in an un-
regulated manner.
- ICS is controversial due to the legal, human rights, moral and bioethical
questions it raises.
- From a public international law, human rights perspective, the rights of
surrogate women and children are those most at risk in ICS.
- A child is at the centre of all ICS arrangements; children born through ICS
– like all other children – are entitled to all the rights provided by the CRC.
- The child’s rights and interests may clash with those of other parties to
ICS arrangements, necessitating rights balancing exercises.
Contextual notes
- This Chapter was written when ICS was still very much an emerging





- At the time it was written, this Chapter was one of a small number of
scholarly works engaging with the phenomenon of ICS from a public
international law, human rights perspective.
- Since the time this Chapter was written, the human rights challenges raised
by ICS are much better understood; today a growing body of scholarly
works exists concerning the human rights challenges raised by ICS, from
a legal perspective.
- As a reaction to the legal and human rights problems raised by ICS, some
States have since taken steps to outlaw ICS while others have addressed
ICS through policy guidance; however, ICS remains unregulated at the
international level.
This Chapter was originally published in the New Zealand Family Law Journal,
Volume 7, Part 7, August 2012, pp. 190-198.
1 INTRODUCTION
It is well-documented that children and women remain two of the most
vulnerable groups of human beings in our societies today. However, relatively
little legal discussion occurs in relation to a specific group of vulnerable
children and women whose human rights are at stake due to the rapidly
emerging practice of international commercial surrogacy (ICS). The current
unregulated growth of this practice is quietly causing a concurrent growth
in potential human rights violations of the children and women whom it
involves, and on whose lives it has an enduring impact and effect. This devel-
opment is unsettling in a number of areas – not least due to the ethical issues
it raises. One important question which has received relatively little attention
or analysis to date however, is the question of what role could, or should the
law play in this rapidly growing trans-boundary issue born of our 21st century
globalised world? Already, national judiciaries are being confronted with
complex ICS cases, with judges struggling to grapple with the legal, ethical
and moral minefield that ICS cases present.
This article is presented in two parts, and explores the phenomenon of
ICS from a predominantly public international law perspective, placing a focus
on the human rights and legal challenges raised. In this, the first part of the
article, attention rests on identifying and discussing the parties to ICS arrange-
ments in the public international context. The second (forthcoming) article
focusses on the public international law human rights issues and challenges
raised by ICS. Particular regard is given to those whom this phenomenon has
the potential to leave most vulnerable: the children born and the women who
act as surrogate mothers. Those who commission ICS arrangements often give
minimal thought to the human rights of the children and women involved,
and the fact that these require protection. There has also been little considera-
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tion given to the role that the law could or should potentially play in ICS, or
indeed the potential value of the law in such situations, and for whose benefit.
The lack of legal regulation, in many cases at the domestic level, and the
absence of any overarching international framework to regulate ICS, is a point
of weakness and a factor potentially leading to serious human rights violations.
Issues of immigration, parentage, guardianship, adoption and citizenship
are often the issues raised by ICS given most attention. However, a more
holistic assessment seems appropriate, in particular one which incorporates
consideration of the human rights issues at stake, in parallel – and with a
respect for – analysis of the relevant private law issues, as well as being infused
with a multidisciplinary outlook. Additional to legal concerns, public policy
issues are writ large in any discussion of ICS. On this note, the Hague Confer-
ence accurately observes that this is
‘an area in which there will be differences of opinion about the proper balances
to be struck, for example, between regulating the conduct of adults and ensuring
protection for the rights or welfare of the born child, or between party autonomy
and the pursuit of other public policy objectives such as the suppression of com-
mercialism in human reproduction.’1
Given the recent advent of ICS, it is perhaps not that surprising that no
coordinated international law approach or attempt to regulate and protect
(either in the public or private international law spheres) has been taken or
even considered extensively with regard to the challenges it poses. However,
time and the obstacles faced should not be allowed to hinder any further the
protection of the rights of the children and women involved. Therefore the
exploration of ICS from an overarching international law perspective should
not be further delayed. As Lee notes, international problems require inter-
national solutions:
‘Governments should recognize their duty to protect children, women and families
from opportunistic and reckless practitioners who primarily seek to profit from
the existing climate of disparate regulation of commercial surrogacy. Many public
policy issues can no longer be resolved within the isolation of national borders.
[…] success requires either global coordination or cooperation. Inaction could harm
the health and safety of women and children.’2
1 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Private Inter-
national Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising From International
Surrogacy Arrangements (Prel. Doc. No. 11, March 2011).
2 Ruby Lee, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation,




Lee further posits that “In an integrated global society, inaction can have direct
consequences to all.”3
2 UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND ITS
PARTIES
Whilst the practice of surrogacy is not new4 and the use of surrogates under-
went a modern resurgence in the 1980s (predominantly in the United States),5
international commercial surrogacy (ICS) is very much a phenomenon of recent
times. In fact, it is best understood as a 21st century challenge given that it
has rapidly emerged in the past ten years and raises, among others, intersecting
issues of bioethics, reproductive technologies and science, changing familial
structures, the use of the human body, modern communication media, global-
isation and law.
Under an ICS arrangement (as distinct from compassionate or altruistic
surrogacy which is non-commercial in nature), “commissioning parents”
(heterosexual or homosexual couples or individuals) are motivated by different
reasons (discussed further below) to arrange for a surrogate mother located
in a different country than that in which they live, to carry a child to term.
After birth, the surrogate is expected to hand the child over to the commission-
ing parents, who will raise the child, in many instances without on-going
contact with the surrogate. Depending on the particular arrangement, the
surrogate may in fact act anonymously throughout the entire process from
impregnation to provision of the child to the commissioning parents. In terms
of the biological make-up of the child born from an ICS arrangement, there
are many possibilities (for ease of reference the six core possibilities, which
may have variants dependent on whether donors or surrogates act anonymous-
ly or are known, are also set out in diagrammatic form at Figure 1). The child
may or may not be genetically linked to one or both of the commissioning
parents. The child may or may not be genetically linked to the surrogate
mother. Where there is a genetic link to the surrogate, this may be understood
as a “traditional surrogacy”6 or “complete surrogacy”7 given that the surro-
3 Id. at 299.
4 Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues – Expanded Edition, 5
(1990).
5 E.g. id. At 2-4, Field discusses two of the most well-known cases from this period in the
US, Stiver v Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th cir. 1992), and In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
6 Margaret Ryznar uses the term “traditional surrogacy” meaning one which “results in a
surrogate’s genetic child following her artificial insemination with the intended father’s
sperm.” See Margaret Ryznar, International Commercial Surrogacy and Its Parties, 43(4) John
Marshall Law Review 1010 (2010). The “traditional” aspect can therefore be understood
as drawn from the fact that the surrogate gives birth to her “own” child in the sense that
it is genetically related to her, and not genetically related to the commissioning mother
or to a third-party egg donor.
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gate both provides her own genetic material to create the child, and therefore
has a genetic link to the child as well as being its carrier during gestation.
Where there is no genetic link to the surrogate, the term ‘gestational surrogate’
is often used.8 Eggs and sperm are sometimes separately paid for and
implanted (provided by donors), or an embryo is purchased and implanted.
Any of these variants may either involve known or anonymous donors. In
some ICS cases, the advent of cryo-shipping is utilised, to ship embryos or
sperm or eggs via international courier from their origin to the place in the
world where they will be used in an ICS arrangement. An exchange of money
adds the ‘commercial’ element to ICS; fees are often paid to surrogacy clinics
carrying out the associated medical procedures, and/or to the third party who
arranges the surrogacy, and/or to the surrogate herself. Contractual documents
sometimes govern the transactions, but not always.9 Of course, the exact nature
of each commercial surrogacy arrangement differs in all these aspects, and
it is in many cases difficult to map all the various persons, places and trans-
actions involved; this sets ICS apart from domestic surrogacy arrangements,
or purely altruistic compassionate surrogacy, squarely locating it in the context
of the 21st century globalised world.
7 Mary Lyndon Shanley prefers this term to the use of “traditional surrogacy”. See Mary
Lyndon Shanley, Making Babies, Making Families: What Matters Most in an Age of Reproductive
Technologies, Surrogacy, Adoption and Same-Sex and Unwed Parents, 103 (2001).
8 E.g. this is the term used by Amrita Pande throughout her work focussing on non-genetic
surrogate mothers in India. See Amrita Pande, It May Be Her Eggs But It’s My Blood: Surro-
gates and Everyday Forms of Kinship in India, 32 Qualitative Sociology 379-397 (2009). Sangeeta
Udgaonkar states that “Gestational surrogacy arises when the embryo is transferred into
the uterus of the surrogate mother and is then carried by her. The surrogate mother only
contributes her womb but not her occyte. […] Genetic surrogacy arises when the surrogate
donates the oocyte as well as carries the child. In a genetic surrogacy, therefore, the surro-
gate mother is an oocyte donor as well.” See Sangeeta Udgaonkar, The Regulation of Oocyte
Donation and Surrogate Motherhood in India, in Making Babies: Birth Markets and Assisted
Reproductive Technologies in India 82 (Sandhya Srinivasan ed., 2010). Ryznar surmises that
in the process of gestational surrogacy, “the surrogate mother bears a non-genetic child
following in-vitro fertilisation with a couple’s embryo”. See Ryznar, supra note 6, 1010.
However, what Ryznar fails to note is that the “couple’s embryo” may not always constitute
the genetic material of the commissioning parents themselves; while it is true that in many
cases the sperm of the commissioning father is used, the egg used in the embryo may have
come from the commissioning mother, or it may have come from a third party (possibly
anonymous) egg donor.
9 See for a comprehensive discussion of the various types of surrogacy arrangements the
Indian Supreme Court’s observations in Baby Manji Yamada Vs. Union of India & ANR




Figure 1: the main models of international commercial surrogacy
Given the above, an ICS arrangement could lead to a scenario, for example,
whereby a heterosexual couple in New Zealand pays a clinic in Thailand for
the implantation of the male’s sperm, combined with an ovum purchased from
the United States, into a Thai surrogate mother who gives birth in Thailand.
Alternatively, consider the scenario described in a recent article: “In a hospital
room on the Greek island of Crete with views of a sapphire sea lapping at
ancient fortress walls, a Bulgarian woman plans to deliver a baby whose
biological mother is an anonymous European egg donor, whose father is
Italian, and whose birth is being orchestrated from Los Angeles. She won’t
be keeping the child.”10 Superficially, the complexities of such factual scen-
arios are immediately apparent, but a further tangle of difficult issues underlies
these scenarios, raising numerous potential human rights challenges for the
children born and the surrogate mothers involved. These issues will be dealt
10 Tamara Audi and Arlene Chang, Assembling the Global Baby, 10 December 2010, Wall
Street Journal Online, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703493504
576007774155273928.html (last visited June 1, 2011).
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with in the second article in this series, however, should ideally be considered
within the context presented in this (the first) article.
3 TRACKING THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF A MARKET: A GLOBAL ‘TRADE’
IN BABIES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
The emergence of ICS really started to become prominent in the early 2000s,11
but it has only been in the last 5 years where there has been a clearly identifi-
able increasing trend of greater use of these arrangements.12 As the Hague
Conference on Private International Law recently stated in a discussion paper
on international surrogacy, “A brief internet search of “international surrogacy”
and, in today’s world, one is a click away from hundreds of websites promis-
ing to solve the problems of infertility through in-vitro fertilisation techniques
(“IVF”) and surrogacy: for a price. It is now a simple fact that surrogacy is a
booming, global business.”13 Domestically, surrogacy is the subject of legal
regulation in many jurisdictions. Some states – in fact the majority of states
which regulate surrogacy – take a very strict approach to commercial surro-
gacy, banning it outright, whilst altruistic surrogacy is generally permitted
in those jurisdictions.14 Commercial surrogacy is however, legal in some other
jurisdictions and in those places there is a dedicated domestic legal regime
which governs the practice of surrogacy.15 Celebrity cases in the media (for
11 See for one of the first legal assessments of ICS, Angie Goodwin McEwen, So You’re Having
Another Woman’s Baby: Economics and Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law 271-304 (1999).
12 This is evident in the increased numbers of cases coming before domestic courts in jurisdic-
tions such as the United Kingdom, India and France on the issue, whereas previously they
were virtually non-existent. E.g. see the recent cases of RE: L (A minor), [2010] EWHC 3146
(Fam) (UK); Balaz v Anand Municipality, High Court of Ahmedabad (11 November 2009)
(India); and the Mennesson case involving French commissioning parents who had twins
in California via ICS, Arrêt n° 370 du 6 Avril 2011 (10-19.053), Cour de Cassation – Première
Chambre Civile (France).
13 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, supra note 1, 6.
14 E.g. New Zealand, Canada, Australia, The Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom.
In France and Italy however, all forms of surrogacy are illegal. For a helpful survey on
domestic legislative responses to surrogacy see Susan Markens, Surrogate Motherhood and
the Politics of Reproduction 20-49 (2007).
15 E.g. in Israel and Ukraine. In India, the controversial Draft Assisted Reproductive Techno-
logies (Regulation) Bill 2010, available at http://www.icmr.nic.in/guide/ART%20REGULA
TION%20Draft%20Bill1.pdf (last visited June 1, 2011), has been finalised and is awaiting
approval. It will bring into effect a comprehensive domestic regime governing clinics
providing international surrogacy in India and addresses related rights and duties. See for
commentary on the Bill, A. Malhotra, Legalising Surrogacy – Boon or Bane?, 2010, The Tribune
India, available at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100714/edit.htm#6 (last visited
June 1 2011); Jagran News Network, Bill on Surrogate Mother Awaits Approval of Law Ministry,
January 27, 2011, available at http://post.jagran.com/bill-on-surrogate-mother-awaits-




example Cristiano Ronaldo, Elton John) have drawn attention to ICS, but
everyday people are driving demand for the service of ICS, fuelling recent
growth in what some are now calling a baby production ‘industry’.16 Demand
for ICS appears to be growing, and as the very possibility to undertake such
arrangements is becoming more widely known (and is easily available via
the internet), the supply end of the market is trying to keep pace and expand
to meet this demand. In particular, growth is apparent in developing states
such as Thailand and India, seeking to cater to the growing number of pro-
spective commissioning parents from the developed world. ICS has the potential
to be a very big, global business (arguably it already evinces the hallmarks
of this), which in turn has the potential to generate substantial profits for the
many different actors involved, such as medical clinics, surrogacy brokers,
and surrogate mothers.17 In discussing the role that contractual arrangements
– which exist in and govern some ICS arrangements – take on in this market,
McEwan notes that “The modern contracts between surrogate mothers and
commissioning parents have become a market-driven event that is much more
complicated than simply bringing a new life into the world.”18
The development of this market is reliant on the on-going demand of
commissioning parents as the party in ICS arrangements driven by a desire
for a child, and thus for the surrogacy arrangement. The various motivations
of such commissioning parents are discussed below, but it is interesting at
this point to raise the question of whether the growth in the ICS market should
be understood as having grown out of being a market of ‘last resort’ – that
is, commissioning parents tend to only resort to such arrangements after
exhausting all other alternative options, or, should it be better understood as
being a market of ‘easy resort’ – that is, one which is convenient to commis-
sioning parents as they can have a baby created for them offshore without
the usual stresses and hassles of a regular pregnancy (granted though, an ICS
arrangement comes with many other unique stresses and hassles of its own).19
In practice, a combination of both elements is probably likely to be present.
One of the most problematic aspects of the ICS market as it currently
operates, from a legal perspective, is the unregulated international nature of
the market which characterises it. The “global baby economy”, described by
16 E.g. Zippi Brand Frank, Google Baby (film, 2009).
17 In India, the ICS market as a whole is currently estimated to be worth US$445 million
annually. See Neha Wadekar, Wombs for Rent: A Bioethical Analysis of Commercial Surrogacy
in India, 10:3 TuftScope: The Journal of Health, Ethics and Policy (2011) available at http://
www.tuftscopejournal.org/issues/S11 (last visited June 1, 2011).
18 McEwen, supra note 11, at 273.
19 Rachel Cook, Shelley Day Sclater, and F. Kaganas (eds.), Surrogate Motherhood: Inter-
national Perspectives, 3 (2003); P.S. Hoe, More Seek International Surrogate Mothers,
November 8, 2010, The New York World, available at http://thenewyorkworld.com/2010/
11/08/more-seek-international-surrogate-mothers/ (last visited June 1, 2011).
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one commentator as the “baby production industry in age of globalisation”20
has been allowed to establish itself and to grow with very few legal barriers,
besides domestic laws which may or may not regulate the practice in part,
dependent on the various jurisdictions in which the parties to the surrogacy
arrangement are located. Lee frames the practice using the term “global out-
sourcing of commercial surrogacy”.21 Essentially, having enough money to
pay for ICS is the only gatekeeper directly regulating the market at the inter-
national level, other than where individual states have enacted domestic
legislation which addresses ICS.22 However, to date such states are few, and
therefore the effect is piecemeal and far from providing any sort of overarching
legal regime, let alone a protective legal regime focussed on the children born
and the women who act as surrogates. To have such a market functioning
across borders – essentially trading in human life – without any coordinated
legal regulation23 or consideration of how to provide a protective framework,
is highly problematic.
4 THE PARTIES TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS
Having discussed the emergence of the phenomenon of ICS, focus of this article
now turns to highlight the various parties involved in an ICS arrangement.
An understanding of the different, often very personal, motivations driving
the various parties’ actions or underlying their specific situations is essential
at this point. This will help serve as a background against which to consider
wider human rights legal issues associated with ICS.
4.1 The commissioning parents
The commissioning parents are those who commission the ICS arrangement,
and thereby the engagement of a surrogate, possibly an arrangement through
a medical clinic and/or surrogacy broker, and crucially, the creation of a child.
20 Zippi Brand Frank, Google Baby: Synopsis, 2010, available at http://www.zippibrandfrank.
com/ (last visited June 1, 2011.
21 Lee, supra note 2, at 275-300.
22 E.g. in Australia the New South Wales Surrogacy Act 2010 bans ICS; in India, the Draft
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010, when it comes into effect, will
allow ICS within a regulatory framework.
23 Consideration of the prospects for a private international law regulatory framework
currently forms part of a research project being undertaken at the University of Aberdeen,
with support from the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The project is called
“International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for Legal Regulation at the
International Level”, and is led by Professor Paul Beaumont and Dr. Katarina Trimmings.
Background to the research is available at http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/surrogacy/




Sometimes an individual will commission an ICS arrangement, but in the
majority of instances it is a couple that commissions an international surrogate
child, therefore the term “commissioning parents” will be used throughout
this article; it is worth noting that sometimes the term “intending parents”
is used.24
A range of factors may underlie the actions of commissioning parents. For
example, in many ICS cases, the commissioning parents are themselves unable
to conceive (for varying reasons) and may have already been through a number
of rounds of in vitro fertilisation treatment (IVF, also sometimes known as
artificial reproduction treatment or ART) without success; in some cases they
have exhausted the surrogacy options in their home country, again without
success (either due to there being a lack of women willing to act as surrogates,
or due to legal barriers). Alternatively, some commissioning parents will have
explored the adoption options which may be available either locally or via
intercountry adoption. However, the declining number of children available
for adoption worldwide,25 coupled with the difficulties in adopting a child
internationally (such as time delays, strict eligibility requirements, the nature
of the children available) arguably make adoption an option trending down-
wards in its uptake around the world.26
Having often explored other options as discussed above, ICS then might
become an attractive and viable option for commissioning parents who have
the financial means to access it, for a number of reasons. Firstly, many commis-
sioning parents have a strong preference for a child who has a genetic link
to both or at least one of the commissioning parents; this may in fact be ICS’
strongest selling point. As McEwan notes, “parents’ desires for a genetic link
with their children makes surrogacy attractive in its own right”.27 It may be
possible for commissioning parents to achieve this via an ICS arrangement,
either through means of embryo implantation (using the commissioning
parents’ genetic sperm and egg) in the surrogate, or by using the commission-
ing father’s sperm. Going to extreme cases, the possibility of a so-called
“saviour-sibling child” – a child who is conceived in order to enable access
to genetic material such as bone marrow for a sick sibling – could be the
motivation underlying some ICS arrangements.28 Related to the desire for a
24 E.g. Ryznar, supra note 6; the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, supra note 1.
25 See generally Robin Hilborn, Global Adoptions Fall One-Third in Six Years, Adoption News
Central, March 15, 2011, available at http://www.familyhelper.net/news/110315global.html
(last visited June 20, 2011); and Peter F. Selman, Intercountry Adoption in Europe 1998-2008:
Patterns, Trends and Issues, 34:1 Adoption and Fostering 8, 15 (2010).
26 Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: The Human Rights Position, 1:1 Global Policy 92
(2010).
27 McEwen, supra note 11, at 273.
28 Eric Blyth, To Be or Not to Be? A Critical Appraisal of the Welfare of Children Conceived Through
New Reproductive Technologies, 16:4 International Journal of Children’s Rights 501-510 (2008).
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genetically related child, the “erosion of traditional notions about the structure
of the family and the strides in reproductive techniques”29 also arguably
contribute to the popularity of surrogacy, including ICS.
Furthermore, the financial viability of ICS may also motivate commissioning
parents to undertake such an arrangement. Undertaking an ICS arrangement
in a developing state such as India or Thailand is in most cases significantly
cheaper that undertaking a commercial surrogacy arrangement in the devel-
oped world in places where it is legally possible and regulated, such as some
states in the United States.30 Illustratively, the difference in cost margin has
been reported as being up to as much as $78,000 (US).31 Therefore undertaking
surrogacy in a developing country where it is available to foreign commission-
ing parents is much more financially viable, and indeed attractive, for the
majority of commissioning parents than commercial surrogacy options in the
developed world.
Finally, the perceived legal flexibility of ICS may also be a motivating factor
for commissioning parents to favour the option of undertaking surrogacy
internationally rather than domestically. For example, Ryznar discusses the
strict legal regulation in some states in the United States regarding surrogacy,
and some of the legal outcomes, such as the Baby M case in which the surro-
gate mother’s decision to not hand over the baby after its birth was upheld
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.32 Ryznar argues that there is no doubt
that “domestic cases like this one have increased the appeal of international
commercial surrogacy.”33 However, despite the possible attraction of ICS due
to what may be a prohibitively restrictive legal regime governing surrogacy
in the home-state of the commissioning parents, the very existence of this
domestic regulation of commercial surrogacy may still be problematic in terms
of its ultimate impact on an ICS arrangement. The effect may be that in the
home-state, such an arrangement is essentially held to be illegal, which can
raise problems when commissioning parents attempt to return with a surrogate
to a state such as France after undertaking an ICS arrangement in an offshore
commercial surrogacy-friendly jurisdiction.34 The commissioning parents,
29 McEwen, supra note 11, at 273.
30 E.g. Arkansas, Illinois, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, Virginia. Californian
courts have consistently allowed commercial surrogacy under precedential case-law, there
is no Californian legislation governing commercial surrogacy.
31 Amana Fontanella-Kahn, India, the Rent-a-Womb Capital of the World: The Country’s Booming
Market for Surrogacy, August 23, 2010, Slate, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2263136/
(last visited June 1, 2011).
32 Ryznar, supra note 6, at 1014.
33 Id.
34 Essentially, such cases raise conflict of laws issues. See for discussion of the Mennesson
case (France/US), Gilles Cuniberti, Flying to California to Bypass the French Ban on Surrogacy,
November 5, 2007, Conflict of Laws.net, available at http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/flying-
to-california-to-bypass-the-french-ban-on-surrogacy/ (last visited June 1, 2011). Another




and therefore the child, may end up caught in a conflict of laws quagmire
with no simple way out. To the extent to which this may raise human rights
challenges, this possibility will be further discussed in the forthcoming second
part of this article.
4.2 The surrogate mother
The role of the surrogate mother in an ICS arrangement is primarily to be the
host to the surrogate child for the gestation period. In cases where she only
hosts the child in this way, she is best understood as the biological carrier of
the child. In some ICS arrangements, the surrogate’s genetic material is also
used. In such instances, she is both biologically and genetically linked to the
child (and therefore this might be referred to as a full surrogacy). The other
key role of the surrogate mother in ICS is that she is expected to, and sometimes
is contractually bound (if there is a contract governing the ICS arrangement,
this will be the expectation of the commissioning parents) to hand the baby
over to the commissioning parents directly following its birth. This is done
on the understanding that it is the commissioning parents who will assume
responsibility for the child and raise the child, not the surrogate mother.
The surrogate is, like the commissioning parents, potentially motivated
by various reasons to participate in an ICS arrangement. Some surrogates are
motivated on purely compassionate grounds of wanting to help those unable
to become pregnant themselves to have a child, whereas other surrogates are
motivated by financial gain. This is understandable in the context of the
developing world, where ICS arrangements have been recently characterised
as a new type of “labour”: ironic in that the very act of labouring to carry the
child for 9 months, and the act of labour itself, are combined, in a form of work
which is in many cases providing economically marginalised, poverty-stricken
women an income they would have never otherwise have dreamed of.35 In
some cases however, surrogates might not participate in ICS by choice, but
under external pressure. These issues will be further elaborated on in the
discussion of women’s rights in part two of this article.
Act 2010 (which came into effect on 1 March 2011), which makes it illegal to engage in
commercial surrogacy arrangements within the territory of NSW or outside NSW, including
undertaking ICS overseas.
35 Pande first explicitly characterised ICS as a new and particular type of “labour”. See Amrita
Pande, Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect Mother-Worker, 35:4 Signs:
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 989-992 (2010). ICS can be viewed as a literal
nine months of “labour” ending in the “labour” of child-birth.
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4.3 The child
The child who is born from an ICS arrangement is of central importance:
essentially the child is the product which the commissioning parents commis-
sion, the surrogate nourishes and produces, and the commissioning parents
then take ‘ownership’ of. The child is therefore vulnerable as a potential cite
of contestation; the rights and interests of the child are one of the central
concerns of the author’s research, and will be discussed more extensively part
two of this article.
4.4 The medical staff and surrogacy broker
Some ICS cases are private arrangements not carried out with the assistance
of a medical clinic specialising in surrogacy, whereas others utilise such
services. Whilst such clinics have existed in some states of the United States
of America for many years, more pertinent to the current ICS market is the
emergence of such clinics in developing states. The business of many of these
clinics in the ICS field shows no sign of slowing in growth.36 Such clinics may
also orchestrate the financial transactions for the arrangement, receiving money
from the commissioning parents, and in cases where the surrogate is being
paid, the payment to the surrogate may be funnelled through the clinic as part
of a larger transaction. Such clinics’ medical staff deal with ICS arrangements
on a daily basis, and in many instances rely on ICS brokers employed not only
to recruit surrogates, sometimes using undue pressure,37 but who are also
tasked with matching surrogates to commissioning parents.
The notion of the surrogacy broker should also be understood more widely
as encompassing the many ICS brokerage businesses functioning widely
through the internet, promoting the various international surrogacy options
to prospective commissioning parents. This highlights the role played by
modern communication technologies (and their centrality to many ICS arrange-
ments), which enable prospective commissioning parents to access information
about potential surrogacy arrangements available on the other side of the world
via simple mouse-clicks; in extreme instances, such arrangements may be
conducted entirely remotely, with the commissioning parents often erroneously
believing it is as simple as flying in to collect the child once it is born. Such
instances emphasise the often made-to-order nature of ICS.
36 E.g. the Ankanksha Infertility Clinic run by Dr. Nayna Patel which is one of the subjects
of Google Baby, supra note 16, and the Hope Maternity Clinic run by Dr. Usha Khanderia,
discussed by Pande, supra note 35. Both clinics are located in Anand in the state of Gujarat
in India.




5 BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE BIOETHICAL AND MORAL CONUNDRUMS OF INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AND THE INTERFACE WITH HEALTH
LAW ISSUES
The scope of this article does not extend to engaging in a full discussion of
the ethics of ICS. However, brief discussion of the core bioethical and moral
conundrums provides an essential contextual prism through which to frame
and view any legal and human rights focused analysis of ICS. As Wendy
Chavkin states,
‘The biology of reproduction has clearly become fragmentable, with gestation and
organs and gametes and intracellular ingredients and genetic components now
separable. The meanings accorded to these bits and processes is both highly varied
and contested.’38
Already, the terms “world babies” and “designer babies” are being applied
to the children born from ICS arrangements. Surrogates have been referred
to as “rentable wombs” and part of “baby-farming” schemes or “baby
factories”.39 Brief discussion of some of the core bioethical and moral issues
thus provides a primer for later discussion of the human rights challenges
posed by ICS for surrogate women and children (contained in part two of this
article).
The first bioethical issue raised by ICS relates to the commercialisation of
human reproduction. Discussing the increasing numbers of American couples
seeking to engage Indian surrogates to carry a child for them in India, Lee
notes that “this practice raises ethical concerns, indicating that U.S. outsourcing
is no longer limited to manufacturing and service jobs, but has expanded to
include women’s biological and reproductive bodily functions.”40 The ethically
problematic aspect of international surrogacy in this respect is expanded upon
by McEwan who observes “While placing a monetary value on a product or
service seems natural in many areas of society, it presents new challenges when
introduced into the reproductive arena. [… gestational surrogacy has] brought
into question the ethics of paying women to bear children and the potential
for exploiting surrogates through those payments.”41 Essentially, what this
aspect of the discussion around ICS boils down to are the problematic bioethical
issues caused by the creation of human life through biotechnological advances,
and the commodification of the body, where babies are part of a human trade
38 Wendy Chavkin and Jane Maher (eds.), The Globalization of Motherhood: Deconstructions and
Reconstructions of Biology and Care, 12 (2010).
39 E.g. see SBS Australia, India’s Baby Factory, Dateline Transcript, available at http://
www.sbs.com.au/dateline/story/transcript/id/600008/n/India-s-Baby-Factory(lastvisited
June 1, 2011).
40 Lee, supra note 2, at 278.
41 McEwen, supra note 11, at 272.
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
Contextualising a 21st Century Challenge: Part One 43
and where women are, some would say, reduced to a means of production
to be utilised to this end.42
A second bioethical and moral challenge raised by ICS is the issue of
technological intervention in and on the body, and the extent to which this
is permissible from an ethical viewpoint. As Gupta and Richards state, “By
facilitating greater degrees of intervention on the body, technology unsettles
our knowledge of what bodies are and puts to test our ability to make moral
judgments about how far science should be allowed to reconstruct the
body.”43 At its extremes, this bioethical issue ventures into the area of issues
of the post-human body, and where technological intervention may eventually
lead in the future.44
Thirdly, and interrelated to the abovementioned issue, the extent to which
ICS may sometimes be seen (in part) to be an exercise in eugenics raises press-
ing ethical and moral questions. For example, to what extent should commis-
sioning parents be able to select aspects such as the race and sex of the child
they commission through ICS? Further, to what extent should commissioning
parents be able to make decisions such as whether to abort a child being
carried by a surrogate who is found during gestation to have a genetic disabil-
ity or disease, or simply doesn’t carry the specific characteristics or sex desired
by the commissioning parents? Whilst these may seem like extreme cases, there
exists very real potential for such practices to eventuate within the paradigm
of ICS. Indeed, the already existing sex-selective abortion practices in natural
childbirth in India and China highlight that this is not a theoretical possibility.
Such potential in ICS will touched on further at the end of this article in a brief
discussion of rights balancing in ICS. Furthermore, the ethical aspects of
whether the practice of ICS can be seen to be exploitative of women is a large
issue at a more general level, but will be discussed further in part two of this
article from a public international law human rights perspective.
Finally, it is worth noting that governments are often unwilling to discuss
issues such as ICS due to the fraught nature of the bioethical and moral issues
raised, which are often viewed as alienating and highly controversial within
public debate. This is perhaps one of the main reasons why the majority of
democratic governments to date have assumed a hands-off approach when
it comes to taking a position on ICS (effectively therefore not taking a position).
However, the on-going uptake of ICS by citizens from various jurisdictions
42 See generally Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta and Annemiek Richters, Embodied Subjects and Frag-
mented Objects: Women’s Bodies, Assisted Reproduction Technologies and the Right to Self Deter-
mination, 5 Bioethical Inquiry 240-241 (2008).
43 Id. at 248.
44 See for a comprehensive exploration of the potential posthuman future, F. Fukuyama, Our
Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2003). See for insight into
the impact of the notion of posthuman humanity on the law and on judging, Jeffrey L.
Amestoy, Uncommon Humanity: Reflections on Judging in a Post-Human Era, 78:5 New York




throughout the world is likely to continue to come into conflict with this
legislative and policy-development and political reticence, and the bioethical
and moral issues are likely to increasingly come to the fore as topics on the
agenda for public debate. Lee expands, “When most surrogacy agencies are
focused solely on the economic gain, the significant social, political and ethical
considerations surrounding commercial surrogacy become more urgent.”45
However, it should also be noted at this point that it is unlikely that the many
challenges of ICS can be adequately addressed through treating it as an issue
which can be addressed by national legislative and policy measures in the
first instance, as Lee predominantly argues.46 Rather, without international
impetus, national legislatures are likely to be reticent to holistically addressing
ICS. Indeed, given that ICS functions through what are primarily private
businesses providing the services of ICS, there may be little motivation in some
states with lower levels of transparency and good governance to pass laws
or establish policies which might impact on the profitability of the ICS market.
This said, if a private international law framework is to work in this area to
provide global regulation of ICS, as is envisaged as a possibility,47 two key
things can be said at this stage regarding what it will need to work.
Firstly, it will require willingness from national governments to submit
to such regulation, and in turn will require national legislatures to enact
implementing legislation or policies to give effect to such a regulatory frame-
work. Secondly, it will require the wider support of complementary implemen-
tation of public international law human rights standards, to ensure a holistic
protective regime for those most impacted by ICS, being the women and
children involved.
6 HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION: WHEN IS A CHILD A CHILD?
One of the central concerns of part two of this article is an examination of the
rights and interests of the child who is produced by ICS arrangements. In order
to be able to progress to discussion and analysis of children’s rights in this
context, it is first necessary to briefly consider the legal question of “when
is a child a child?” Granted, this question could be treated as a stand-alone
research topic in itself, and will be explored in the context of ICS in more depth
in future research. At this juncture, this article intends only to provide a brief
introduction to this question in the ICS context; more research and work on
this aspect of ICS will form part of the author’s future work on the wider topic.
The question of when is a child a child presents a highly fraught area;
indeed, there exist “great differences in opinion about the legal protectability
45 Lee, supra note 2, at 281.
46 Id. at 300.
47 See the current project at the University of Aberdeen, supra note 23.
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of [the unborn] child.”48 However, consideration of this question is necessary
to be able to assess when legal protection of a child begins, and therefore when
a child’s rights can be the subject to the protection of public international law
and the body of children’s rights law. Cornock and Montgomery provide a
helpful starting point in this assessment, noting that “When considering the
legal rights of the unborn child, the questions that the law has to address are:
what is the legal status of the unborn child and when does the child’s legal
personality begin?”49 At the domestic level, this issue is a matter for national
legislatures. Bainham writes that “The beginning of childhood raises directly
the status of the foetus or unborn child. English law generally takes the posi-
tion that personhood is established at birth and not before.”50 He also notes
that in the US, a similar view is taken to the English position, and as confirmed
in the landmark case of Roe v Wade,51 the unborn child is not a person under
the US Constitution.52 However, the effect of this is not to say that no legal
protection is extended to the unborn child, but that if it is, that protection is
not provided on the basis of a status of personhood or childhood.53
At the international level, the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) defines a child as meaning “every human being below the
age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority
is attained earlier.”54 The use of the ambiguous term “human being” leaves
it open to individual States Parties to determine whether or not an unborn
child can be brought within the scope of the Convention, and as to what level
of legal protection would be afforded to children in the embryonic or foetal
stage during gestation.55 However, what adds a further level of complication
to the position taken by the Convention regarding the rights protection of the
unborn child, is the following statement found in the preamble (citing a
preambular paragraph of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child56) which
reads: “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as
well as after birth”.57 This seems to indicate that the unborn child falls under
the protection of the Convention, yet this is ambiguous in light of Article 1,
which appears to rule this out, with its use of the term “human being”. How-
48 J.H.H.M Dorscheidt, The Unborn Child and the UN Convention on Children’s Rights: the Dutch
Perspective as a Guideline, 7 International Journal of Children’s Rights 303 (1999).
49 Marc Cornock and Heather Montgomery, Children’s Rights In and Out of the Womb, 19
International Journal of Children’s Rights 4 (2011).
50 Andrew Bainham, Children: The Modern Law (3rd ed.), 86 (2005).
51 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
52 Bainham, supra note 50, at 86.
53 Id.
54 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art, 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
55 Dorscheidt, supra note 48, at 303.
56 Declaration on the Rights of the Child (adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 1386
XIV), Dec.10, 1959).




ever, as posited by Joseph, arguably the fact that this sentence appears in the
preamble is crucial, as “what is stated in a preamble is by way of foundation
and motivation for the substantive content of the relevant document.”58
Extending this view to its logical end, it is arguable that the CRC does not
necessarily exclude the unborn child from its scope of protection. Joseph takes
a more absolutist position: “The inescapable conclusion here is that the child
before as well as after birth is to be protected by the CRC, if that Convention
is interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.”59
However, leading jurisprudence in this area does not appear to accept such
an absolutist position. Under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), it has been established in the cases of Vo v France60 and Evans v United
Kingdom61 that the unborn child does not have a right to life (safeguarded
for “everyone” in Article 2 of the ECHR), and therefore is not afforded the
human rights protection of the Convention. As Katherine Freeman wrote
insightfully prior to these judgments, “If the European Court of Human Rights
were to find that “everyone” includes unborn human beings, and therefore
“[e]veryone’s right to life” protects the unborn child, the abortion laws of many
member states would then be held in contravention of the European Conven-
tion.”62
A final aspect of the issue of when is a child a child is the fact that tensions
also exist between the protection of the unborn child and the protection and
rights of the mother who carries the child, and at a further extension, the rights
of the father. In characterising this issue, Cornock and Montgomery observe
it can be asked which rights have priority should a conflict arise between the
two.63 In English law, the position is held that the rights of the mother over-
ride the unborn child should the two come into conflict (for example in the
case of medical treatment). This is “based upon the concept that the foetus
is part of the woman’s bodily integrity until such a time as it has been born
and is independent of the woman. Until that point the woman’s consent is
sufficient for treatment to her and also the foetus. The father has no rights
regarding treatment that is necessary for the benefit of the unborn child if the
mother will not consent to the medical treatment.”64 The English case of Paton
v United Kingdom saw the then European Commission of Human Rights earlier
holding this position regarding the legal inability of a prospective father
58 Rita Joseph, Human Rights and the Unborn Child, 4-5 (2009).
59 Id. at 6.
60 Vo v France, (2005) 40 EHRR 12.
61 Evans v United Kingdom, Application no. 6339/05, Grand Chamber judgement (2007).
62 Katherine Freeman, The Unborn Child and the European Convention on Human Rights: To Whom
Does “Everyone’s Right to Life” Belong?, 8:2 Emory International Law Review 616 (1994).
63 Cornock et al, supra note 49, at 8.
64 Id. This position was made clear in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S, [1998] 2 FLR 728.
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preventing the unborn child’s mother from having an abortion. The effect of
this was that the unborn child’s rights will be outweighed by the mother’s
rights.65 Discussion of this aspect will become further relevant in discussions
of rights balancing in ICS, a topic that the author will engage with in future
writing on this topic.
Therefore what appears apparent in answer to the question under law as
to “when is a child a child?” is that this is an area open to interpretation,
however one which the courts, both at the national and international level,
have taken the position that it is usually the case that the unborn child is not
afforded rights protection; rather, that protection begins at birth, and until
that point in time, the balance, should rights conflict, tips in favour of the
mother. Yet, ambiguity exists, with some arguments able to be made that a
child should also be understood as including an unborn child for the purposes
of the CRC; indeed the Committee on the Rights of the Child appeared to –
intentionally or not – assume this position with its issuance of General Com-
ment no. 7, which cited the act of sex selective abortion as one which may
violate the right to non-discrimination under Article 2,66 sex-selective abortion
being an act which occurs in respect of the unborn child. As previously men-
tioned, it is not the within the scope of this article to focus in-depth on this
question. However, the core point to be made here is that in the area of ICS,
it is worth keeping in mind the notion of the child as possibly encompassing
both the unborn and born child in the subsequent consideration of rights
protection in the context of commodification and the vulnerability of women’s
and children’s rights. Moreover, it is paramount to remember that in all the
possible models illustrated in Figure 1 (above), a child is the ultimate outcome,
and no matter what model of ICS that child is the product of, that child has
certain rights, as does the surrogate mother who carries him or her. In part
two of this article, the rights provided under public international law to these
groups are identified, in order to subsequently be able to assess how ICS may
pose specific challenges to these rights and interests.
65 Paton v United Kingdom, (1980) 3 EHRR 408. The Commission said at para. [19] that “The
‘life’ of the foetus is intimately connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from,
the life of the pregnant woman.”
66 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 7 Implementing Child Rights





3 Contextualising a 21st Century Challenge
Part Two
Public International Law Human Rights Issues: Why
Are the Rights and Interests of Women and Children
at Stake in International Commercial Surrogacy
Abstract
Public international law provides an important lens through which to deal
with ICS as a twenty-first century human rights challenge, given the range of
human rights issues arising through this method of family formation, and the
framework for protection provided by international human rights law. Indeed,
one of the main tenets of this study is the value of the CRC to ensuring
children’s rights are protected and upheld in ICS. This Chapter therefore
introduces the rights and interests most at stake in ICS for the two most vulner-
able parties from a human rights perspective: surrogate mothers and children
who are conceived and born through ICS. It demonstrates that some of the
human rights challenges faced by children in ICS are interrelated to those
sometimes experienced by surrogates. This Chapter develops understanding
of why the rights of women and children are at stake in ICS; the child’s rights
situation in particular will be examined more deeply in later chapters of this
study.
Main Findings
- Children born through ICS can face practical problems following birth
which pose risks to their human rights. At particular risk are children’s
rights to nationality; identity preservation; and to not be discriminated
against.
- Surrogate mothers in ICS can also face risks to their human rights, including
their reproductive autonomy and rights, and their rights not to be exploited
and/or trafficked.
- The risks of human commodification and human trafficking are challenges
common to both children and surrogate women in the context of ICS.
- Judicial decision-making in ICS cases should, based on the individual facts
of a case, be child-centred to ensure the rights and best interests of children





- This Chapter was written at a time when very limited scholarly works had
considered the situation of children in ICS, but a multidisciplinary body
of work existed concerning the situation of surrogate mothers in ICS.
- At the time it was written, this Chapter was one of the first analyses of
children’s rights in ICS from an international human rights law perspective.
- It was also one of the first scholarly works presenting analysis in one place
of the children’s rights and women’s rights challenges raised by ICS.
- Since the time this Chapter was written, although legal scholars and inter-
national bodies have increasingly engaged with ICS from a child rights
perspective, a close focus on the child’s rights in ICS remains limited; ICS
jurisprudence at domestic and regional levels has developed; and the
situation of children born through ICS has come under greater scrutiny
from international media. The rights of surrogate women in ICS have
continued to receive attention from multidisciplinary scholars, domestic
courts and international media.
- However, children’s and women’s rights continue to be at risk and
infringed in ICS, and a lack of international regulation persists, as does a
lack of international consensus about ICS as a practice.
This Chapter was originally published in the New Zealand Family Law Journal,
Volume 7, Part 8, December 2012, pp. 206-214.
1 INTRODUCTION
Building from the first article in this series, the present article discusses some
of the core challenges posed by international commercial surrogacy (ICS)
arrangements to the rights of children and women. Given the lack of compre-
hensive consideration of children’s rights and how they are impacted and
affected by ICS to date, primary emphasis is placed on discussion of why ICS
should be recognised as an international human rights problem affecting
children. As part of this discussion, relevant case law from various inter-
national jurisdictions are touched upon. The challenges to women are the
secondary focus of the article, and issues cutting across both groups are dealt
with together in a discrete subsection. All of the issues raised in this article
have significant public policy dimensions in addition to legal facets, and
elaborate on the issues raised in the discussion of bioethical challenges posed
by ICS in part one of this article. As Ryznar notes, “it would be very difficult,
and perhaps unwise, to consider only the legal framework of international
commercial surrogacy while ignoring public policy goals. Should surrogacy
remain legal, these public policy considerations center on protecting the three
primary groups of people involved in international commercial surrogacies:
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the surrogates, the commissioning parents, and the resulting children. It is
therefore vital to analyze the rights, interests and obligations of these parties.
Naturally, they vary, but each has implications for the potential regulatory
framework”.1
2 CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
One of the most striking aspects of research undertaken to date on ICS is the
lack of in-depth attention given to the position of the children involved and
who ICS ultimately produces. Instead, attention largely falls on the situations
of the commissioning parents or the surrogate mother. This is not to say that
there are not some notable exceptions of scholarship focussed on ICS or directly
related issues – there are,2 but more comprehensive thought needs to be given
to how ICS affects children. This article seeks to make a preliminary contribu-
tion to this on-going work, and to what is hoped is further work in this area
by a range of legal scholars and practitioners. This will add to and complement
the body of work already further established in other disciplines (such as social
work and sociology) on ICS. As Michael Freeman observed in 1996, “Assisted
reproduction has hitherto neglected a children’s rights perspective – and it
shows. There has been no systematic exploration of the questions it raises
which has put children, their interests and rights to the forefront.”3 In 2011,
this equally applies to the ICS context. Indeed, assessment of the situation of
the commissioning parents and surrogate mothers is essential to understand
the overall picture. However, the importance of inserting the children born
from ICS into the centre of discussion of these arrangements is crucial, to
highlight the pressure points where their rights may be particularly vulnerable
to violation. It must always be remembered that all the scenarios depicted in
Figure 1 (see part one of this article) result in the creation of a child. As Fuku-
1 Margaret Ryznar, International Commercial Surrogacy and Its Parties, 43(4) John Marshall Law
Review 1024 (2010).
2 E.g. see generally Eric Blyth, To Be or Not to Be? A Critical Appraisal of the Welfare of Children
Conceived Through New Reproductive Technologies, 16:4 International Journal of Children’s
Rights 501-510 (2008); Michael Freeman, The New Birth Right? Identity and the Child of the
Reproduction Revolution, 4 International Journal of Children’s Rights 273-298 (1996); George
Palattiyil, Eric Blyth, Dina Sidhva and Gita Balakrishnan, Globalization and Cross-border
Reproductive Services: Ethical Implications of Surrogacy in India for Social Work, 53 International
Social Work 686-670 (2010); Ryznar, supra note 1; and Mary Lyndon Shanley, Making Babies,
Making Families: What Matters Most in an Age of Reproductive Technologies, Surrogacy, Adoption
and Same-Sex and Unwed Parents (2001). Shanley states at 104 “While contract pregnancy
clearly can be viewed from the perspective of those who commission a pregnancy, I put
the woman who bears the foetus, and the child who will be born, at the centre of my
analysis.”
3 M. Freeman, The New Birth Right? Identity and the Child of the Reproduction Revolution, 4




yama and Furger write regarding bioethics and human reproduction, “Since
reproduction aims at the creation of children, their welfare ought to be placed
first and foremost as an objective of regulation.”4 Therefore an assessment
of the most significant ways in which children’s rights may be breached
through ICS follows.
2.1 The immediate practical problems for children born from international
commercial surrogacy arrangements
In many ICS cases, commissioning parents do not adequately foresee the
practical implications and consequences that their actions will have for the
child they have commissioned. Things many commissioning parents assume
will be taken for granted after the child’s birth (for example, who the legal
parents of the child will be, and what eligibility for citizenship the child will
have) can become highly problematic. Thus, unforeseen complications can
dominate immediately following an ICS birth. As Hedley J. (the United King-
dom judge who has been most active in the international surrogacy area)
recently said, “I have been extremely anxious about the difficulties people have
got themselves into […] without appreciating the legal implications of doing
so. […] a number of people have found themselves getting into a mess un-
necessarily and their children into a mess unnecessarily”.5
These complexities arise because of the international nature of the surrogacy
arrangement; the involvement of parties from two different – or sometimes
more –jurisdictions brings cross-border issues into play, along with a raft of
potential conflict of laws issues. Problematic situations often occur when the
home state of the commissioning parents bans commercial surrogacy, and they
undertake an ICS arrangement in a foreign jurisdiction. In these cases the law
of the home state may take a different view of issues which affect the child
(such as who the legal parents are) than the position taken by the law of the
state where the child is born. Storrow captures the practical issues likely to
arise in many ICS cases, given the legal lacuna in this area: “The children born
of international surrogacy tend to be born in the host country. The intending
parents must obtain travel documents to return with their new children to
their countries of origin. […] A government intent on curtailing cross-border
surrogacy may refuse to issue a passport or visa to the child, may not bestow
citizenship upon the child and may refuse to recognize the intended parents
4 Francis Fukuyama and Franco Furger, Beyond Bioethics: A Proposal for Modernizing the Regu-
lation of Human Biotechnologies, 4 (2006).
5 BBC Radio 4, Interview with Mr Justice Hedley of the High Court of the UK, May 19, 2011, The
World at One. An unofficial transcript of the interview is available at http://www.natalie
gambleassociates.com/assets/assets/interview.pdf (last visited June 1, 2011); a report on
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as the legal parents of the child. Problems can also arise in host countries
where the law does not automatically entitle the intending parents to recog-
nition as the legal parents of the child.”6 Therefore these immediate challenges
after birth are essentially issues of legal status, which can create “legal limbo”7
for the child (and by extension the commissioning parents). Given the nature
of these issues it may seem most appropriate to resolve such issues through
domestic legislation and from a private international law perspective.8 How-
ever, they are also important to consider from a public international law
standpoint, as these practical problems very much raise the question of what
is in the best interests of a child born from an ICS arrangement. As Article 3(1)
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states:
‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.’
Therefore, in any actions of the kind described in Article 3(1) which are taken
to resolve the situation of an ICS child regarding their relationship to their
commissioning parents, their citizenship, ability to travel internationally or
their welfare, the best interests of the child should be treated as a primary
consideration.
Some recent judicial decisions where these issues have been at stake illus-
trate how the child’s best interests might be assessed and practically applied.
The UK High Court handed down a landmark international surrogacy decision
in 2010, RE: L (A minor).9 In this case, British commissioning parents had
commissioned a surrogate in Illinois, who had provided them with a baby,
L. At issue was whether the commissioning parents could be recognised as
L’s legal parents, and whether the Court would recognise the ICS agreement,
given payments to a surrogate other than ‘reasonable expenses’ are illegal
under UK law.10 In this instance a parental order was made in favour of the
commissioning parents being L’s legal parents. Hedley J. highlighted other
practical difficulties, noting:
6 Richard Storrow, Assisted Reproduction on Treacherous Terrain: The Legal Hazards of Cross-border
Reproductive Travel, 23 Reproductive BioMedicine Online 543 (2011).
7 Louisa Ghevaert, International Surrogacy: Progress or Media Hype?, 590 BioNews (2011)
available at http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_85684.asp (last visited June 1, 2011).
8 Indeed, these are the types of issues being considered by a current research project at the
University of Aberdeen, led by Professor Paul Beaumont and Dr. Katarina Trimmings. The
project is called “International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for Legal Regula-
tion at the International Level” and is supported by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law. Background to the research is available at http://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/
surrogacy/index.shtml (last visited June 1, 2011).
9 RE: L (A minor), [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam).
10 UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, section 59(4) amending s42(2) of the




‘[…] there still remain real issues about re-entry to the UK although in this case
it was effected through temporary leave granted to the child who had a USA
passport. It remains essential for each commissioning couple to acquaint themselves
with their immigration position before committing themselves to a surrogacy
agreement.’11
Standing as one of a small handful of legal decisions on ICS internationally
(at the time of writing in 2011 only two others have been decided in UK
courts),12 the decision in RE: L is important in a number of respects. Firstly,
it highlights the range of legal issues requiring resolution in ICS cases regarding
the status of both the child and the commissioning parents, in relation to each
other (and for the child in general).
The second important aspect of the RE: L decision (arguably the most
important given potential wider impact on other cases) is that the judgment
explicitly considered the welfare of the child to be the paramount considera-
tion, and in this case the welfare of the child was found to outweigh public
policy considerations regarding payments in surrogacy arrangements:
‘It must follow that it will only be in the clearest case of the abuse of public policy
that the court will be able to withhold an [parental] order if otherwise welfare
considerations supports its making. It underlines the Court’s earlier observation
that, if it is desired to control commercial surrogacy arrangements, those controls
need to operate before the court process is initiated i.e. at the border or even
before.’13
By holding that the welfare of the child is the paramount concern, the UK
courts have thus to date taken a child-centred approach to ICS cases. However,
the Court also made the important observation regarding the commercial
aspect of international surrogacy arrangements that each case must be
scrutinised on its own facts, given the impossibility of pinning down a conven-
tional quantum of payment.14 Indeed, the case-by-case consideration of ICS
cases in national courts (regarding matters such as these practical issues which
ensue immediately after birth of an ICS child) means there will remain an
element of unpredictability in judicial decision-making in this area.
A second case illustrating the comprehensive practical problems for a child
immediately following their birth from an ICS arrangement is the case of Baby
Manji.15 The commissioning parents, the Yamadas, were from Japan and
11 RE: L (A minor), [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam) para. [8].
12 See the earlier cases RE: X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), and RE:
S (Parental Order), [2009] EWHC 2977 (Fam).
13 RE: L (A minor), supra note 11, para. [10].
14 Id., para. [7].
15 Baby Manji Yamada vs. Union of India & ANR, [2008] INSC 1656 (29 September 2008).
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entered into a surrogacy contract through a prominent Indian surrogacy
clinic.16 An embryo was created using Mr Yamada’s sperm and the egg of
an anonymous Indian donor, and implanted into an Indian gestational surro-
gate. Manji was born in July 2008 however the Yamadas divorced a month
earlier. Mr Yamada wanted to care for Manji; Mrs Yamada did not.17 As Kari
Points describes,
‘The way she saw it, she was unrelated to the baby biologically, genetically and
legally. Under the terms of the agreement with the clinic, the egg donor’s respons-
ibility had ended once she provided the egg, and the surrogate’s job was finished
as soon as she gave birth. Suddenly, Baby Manji had three mothers – the intended
mother who had contracted for the surrogacy, the egg donor, and the gestational
surrogate – yet legally she had none. Was she Indian? Was she Japanese? Could
she have an identity and a nationality without having a mother? The surrogacy
contract did not cover a situation such as this. Nor did any existing laws help to
clarify the matter.’18
Following diplomatic wrangles, the matter was heard by the Supreme Court
of India.19 It directed the relevant Indian government departments to deal
with the case expeditiously however, the Supreme Court did not enter into
any discussion of the best interests of the child. Eventually, identity documents
enabling travel to Japan were issued by the Indian government as an ad-hoc
solution, and a temporary one year visa was issued by the Japanese govern-
ment on humanitarian grounds, allowing entry to Japan.20 Thus, the difference
in focus between the approach taken by the Indian Supreme Court and the
UK High Court in the two cases discussed can be contrasted; the UK Court
demonstrating a proactive, child-centred approach, whilst the best interests
of the child were seemingly a peripheral concern for the Indian Supreme Court,
leaving Manji in a vulnerable position.
2.2 The potential for statelessness
Related to the practical matters which may affect the child immediately after
birth, the very real potential of an ICS child ending up as being stateless
requires consideration. The implications of statelessness are large for anyone,
but for a child they may be further magnified. A child in an ICS arrangement
16 The Ankanksha Infertility Clinic in Gujarat.
17 See for a full factual outline of the case and a discussion of the case from an ethical point
of view, Kari Points, Commercial Surrogacy and Fertility Tourism in India: The Case of Baby
Manji, available at http://www.duke.edu/web/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf
(last visited June 1, 2011).
18 Points, supra note 17, at 2.
19 Baby Manji Yamada vs. Union of India & ANR, supra note 15.




may end up stateless if the country of its birth and the commissioning parents’
country (or countries) of citizenship refuse recognition. Essentially baby Manji
(discussed above) was left stateless given the refusals of both the Indian
government to issue a passport, and the Japanese government to recognise
citizenship.
Further instances of statelessness have arisen in the Indian ICS context. One
case, Balaz v Anand Municipality, involved German commissioning parents who
contracted an Indian surrogate mother to carry a child for them.21 Twins
Nikolas and Leonard were born in 2008 in India however they remained
stateless for two years.22 The twins were confined to India, whilst their com-
missioning parents engaged in lengthy endeavours to regularise the twins’
situation to enable them to go to Germany. Eventually the case was resolved
by requiring the commissioning parents to adopt the twins through
intercountry adoption (by exception to usual intercountry adoption policy),
in order for them to be able to leave India and enter Germany.23 Travel visas
were then issued by the German government;24 therefore the issue of state-
lessness of children born from ICS was not explicitly confronted.
A similar situation has arisen in another Indian ICS arrangement, involving
a Norwegian commissioning mother who contracted a surrogate mother in
Mumbai. After implantation of an embryo created using sperm from an ano-
nymous Scandinavian donor and an egg from an anonymous Indian donor,
twins were born in January 2010. However, Norway refused travel documents
for the children given DNA tests showed no genetic link between the commis-
sioning mother and the twins (therefore Norway recognises the surrogate
mother as the legal mother).25 The Indian government takes the opposite
position (that the commissioning mother is the legal mother), and refuses
recognition of the twins as Indian nationals.26 In contrast to the Balaz case,
the Norwegian government says adoption is not an option open to the commis-
21 Balaz v Anand Municipality, High Court of Ahmedabad (November 11, 2009).
22 See Dahananjay Mahapatra, German Surrogate Twins to Go Home, May 27, 2010, Times of
India, available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-05-27/india/28279835_1_
stateless-citizens-balaz-surrogate-mother (last visited June 1, 2011).
23 Rakesh Bhatnagar, Adopt Surrogate Twins, SC Tells German Couple, January 18, 2010, Daily
News and Analysis, available at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_adopt-surrogate-
twins-sc-tells-german-couple_1336403 (last visited June 1, 2011).
24 Hillary Brenhouse, India’s Rent-a-Womb Industry Faces New Restrictions, June 5, 2010, Time
Magazine, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1993665,00.html
(last visited June 1, 2011); Times Now, German Twins Leonard, Nikolas Granted Visa, May
16, 2010, Times of India, available at http://www.timesnow.tv/articleshow/4346013.cms
(last visited June 1, 2011).
25 Sumitra Deb Roy, Divergent Laws Leave Twins Stateless, February 2, 2011, Times of India,
available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-02-02/india/28380051_1_fertil
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sioning mother.27 At the time of writing of this article, the case remains un-
resolved, the twins remaining stateless in India.28
The UK High Court has also been confronted with cases involving stateless
children born from ICS arrangements. A good example is the case of RE: IJ
(A Child).29 The case involved UK commissioning parents who had a child
born in Ukraine to a Ukrainian surrogate mother in 2010 through an ICS
arrangement (an embryo created using the sperm of the commissioning father
and the egg of an anonymous donor was implanted). Again, difficulties arose
in the areas of legal parentage and citizenship; the child was left stateless for
a period of time, as a result of the different positions of the respective Ukrain-
ian and UK laws pertaining to surrogacy. A similar situation arose earlier in
the UK case of RE: X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy).30 In that matter, a UK commis-
sioning couple entered into a contractual arrangement with a surrogate in
Ukraine; again an anonymous egg was fertilised with the commissioning
father’s sperm and implanted, and twins were born. Similar problems ensued
as in RE: IJ. Hedley J. importantly stated in the RE: X&Y decision that “As
this case vividly demonstrates, not only may (and probably will) those laws
be different but they may be incompatible to the point of mutual contra-
diction.”31 Effectively this left the twins without clear parents or nationality,
the ultimate impact being they were, for a time, stateless.
These cases of child statelessness resulting from ICS are particularly prob-
lematic when viewed in light of Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).32 What the cases illustrate is
that States Parties to the CRC have displayed a large degree of reticence regard-
ing recognition of the child’s rights in ICS cases, as required by Article 7(1).
In particular, the right to acquire a nationality from birth and to ensure imple-
mentation of these rights where the child would otherwise be stateless have
been neglected. Arguably in some of the cases discussed above, states have
breached their obligations under Article 7, given that children have not had
their right to nationality from birth fulfilled (in some cases waiting for over
27 R. Kumari, Complications of Surrogate Motherhood in India, Gender Matters India (28
January 2011), (http://csrindia.org/blog/2011/01/) (last visited 1 June 2011).
28 However, the case has apparently not had the effect of dissuading Norwegian commission-
ing parents from seeking ICS in India, with a reported marked increase during 2011, see
Views and News from Norway, Indian Surrogates for Norwegian Women Increase, (23 March
2011) (http://www.newsinenglish.no/2011/03/23/indian-surrogates-for-norwegian-women-
increase/) last visited 1 June 2011.
29 RE: IJ (A Child), [2011] EWHC 921 (Fam).
30 RE: X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam).
31 Id. at para. [3].
32 Article 7(1) states that the child shall be registered immediately after birth, and have the
right to a name and nationality from birth, and to know and be cared for as far as possible
by his/her parents; Article 7(2) requires States Parties to ensure implementation of these





two years). Moreover, Article 7(2) emphasises that Article 7(1) rights are
particularly important in cases where, if those rights are not fulfilled, the child
would otherwise be stateless. This has been the outcome in many cases like
those discussed above; states should therefore be doing much more to ensure
these rights are fulfilled.
2.3 The commissioned child as a contested or unwanted child
Given the situations a child born from an ICS arrangement may face following
birth (as discussed above), it can be posited that in extreme cases, these
children end up falling into one of two categories. Firstly, the child may best
be understood as a ‘contested child’: where more than one party claims the
child, for example estranged commissioning parents who may both lay claim
to the child, or a surrogate mother changes her mind refusing to provide the
baby to the commissioning parents, acting against any contractual agreement.
A second alternative is that the child may be an ‘unwanted child’: when born,
neither the commissioning parents nor the surrogate are willing to take re-
sponsibility for the care of the child. Such a situation may arise for a number
of reasons, for example in instances where the commissioning parents have
lost interest in parenting a child, or perhaps if the child is born with a birth
defect or disability. Both contested children and unwanted children who are
products of ICS arrangements will likely face social and legal uncertainty in
the early phase of their life, and will continue to experience the impact of these
situations as they grow older and potentially throughout their lives. Their
status as a contested or unwanted child may well have an impact on their
sense of personal identity, a separate but related issue which will now be
examined.
2.4 The child’s right to identity
The right to identity is likely to be highly relevant in almost all cases of ICS,
given the unique circumstances surrounding birth, and the child’s particular
situation post-birth (as mentioned above, the position of the child immediately
following birth can be highly variable, sometimes precarious). Indeed, this
issue merits further research and discussion in the future given its importance
in the context of ICS, and the author intends to engage in such a project. For
the purpose of the current article, it can be said that two factors based on the
nature of ICS mean that such arrangements will likely have a distinct impact
on the child’s right to identity.
Firstly, in many ICS arrangements, the child will either have only a half
genetic link to the commissioning parents, or no genetic link to the commis-
sioning parents. Often genetic material is anonymously donated; in some cases
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the surrogate mother may also be acting anonymously. Secondly, the inter-
national nature of the surrogacy arrangement means the child is likely to grow
up in a place and culture that may be geographically distant from the place
they were born, and culturally dislocated from their ethnic and cultural origins.
This will be especially marked where commissioning parents from developed
states use surrogate mothers in developing states.
Identity is a contested notion; as Blauwhoff notes, its multidimensional
nature means “it comes as no surprise that identity has so far not been given
a legal definition.”33 However, it is widely agreed that identity is an important
concept in relation to a person’s sense of self; it is through the concept of
narrative identity – based on understandings of the past, and memory – that
we construct our own notions of personal identity. Michael Freeman therefore
describes identity as
‘[…] what we know and what we feel is an organising framework for holding
together our past and our present and it provides some anticipated shape to future
life. It is an inner personal landscape.’34
Van Bueren identifies further dimensions:
‘An identity transforms the biological entity into a legal being and confirms the
existence of a specific legal personality capably of bearing rights and duties.’35
Freeman’s description of identity is particularly apt in considering the import-
ance of the right to identity for children born out of ICS arrangements. Many
such children will not have access to this organising framework, given that
they may have been created using genetic material from anonymous donors,
may not know who their birth mother was, and may be culturally and geo-
graphically dislocated from their cultural origins and birth place, given the
intention that they have been made in order to travel to and live in another
part of the world.
Given these factors, ICS threatens to perpetuate the status quo in relation
to the right to identity as “an interest long neglected and constantly denied”.36
However, the right to identity is a right too important to neglect in ICS situ-
ations; after all, “There can be few more basic rights than a right to one’s
identity.”37 The CRC was the first international human rights treaty to explicit-
ly recognise the right to identity; although the right to identity enshrined in
33 Richard J. Blauwhoff, Foundational Facts, Relative Truths: A Comparative Law Study on Children’s
Right to Know Their Genetic Origins, 20 (2010).
34 M. Freeman, The New Birth Right? Identity and the Child of the Reproduction Revolution, 4
International Journal of Children’s Rights 290 (1996).
35 Geraldine van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child, 117 (2006).





the CRC does not envisage the specific situation of artificially created children,
it holds particular significance for that group of children,38 and by extension
to children born from ICS arrangements. Article 8(1) and 8(2) provide that:
‘(1) States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her
identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law
without unlawful interference.
(2) Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her
identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with
a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.’
In the context of ICS, regarding the right to identity there are definite overlaps
with issues discussed in previous sections. However here, three dimensions
of the right to identity are arguably of heightened significance and deserve
particular attention. Each of these is briefly considered below.
2.4.1 The importance of identity to knowing one’s personal narrative
In ICS, unless specific steps are taken to ensure the child knows where they
came from (including the identity of their genetic parents, as well as the
identity of their birth mother), such children may be effectively left in an
identity vacuum, lacking knowledge of their personal narrative. This could
have a significant psychological impact on such children. In the context of
adoption, discussion of a state of ‘genetic bewilderment’ has been a term
applied to describe the effects of not being able to fully establish one’s identity
through a personal narrative.39 This is equally applicable to the situation of
children born from ICS arrangements; Sants states that
‘a genealogically bewildered child is one who either has no knowledge of his
natural parents or only uncertain knowledge of them. The ensuing state of confusion
and uncertainty fundamentally undermines his security and this affects his mental
health.’40
Leighton argues that children have a right to “the development of a sense of
self as a lived narrative blending action and memory [and] to participate in
their own histories and their own future.”41 Furthermore “children who have
no identifiable origin, no identifiable human beginning to their personal
38 Id.
39 See generally H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 37:2
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 133-141 (1964).
40 Id. at 133.
41 N. Leighton, The Family: Whose Construct is it Anyway?, in The Family in the Age of Biotechno-
logy, 103 (Carole Ulanowsky ed., 1995).
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narrative may have a sense of alienation in the world in which they find
themselves.”42 Van Bueren also posits that
‘the only method to preserve an identity is to have full knowledge of all the
components of that identity, including that of the biological parents, and that
unlawful interference includes not only actions which are unlawful in domestic
law, but also actions which are unlawful in international law.’43
It is crucial that ICS children have knowledge of their genetic and cultural
origins, in order to be able to piece together their identity which will have
had its earliest beginnings in a cross-border context. Ryznar captures the crucial
essence of what lies at the root of the issue, asserting that “Although such
issues unavoidably arise in the adoption context, they are being intentionally
created in international commercial surrogacy.”44 Therefore, it is crucial that
intentional and proactive steps are taken by those involved in ICS – the commis-
sioning parents, surrogacy clinics, medical professionals and national and state
governments – to uphold the child’s right to identity.
2.4.2 The importance of identity to knowing one’s cultural and ethnic background
Knowing one’s cultural and ethnic origins is another important aspect of
identity. However, children born from ICS arrangements may not be provided
with a sense of this, given that they are removed from the culture and ethnicity
they are born in and with (apart from those situations where the commission-
ing parents are of the same ethnic or cultural background as the surrogate
and/or genetic parents). The importance of knowing this aspect of one’s
identity has been identified as important in intercountry adoption; the Hague
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption explicitly requires that due consideration is given to
the child’s ethnic and cultural background for children who are adopted
intercountry.45 Unless the commissioning parents in ICS arrangements con-
sciously ensure that the child knows their ethnic and cultural background and
take active steps to ensure these links and knowledge are maintained, the child
may end up ethnically and culturally dislocated and isolated. Therefore the
importance of knowing this aspect of one’s identity should be extended by
analogy to the ICS context.
42 Id.
43 Van Bueren, supra note 35, at 122.
44 Ryznar, supra note 1, at 1036.
45 Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation In Respect




2.4.3 The importance of identity to knowing one’s genetic origins – the medical
and health rationale
Van Bueren asserts that
‘Denying access to genetic records goes to the very heart of child-to-child equality,
child autonomy and participation. Autonomy requires not only the skills to use
knowledge but also, as a necessary precondition, access to the knowledge.’46
Indeed, this knowledge aspect of identity and knowing one’s genetic origins
is particularly important; as Blyth further notes, genetic origins are important
especially given that
‘[…] we are aware anecdotally of concerns expressed by some parents who sought
donor services in another country who are seeing in their growing children unanti-
cipated physical characteristics, suggesting, at the very least, that the ethnic origins
of their child’s donor might not be what they originally thought. As these children
grow up, whatever their parents initial intentions, it will be impossible to avoid
talking to their children about their origins.’47
However, perhaps the strongest reason why it is important that children born
from ICS arrangements have the opportunity to know their genetic origins is
due to the importance of knowing this information for health reasons. Knowing
one’s personal health history – for example a heightened risk of developing
a particular hereditary medical condition can be critically important. Again,
in the context of intercountry adoption under the Hague Convention, the
child’s medical information is safeguarded, with contracting states obliged
under Article 30(1) to preserve this for the child and under Article 30(2) to
make this available to the child. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
is yet to take a concrete position on the importance of knowing one’s genetic
origins as part of the right to identity in the context of donor assisted con-
ception, but it has in some cases been critical of states that endorse donor
anonymity (and as yet has not ventured into any consideration of ICS).48
Unless commissioning parents and states play an active role in ensuring the
child is privy to such information, the child may not have the opportunity
to know their genetic origins. Given the cross-border location of their genetic
origins, they may prove extremely difficult or impossible to trace, especially
46 Van Bueren, supra note 35, 121.
47 Eric Blyth, Tackling Issues in Cross-Border Reproductive Care, 2009, 508 BioNews, available
at http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_38069.asp (last visited June 1, 2011).
48 Eric Blyth, Donor anonymity and secrecy versus openness concerning the genetic origins of the
offspring: international perspectives, 2006, 2 Jewish Medical Ethics, available at http://www.
medethics.org.il/articles/JME/JMEM10/JMEM.10.1.asp (last visited June 1, 2011).
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in cases where anonymity has played a part, either in terms of donor(s) or
the surrogate.
2.5 Potential for the selective creation of children – designer babies
Another way in which children may be left vulnerable given their creation
through ICS is that their commissioning parents might select the characteristics
of the child, essentially creating a ‘designer baby’. Numerous motivations may
underlie this, and various methods may be employed. For example, Shanley
notes a common goal is to “create a family in which the children appeared
to be the biological offspring of the husband and wife.”49 Sometimes, commis-
sioning parents may want to ensure the child is a specific sex, and that it does
not carry a genetic disease or disability. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
(PIGD) allows this via analysis of embryonic cells. Utilisation of such screening
methods may lead to sex-selective abortion or abortion on the grounds that
the child carries a genetic disease or disability. Regarding the use of PIGD, Blyth
notes its use “to exclude “undesirable” characteristics is criticized for legitimat-
ing sex discrimination, eugenic practices, and undermining the dignity of
existing sick and disabled individuals as having a life that is “not worth liv-
ing”.”50 Rao further asserts we are thus now in “the brave new world of neo
eugenics”.51
In his discussion of this issue Blyth highlights two further possibilities given
rise through pre-selection of characteristics, which may be brought to fruition
via ICS and therefore applied to the current discussion. Rarely, some commis-
sioning parents may seek to create a child with a specific disability or physical
condition. Blyth says that “Given the ostensible purpose of technology to avoid
disabilities and adverse health conditions, its use deliberately to conceive a
disabled child would strike many as perverse”,52 however goes on to note
that “Nevertheless, recent research has shown that some clinics in the United
States would be willing to “select in” a disability.”53 Clearly this raises a
question in terms of whether such actions would be in a child’s best interests;
arguably in most cases, it would be difficult to see that the child’s best interests
would be served by such actions. Another possibility is a child who is con-
ceived as a saviour sibling: a child whose tissue or cord blood could be used
49 Shanley, supra note 2, at 82.
50 Eric Blyth, To Be or Not to Be? A Critical Appraisal of the Welfare of Children Conceived Through
New Reproductive Technologies, 16:4 International Journal of Children’s Rights 510 (2008).
51 Mohan Rao, The Brave New World of Neo Eugenics, 94-110 Making Babies: Birth Markets and
Assisted Reproductive Technologies in India 82 (Sandhya Srinivasan ed., 2010).





to treat a pre-existing sibling who is sick with a life-threatening illness,54 as
previously noted in part one of this article.
These situations of potential selective creation of children through ICS are
problematic given the tension between the child’s existence in and of itself,
and the purpose for which it was created. Again, the question of what is in
the best interests of the child, and how the reason for their existence would
impact them later in life, arises. Here the relevance of Blyth’s question as to
whether bringing children into the world can ever be regarded as contrary
to their interests comes into sharp focus.55 Essentially, what these practices
amount to is “instrumentalisation of children conceived with “made-to-order”
characteristics or to perform a particular role, rather than for their own intrinsic
worth”.56 These methods also veer into the territory of the commodification
of the child, in this sense, for a specific purpose. The wider issue of commodifi-
cation of children through ICS will be considered separately in this article,
together with the issue of the commodification of women through ICS.
2.6 The impact of the creation of international surrogate children on po-
tential adopted children
The rights of existing children awaiting adoption worldwide may be adversely
affected by ICS, and more specifically, by the creation of children through ICS.
Ryznar characterises the impact of ICS on adoption candidates as an “opportun-
ity cost”,57 because by choosing the alternative of ICS over adoption, commis-
sioning parents are displacing resources that may otherwise go towards
adoption (thereby having a potentially negative effect on children awaiting
adoption).58 The motivation of commissioning parents to choose ICS over
international adoption may be easily explained; as already discussed part one
of this article, ICS offers the chance of a child with a genetic link to one or both
of its commissioning parents, which many desire. As Pande notes, “The high
demand for gestational surrogacy is precisely because the genetic tie remains
a powerful and enduring basis of human attachment.”59 Moreover, the
stringent regime of comprehensive checks and assessments to be undertaken
in international adoption (under the Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Intercountry Adoption) – whilst all focussed
on the best interests and welfare of the child – along with the time involved,
may be perceived by prospective adoptive parents as presenting too many
54 Id, at 509.
55 Id. at 506.
56 Id. at 510.
57 Ryznar, supra note 1, at 1028.
58 Id. at 1037.
59 Amrita Pande, It May Be Her Eggs But It’s My Blood: Surrogates and Everyday Forms of Kinship
in India, 32 Qualitative Sociology 393 (2009).
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hurdles, when ICS provides an alternative posing fewer barriers to having a
child expeditiously. Although this may be a mistaken belief (as already noted,
ICS brings with it a whole host of unique issues that are likely to be difficult
to resolve), it does provide an alternative to adoption which is, at least super-
ficially, in many aspects likely to be more attractive to many commissioning
parents.
The current unregulated nature of the ICS market thus raises major ques-
tions as to who can access children via this new market. In stark contrast to
intercountry adoption which is governed by a robust international regulatory
framework (and indeed, one which has the protection of children at its heart),
nothing of this kind exists to govern ICS, making children freely available to
all people with the financial means to access the market. This makes children
born from such arrangements potentially vulnerable to situations in which
their welfare is not safeguarded, leaving them open to abuse and neglect in
extreme cases, and as will be discussed shortly, to the risk of human traffick-
ing.
3 WOMEN’S RIGHTS
As previously mentioned, to date, the majority of analysis of ICS remains
centred on the position of the women who act as surrogates and their possible
exploitation in the “brave new world of globalized motherhood”.60 This
section provides an overview of some of the key human rights issues associated
with women who act as surrogates in ICS, and highlights some of the key ways
in which women’s rights are potentially made vulnerable.
3.1 The potential for exploitation of the socio-economic position of poor
women and for ICS to contribute to perpetuated marginalisation
Recent work of sociologists, journalists and filmmakers has revealed a picture
of the situation of some of the women acting as surrogates in the burgeoning
ICS market, especially in developing states.61 Whilst the US continues to main-
60 Wendy Chavkin and Jane Maher (eds.), The Globalization of Motherhood: Deconstructions and
Reconstructions of Biology and Care, 11 (2010). See generally for discussion of the potential
for exploitation of women through ICS: Susan Markens, Surrogate Motherhood and the Politics
of Reproduction 20-49 (2007); Pande, supra note 59; and Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta and Anne-
miek Richters, Embodied Subjects and Fragmented Objects: Women’s Bodies, Assisted Reproduction
Technologies and the Right to Self Determination, 5 Bioethical Inquiry 240-241 (2008).
61 See generally for the most in-depth, up-to-date work in this vein Pande’s body of work:
Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect ‘Mother-Worker’, 34:4 Signs: Journal
of Women in Culture and Society 969-992 (2010); Not an “Angel”, Not a “Whore”: Surrogates




tain a strong foothold in the ICS market, the rapid growth in ICS is located in
the developing world, in states such as India and Thailand. The supply-end
of the ICS market is growing there through specialised medical clinics meeting
the demand of prospective commissioning parents predominantly coming from
the developed world, seeking cheaper surrogacy options.62 These clinics
recruit surrogates who are in most cases socio-economically marginalised, and
are usually required to have already had at least one child and be within a
specified age bracket.63 Lee accurately observes therefore “the potential for
exploiting poor women’s reproductive functions as a form of cheap labour
for economic profit is greatly heightened.”64
That economically poor women are acting as surrogates in the developing
world to meet the demand of developed world customers raises the question
of whether these women are being exploited; indeed the fact that poor women
are targeted to act as surrogate mothers seems to indicate that because of their
poor financial situation or “economic desperation”65 they will not only be
more likely to take up work as a surrogate, but also be more likely to provide
the child once born, to receive the monetary payment for the labour undertaken
(and endured). Similar questions as to exploitation have been levelled in
relation to the market for surrogacy services in the US, with a disproportionate
representation of racial minorities acting in this capacity, seemingly reflecting
the allure of the financial gain.66 McEwen comments that “the barriers to
exploiting poor women and women of color as gestational surrogates are
few.”67 Moreover, in the ICS context, the fact that women are being offered
sums of money incomparable to anything they would otherwise earn, makes
acting as a surrogate highly attractive; whether this is exploitation is therefore
questionable, given the power imbalance which has been established in the
ICS market. As Goodwin says,
be her eggs but it’s my blood’: Surrogates and Everyday Forms of Kinship in India, 32:4 Qualitative
Sociology 379-405 (2009). A recent e-book has been published: The Indian Surrogate: A Look
Into India’s Surrogacy Industry, 2010, available at http://theindiansurrogate.com/ (last visited
July 1, 2011). A recent film on ICS is Rebecca Haimowitz and Vaishali Sinha, Made in India,
2010, http://www.madeinindiamovie.com (last visited June 1, 2011); see for a review of
Made in India Rachel Lyons, Film Review: Made in India, 2011, 599 BioNews, available at http:/
/www.bionews.org.uk/page_89652.asp (last visited June 20, 2011).
62 E.g. the Hope Maternity Clinic in Gujarat, India, where Pande carried out her field work.
See Pande, supra note 59, at 973ff.
63 Id. at 973.
64 Ruby Lee, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation,
20 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 281 (2009).
65 Pande, supra note 59, at 976.
66 Shanley, supra note 2, at 121.
67 Angie Goodwin McEwen, So You’re Having Another Woman’s Baby: Economics and Exploitation
in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 304 (1999).
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‘these women rent biological space to Americans and others urging them to export
their reproductive process to other parts of the globe. These women are paid sums
they otherwise would never see and are offered safe, clean housing and food. Most
of them know – and even count on – never seeing the babies they will birth ever
again.’68
The question of whether ICS is taking advantage of impoverished women has
received some judicial attention in India. The Gujarat High Court highlighted
the possibility of exploitation in the Balaz case, stating that “Exploitation of
women through surrogacy was also a worrying factor”.69 When the case
progressed to the Supreme Court of India, the Court is reported to have
expressed concern for the situation of poverty-stricken women in India and
emphasised the pressing need to create guidelines in order to protect surrogate
mothers – in doing so it directed the Indian Surrogacy Law Centre to draw
up such guidelines.70
Some advocates of ICS argue that it is a positive development for poor
women, as it contributes to bringing them out of poverty.71 While this may
be the case in theory – or indeed even one of the aims of those who run
surrogacy clinics in developing states – it remains the case that many of the
surrogates will experience social stigmatisation in countries such as India in
reaction to their work as a surrogate.72 There, surrogates commonly move
away from their home town and family for the year, often living in a surrogacy
hostel or clinic, hiding in fear of the stigma attached to such activity;73 at the
worst level, they will be seen as dirty workers, akin to prostitutes, who are
also viewed negatively in Indian society.74 Moreover, it is questionable
whether the surrogates actually receive all of the money they are promised
68 Michele Bratcher Goodwin (ed.), Baby Markets: Money and the New Politics of Creating Families,
at x (2010).
69 Balaz v Anand Municipality, High Court of Ahmedabad (11 November 2009) (India), at para.
[10].
70 No official report of the Supreme Court judgment in the Balaz case is available, but see
Bar&Bench News Network, The Curious Case of Nikolas and Leonard Balaz, available at http://
barandbench.com/brief/2/401/the-curious-case-of-nikolas-and-leonard-balaz (last visited
June 1, 2011). At the time of writing, no reference to the existence of such guidelines can
be found, which indicates they have not come to fruition.
71 E.g. Dr Nayna Patel, who has been dubbed India’s Mother of Surrogacy, see India’s Mother
to Surrogacy, in The Indian Surrogate: A Look Into India’s Surrogacy Industry, supra note 61;
in a television interview Dr Patel stated “How can you say that couple is exploiting the
female when that female willingly wants to do it? You can call it exploitation when some-
body is forcing, you cannot force surrogacy like any other organ transplant because it’s
a whole procedure of one year – almost nine months.” See SBS Australia, India’s Baby Factory,
Dateline Transcript, available at http://www.sbs.com.au/dateline/story/transcript/id/
600008/n/India-s-Baby-Factory (last visited June 1, 2011). .
72 Pande, supra note 59, at 975.
73 Id. at 981.
74 Pande, Not an “Angel”, Not a “Whore”: Surrogates as “Dirty” Workers in India, 16:2 Indian




or contracted to receive. In some cases, this money is said to end up going
to surrogates’ husbands, the surrogates themselves gaining very little benefit
from their labour.75
3.2 The potential for the exploitation of women’s bodies and reproductive
rights and autonomy
A further concern regarding women’s rights is that ICS exploits women’s bodies
and their reproductive rights and autonomy. Chavkin talks of the “disaggrega-
tion of motherhood”,76 whilst Goodwin describes ICS as “women leasing their
wombs”77 – therefore acting merely as incubators. It is necessary to ask
whether women are doing this of their own volition, with an awareness of
their own bodily integrity, or if they are under external pressure to become
surrogates in ICS arrangements. The allure of the money offered to surrogates
has been touched on above. However in India, another factor might influence
surrogates’ decisions to be party to an ICS arrangement. In some cases it has
been said that surrogates are effectively pushed into this work through a
combination of guilt (for example to make up for not being able to marry off
one’s daughter) and a belief that it is the right thing to do, as it is characterised
as an altruistic action for the benefit of other human beings who are less
fortunate.78 In such cases the surrogate is therefore left in a relatively weak
position with little bargaining power; Drabiak comments that
‘payment for commercial surrogacy is defined as a deeply emotional transaction.
[…] However, unlike most other forms of employment, commercial surrogacy
demands a consistent physical labor commitment, 24 hours a day for nine months,
and – most importantly – results in the production of a human being.’79
Therefore reproductive autonomy may be precarious in ICS situations, and
the surrogate’s right to health, including sexual and reproductive health as
a core component,80 may be jeopardised. From a mental health perspective,
undertaking the role of a surrogate may have immense psychological impact,
especially given that the surrogate is expected to give up the child after birth.
75 Pande, Not an “Angel”, Not a “Whore”: Surrogates as “Dirty” Workers in India, 16:2 Indian
Journal of Gender Studies 157 (2009).
76 Chavkin, supra note 60, at 9.
77 Bratcher Goodwin, supra note 68, at x.
78 Pande, supra note 59, at 975-976.
79 K. Drabiak, C. Wegner, V. Fredland and P.R. Helft, Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy:
A Call for Uniformity, Journal of Law, 35:2 Medicine and Ethics 304 (Summer 2007).
80 Aart Hendriks, The Close Connection Between Classical Rights and the Right to Health, With
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As depicted in the opening scene of the trailer for Google Baby, this will not
always be easy. There, a surrogate is seen giving birth. She is shown the baby,
who is immediately removed to the commissioning parents. At this, the surro-
gate cries, and Dr Nayna Patel is heard asking “why are you crying?”81 What
this appears to illustrate is that Gupta and Richters’ assertion that some surro-
gates “feel as though their body belongs to someone else”82 may bear out
in practice. Moreover, under arrangements governed by contracts, “the natural
mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond
with her child.”83
Regarding physical aspects of the right to health and reproductive auto-
nomy, ICS surrogates may not be made aware of the health risks they face by
becoming a surrogate. As Gupta and Richters state, marginalisation may be
perpetuated, and reproductive autonomy subordinated:
‘Although offered as a choice, the decision to […] rent a uterus is seldom made
on the basis of full information regarding health hazards, or in absolute freedom.
It can be a considered decision, but the decision is generally made in a context
of limited possibilities for self-expression or development, rising unemployment,
lack of financial resources and in circumstances not always self-created.’84
Smith-Cavros also poses the question well:
‘In countries where hunger and safe living conditions are dire problems for many,
such as India, do women turn to surrogacy […] by choice and through the proper
channels of informed consent, or out of desperation and lack of information and
choices?’85
Therefore given the situations in which many ICS surrogates find themselves
taking up their role, their right to health and reproductive autonomy may be
jeopardised. The higher likelihood of multiple gestation births through ART
often used in surrogacy, and the risks that go along with multiple births, may
not be made clear to prospective surrogates in the developing world.86 There-
fore surrogates may be “facing increased chances of pregnancy associated
health problems for themselves and their foetuses”,87 without knowledge
of this situation.
81 HBO, Google Baby Trailer, available at http://www.zippibrandfrank.com/ (last visited June 1,
2011).
82 Gupta et al., supra note 60, at 247.
83 Martha M. Ertman and Joan C. Williams (eds.), Rethinking Commodification, 64 (2005).
84 Gupta et al, supra note 60, at 247.
85 Eileen Smith-Cavros, Fertility and Inequality Across Borders: Assisted Reproductive Technology
and Globalization, 4:7 Sociology Compass 470 (2010).





4 HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES COMMON TO BOTH WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS
The previous sections focussed on human rights issues raised by ICS pertaining
to women and children as distinct groups. Additionally, there are some im-
portant human rights issues and challenges which cut across both groups. This
highlights the fact that the rights of women who act as surrogates in ICS, and
the rights of the children they give birth to, are to a certain extent intertwined;
cognisance of this fact will assist in understanding the challenge of rights
protection for both groups. This section discusses two of the most significant
common issues.
4.1 Commodification of women and children
ICS arguably commodifies both women and children. Radin provides a helpful
definition of commodification as “the social process by which something comes
to be apprehended as a commodity, as well as to the state of affairs once the
process has taken place.”88 Corea says when women act as surrogates their
bodies form part of a “reproductive supermarket”,89 thereby reduced to
commodities filling a demand in the market. However, surely whether or not
women who act as surrogates should be understood as commodified depends
to some degree on whether they undertake their work as a surrogate of their
own volition, or if they are unduly pressured into acting as a surrogate. As
discussed previously, in some cases of ICS, it seems apparent that surrogates
are not undertaking their role fully of their own choice, but under external
pressure or against their will. Despite this distinction, the fact remains that
regardless of whether or not ICS surrogates act out of their own choice as
surrogates, they do function as a commodity within a global market, integral
to the entire transaction. This is because without the surrogate mother, it would
not be possible for commissioning parents to have the child they commission.
The children born from such arrangements may also be viewed as commo-
dities to be bought in the marketplace of ICS. Mahabal asks “Are babies com-
modities to be planted and harvested?”,90 whilst Michael Freeman notes the
effect of surrogacy has been to commodify children, as the child “can be seen
as the product of an expensive business transaction. Technically, the commis-
sioning parents may be buying gestational services but they feel they are
88 Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities, in Martha M. Ertman and Joan C. Williams
(eds.), Rethinking Commodification, 64 (2005), at 81.
89 Gena Corea, Surrogate Motherhood as a Public Policy Issue, in Reconstructing Babylon: Essays
on Women and Technology, 131 (P. Hynes (ed.), 1991).
90 Reported in Mark Magnier, Room for Abuse in India Surrogacy, April 30, 2011, The Seattle
Times,availableathttp://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/health/2014914731_indiasurro
gate01.html (last visited June 1, 2011).
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buying a baby.”91 Freeman rightly observes this wholly undermines any view
of children as rights-bearing persons.92 This may also have the spin-off effect
of additionally undermining women’s rights by rendering their role in ICS less
visible.
4.2 The risk of human trafficking
Related to the concern that ICS commodifies women and children, is the
heightened vulnerability of these groups to human trafficking caused by ICS;
Corea describes surrogacy as “international traffic in women”.93 The fear is
that women, especially in the developing world, may be trafficked for use as
surrogates, whose babies will be harvested and sold. Recently this was shown
not to be beyond imagination when a human trafficking and baby ring was
found holding 14 Vietnamese women captive, seven of whom were pregnant,
some said to have been raped.94 Indeed, this case starkly shows the possibility
of both women and children to be trafficked to exploit the demand for ICS.
The possibility of alleged commissioning parents commissioning children
who are then trafficked also exists as a possible danger in the current unregu-
lated ICS market. Non-governmental organisations in India raised this concern
in the case of Baby Manji Yamada vs. Union of India & ANR.95 More recently,
a French family was found smuggling surrogate baby twins, born to a surro-
gate mother in Ukraine, into France. The babies were said to have been
smuggled so the commissioning parents could register them as French citizens.
The smuggling was, in the eyes of the commissioning parents, a means to
ensure their surrogate children French citizenship given that surrogacy is illegal
91 M. Freeman, supra note 34, at 286.
92 Id. at 282. See for further discussion Hugh V. McLachlan and J. Kim Swales, Show Me the
Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange: Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the Alleged
Commodification of Children: A Defence of Legally Enforceable Contracts, 72 Law and Contem-
porary Problems 91 (2008).
93 Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to
Artificial Wombs, 245 (1985).
94 See for reports of the Baby 101 human trafficking ring: ABC News, Women Freed from
‘inhuman’ Baby Ring, February 25, 2011, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/
2011/02/25/3148396.htm (last visited June 1, 2011); and K. Macnamara, Future Uncertain
for Unborn Children in Thailand Baby Scam, February 27, 2011, Jakarta Globe, available at http:/
/www.thejakartaglobe.com/international/future-uncertain-for-unborn-children-in-thailand-
baby-scam/425497 (last visited June 1, 2011).




in France.96 These cases highlight the vulnerability of both children and
women to be trafficked within the context of ICS, their human rights thus
endangered due to the development of this global market.
This article has provided comprehensive coverage of the human rights
challenges that ICS poses to the women who act as surrogates and the children
who are born from such arrangements. Such a comprehensive identification
and analysis of the human rights challenges arising out of ICS, collected
together in one place, has not been undertaken to date. Arguably this forms
a crucial foundation upon which recognition should now start to be given to
ICS as a 21st century human rights challenge, requiring attention from the
international community. In light of the human rights challenges and issues
in this article, it can be said that for many of these issues, public international
law tools and instruments – in particular human rights standards and norms –
already exist, through which such challenges can and should be addressed.
In order to protect the rights of those made vulnerable through ICS, the various
parties involved in ICS arrangements, along with States Parties to relevant
public international law treaties and other instruments, need to ensure that
they act in ways which uphold and safeguard the rights of women and
children in ICS, rather than jeopardise them. Indeed, this will often require
the various competing rights and interests at play to be balanced against one
another, in order to establish where rights protection is most needed in order
to safeguard the groups made vulnerable in ICS. The crucial issue of rights
balancing in ICS remains a rich and important area of research to which the
author will focus on in the future.
96 Associated Press, Family Held After Trying to Smuggle Babies Out of Ukraine, March 24, 2011,
The Guardian, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/24/family-
smuggle-surrogate-babies-ukraine (last visited July 1, 2011). In France, the decision of the
Cour de Cassation in the case of the Mennessons (Arrêt n° 370 du 6 Avril 2011 (10-19.053),
Cour de Cassation – Première Chambre Civile (France) demonstrates that it is not possible
for ICS children to gain French citizenship.
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4 Multiple ‘Mothers’, Many Requirements
for Protection
Children’s Rights and the Status of Mothers in the
Context of International Commercial Surrogacy
Abstract
ICS always involves multiple potential parents, and this is a complicating factor
for the child’s enjoyment and exercise of their rights. This Chapter demon-
strates this by focusing on one of the key relationships in ICS, between the child
and their multiple ‘mothers’. It contends that the notion of ‘mother’ is contested
within the ICS context and cannot be understood straightforwardly because
ICS involves more than one woman who may be genetically, legally, or socially
understood as ‘mother’. Examining this complex and tangled web of maternal
relationships, this discussion traverses the various constructs of ’mother’ in
ICS and focusses on the central feature common to these mothers: to have, or
to care for, a child. This Chapter discusses the child’s rights in relation to those
of his or her ‘mothers’, and the complexity of ICS mother-child relationships.
The potential interests of each of the ’mothers’ in ICS vis-à-vis the child are
examined, and attention is given to how such rights and interests might be
balanced with the rights of the child.
Main Findings
- Mother-child relationships are a central nexus in ICS arrangements.
- Mother-child relationships are complex in ICS because there are multiple
women in any one ICS arrangement who may be understood to be the
child’s mother, linked to the genetic, biological and social aspects of
‘mother’.
- As such, ICS challenges traditional notions of motherhood and this has
implications for the rights of children born through ICS and the mother-
child legal relationship.
Contextual notes
- This Chapter was written at a time when multidisciplinary scholars were
beginning to come together to discuss the challenges raised by ICS. The
main findings of this Chapter were initially presented to an international
multidisciplinary workshop, Deconstructing and Reconstructing “Mother”:




bia University in 2012 and provided the sole contribution from a child
rights, international human rights law perspective.
- Jurisprudence which has emerged since the time this Chapter was written
– and which is discussed later in this doctoral thesis – highlights that the
surrogate mother-child relationship is still a contested site within ICS
arrangements, continuing to present challenges from a rights balancing
perspective amongst the core parties to ICS.
This Chapter was originally published in Yasmine Ergas, Jane Jenson and
Sonya Michel (eds.), Reassembling Motherhood: Procreation and Care in a Globalised
World, Columbia University Press, 2017.
1 INTRODUCTION
International commercial surrogacy (ICS) is inherently complex; a method of
having a child largely made possible through a combination of technological
advances, market-forces, and changing attitudes towards family structure and
human reproduction. ICS raises a raft of profound, intersecting issues relating,
among others, to bioethics, commodification of human life, globalisation and
migration. ICS largely operates in an unregulated manner across international
borders. People from disparate corners of the world are drawn together in
a relationship that has its roots in the supply and demand of commercial
human reproduction.1 In this respect, ICS is different from other international
commercial transactions given that a child is the intended outcome. Work is
currently under way at the international level to assess whether an inter-
national regulatory framework for international surrogacy is viable.2 Yet global
consensus remains elusive given the range of State views and approaches to
1 It should be noted that not all international surrogacy is international commercial surrogacy.
Some international surrogacy arrangements are altruistic in nature, characterised by the
notion of a ‘gift relationship’ (see Liezl van Zyl and Ruth Walker, “Beyond Altruistic and
Commercial Contract Motherhood: The Professional Model,” Bioethics 27, no. 7 (2013): 374.)
However, this chapter takes international commercial surrogacy as its focus and therefore,
altruistic arrangements fall out of scope.
2 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference, Project on The Private International Law Issues
Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising From International Surrogacy
Arrangements:http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=178(last accessed
01 February 2014). This Project was preceded by work led by Professor Paul Beaumont
and Dr Katarina Trimmings, School of Law, University of Aberdeen: http://www.abdn.ac.
uk/law/research/international-surrogacy-arrangements-151.php (last accessed 01 February
2014). An output of the work of the University of Aberdeen was the following text: Katarina
Trimmings and Paul Beaumont (eds.), International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation
at the International Level, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013). See for work by the author included
as part of this collection, Achmad, C., ‘New Zealand’, at 295-310.
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ICS, the lack of legislative and policy alignment, and in some instances, polarity
of these positions.3
ICS functions with the express aim of producing a child. Such children are
often much-wanted and longed-for by the people seeking them.4 However,
sometimes only minimal thought is given to how the eventual child’s rights
will be upheld and protected in an ICS arrangement. This is despite a core
principle of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
that: “In all actions concerning children…the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.”5 This chapter proceeds from an international
human rights law perspective: The centrality of the child to ICS, and the child’s
inherent vulnerability given his or her lack of personal autonomy and agency
requires that his or her best interests be held paramount. But they must also
be balanced with the rights of other persons involved. Therefore, to properly
interpret the rights of the child in the ICS context, those of the multiple mothers
involved require consideration.
Consequently, while this chapter takes the centrality of the child in ICS
arrangements as its point of departure, it focuses on the complex and tangled
web of ‘mother’ relationships that ICS entails,6 examining the various inter-
pretations of ‘mother’ that ICS arrangements may foster and their attendant
implications for the rights of the child. This chapter highlights the enduring
need to adhere to human rights law in ICS situations. Doing so allows for a
balancing of the human rights and interests of mothers and children, to achieve
rights protection where the mother-child nexus is rendered fragile and un-
certain by the ICS context.
3 E.g. some jurisdictions criminalise commercial surrogacy with extraterritorial effect (New
South Wales, Australia is one example, see sections 8 and 11 of the New South Wales
Surrogacy Act 2010), while others (such as India, Ukraine, Thailand) allow it to operate
in a largely unregulated manner. For a discussion of the conflicts that discordant legal
frameworks may produce, see Yasmine Ergas, “Babies without Borders: Human Rights,
Human Dignity and the Regulation of International Commercial Surrogacy.” 27 Emory
International Law Review (2013), 117-188.
4 Arguably, this will be the case in the majority of ICS cases. However, the possibility of
persons commissioning children through ICS for purposes of child abuse, exploitation and/
or trafficking cannot be ruled out. This has implications for the rights of the child given
that they may be born into a situation whereby their rights under Articles 19, 34, 35, 36
and 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3) are breached. The preamble to the Convention recognises the inherent dignity
of the child.
5 Article 3(1), Convention on the Rights of the Child.
6 N.B. this chapter focusses on mothers in ICS, not fathers. However, complications can
certainly arise in relation to the roles of ‘fathers’ in ICS and it is possible to envisage ICS
situations with multiple potential ‘fathers’. E.g., such a situation may arise in ICS arrange-
ments where two commissioning fathers are involved, or where a commissioning father
does not provide his sperm for use in the arrangement and a sperm donor is involved,
meaning there is a third-party genetic ‘father’. This chapter does not delve into the question
of whether men can be said to ‘mother’ in ICS arrangements. However, from an anthro-




2 UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY AS A DIS-
TINGUISHABLE PHENOMENON
This chapter uses the term ‘International Commercial Surrogacy’ (ICS) in
reference to surrogacy arrangements ‘commissioned’ by people7 paying money
to have a child through surrogacy in a State other than their own.8 ICS is
characterised by its cross-border and commercial nature.9 While the practice
of surrogacy grew from the mid-1970s and through the 1980s (predominantly
in the United States),10 ICS has emerged forcefully over the past decade. Inter-
national surrogacy markets have developed and continue to grow, particularly
in global South states such as Thailand and India,11 with demand flowing
predominantly from the global North.12 The supply of ICS from global South
states is dynamic in nature, gradually changing and adapting to demand and
also in reaction to changing social attitudes and political pressures; notably,
in early 2015 the Thai parliament passed a legislative ban on all commercial
surrogacy services for non-Thai nationals (unless a person has been married
to a Thai national for at least three years), with criminal penalties for commis-
sioning parents and surrogate mothers who contravene the law.13 But the
supply of ICS services is not limited to the global South. To the contrary, global
North states, such as, within the U.S., the state of California, attract a signi-
7 ‘Commissioning parents’ may also be referred to as intending parents.
8 Commissioning parents who engage in international commercial surrogacy are motivated
by various reasons. E.g. amongst other things, the inability to conceive a child themselves;
desire to have a child with a genetic link to themselves; rejection of domestic or intercountry
adoption or the failure to successfully adopt a child, for various reasons; inability to access
surrogacy domestically; relative affordability of international surrogacy in certain States
such as India and Thailand in comparison to States such as within the United States of
America where commercial surrogacy is legal.
9 As distinct from compassionate or altruistic surrogacy, ICS involves a commercial element
of some kind.
10 Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues – Expanded Edition,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 5: 2-4. Field discusses two of the most well-
known cases from this period in the US, Stiver v Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th cir. 1992), and
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
11 For discussion of the concept of a market for international surrogacy, see Debora L. Spar,
The Baby Business: How Money, Science and Politics Drive the Commerce of Conception, (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 2006), Chapter 3 “Renting Wombs for Money and Love:
The Emerging Market for Surrogacy,” 69-96.
12 However, commissioning parents from the global North do seek international surrogacy
arrangements in countries such as Ukraine and the United States. E.g. see the cases Re
Application by BWS [2011] NZLFR 621: commissioning parents residing in New Zealand
commissioned twins in California; and X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam):
commissioning parents in the UK commissioned a child in Ukraine.
13 BBC News, Thailand bans commercial surrogacy for foreigners, 20 February 2015, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31546717 (last accessed 20 May 2015).
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ficant part of the market.14 Northern states (such as California) can offer both
legal certainty regarding legal parentage through the possibility of pre-birth
orders, while global South states compete in part by providing ICS at lower
cost and sometimes offering associated medical procedures – such as multiple
embryo transfer to increase the likelihood of pregnancy, selective fetal re-
duction, mandatory caesarean deliveries – which are unavailable in global
North states.15
Following the birth of a child through an ICS arrangement, the woman
acting as the surrogate is expected to relinquish the child to the commissioning
parents: the arrangement itself is premised on the fact that it is the commission-
ing parents (or commissioning mother(s) or father(s)) who intend to raise the
child. Depending on the particular arrangement, the commissioning parents
may or may not maintain contact with the surrogate. Moreover, she may act
anonymously throughout all stages of the ICS arrangement.
In terms of the biological make-up of a child born through ICS, there are
many possibilities. Within these possibilities, variants can exist, dependent
on whether donors or surrogates act anonymously. The child may or may not
be genetically related to one or both of the arrangements in which the surrogate
has provided the ovum – thus establishing a genetic link between herself and
the child – are termed “traditional surrogacy”16 or “complete surrogacy.”17
But in “gestational surrogacy” – which has increasingly become the norm –
embryos formed either by the commissioning parents’ gametes or obtained
from third parties are implanted in the surrogate, sometimes after being
shipped across borders for use.
14 Whilst comprehensive data on the incidence of international commercial surrogacy in the
U.S. is not available, survey data of all fertility treatment provided in the U.S. (approximate-
ly 6000 cycles) is delivered to persons domiciled in countries other than the U.S., amounting
to 4 per cent. See: Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine,
“Cross-border reproductive care: a committee opinion.” Fertility and Sterility 100:3 (Septem-
ber 2013) 645-650 at 645. For an overview of commercial surrogacy laws in the various U.S.
states, see Creative Family Connections 2015, Gestational Surrogacy Law Across the United
States: State-by-State Interactive Map for Commercial Surrogacy, http://www.creativefamily
connections.com/#!surrogacy-law-by-state/f49jq (last accessed 15 September 2015).
15 E.g. in some instances in ICS arrangements in global South states, procedures such as
multiple embryo transfer and foetal reduction are offered.
16 Margaret Ryznar defines “traditional surrogacy” as a surrogacy which “results in a surro-
gate’s genetic child following her artificial insemination with the intended father’s sperm.”
See Margaret Ryznar, “International Commercial Surrogacy and Its Parties,” John Marshall
Law Review 43, no. 10 (2010): 1010. The “traditional” aspect can therefore be understood
as drawn from the fact that the surrogate gives birth to her “own” child in the sense that
it is genetically related to her, and not genetically related to the commissioning mother
or to a third-party egg donor.
17 Mary Lyndon Shanley prefers this term to the use of “traditional surrogacy”. See Mary
Lyndon Shanley, Making Babies, Making Families: What Matters Most in an Age of Reproductive





Payments for ICS arrangements may flow in multiple directions. For
example, fees may be paid to surrogacy clinics carrying out the associated
medical procedures. Surrogacy brokers or third parties are often involved in
arranging the surrogacy, usually commanding fees for doing so.18 The surro-
gate herself may be paid for her services – either directly or through the clinic
or other third party.19 Contractual documents sometimes govern ICS arrange-
ments, but not always.20 The exact nature of each ICS arrangement differs
in all these aspects, often making it difficult to map all the people, places and
transactions involved.
3 THE CENTRAL FEATURE OF ‘MOTHER’: CHILD
International human rights law is largely about protection. It is relevant to
ICS situations, given the inherent vulnerabilities of those involved in ICS
arrangements, not least children. Crucially, international human rights law
provides standards and norms setting out the rights and corresponding mini-
mum protection measures to which all human beings and particular groups
are entitled. To properly understand the rights of particular vulnerable groups,
it is important to understand them holistically, in relation to the rights of those
around them and in the context in which their rights may be at risk of being
breached. This applies to understanding the situation and rights of the child
in ICS arrangements. In particular, understanding the ‘mother’-child relationship
is crucial, given it is a central nexus within all ICS arrangements.
But in ICS the rights (and obligations) of ‘motherhood’ may apply to several
women.21 The defining and universal feature of ‘mother’ is ‘child’. It is always
the existence of a child who is cared for or in some way related to a woman
that leads to her being understood as a ‘mother’ – both legally and socially.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘mother’ as “a woman in relation to
18 Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Private Inter-
national Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising From International
Surrogacy Arrangements (Prel. Doc. No 11, 2011), 19.
19 Surrogates are open to the risk of exploitation here, and women who act as surrogates may
already be vulnerable given their pre-existing position of economic marginalisation. Payment
of surrogates may be arbitrary and not always guaranteed. For discussion of the risk to
surrogate mothers in India in relation to payment, see Centre for Social Research, Surrogate
Motherhood – Ethical or Commercial (2013) 47-48. See also Amrite Pande, Wombs in Labor:
Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014)
56; 71.
20 See for a comprehensive discussion of the various types of surrogacy arrangements, see
the Indian Supreme Court’s observations in Baby Manji Yamada Vs. Union of India & ANR
[2008] INSC 1656 (29 September 2008), paras. [5]-[12].
21 It is worth noting, however, that ‘mother’ is a term which is arguably applicable to men.
For example see Darren Rosenblum, “Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parent-
ing.” Harvard Journal of Law and Gender vol 35 (2012): 57.
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a child or children to whom she has given birth”.22 Traditional understandings
of whom and what constitutes a ‘mother’ at law align with this definition,
with many domestic jurisdictions propounding the position that the person
who can be understood to be a legal mother is the woman who gives birth
to a child, in accordance with the maxim ‘mater semper certa est’ or ‘the
mother is always certain’.23 Adoption and parentage laws have broadened
the notion of a legal mother or parent in some specific circumstances.
ICS challenges these traditional notions of motherhood in new ways, beyond
those entailed by adoption and assisted reproductive technology. In an ICS
arrangement, as many as three different women can be identified as ‘mother’
in relation to any particular child.24 These are: the woman who acts as a
surrogate; the woman who provides her ovum; and the woman who (either
alone or with a partner) ‘commissions’ the child. Who is considered the (or
‘a’) mother, impacts not only that particular woman’s rights but also those
of the other women implicated in any specific ICS arrangement; due to the
commercial and cross-border elements present in ICS, these situations stretch
the limits of the meaning of ‘mother’ and who can be understood as being
a ‘mother’ into new terrain. The potential implications of three different women
being variously understood as ‘mother’ in an ICS arrangement can furthermore
have implications for and impacts on the rights of any child who is born.
4 MULTIPLE MOTHERS: THE MANY FACES OF ‘MOTHER’ IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
4.1 Surrogate
As the woman who gives birth in ICS, the surrogate performs the role closest
to the traditional notion of ‘mother’. In many ICS ‘demand’ jurisdictions (that
is, States in which commissioning mothers or parents originate from or reside
22 See Oxford Dictionary online, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), http://oxforddiction
aries.com/definition/mother (last accessed 01 February 2014).
23 One such example is New Zealand’s Status of Children Act 1969. Section 5 puts forward
the presumption that it is the woman to whom a child is born who is the mother of the
child. Section 17 governs motherhood in assisted reproduction situations, and posits that
the woman who becomes pregnant is the mother even though the ovum is donated by
another woman. Another example is found in the UK: section 33 of the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act 2008 specifies that the mother of a child born through surrogacy is
always the surrogate.
24 In fact, in situations where there are two commissioning ‘mothers’ (as will be the case where
a same-sex couple commission a child through ICS), this may be expanded to four potential
‘mothers’ in relation to one child. For simplicity, in what is already a complex discussion,
this situation is not considered in this chapter, which is confined to consideration of the
possibility of three ‘mothers’ in ICS situations. In situations where there are no commission-
ing mothers (i.e. there are commissioning fathers), there will only be two potential mothers,




in), under domestic legislation a woman who gives birth as a surrogate is held
to be the legal mother of the child. This hinges on the very act of biologically
carrying the child to term through supporting and nourishing the child’s
development with her own biological matter and giving birth to the child.
However, in ICS situations, the surrogate’s role in relation to the child is
intended from the outset of an ICS arrangement to be time-limited to the
gestation period and the birth. After the child’s birth, she is expected to re-
linquish the child and any ‘mother’ role that she may have felt or held before
the child’s birth, given that it has ostensibly been agreed that the commission-
ing ‘mother’ will care for and raise the child as its ‘mother’ in an on-going,
social sense. As numerous legal cases and anthropological studies have shown,
however, in practice the surrogate may feel an enduring connection to the
child at the emotional level, given her role carrying the child to term and
giving birth to the child, acts which are immutable. This can give rise to many
reactions – from private grief to legal challenges to the obligation to relinquish
the child. While the surrogate may enter into an ICS arrangement with the
intention of providing the child to the commissioning ‘mother’ following the
child’s birth, her intentions may change throughout the course of the ICS
arrangement or once the child is born, and she may decide she wants to keep
the child.
Where the law views the surrogate as the child’s legal mother, this creates
an obstacle in ICS in terms of the legal parent-child relationship. In such cases,
the position of the surrogate as a legal ‘mother’ persists until the relationship
between her and the child is severed at law, for example through the establish-
ment of a legal parent-child relationship between the commissioning mother
(or parents) and the child through adoption. This severance of the parent-child
legal relationship is not always possible and is in no way guaranteed. More-
over, in many jurisdictions where a child is born through ICS, the surrogate
is listed as ‘mother’ on the child’s birth certificate. India constitutes an ex-
ception to this rule: current guidelines stipulate that birth certificates in the
case of ICS children will be issued in the names of the genetic or commissioning
parents, such that the surrogate does not have formal ‘mother’ status under
Indian law. Thus in many ICS situations, the surrogate is physically, socially
(in some respects, at the very early part of the child’s life, from conception
to birth) and legally viewed as the eventual child’s mother. Yet she performs
her ‘mother’ role having agreed to be left childless following birth and in the
knowledge that the commissioning mother (or parents) is expecting to be
provided with the child once he or she is born. As noted above, however, the
intentions of a surrogate may change over the course of a pregnancy or once
a child is born in an ICS arrangement (potentially leading to a dispute over
the child with the commissioning ‘mother’), the possibility of which can never
be completely eliminated from such arrangements. Even in ICS arrangements
governed by contracts in jurisdictions where such contracts are enforceable,
situations may arise where the surrogate mother acts in a manner contravening
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the agreement and it may be extremely difficult to enforce performance of
the contract.
Surrogates have variously been described as ‘outsourced’ wombs, ‘cheap
or rentable womb[s]’, ‘human incubator[s]’, ‘gestational carrier[s]’ and ‘bio-
logical mother[s]’. Arguably, this wide range of terminology – which appears
to studiously avoid references to a ‘mother’ role – highlights that the surrogate
is open to marginalisation and exploitation in ICS arrangements, regardless
of the reality that without her participation, the commissioning ‘mother’ would
have difficulty in realising her wish to have a child. Pande observes the dual
imperative under which surrogates in India are expected to carry out their
role, counselled in fertility clinics and surrogacy hostels to simultaneously see
themselves as ‘workers’ and not ‘mothers’ (‘worker-producer’), and as ‘mothers’
and not ‘workers’ (‘mother-reproducer’). Pande describes this training as
“manufacturing the perfect motherworker’. She notes that the surrogate “is
expected to be a disciplined contract worker who gives up the baby at the
termination of the contract, [and] is simultaneously urged to be a nurturing
mother for the baby, and a selfless mother who will not negotiate the payment
received.” Furthermore, an integral aspect of the conflict inherent in the
surrogate’s ‘mother’ role in ICS arrangements is neatly summarised in Pande’s
statement that “When one’s identity as a mother is regulated and terminated
by a contract, being a good mother often conflicts with being a good worker”.
4.2 Genetic
A woman contributing her genetic material in ICS arrangements is in a similar
position to the surrogate, given that to a certain extent, her role is time-limited.
Through the discrete act of providing ovum, her role in the ICS arrangement
is complete. However, her role differs from that of the surrogate as through
this act of donation, she establishes an enduring genetic connection with the
child. Although gestation – the act which is unique to the surrogate mother
in ICS – entails a series of biological processes which have an enduring impact
on the child, it is the genetic mother alone who has a genetic connection to
the child who is born. But does this mean that the woman who provides
genetic material in ICS should be understood as a ‘mother’ in relation to any
eventual child who is born? Clearly, there is a strong argument to be made
that she can properly be distinguished as the ‘genetic mother’, separate from
the surrogate or the commissioning mother. A genetic relationship with a child
cannot be severed at law or otherwise altered. Indeed, unlike the relationship
between the child and the commissioning and surrogate ‘mothers’, the genetic
‘mother’s’ relationship with the child is able to be scientifically proven through
DNA testing. Yet such a genetic mother may not be recognised under law as




is generally reserved for the birth mother and in some exceptions, the commis-
sioning mother.
In ICS, the involvement of the genetic ‘mother’ with the child may go no
further, remaining purely based in genetics. Drawing an analogy from the
experience of domestic surrogacy involving genetic surrogate mothers, the
willingness of the commissioning parents to have the genetic ‘mother’ involved
in the child’s life is the likeliest factor immediately determining the extent of
any social relationship with the child. In arrangements where the genetic
‘mother’ acts anonymously, this most likely will remain impossible.
In some instances of ICS, the genetic ‘mother’ may be blended with the
surrogate ‘mother’ or the commissioning ‘mother’. In practice this means that
the surrogate can also be the genetic ‘mother’, therefore bringing a child who
is genetically hers (through donation of her ovum) to term. In some ICS ar-
rangements, the genetic ‘mother’ will be the commissioning ‘mother’, if she
is able to contribute ovum. For example, this can occur in situations where
the commissioning ‘mother’ cannot carry a child to term due to a hostile
uterine environment but is fertile and can provide gametes, or where a com-
missioning ‘mother’ does not wish to or is unable to carry a child to term for
other reasons but can provide gametes.
Lastly in relation to the genetic mother, it is important to note that often
she will be referred to as the ‘egg donor’. The effect of this is to remove any
reference to this woman as being a mother in relation to the child, reducing
her role to a purely transactional one, giving no recognition to the enduring
nature of her connection to a child born through IC as a result of the provision
of her genetic material.
4.3 Commissioning
Although it is the genetic and surrogate ‘mothers’ who physically enable a
child to be born through ICS, most ICS arrangements begin with the desire of
the commissioning ‘mother’ (or the commissioning parents or the commission-
ing father) to have a child. Nevertheless, it is this woman whose role as
‘mother’ is the most challenging construction within ICS. The commissioning
‘mother’ is the person (or one of the persons) who drives the whole ICS ar-
rangement – it is her desire to have a child that brings into play the involve-
ment of the two other potential ICS ‘mothers’, by virtue of the fact that she
is unable to conceive or carry a child herself or chooses not to.
However, in many ICS arrangements she is not the ‘mother’ with a genetic
connection to the child, and in all ICS arrangements she is not the woman who
gives birth. Therefore, in ICS the woman who seeks to ‘mother’ the child in
a social and on-going sense is the ‘mother’ with the most problematic link
to the child and to the legal parental status of ‘mother’. This is particularly
so given traditional legal paradigms and emphasis placed on the biological
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nexus between mother and child through the act of gestation and birth. The
‘mother’ role that the commissioning mother seeks to fulfil is wholly socially
constructed, rather than established though a genetic or biological link (as is
true in the case of the child’s genetic ‘mother’ and surrogate ‘mother’ respect-
ively). As previously noted, often the law does not recognise her as a mother
at all. In jurisdictions where this is the case, to become the child’s legal mother,
the commissioning ‘mother’ has no other option than to apply to adopt the
child or seek legal parentage of the child. This woman’s status as ‘mother’
in ICS situations is, at its crudest, borne of a transaction. However, to reduce
her ‘mother’ role to such a restricted reading ignores the most basic fact, that
it is often due to her deep desire to have a child to care for and to mother,
that the child has come into being. Her role as ‘mother’ to the child, if she
goes on to care for the child, is that of a mother in the social sense. The ques-
tion is when – and how – across the many jurisdictions that may come into
play in ICS, this desire can be coupled with her legal recognition as a ‘mother.’
In ICS cases where the commissioning ‘mother’ is also the genetic ‘mother’,
it is arguable that her status as ‘mother’ is bolstered, given her enduring link
to the child in terms of DNA. However, in practice the features most important-
ly distinguishing the commissioning ‘mother’ from the other two potential
‘mothers’ is that without her there would be no child. Whilst all the ‘mother’s
involved in ICS are indispensable to the success of any individual arrangement
in producing a child, it is the commissioning ‘mother’ who initiates the process
and from the outset of the ICS arrangement, she is the only ‘mother’ intending
to care for and raise the child as her own.
Despite the surrogate mother’s contractual obligation to transfer the child
to the commissioning ‘mother’ upon or shortly after birth, the commissioning
‘mother’ remains highly vulnerable: contracts governing ICS arrangements are
often difficult to enforce and as previously noted, the intentions and decisions
of the surrogate may change over the course of her pregnancy or following
the birth of the child. Requiring specific performance of such contracts would
be contrary to the child’s rights as established under international human rights
law, given that specific performance would explicitly render children the
product of such contracts and in doing so, commodify them. Requiring specific
performance of such contracts would also be contrary to the rights of the
surrogate ‘mother’, given that she may well have a valid claim to a legal
mother-child relationship regarding the child she has brought to term and
given birth to. To require specific performance of such contracts would there-
fore ignore the reality of the surrogate ‘mother’s’ role in ICS arrangements.
Moreover, within limits, the commissioning mother’s rights may also be
impacted through a lack of clarity over her legal status as a ‘mother’ in relation
to the child.
Therefore, although the commissioning ‘mother’ is the ‘mother’ (in contrast
with the surrogate and the genetic ‘mother’) who likely intends to care for




arrangement (unless, of course, she changes her mind), she is the ‘mother’ with
the most difficulties in establishing a ‘mother’ relationship in ICS.
5 ABSENCE OF ‘MOTHER’ IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
Despite the fact that multiple women may be able to stake a claim to being
their ‘mothers’, children born of ICS arrangements may also be left ‘motherless.’
An absence of ‘mother’ can occur due to human and legal factors, as discussed
below.
5.1 Human
The first situation where the absence of a mother to care for and raise the child
is possible is when the commissioning ‘mother’ decides, either before or once
the surrogate gives birth that she does not want to perform this role. Such
a decision by the commissioning mother (or parents) not only undermines
the entire ICS arrangement, but it leaves the child in a position of heightened
vulnerability. This possible outcome can never be completely ruled out in ICS,
given that at their root, such arrangements are based on a good faith under-
standing that all parties will follow through on the actions they commit to
in respect of one another. In situations where the commissioning mother rejects
the child, the surrogate ‘mother’ or the genetic ‘mother’ might be willing to
be a ‘mother’ to the child on an on-going basis. But in situations where none
of the three ‘mothers’ want to be a ‘mother’ to the child in an on-going manner,
and if the partner of the commissioning mother (in instances where she has
a partner who is legally recognizable as a parent) also reneges on the ICS
arrangement, it may well fall to the State to assume a care and protection role
in relation to the child, if the State is unsuccessful in attempts to enforce
maternal obligations where commissioning ‘mothers’ have been deemed legal
mothers. In such situations, the State will arguably be obliged to do so under
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
This further raises complex questions around which State should or is best
positioned to take responsibility of the child when ICS arrangements go awry
in this way. Arguably in situations where demand flows from commissioning
parents in the global North to have a child through a surrogate in the global
South, international development burden-sharing theory can be applied by
analogy. On such a basis, the State the commissioning ‘mother’ (or parent(s))
originates from or resides in should provide care and protection to the child,
rather than leaving the State where the child is born with this burden. How-
ever, the converse argument can be made in situations where the home State
of the commissioning mother or parents does not sanction ICS but the country
in which the surrogacy and birth takes place does allow ICS. In such situations,
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arguably it is the State that has opened itself to the risk of the burden of ICS
children who end up motherless (or parentless) that should be the State to
take responsibility for the child.
5.2 Legal
The second factor that may lead to a child born through ICS being ‘motherless’
or without parents who are committed to caring for and raising him or her
is the law itself. Such a situation can be triggered when national legislation
and policy either does not make provision for ICS or actively prohibits it. The
inadequacies of national frameworks, the conflicts among them, and the
absence of international regulation interact, undermining the certainty that
children born through ICS will have a legally recognized ‘mother’ (or parent(s)).
Where legally recognized parentage cannot be established, the child may also
not have access to other entitlements, which can impact negatively on the
child’s rights.
In practice, such situations occur when neither commissioning ‘mother’
nor commissioning ‘father’ can demonstrate a connection to the child meeting
particular state requirements for creating a legal parent-child relationship (or
gaining entry to their home State to begin such a process). This can happen
in instances where the state of origin of the commissioning mother – or parent
generally – requires proof of a specific kind of connection (for example, genetic)
in order to recognize parentage and, hence, citizenship.
Ireland provides an example of this. Under the Irish Guidelines a child
will not be considered for a travel document or citizenship by the Irish govern-
ment unless DNA evidence of a genetic link to the commissioning ‘father’ is
provided, from a “suitably qualified independent third party.” Such a require-
ment raises severe implications in ICS arrangements where donor sperm has
been used and no genetic link between the commissioning father and the child
exists, or in instances where there is no commissioning father, but only a
commissioning mother or mothers. In such situations, the position of the child
and protection of their rights will remain highly uncertain. Whether the child’s
status is regularised by State exercise of exception-based discretionary decision-
making must surely be viewed as a remote possibility. State level guidance
has been established in the United Kingdom, requiring a genetic link to at
least one of the commissioning parents for entry of the child into the UK. Proof
must be gained via DNA testing through an accredited company. This is a
slightly less restrictive approach to that of Ireland, given the wider scope of
the proof of a connection to the child from a commissioning mother or father.
In some other jurisdictions where such formal guidelines and requirements
do not exist, courts appear to be taking into consideration evidence that proves
some sort of link – usually genetic – between the commissioning ‘mother’ and/




child relationship. But where courts cannot establish such a link and govern-
mental regulations prohibit establishing a legal relationship between the
commissioning ‘mother’ and the child, the commissioning ‘mother’ is prevented
from caring for the child in her home State. In such situations, the commission-
ing ‘mother’ still wants to mother the child. However, where neither surrogate
nor genetic ‘mother’ want to ‘mother’ the child in lieu of the commissioning
mother, and if the commissioning mother cannot stay in the State where the
child is born, the child may be abandoned in the country of his or her birth,
without a ‘mother’ (or other parent). Essentially, the child is left without a
legally recognised parent, despite being brought into the world as a result
of very specific and directed actions by a person who went to great lengths
to have a child and others who have participated in enabling this to happen.
Again, this undermines the child’s rights to citizenship and nationality as well
as to preserve their identity and to grow up in a family environment. Parent-
lessness under law often correlates with statelessness, leaving children at risk
of being brought up in institutions that may afford few protections of their
human rights.
6 THE CONTESTABLE NOTION OF ‘MOTHER’ IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROG-
ACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
The timeline of ICS arrangements leads to the three different women discussed
in this chapter being involved in the arrangement at different points in time
and for different lengths of time. The very fact that the genetic mother’s
gametes contribute to the genetic make-up of a child born through ICS means
that her link with the child can neither be changed nor displaced; it is inherent-
ly un-severable. The link between her and the child is a significant one. How-
ever, unless the genetic mother also acts as the surrogate, in ICS she will rarely
be recognised as the child’s legal mother, at any point in the ICS timeline. This
can have implications for the child’s rights to identity and health, in particular
if she acts anonymously and the child therefore does not know even so much
as her name. Despite the position that the law may take, the genetic mother’s
link does not ‘stop’ at any point in time. It is arguably in both the child’s and
the genetic mother’s best interests that there is at least social recognition of
the mother role played by the genetic mother in relation to the child. India’s
National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of ART Clinics
in India appear to acknowledge this to some extent, providing for information
about donors (including their identity) to be released by ART clinics only “after
appropriate identification, only to the offspring and only if asked by him/her
after he/she reaches the age of 18 years, or as and when specified for legal
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Contrary to the genetic mother, if acting purely as a surrogate in an ICS
arrangement, the surrogate mother does not have any on-going relationship
with the child unless that is agreed to with the commissioning parents, or if
the child seeks out their surrogate mother later in life and the relevant informa-
tion is made available. Again this will be extremely difficult if the surrogate
acts anonymously. In most instances of ICS, it seems likely that the surrogate’s
role in the child’s life will be time-limited to the period of pregnancy and birth,
with the surrogate not playing any role in the sense of a social mother. This
is unfortunate and should be guarded against, given that an on-going role
in the child’s life, or at the very least knowledge of the surrogate mother can
aid in realisation of the child’s rights to identity, nationality and health. The
legal position of the surrogate may well be to the contrary, however, given
the position that in many jurisdictions the surrogate mother is recognised as
the legal mother the child, a position which often can only be displaced
through legal extinguishment of the parent-child relationship of the surrogate
and the child through the establishment of a new legal parent-child relationship
via the granting of an adoption order.
In practice, it is possible in ICS situations for the commissioning mother
to assume the social ‘mother’ role as soon as the surrogate relinquishes the
child, despite her not having any guarantee that she will eventually be
recognised as the child’s legal mother. A gulf between fact and law may
therefore persist for quite some time, until a legal relationship is established.
If the parent-child relationship between surrogate mother and child is ex-
tinguished through law, any reinstatement of the surrogate’s ‘mother’ role
in relation to the child will be dependent on whether the commissioning
mother or parents involve the surrogate in the child’s life in any on-going
capacity. Again, as discussed above in relation to the genetic mother, from
a human rights perspective, arguably the surrogate should continue to be
construed as a ‘mother’ to some extent in relation to the child, given the fact
that she brought to term and gave birth to the child. These are factual acts
which cannot easily be displaced, other than through a social re-construction
of the circumstances of a child’s gestation and birth. That the surrogate
‘mother’ unlikely has any ongoing relationship with a child born through ICS
following their birth may well have implications for the surrogate as well as
the child. The surrogate may be impacted from a mental or physical health
perspective (or a combination of both) without any on-going role or recognition
of the role she played in bringing the child into the world. From a child rights
perspective, the child may be impacted negatively if the surrogate plays no
on-going role or if there is no opportunity for the child to have any knowledge
of their surrogate mother and her role, given that the child may wish to know
her identity later in life, in particular to realise his or her own rights to identity
and to health.
Of course, the converse argument can be put forward, that knowledge of




bewilderment in relation to their identity. Steps should be able to be taken
to ameliorate such an outcome, through providing the child with appropriate
support in their understanding the circumstances of their birth. Equally, the
surrogate may not wish to have on-going contact or involvement with the
child, who she may purely view as the child of the commissioning mother
(or parents).
As with the question of when – as well as whether – the genetic and
surrogate mothers in ICS ‘stop’ being ‘mothers’ to the children they play an
integral role in creating, it is necessary to consider when a commissioning
‘mother’ starts being a mother. This is despite the fact that she is the one
woman of the three possible mothers in an ICS situation who at all points
through an ICS arrangement (unless she changes her mind) wants to per-
manently and enduringly be the mother to the child who is born, and be
recognised as such, both legally and socially. In practice, she is the woman
whom it is most difficult to construe as mother to the child, given that in most
ICS arrangements she is not genetically related to the child and the law will
not automatically recognise her as the child’s mother. Therefore, the question
of when a commissioning mother becomes a mother in ICS situations requires
consideration from both a social and a legal perspective.
Unlike the genetic and surrogate ‘mothers’, the commissioning mother’s
status in relation to the child is entirely socially constructed, until a point in
time where she is able to establish a legal parental relationship with the child.
Her relationship to the child is arguably based on four factors which may be
present prior to the establishment of any legal status: her desire to have the
child and intention to care for and raise the child as her own; the payment
of money in relation to the ICS arrangement; that she may be party to either
a written or oral agreement about the arrangement; and that she is likely to
assume responsibility for caring for the child as his or her ‘mother’ once the
surrogate mother relinquishes the child.
Arguably, the commissioning ‘mother’ becomes a mother to the child in
a meaningful social sense from the point in time when she assumes care for
the child, following his or her birth. It is from that point that the surrogate’s
substantive involvement with the child is usually expected to end and the child
and commissioning mother can begin to form an attachment in the form of
a mother-child relationship. However, the surrogate ‘mother’ may want to
maintain a connection to the child, and in some ICS arrangements there will
be a period of substantive overlap regarding involvement and attachment of
the child and his or her surrogate ‘mother’ and his or her commissioning
‘mother’. For example, this may occur if, at the request of a commissioning
‘mother’, a surrogate ‘mother’ agrees to breastfeed the child during his or her
first few days or weeks of life. From the perspective of commissioning
‘mothers’, it is understandable however, that many view themselves as the
child’s mother from the child’s conception onwards, given the child carried
by the surrogate is intended for the commissioning ‘mother’ (or parents). This
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view likely holds even if the commissioning mother is not genetically related
to the child and lives in a different State to that where the surrogate is located.
Surrogates themselves may or may not view the commissioning ‘mother’ as
the mother of the child in ICS arrangements. Again, this is understandable
given the complexities of the practical and emotional aspects of carrying a
child for another person – a child who may or may not be genetically related
to the surrogate herself. Therefore, identifying when a commissioning ‘mother’
becomes a mother from a social mothering perspective in ICS arrangements
is a blurry exercise. In reality, in addition to what relevant laws and regulations
prescribe, it will be largely dependent on the different personal attitudes and
individual circumstances involved in specific ICS arrangements; navigation
of who is ‘mother’ and when may prove complicated and fraught.
While some States such as Ukraine and California maintain a competitive
edge in the ICS market through securing the recognition of the commissioning
‘mother’ as the legal mother of a child born through ICS, in some States supply-
ing ICS, it can take a substantial period of time for a commissioning ‘mother’
(or commissioning parents) to attain legal ‘mother’ status in relation to a child
born through an ICS arrangement – indeed, if she is able to at all. This will
lead to great uncertainty in status for both the child and the commissioning
mother. The child’s rights to nationality, identity and to grow up in a family
environment under the Convention on the Rights of the Child may again be
undermined as a result. In some jurisdictions, gaining legal status as mother
to a child commissioning through ICS may simply not be possible under the
relevant domestic legislation, with discretionary measures such as adoption
orders providing the only method by which a legal parent-child relationship
can be established. Given this reality, the child may be in a vulnerable situation
regarding his or her right to grow up in a family environment and potentially
rendered stateless, impacting on their wider rights.
In States such as Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, judges
are grappling with the fact that while domestic legislation construes the birth
mother of a child to be the child’s legal mother and furthermore, prohibits
commercial surrogacy domestically, albeit without extraterritorial effect, they
are faced with applications from commissioning ‘mothers’ for parentage or
adoption orders in respect to the children that have been born through the
ICS arrangements they have entered into. But, as Justice Hedley of the UK High
Court insightfully remarked, the “difficulty is that it is almost impossible to
imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the case comes to court,
the welfare of any child (particularly a foreign child) would not be gravely
compromised (at the very least) by a refusal to make an order.” Chief Judge
Pascoe of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia has described this as the “fait
accompli upon return” in international surrogacy cases coming before Austra-
lian Family Law Courts. And while for many judges the “fait accompli” of
the child’s existence combines with the obligation to adopt their best interests




the orders that the commissioning parents have requested, at least in theory
there is no guarantee that this will be the case. Unless ICS is recognized by
law and acknowledged in birth certificates that the commissioning mother’s
state of origin is willing to accept, she will be compelled to overcome the
hurdle of establishing her legal status in relation to the child to gain full
recognition as the child’s mother.
7 CONCLUSION
Establishing the status of the various potential ‘mothers’ involved in ICS is
both socially and legally complex. Not only is this problematic for the various
ICS ‘mothers’, but as demonstrated throughout, the ramifications for the
realisation of the rights of the child born through ICS can be wide-ranging,
generating long-term negative impacts. The common denominator in all ICS
arrangements is what the arrangement is driven towards providing: a child.
In the absence of international agreements capable of regulating the attribution
of ‘motherhood’ and the rules of parentage generally, children born through
ICS are, and will continue to be, in a position of heightened vulnerability. As
Michael Freeman has said, “There can be no doubt that children are amongst
the most vulnerable and powerless members of our society today.” The risk
is that the current uncertainty surrounding the attribution of motherhood
exacerbates such vulnerability.
The speed with which the technological and medical advances making
ICS possible have progressed has outstripped the development of the law to
regulate and provide protection to parties made vulnerable in these arrange-
ments. The need for national legislators and policy-makers to engage with
developing responses to ICS focussing on ensuring human rights protection
is necessary, and it is crucial that the international community remains engaged
in continuing to consider options for possible international collaboration and
regulation. A focus on the rights of the child in ICS in relation to the position
of the child’s potential ‘mothers’ is particularly important given the absence
of any international regulatory framework governing the market or operation
of ICS. The child has rights in relation to their ‘mothers’ and their ‘mothers’
have rights and interests in relation to the child. However, as this chapter has
demonstrated, distinctions exist in ICS between notions of genetic, social and
legal ‘mothers’, and these impact the rights of the child and the ‘mothers’ own
situations. The child is the ultimate factor leading to a woman being under-
stood as a mother, and while all the ‘mothers’ involved in ICS have human
rights which may be open to breach through ICS and must be protected and
upheld, the rights of children born through ICS require protecting alongside
and balanced in relation to the situations of their multiple ‘mothers’.
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5 International Commercial Surrogacy and
Children’s Rights
Babies, Borders, Responsibilities and Rights
Abstract
This Chapter argues that the child is the locus of vulnerability in ICS. It is
complementary to the earlier chapters of this study as it also presents dis-
cussion of the ethics and economics of ICS in relation to children, as well as
assessing jurisprudential trends and non-judicial responses to ICS in selected
ICS demand states, in light of the child rights framework under public inter-
national human rights law. This analysis shows that more can be done at the
government legislative and policy levels to protect the rights of children
conceived and born through ICS. It also argues that the framework of standards
and norms for protecting the child’s rights and best interests established by
the CRC should be further utilised in jurisprudential decision-making, too. This
will help to ensure that the child’s rights and best interests are placed at the
heart of ICS practice. This Chapter therefore advances the idea of the CRC not
only setting standards and obligations for states and other key actors in ICS,
but also as a useful and necessary tool for use in the ICS context, to uphold
the child’s rights and best interests in ICS.
Main Findings
- The ethical and economic challenges raised through the practice of ICS
trigger risks to the rights of children conceived and born through ICS; the
child’s rights and interests can also clash with those of his or her potential
parents.
- Children should be understood as the central locus of vulnerability in ICS
arrangements. Their rights to identity preservation, nationality, family
environment, health, education and social security can be particularly at
risk.
- In the absence of dedicated legislation concerning ICS, Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom are using quasi-policy responses to guide
actions in relation to individual ICS cases; these reflect child rights stand-
ards and norms to differing degrees.
- At the time of writing, Courts across the three jurisdictions were new to
dealing with ICS cases; analysis indicates that the Courts’ have only
limitedly harnessed the CRC and other mechanisms to uphold children’s





- This Chapter was written at a time when State responses to ICS were
initially developing and ICS jurisprudence was beginning to develop,
despite a lack of international consensus concerning ICS.
- The Chapter was initially presented at the New Zealand Law Society
Continuing Legal Education International Adoption and Surrogacy Confer-
ence, the first Conference of its kind in New Zealand.
- At the time of writing, the examples provided from three English-speaking,
common law jurisdictions grappling with ICS as emerging demand-States
provided a useful snapshot of state practice and judicial decision-making,
and the extent to which these reflected CRC standards and norms. Since
the time of writing, ICS demand continues in these jurisdictions; quasi-
policy guidance is still used, and judicial decision-making in ICS cases
reflects a growing trend of judges considering children’s rights and best
interests. N.B. Starting in 2018, the UK Law Commission will embark on
a three-year surrogacy law reform project.
- Since this Chapter was written, some of the most significant ICS supply-side
states have closed down ICS (e.g. India and Thailand); others have devel-
oped and have closed down ICS (e.g. Nepal); and others have developed
but are taking steps towards limiting ICS (e.g. Cambodia). No definitive
statistical data on the global prevalence of ICS exists.
- Although an absence of international consensus regarding ICS persists, since
the time this Chapter was written, a number of international bodies are
now actively exploring avenues towards greater consensus, through private
international law and public international law frameworks.
This Chapter was originally published in New Zealand Law Society, Inter-
national Adoption and Surrogacy – Family Formation in the 21st Century (2014),
pp. 79-112.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, international commercial surrogacy (ICS) has established
itself as a new method by which to have a child. Families are being built in
new ways leveraging off globalisation, technological advances in medical
science and communications, and the lower costs of artificial reproductive
technologies and surrogacy offered through burgeoning supply markets in
the Global South. Across a multidisciplinary spectrum, much attention has
been given to the phenomenon of ICS from the perspective of the “commission-
ing” or “intending” parents, and the woman who acts as a surrogate. However,
the child is the person at the centre of ICS arrangements and is the person
inherently lacking agency, consequently in a position of heightened vulnerabil-
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ity. Yet relatively little consideration – including by way of legal analysis
through the rubric of international human rights law – has to date focused
squarely on the rights of the child.
This paper, intended as a working paper to be elaborated on and detailed
further through a presentation at the NZLS CLE International Adoption and
Surrogacy Conference, seeks to focus in on the situation of the child in ICS,
with reference to international law human rights standards and norms. It
encourages understanding the child as a core locus of vulnerability in ICS. This
is done through an exploration of the framework of the rights of the child in
ICS, as well as consideration of perspectives on the ethics and economics of
ICS in relation to children. Jurisprudential trends and non-judicial responses
to ICS in three ICS ‘demand’ states are examined (Australia, New Zealand and
the United Kingdom), in light of the rights framework and the ethical and
economic context. Overall, this paper explores the specific vulnerabilities of
children born through ICS, highlighting avenues for increased protection
through international human rights law.
2 CONCEPTION CROSS-BORDER
Discussion of the rights of the child in ICS necessitates being placed in the
overarching context of the growth of conception cross-border. The expansion
of ICS over recent years can be viewed as part of a trend of increasing numbers
of people traveling cross-border internationally, predominantly from the more
developed to the lesser developed world, to access a range of medical treat-
ment and health services, often motivated by wider availability of services
and competitive pricing in comparison to that offered in a home-State (Ramirez
de Arellano, 2007). Ramskold and Posner note that reproductive tourism has:
‘alongside other forms of medical tourism, grown in scale and numbers as globalisa-
tion has gradually erased many economic and cultural borders. Transitional capital
economies in Southeast Asia, technological advances and free trade pave the way
for the interest of the comparably affluent, yet ever more infertile, Western couples.
[…] In the last decade, reproductive tourism has, alongside escalating demand,
become a multimillion industry, stimulating national economies and providing
jobs in both the service sector and healthcare.’ (Ramskold and Posner, 2013: 397)
Human reproductive tourism, therefore, is placed in the wider context of the
growth of medical tourism, yet ultimately leads to something quite different
in comparison to a more standard medical procedure such as a hip replacement
or dental surgery. Ultimately, it leads to a child. In the area of human repro-
duction, never has it been easier for gametes (egg or sperm cells) to be pur-
chased and shipped internationally, and to access the “services” of a surrogate




arrangement will include an exchange of money – thus bringing the com-
mercial element into international surrogacy.
India and Thailand have emerged as the two most popular destinations
to access or undertake ICS, and in this respect they are “supply” states. Mexico
is tipped as the next emerging international surrogacy supply state (Global
IVF, 07 January 2014, online), and Georgia and Ukraine are both popular among
European commissioning parents. The boom in the growth of international
commercial surrogacy is most clearly demonstrated in India, where it is
estimated that 25,000 children have now been born through surrogacy (Shetty,
2012: 1633). However, in both India and Thailand, the surrogacy market has
been left to operate in a largely unregulated manner. In India, since the
legalisation of commercial surrogacy in 2002, the surrogacy “industry” is
increasingly seen as a component in the growth of the State’s role international-
ly as a hub for medical tourism, which has expanded over recent years (Lal,
2010: Asia Sentinel, online). Henaghan observes that:
‘In recent years, the Indian Government’s efforts to promote India as a cost-effective,
quality medical tourism destination, as well as the abundance of women willing
to be surrogates for a lower price (compared to the United States) has meant that
increasing numbers of couples have travelled from Western countries to India to
commission their children.’ (Henaghan, 2013: 3).
Arguably the key driver of the growth of the industry has been lower costs
than in Western countries and the availability of surrogates as Henaghan notes.
Mukherjee elaborates that:
‘So far [as the] the Indian perspective is concerned […] Indian surrogates have been
increasingly popular with fertile couples in industrialized nations due to the
relatively low cost. At the same time, Indian clinics are becoming more competitive,
not only in the matter of pricing, but also in the hiring and retention of Indian
females as surrogates.’ (Mukherjee, 2011: 1)
Estimates of the value of the Indian surrogacy industry differ, with the Con-
federation of Indian Industry reportedly claiming the surrogacy industry to
be worth $2.3 billion USD annually (Shetty, 2012: 1633), whilst other groups
endorse claims of a more modest figure of $450 million USD annually (Center
for Social Research, 2013: 23). Malhotra and Malhotra state that over 200,000
clinics are estimated to be operating in India, offering IVF, artificial insemina-
tion and surrogacy (Malhotra and Malhotra, 2012: 31), whilst other commenta-
tors estimate India has approximately 3000 clinics specialising in surrogacy
(Sama, 2012: 7). Although it is difficult to draw a conclusive view as to the
size and value of the international surrogacy industry in India from the com-
peting overall estimates, it is clear that international surrogacy is continuing
its upward trend, yet continuing to operate in a laissez-faire manner, showing
little concern for protecting and upholding the rights of the child. The Assisted
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Reproductive Techniques Bill 2010 (India) – which would introduce a legis-
lative and policy framework for commercial surrogacy in India – continues
to languish in legislative limbo, as it has done so through the course of success-
ive parliaments over recent years (Ghosh, 2013: Indian Express, online). In
Thailand, currently no legislation exists which directly governs international
commercial surrogacy, however draft legislation (the Assisted Reproductive
Technologies Bill number 167/2553) which would clarify the legal situation
in Thailand relating to surrogacy is pending (approved, not yet adopted by
Cabinet).
The growth in cross-border conception is reflected in a corresponding
growth in numbers of applications coming before domestic courts in global
North countries for regularisation of parent-child relationships (such as applica-
tions for parentage and adoption orders). Three Commonwealth/common law
jurisdictions provide an illustrative snapshot (further detailed in Table 1
below). However, note that the sample of case law used is limited, given that
it is based on all decisions lodged on relevant legal databases between 2008
and up to and including 28 February 2014. This does not give a full, compre-
hensive picture in terms of the global number of cases involving international
surrogacy in each of these jurisdictions, as there are other routes (for example,
ad-hoc ministerial decision-making and situations that do not come before
courts), as well as other legal decisions not lodged in these legal databases
(certainly true in the New Zealand context, and likely to be true in Australia
and the United Kingdom). The sample included in this paper though does
have value as an indicative sample, and whilst the numbers of cases falling
within this particular sample are not large by any measure, they are indicative
of a growth in commissioning parents from these countries engaging in inter-
national surrogacy. Many of these cases have a commercial element. Taken
as a group, this body of case law illustrates that family courts in all three
jurisdictions are dealing with a novel area of law concerning the rights of the
child, in the face of any internationally agreed regulation of international
surrogacy, a lack of explicit (or any) national legislation on international
surrogacy, or national legislation and policy which is often difficult to reconcile




Table 1: Decisions of Courts in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, 2008-2014,
dealing with applications arising in relation to international surrogacy situations (based on
all decisions lodged on relevant legal databases up to and including 28 February 2014)















11 Collins v Tangtoi [2010]
O’Connor v Kasemsarn [2010]
Dennis v Pradchaphet [2011]
Dudley v Chedi [2011]
Johnson v Chompunut [2011]
Hubert v Juntasa [2011]
Findlay v Punyawong [2011]
Edmore v Bala [2011]
Gough v Kaur [2012]
Ellison v Karnchanit [2012]




























7 Re KJB and LRB [Adoption] [2009]
Re an application by KR and DGR
to adopt a female child [2010]
Re an application by BWS & Anor
to adopt a child [2011]
Re Adoption by S and S [2011]
Re DMW [2012]
Adoption application by SCR
[2012]






















13 Re W [2013]
Re P-M [2013]
Re C (A Child) [2013]
Re C (A Child) [2013]
J v G [2013]
Re A & B (Parental Order
Domicile)
D and L (Surrogacy) [2012]
Z and Anor v C [2011]
Re X and Y (Children) [2011]
IJ (A Child) [2011]
L (A Minor) [2010]
Re K (Minors) (Foreign Surrogacy)
[2010]



























The total number of 31 cases across the three jurisdictions set out in Table 1
illustrates the growing body of jurisprudence across national courts pertaining
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to international surrogacy and ICS. This is likely to continue to expand; for
example, recent figures reported from the United Kingdom estimate that over
1000 babies born through international surrogacy may be brought into the
UK annually (Blyth, Crawshaw, Van den Akker, 17 February 2014: Bionews,
online).
3 THE ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIALISING CONCEPTION
A strong argument exists for understanding this rapidly emerging growth
in transnational reproductive services as the development of a new kind of
“market”, trading in human reproduction and fertility. Spar observes that:
‘As technology made it easier for parents to choose all the components of assisted
conception – the eggs, the sperm, the womb, the broker, and the governing juris-
diction – it was only a small and logical leap to international trade.’ (Spar, 2006:
86)
However, what exactly is international commercial surrogacy a market in?
A straightforward, black and white answer to this question would be that it
is a market in surrogacy. Beyond this though, arguments can be made for this
being understood as a market for the broader trade of human reproductive
services, including the trade of human bodily products (gametes, embryos)
for use for the conception of children to be carried to term by surrogates. Going
a step further, the argument can be made that the growth of ICS has in fact
brought with it the growth of a new market: in children, specifically produced
to order in one place in the world, destined for another, the end “product”
in a commercial transaction.
This paper does not seek to take up a specific position as to whether ICS
amounts to the sale of children, but rather, it is intended that this paper at
least raises these questions and issues for consideration.
These are highly controversial propositions to explore, given the difficult
ethical terrain that they stray into, and the moral aspects they entail. But why
this question matters in relation to children’s rights in ICS is because although
a market has for some time existed in the trade of gametes and embryos (with
these human bodily products available for purchase in a number of states),
under the international human rights framework, a market trading in children
is prohibited by prescribed standards and norms. These are set down in
international law and reflect that international consensus generally abhors such
a practice as a fundamental principle. Moreover, as Ergas discusses, a strong
argument exists for the prohibition on the sale and trafficking of children as
a possible ius cogens norm (Ergas, 2013: 432-434), and it is questionable
whether any future treaty governing international surrogacy would survive
ius cogens scrutiny (Ergas, 2013: 434-435). Sandel notes that this relates to the




deciding not to commodify them, or through explicitly excluding them from
the realms of goods and services which can be bought and sold through the
market: it follows that to reduce human beings to items which can be treated
in such a way, fails to accord the appropriate value to them, as sentient beings
to which dignity and respect inherently attach (Sandel, 2012: 9-10). Sandel is
not alone in putting forth such an argument, which appears to accord with
the approach taken by international human rights law, built on international
agreement relating to the value accorded to children. The value the inter-
national community places on children, as reflected in international law, has
nothing to do with money or commerce. In fact, it prohibits the commercial-
isation of children.
Regarding children as a specific subset of human beings, Sandel observes:
‘We don’t allow children to be bought and sold on the market. Even if buyers did
not mistreat the children they purchased, a market in children would express and
promote the wrong way of valuing them. Children are not properly regarded as
consumer goods, but as being worthy of love and care.’ (Sandel, 2012: 10).
Sandel takes his argument further to observe the growing trend of the market’s
reach into realms of life previously not governed by the market (Sandel, 2012:
28) and reasons that the value of certain things – such as human beings more
generally, or concepts such as love – is degraded and corrupted through their
marketisation (Sandel, 2012: 14-15).
Returning to the international legal framework then, this approach to how
the international community “values” children is reflected in the consensus
resulting in a number of relevant provisions at international law. The preamble
to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989) notes
that particular care, including special safeguards, should be extended to
children due to their specific stage in life. This flows through to the best
interests of the child principle set out in art 3 of the CRC and the non-discrim-
ination principle set out in art 2. This position is reflected in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states the right of the child to
“such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State”, without discrimination (ICCPR, 1966:
art 24). Under the CRC, States Parties have obligations to provide a range of
protective measures and specific safeguards in relation to children and their
rights (for example, see arts 19, 20, 23). Similarly, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that:
‘Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all
children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage
or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from economic
and social exploitation.’ (ICESCR, 1966: article 10(3).
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Article 25(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes – reflect-
ive of the social mores of the time – that all children shall enjoy the same
“special protection”, regardless of whether they are born in or out of wedlock
(UDHR, 1948).
Turning to the position at international law regarding the sale of children,
which relates to the ethical and economic question of value, the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and an associated Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion (2000) are indicative of the status of international agreement, and provide
a framework of standards and norms to define actions and behaviour among
and between states and citizens. The Convention on the Rights of the Child
makes clear the position at international law on the sale of children. Art 35
is broad in this respect, and the threshold of expected action on States Parties
is high:
‘States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures
to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or
in any form’.
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Sale of Children, Child prostitution and Child pornography (2000) reflects the
grave concern of the international community about international traffic in
children for the purpose of sale, child prostitution and child pornography
(Optional Protocol, 2000: Preamble). States Parties to the Optional Protocol
are required to “prohibit the sale of children” in line with the Protocol (art 1).
“Sale of children” is defined as being “any act or transaction whereby a child
is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for remuneration
or any other consideration” (art 2(a)).
Therefore, in considering the ethics and economics of conception in light
of the clear standards and norms international law has established in relation
to how children are to be valued (and thus protected), it is necessary to at
least ask the question: does international commercial surrogacy amount to
a market in the sale of children, commodifying them as a “product” to be
traded, with the determination of their monetary “value” left open to the forces
of the market? Or, should ICS be viewed as the provision of a specific package
of services, that is, reproductive services provided by the woman who acts
as a surrogate, and the services of associated medical clinicians and other actors
in the industry? It is near impossible to get away from the reality that, if we
are to identify the ultimate “product” in the commercial exchange which takes
place in an ICS arrangement, it is a child. It is upon delivery of that child –
once born, to the commissioning parent or parents – that the “transaction”
is complete, and therefore it becomes difficult not to see this as falling into
the definition set out by art 2(a) of “sale”.
If we are to accept such a view, this raises confronting and difficult ques-
tions relating to the obligations of the State around the practice of ICS, and




human rights law. On the other hand, if we are to accept that ICS is a trans-
action which is predicated on and results in an exchange of reproductive
services, the upshot of which is the birth of a child, this takes us away from
the confronting and difficult question as to whether ICS is a commercial trans-
action for the sale of children. However, even if we accept this view, it is
impossible to get away from the fact that in reality, no ICS arrangement can
be said to be completed – certainly not in the eyes of the commissioning
parents who are one party to such an arrangement – until the child who is
born is in their care alone, once handed over to them (even if not literally)
by the surrogate mother.
Looking at State practice to date in relation to ICS, it does not provide a
conclusive view either way in relation to this vexed issue. There is very little
international consensus in relation to international commercial surrogacy
specifically, reflected in national legislative and policy approaches which
variously outlaw the practice, tolerate it without an explicit regulatory or
statutory framework, or explicitly legalise it (Trimmings and Beaumont, 2013:
443). On the face of it, this variation in state practice seems to show that some
states do not view ICS as contradictory or in breach of their international
human rights obligations. Yet the fact that other states expressly outlaw ICS
through national law with extraterritorial effect (for example, New South
Wales, Australia) can be seen to indicate that ICS is viewed in some states as
inconsistent with international human rights law. In the case of some states,
a reticence to engage with the issue has resulted in the legal position being
somewhat unclear, arguably resulting in such states occupying a position of
“permissibility” (Spar, 2006: 207) in relation to the practice of ICS. Indeed, the
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference has questioned the feasibility of
achieving international consensus on issues relating to international surrogacy,
such as the question of unifying applicable conflicting private international
law rules (Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference, 2012: para. 54).
Spar notes that in an abstract sense, the business model underlying the
advent of international commercial surrogacy is a thoroughly reasonable one
(Spar, 2006: 86). Indeed, if we are to take a purely market reasoning approach
to ICS, that is, that if an exchange or trade of (any kind of) goods or services
benefits both the buyer and seller, this leads to improving our collective or
societal wellbeing. Goods are allocated efficiently, through the market, because
the demand of the buyer is met by the supply of the seller. As Sandel notes,
both sides are better off, their utility increasing. (Sandel, 2012: 29) However,
Spar observes that:
‘although eggs and sperm are now widely available in markets like the United
States, it is tougher to find wombs. Because wombs come attached to women, who
don’t have any inherent incentive to endure the physical costs and emotional
upheaval attached to pregnancy and labor. Purely in commercial terms, therefore,
it makes sense to pay women for undergoing the rigors of pregnancy and thus
to seek women for whom paid pregnancy is an economically attractive proposition.
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
International Commercial Surrogacy and Children’s Rights 101
[…] Some of these poor, young mothers will live in the developed world. But many
more, demographically speaking will live in poorer nations of the developing world,
where opportunities for poor, young women are even scarcer.’ (Spar, 2006: 86-87)
Indeed, some commissioning parents will expressly want to ensure their
surrogate is paid, and that to not pay such a person for what they are doing
to enable them to have a child would be wrong. One commissioning mother
from the United States who commissioned surrogacy in India has written that:
‘Charges of ‘renting a womb’ and exploitation have long tarnished the practice
of surrogacy. But in my mind, a woman going through the risks of labor for another
family clearly deserves to be paid. To me, this was not exploitation. This was a
win-win, allowing the surrogate to have a brighter future and the couple to have
a child. If my money was going to benefit an Indian woman financially for a service
she willingly provided, I preferred that it be a poor woman who really needed
help because the money that a surrogate earns in India is, to be blunt, life-changing.’
(Arieff, 2012: 37)
From these views, it can be observed that the commercial element of ICS leads
to potential issues of global injustice (Spar, 2006: 87; 226-227; Sandel, 2012:
203) which are deserving of a dedicated discussion more comprehensive than
is possible in this paper. Indeed, it is precisely to guard against the exploitation
of economic inequalities that we explicitly ban a trade in human organs – such
as kidneys and hearts – and arguably ICS presents simply a different human
body part being transacted. Yet both Arieff and Spar appear to take up the
position that ICS is a market in the trade of human reproductive services, not
children themselves. Furthermore this supports the notion of ICS amounting
to a “mutually advantageous trade” (Sandel, 2012: 29). However, Spar herself
labels the international surrogacy and human reproductive market “The Baby
Business”, which granted, perhaps, is simply a more convenient and attention-
grabbing label. Spar does further concede however, that taking an outsourced,
market approach to the manufacturing of babies, in a similar way to the
manufacturing of other “products” is a somewhat outlandish proposition, at
least at the superficial level (Spar, 2006: 87), and that it is unclear what kind
of market the “baby business” amounts to, but that it could constitute a
“banned” or “imperfect” market (Spar, 2006: 204-206).
If we are to accept that ICS instead amounts only to a market in reproduct-
ive services only, it regardless still has the effect of commodifying children
to an extent, given their centrality to ICS arrangements and the fact that such
arrangements are only complete once a child is provided. Touched by commo-
dification to any degree, the value we as a society place on children born
through ICS may potentially be corrupted and degraded. In this connection,
it is interesting to note that the Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption has as one




1(b)). However, it is also important to acknowledge the continuum on which
international adoption and international surrogacy are both located. As Spar
notes, adoption and fertility services are:
‘two markets [which are] closely linked. Many people pursue fertility treatment
because they are wary of adoption. Many others pursue adoption because they
have grown weary of or dissatisfied with fertility treatment. Both sides of this
market would prefer to believe that they are not substitutes for one another. But
in reality, of course, they are. Everyone in the fertility market, everyone in the
adoption market, and everyone who purchases eggs, sperm, wombs and PGD
[Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis] is looking for precisely the same thing: a child
to call their own.’ (Spar, 2006: 210)
4 CLASH OF RIGHTS: “PARENTS”, CHILDREN AND OTHER PARTIES
Whilst this paper argues for the child being placed at the centre of international
commercial surrogacy arrangements, to ensure full realisation of their human
rights, it is necessary to recognise the wider parties in ICS situations, not least
the “commissioning parents”. Understanding the full range of potential parties
involved in ICS situations is critical to understanding the context in which
children born through ICS come into the world, and to take a holistic approach
to the child’s rights (Achmad, 2012: 191-194). Due to the various possibilities
for the genetic makeup of a child born through ICS, and the fact that a surro-
gate is involved, there are a number of parties who may claim to be a child’s
“parent”.
Taking first the “mother” parent, this role in relation to the child may be
claimed by a woman or women commissioning the child (therefore seen to
be a “commissioning parent”); the woman who acts as the child’s surrogate
“mother”; and thirdly, the woman who provides her gametes (this could be
the surrogate or the commissioning mother, or another third party, such as
a woman who sells or donates her gametes for use). Turning to the “father”
parent, this role may be claimed by the commissioning father or fathers, and
potentially by a man who donates or sells gametes which are used in arrange-
ment in instances where these are not provided by the commissioning father
or fathers. This complex web of involvement in ICS arrangements amounts
to there being potentially as many as four women who claim to be the
“mother” in relation to a child born through ICS, and up to as many as three
men who might claim to be a “father” to a child in an ICS arrangement. ICS
proceeds on the expectation that the commissioning parent(s) is intended as
the person(s) who will be the parent to the child – at least in a social sense.
However, an argument can be made for each of these different people po-
tentially involved in an ICS arrangement to be understood as a “parent” to
a child who is born through the arrangement. The claim of the various po-
tential parents can stem from a genetic or biological relationship to the child,
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which cannot be displaced, as well as from an intention to parent the child,
in the case of commissioning parents who sometimes have no genetic link to
the child who is born.
The fact that ICS arrangements can lead to there being a multitude of adults
involved who may claim to be a parent to any one child can lead to situations
where the perceived rights of the different “parents” can clash with each other.
A stark example of this is where a commissioning parent or parents and the
surrogate mother have a clash of views in relation to matters such as what
activities the surrogate avoids whilst pregnant, or what happens in an instance
where tests indicate that a child is likely to be born with a birth abnormality
or condition. In such instances, the commissioning parents seek to control more
than just the surrogate’s womb, but her whole body, and her rights being
endangered or violated (for example, such as rights established under arts
11 and 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 1979).
Having alluded to the potential for clashes between the positions and rights
of the various potential “parents” in ICS arrangements, where the concept of
a clash of rights is most clear is when one considers the rights of the child
in relation to the adults in its life who may have a parental claim in relation
to him or her. What is in the interests of any one of the potential “parents”
may not always be in the best interests of the child, nor uphold and protect
their rights. However, the child is most likely to be the person in ICS arrange-
ments with the most heightened level of vulnerability. Whilst the point can
validly be made that commissioning parents can be vulnerable to being taken
advantage of in ICS, and surrogate mothers – especially in the global South,
where they are often economically and socially marginalised – are potentially
very vulnerable to human rights violations (especially in situations where they
are coerced into acting as a surrogate against their will (Center for Social
Research, 2013: 39), not given appropriate support or properly informed about
the arrangement, or not paid as they are told they will be (Center for Social
Research, 2013: 23)), it is the child that is most universally open to the potential
of human rights breaches in ICS. This is because of the inherent vulnerability
that a child is characterised by, due to their lack of agency and inability,
especially in their infancy and early years, to voice their wishes and to form
views in relation to, and have control over what is in their own best interests.
The child’s evolving capacities as they advance in age means that the child’s
agency over their own interests and rights grows (Lansdown (for UNICEF), 2005:
x-xi), however, in ICS situations the child may well be placed in a position of
heightened vulnerability with no ability to have control over their own rights
and interests (very early in their life).
To illustrate, a practical instance of this may arise in ICS situations in
relation to the taking of DNA samples from a child for the purpose of deter-
mining legal parentage. It is likely to be unclear in ICS arrangements as to who




a DNA sample, and this may then lead on to issues around evidential admissib-
ility if the case goes before a court (Keyes and Chisholm, 2013: 115). This raises
the issue of whether having a DNA sample is in the best interests of the child.
This lack of agency is particularly problematic if a person claiming to be the
child’s parent does not act (either intentionally or by omission) in the child’s
best interests to protect the child’s rights. Therefore, the question of who acts
on behalf of and in the best interests of the rights of the child born through
ICS is one that may not, on the surface of an ICS arrangement, be easily deter-
mined. At its worst, a situation could eventuate where no one is acting in the
best interests of the child in an ICS arrangement – not necessarily out of malice
– this could be purely through a lack of information or foresight. Given lack
of international regulation and standards, there is no requirement for an
independent third party to be assigned to the child to advocate for their rights
and best interests to be upheld in ICS arrangements. This may result in a
protection lacuna for the child, if their rights and best interests are not effect-
ively upheld and realised. Moreover, when ICS cases come before courts, it
will not always be automatic as a matter of procedure that the child is inde-
pendently represented, which again may have implications for the rights of
the child.
Above we have considered parents and children as part of this “clash of
rights” in ICS, however, it is important to briefly note that other parties are
very likely to be involved in ICS arrangements. This is significant due to the
potential for these parties to influence the actions of or positions taken by the
various potential “parents” in ICS arrangements. Other parties may include
surrogacy or medical tourism brokers, government officials in the commission-
ing parents’ home state and the state where the child is born, lawyers, medical
doctors and other medical staff or fertility experts. Each of these parties may
approach an individual ICS arrangement with their own vested interests and
motivations, which may not always be in line with protecting the best interests
of the child. It would be of great benefit to children born through ICS if pro-
fessional and other third parties involved in ICS situations increase their focus
on and commitment to taking a child-centred perspective in their practice,
or at least to incorporate awareness of what this entails.
5 THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AT STAKE
Having examined some possible ethical and economic perspectives on ICS and
highlighted the various potential parties and their respective interests, this
section hones in more closely on the broader international human rights law
framework governing the rights of the child. The Convention on the Rights
of the Child is the primary relevant framework in this respect. Provisions of
the Convention which are of particular relevance to ICS situations are discussed
below. Whilst this discussion is not intended to be exhaustive (for more, see
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Achmad, 2012: vol. 7:8, 206-211), it is intended to assist in identification of
some of the rights of the child which are left most at risk in ICS situations. It
is these rights, along with the protection of the best interests of the child, which
it is important, in the first instance, to be conscious of upholding, protecting
and giving effect to in ICS.
5.1 The rights of the child to identity and nationality
As illustrated through earlier discussion of the various parties involved in
ICS, and more specifically the range of persons who may claim to be a “parent”
in relation to a child in these situations, the circumstances of birth of children
born through ICS are likely to be complex. This raises potential challenges for
the child’s rights to identity and nationality. In fact, these are arguably the
biggest child’s rights issues arising out of ICS, given the long-term impact
flowing from the realisation of both of these rights in the life of a child.
5.1.1 The child’s right to the preservation of their identity
Firstly considering identity, without intentional steps being taken to protect
information about the circumstances of their birth and information relating
to their personal genetic lineage and cultural heritage, the identity of children
born through ICS will likely be placed in a precarious position. As national
judges have observed, in the absence of such steps being taken, this will very
likely lead to repercussions for the child in later life, around their understand-
ing of who they are as a person (for example, see J v G [2013] EWHC 1432
(Fam) at [27]). The Australian Family Court has described this as the concept
of “lifetime identity” (G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387; applied in the international
surrogacy case of Ellison and Anor v Karnchanit 2012 FamCA 602 at [91]). Van
Bueren describes an individual’s identity as being:
‘at root an acknowledgement of a person’s existence; it is that which makes a person
visible to society. An identity transforms the biological entity into a legal being
and confirms the existence of a specific legal personality capable of bearing rights
and duties.’ (Van Bueren, 1998: 117).
Art 8(1) of the CRC requires States Parties to the Convention to “undertake
to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity”. This article
states that “identity” includes “nationality, name and family relations as
recognised by law”. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has not pub-
lished a General Comment in relation to the child’s right to preserve his or
her identity. However, to think about the elements which are central to a
person’s identity, in addition to nationality, name and family relations, other
significant aspects are culture, language, ethnic heritage, and genetic history.




the child’s identity could and should be said to include culture and language
as important elements (Stewart, 1992). Van Bueren further advocates for race,
sex and religion to be considered component elements forming a child’s
identity (Van Bueren, 1998: 117). Hodgkin and Newell, writing on behalf of
UNICEF, have more recently sought to confirm the view that nationality and
family are only some of the elements of identity (Hodgkin and Newell, 2007:
115) and therefore art 8 should not be read as putting forward a concept of
the child’s identity as limited to those elements explicitly mentioned in the
Convention texts. Importantly, Hodgkin and Newell note that a further key
element is “the child’s personal history since birth – where he or she lived,
who looked after him or her, why crucial decisions were taken” (Hodgkin
and Newell, 2007: 155).
For children born through ICS, it is these aspects of their identity as related
to their surrogate mother and their genetic parents – where they are different
persons to the commissioning parents – which are vulnerable to not being
preserved. Given the lack of international regulation of ICS, and the varying
levels to which ICS is permitted or regulated in different jurisdictions, no
system currently exists which is directed towards safeguarding the child’s right
to preserve their identity. Such a system has been important, for example, in
the international system of protection which exists around intercountry adop-
tion. Art 30 of The Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention requires steps
to be taken by Contracting States to ensure information about the child’s origin,
particularly the identity of the child’s parents and their medical history, is
preserved. In the absence of a directive protection framework in the context
of ICS, a strong argument can be made for those involved in ICS situations –
especially commissioning parents – to be conscious of the need to protect all
aspects of the child’s identity, so that information about these are preserved
for the child so that they can understand the full circumstances of their birth,
and gain a full picture of their identity in the future at an age where they are
ready or wish to do so. Sometimes, commissioning parents will be acutely
conscious of this need, for example the commissioning parents in Ellison were
observed to have given considerable thought to the children’s future welfare
and needs, including identity and culture (Ellison, 2012: at [122]). However,
this is not always the case, and there is a need to build better awareness among
persons involved in ICS of the need to preserve the child’s identity and the
many quite straightforward steps which can be taken in this respect.
Correspondingly, whether the State also has a corresponding duty to take
steps to assist the child to preserve their identity in ICS situations is a relevant
question. Note that art 8(2) of the CRC states that:
‘Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her
identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with
a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.’
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In this regard, Hodgkin and Newell generally note that “appropriate assist-
ance” could include (among other things):
‘making available genetic profiling to establish parentage; […] ensuring that any
changes to a child’s identity, such as name, nationality, parental rights of custody
etc., are officially recorded; enabling children to have access to the professional
files maintained on them.’ (Hodgkin and Newell, 2007: 117).
The role that the State may play – or is arguably under a duty to play – in
preserving the child’s identity in ICS situations is a complex one, requiring
future consideration outside of the scope of this paper (and one which the
author intends to explore comprehensively in the course of her current doctoral
study).
Finally in relation to the child’s rights connected to identity, it is necessary
to acknowledge that in ICS situations, given the reality that gametes or embryos
from anonymous donors are sometimes used, it will not always be possible
for all aspects of the child’s identity to be preserved, in instances where no
system is in place to facilitate future contact between donors and children born.
Consequently, in situations where anonymous genetic material is used, infor-
mation relating to the child’s genetic history, cultural heritage and “mother
tongue” flowing from a genetic parent or parents may never be able to be
established. Similarly, in instances where a surrogate mother acts anonymously
and information about her is not recorded and provided to the commissioning
parents, or safeguarded for the child to be able to directly access later in life
of their own accord, information tied to the child’s biological carrier (who will
sometimes also be the child’s genetic mother) will again be aspects of the
child’s identity which will fail to be preserved. The lack of preservation of
this kind of identity related information could have implications for the child
as they grow up and develop their capacity to understand the circumstances
of their conception and birth. It is a natural part of development as a person
to ask “who am I?”, and without all aspects of identity information being made
available, the child’s right to preservation of identity in ICS situations may be
difficult to fully realise, even beyond reach of the State. At a practical level,
arguably the most powerful role to be played in protection of this kind of
information is by private providers of fertility and surrogacy services, as a
first line of enforcement, given they are most likely to be the party facilitating
contact with all primary parties to an ICS arrangement. However, the status
quo is that there are differing levels of attention and understanding towards
these issues, and they are not usually made a central priority in ICS in places
such as India and Thailand. To give effect to art 8 of the CRC in the ICS context,
national regulatory and protection frameworks – or an international regulatory
and protection framework – could helpfully establish such requirements and
obligations for collection and retention of information identity by private actors.
Under such frameworks, state actors could usefully play a role in storing and




ing access to this information, analogous to systems in place around the world
aimed at safeguarding and facilitating access to information relating to donor
conceived children (for example, in the New Zealand context see Part 3 of
the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004).
5.1.2 Nationality
Identity and nationality are closely linked, and in situations where a child’s
right to nationality is not upheld and given effect to, this will likely have an
impact on their right to identity. Indeed, as observed above, art 8(1) of the
CRC expresses nationality as an explicit key element of the child’s right to
preservation of his or her identity. The central importance of nationality to
a human’s dignity and worth is illustrated in instances of ICS where a child’s
nationality is not established, as has been the case in many ICS arrangements
to date, triggering a myriad of challenges to the rights of the child (for
example, see Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India & ANR, Jan Balaz v Anand
Municipality, and Re an application by KR and DGR to adopt a female child. As art
7(1) of the CRC makes clear, the child is entitled from birth to the right to
acquire a nationality. This right is also recognised by art 24(3) of the ICCPR.
Despite the importance for the child of enjoying their right to nationality
from birth, in practice, the issue of nationality is often one of the thorniest
in ICS situations. It is often one of the first issues relating to a child’s rights
presenting as a challenging to give effect to in ICS arrangements. This is due
to the practical nature of the concept of nationality, in that it triggers other
protections, such as citizenship, the right to freedom of movement (art 13,
UDHR) and the right to return and leave one’s country of nationality (art 12,
ICCPR), and the ability to hold a travel document issued by the corresponding
state of nationality. One thing that can be said to be archetypal about ICS
arrangements is that the commissioning parents intend for the child that is
born through the arrangement to travel back to their home state with them
following the child’s birth. Nationality and a valid travel document which
enables the child to travel across borders and enter the commissioning parents’
home state are the keys to this (or in the absence of nationality, as has been
seen in practice, the requirement for a valid temporary visa to allow the child
to reside in the home State of the commissioning parents). However, in ICS
situations, it may be difficult, due to the complex nature of the child’s birth
situation, and largely conflicting national laws related to legal parentage and
nationality, to establish the child’s nationality in any straightforward way,
and therefore the child may not be able to travel with the commissioning
parents as they had planned.
This practical issue, which is entwined with the child’s right to nationality
– and by extension – preservation of identity, has recently been playing out
in relation to a number of children born in Thailand to surrogate mothers
through surrogacy arrangements undertaken by Israeli commissioning parents.
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
International Commercial Surrogacy and Children’s Rights 109
Under Thai law, such a child is viewed as the child of the Thai surrogate
mother, and therefore a holder of the Thai nationality. As a result, the sur-
rogate mother is recognised as having full parental rights in relation to the
child. (Goldman, 2014: The Times of Israel, online). In the face of this, the
children born through these arrangements were not recognised as Israeli
nationals and therefore refused Israeli passports, unable to return to Israel
with their commissioning parents. This situation was resolved in early February
2014 through a diplomatic agreement between the Israeli and Thai govern-
ments, whereby an Israeli passport will be issued to the child if the surrogate
mother signs a letter stating she is relinquishing the child, and this is delivered
to the Israeli embassy in Thailand (Carr, 2014: Bionews, online).
Whilst an ad-hoc diplomatic solution was able to be reached in the Israel-
Thailand situation described above, and in that situation, the children involved
did acquire the nationality of their surrogate mother from birth, the upshot
of a complete lack of nationality, where all relevant states refuse to recognise
a child born through ICS as a national, is that the child’s right to acquire
nationality from birth and to hold nationality in an on-going manner is viol-
ated. As Harland notes:
‘It is not just as a result of the lack of parental status of the intended parents, but
the child not being entitled to the nationality of the surrogate. India and Ukraine
are examples of this.’ (Harland, 2013: 3).
Such a child is effectively rendered stateless until a point in time that they
are recognised as holding the nationality of a particular state. These issues,
including statelessness, have come into play in widely reported cases such
as Baby Manji Yamada v Union of India & ANR, and Jan Balaz v Union of India.
However, the CRC makes clear the obligations of the state in this respect. Art
7(1) of the CRC establishes that States Parties shall ensure the implementation
of the child’s right to nationality “in accordance with their national law and
their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in
particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.” In practice however,
ICS is a relatively new issue confronting states (both ICS “demand” and
“supply” states), which are still grappling to decide what approach they will
take in response to issues such as nationality of children born through ICS.
This can trigger unfortunate impacts on the child’s ability to enjoy their rights,
and in extreme situations the outcome for the child is statelessness.
5.2 The right of the child to grow up in a family environment
It would seem safe to say, that in the majority of ICS situations, commissioning
parents are fully committed to providing a family environment for the child




plan to provide with an upbringing characterised by love and happiness. In
such situations, it is arguable that a surrogacy arrangement is built much more
on love than money. Indeed, the preamble to the CRC recognises that “the child,
for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should
grow up in a family environment”. Art 7(1) of the CRC develops this notion
further, specifying that the child has “as far as possible, the right to know and
be cared for by his or her parents”. Other provisions of the Convention
emphasise and reinforce the importance of the child’s right to grow up in a
family environment (for example, arts 5, 10, 19, 20). In the context of inter-
national surrogacy, Harland asserts that:
‘It is in a child’s best interest for the reality of child’s (sic) family life to be legally
recognised. Children’s human rights are entwined, bound up with the human rights
of their parents.’ (Harland, 2013: 3)
Despite recognition that it is most likely that commissioning parents enter into
ICS arrangements with positive intentions in relation to the eventual child, the
possibility of persons entering into ICS arrangements with more untoward
intentions cannot be completely ruled out and must be guarded against. The
notorious Baby 101 surrogacy and human and child trafficking ring, exposed
in 2011 (BBC, 2011: online) demonstrates human rights violations that can be
effected under the guise of international surrogacy. Cases such as this can bring
many of the child’s rights – far beyond the right to grow up in a family
environment – under threat, as well the rights of women. Such cases will,
however, most likely be exceptional in the global context of ICS. To consider
a less extreme situation that may endanger the child’s right to grow up in a
family environment – but a situation that cannot be ruled out in any ICS
arrangement – is the situation which can arise when no potential “parent”
to the child assumes responsibility for caring for the child deserves considera-
tion. Such a situation can arise when the commissioning parents renege on
the ICS arrangement, the surrogate mother does not wish to care for the child
or is anonymous and cannot be traced, and the genetic parents, if they are
separate to the commissioning parents and surrogate, also reject being respons-
ible for the child or are anonymous and untraceable. Such circumstances will
challenge the child’s ability to enjoy their right to grow up in a family environ-
ment, triggering art 20 of the CRC. It will then likely fall to the State to ensure
alternative care of the child (art 20(2)) and to provide him or her with special
protection and assistance (art 20(1)). In ICS cases, which state should bear such
responsibility is likely to present a conundrum, and is again an issue worthy
of benefitting from future consideration and analysis.
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5.3 The rights of the child to health, education and social security
Following on from the types of situations discussed above, whereby a child
born through ICS may be left “parentless”, it is important to briefly mention
that the child’s social and economic rights, such as those to health and health
care services, education and social security may be threatened. Other comment-
ators note that the child’s entitlement to child support and inheritance may
also be precarious (Gamble, 2013: Online). This is because the child’s rights
in relation to social and economic services often flow from or are tied to a
person being recognised as the child’s parent, or from their status as citizens
of a particular state (Harland, 2013: 4). Therefore, without the recognition of
legal parentage (and nationality and citizenship, where these are lacking), these
rights of the child may be placed in jeopardy.
Difficulties may also arise for a child in this respect who is born through
ICS even if, for example, the child’s commissioning parents assume care for
the child and the child is able to return with them to their home State without
a legal parent-child relationship being established; the child may well remain
in a protection vacuum regarding some of their economic and social rights.
These issues have been well traversed, for example, in the long-running case
of Mennesson v France (which has been taken to the European Court of Human
Rights and is pending). The social and economic rights of the child are crucial
for commissioning parents to consider prior to entering into ICS arrangements,
in order to be informed as to what the practical implications of the child being
born through ICS may lead to, and to make decisions which could help prevent
the child potentially being disadvantaged in future. Similarly, states need to
engage in further consideration as to how a child born through ICS is viewed
under their domestic legislation and policy in relation to the realisation of their
social and economic rights, fulfilling their obligations under international
human rights law, as they will, sooner rather than later, likely be confronted
with these issues as ICS grows.
6 INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY SITUATIONS
So far, this paper has traversed some of the ethical issues related to ICS, as
well as examining the potential clash of rights and interests between the parties
to ICS. It has examined aspects of the ethical, economic and human rights
framework relevant to ICS, particularly the rights of the child most at risk of
violation in ICS arrangements. Set against the context of this ethical and legal
framework, and in the absence of any international agreement on ICS, this
section provides a high-level overview of some of the different approaches
being taken in response to ICS internationally, with a specific focus on examina-




discussion limits its reference to a focus on the responses taken by three
Commonwealth nations/common law jurisdictions which can all be character-
ised as “demand” States in the international market of ICS: New Zealand,
Australia and the United Kingdom. However, the discussion could of course
be extended in the future to a wider sample of states, to provide a more global
assessment of international approaches in response to ICS relating to the rights
of the child.
This section is divided into two subparts; the first looks at the rise of national
guidelines or government guidance (in these national jurisdictions) as a quasi-
policy response to ICS, and the second provides a high-level analysis of aspects
of judicial decision-making about the rights of the child in ICS case law.
6.1 The rise of “national guidelines” or government guidance as a response
to international surrogacy: aspects relating to the rights of the child
As a response to international surrogacy, demand States have, over recent
years, begun to take what can be viewed as a quasi-policy approach through
the issuing of national guidelines or government guidance. These are published
on government domain internet pages. The general purpose of such guidance
is twofold. One national purpose is to provide citizens or residents of the State
with information about aspects of undertaking an ICS arrangement as they
relate to national law and policy. This information is relevant before, during,
and after an ICS arrangement is undertaken. The second purpose is to highlight
the various risks and potential pitfalls inherent in ICS arrangements, informa-
tion which is of most relevance prior to embarking on an ICS arrangement.
It should be noted that although this section limits its analysis to guidance
of this nature from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, these
are not the only states to have issued such guidance. Ireland issued guidance
in 2012 (Department of Justice and Equality, Citizenship, Parentage, Guardian-
ship and Travel Document Issues in Relation to Children Born as a Result of
Surrogacy), and India provides an example of an ICS supply State that has
gone some way towards providing guidance attempting to regulate aspects
of the practice of ICS (Indian Council of Medical Research, National Guidelines
for Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of ART Clinics in India; Ministry
of Home Affairs Government of India, Statement on Surrogacy, 2013). Austra-
lia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have all taken slightly different
approaches in issuing this guidance. Positively, each piece of guidance includes
aspects relating to the rights of the child, however, they differ in the extent
to which this is made a focus of or emphasised by the guidance. It is important
to note that these pieces of guidance all relate to international surrogacy
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6.1.1 New Zealand: International Surrogacy Information Sheets and Non-binding
Ministerial guidelines
New Zealand was the first of these three States to publish this kind of informa-
tion and advice, with the publication of the International Surrogacy Information
Sheet (including Non-binding guidelines) in June 2011. This reflects a proactive
approach in the absence of any explicit national legislation or policy regulating
international surrogacy (of any kind). It can also be seen as a response to the
fact that Child, Youth and Family, the service line of the Ministry of Social
Development responsible for child welfare and protection and family support,
had not heard of an international surrogacy case before 2010, but by August
2011 had received 63 enquiries from people in New Zealand exploring inter-
national surrogacy (Dastgheib, 2011: Dominion Post, online). The Information
Sheet and Non-binding guidelines are jointly published by Child, Youth and
Family, Internal Affairs, and Immigration New Zealand. A stated aim of the
Information Sheet is to outline “some of the key issues for New Zealanders
thinking about international surrogacy”, and urges New Zealanders to seek
independent legal advice prior to embarking on any international surrogacy
process, along with advice to contact relevant government departments.
The New Zealand Information Sheet has a strong focus on the rights of
the child, making clear that New Zealand law applies in international
surrogacy situations concerning New Zealand citizens or resident commission-
ing parents. It highlights the need for a legal parent-child relationship and
emphasises that without this, commissioning parents do not have any ability
to make decisions about the child’s needs including medical treatment and
schooling (New Zealand Government, 2011: International Surrogacy Informa-
tion Sheet: 1). The Information Sheet clearly states the requirements regarding
New Zealand citizenship and nationality that govern the situation of children
born through international surrogacy (p.3). The importance of establishing
a family environment for the child is highlighted (p.2), and emphasis is placed
on the need to take steps to preserve the child’s identity. The key paragraph
reads:
‘According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, every
child has the right to family relationships and parental guidance, the preservation
of identity and access to appropriate information. Therefore, although it may not
be required in the jurisdiction where the surrogacy arrangement is made, when
an egg or sperm donor is being used you will need to have as much information
as possible about the identity of that person available. This information will become
very important for the child in the future, should he/she wish to find out more
about his or her genetic and/or ethnic identity. It could also be useful in addressing
any future medical concerns.’ (p. 2)
Furthermore, the Information Sheet states that “all decisions regarding inter-




the child.” (p.4) The inclusion of this kind of information on the rights of the
child is very positive, as it will ideally have the effect of encouraging prospect-
ive commissioning parents to consider these kinds of issues and impacts on
any future child they may have through international surrogacy, before em-
barking on any such arrangement, and bearing them in mind if they pursue
ICS.
The New Zealand Information Sheet includes as an Annex a set of “Non-
binding Ministerial guidelines” which:
‘Ministers are likely to take into account if and when they are deciding to exercise
statutory discretion to issue a visa or grant citizenship for a baby born as the result
of a surrogacy arrangement overseas, who would otherwise not be able to enter
New Zealand or be granted citizenship’ (p. 5)
The Non-binding Guidelines are a set of 11 key factors, all of which can be
seen to relate to the rights of the child in some way. However, of particular
note are the following inclusions in the guidelines: the Minister may consider
“The outcome that is in the best interests of the child” (therefore aligning with
art 3 of the CRC); “The nature of the surrogacy arrangement, i.e. is it altruistic
or commercial?” (this relates to art 35 of the CRC); “Whether there is a genetic
link between at least one of the commissioning persons and the child” (relating
to the right of the child to grow up in a family environment, and the art 7
CRC right of the child to know and be cared for by his or her parents); and
“Steps taken by the commissioning persons to preserve the child’s identity
e.g. do the commissioning persons intend to retain information about the
child’s origins?” (alignment with the child’s rights under art 8 of the CRC).
Taken together, these factors reinforce the key rights of the child under the
CRC which are particularly important in international surrogacy situations.
They provide Non-binding guidelines which, if considered, will lead to dis-
cretionary ministerial decisions that will likely seek to protect and uphold the
rights of the child. The Non-binding guidelines are an innovative approach
to seeking to encourage ministerial discretionary decision-makers to consider
the rights of a child when faced with complex factual scenarios and the role
of making a decision affecting the lives of a number of people, including a
potentially vulnerable child.
Finally in relation to New Zealand, in June 2013 the New Zealand govern-
ment (the same government agencies which published the earlier Information
Sheet, plus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade) published a new, addi-
tional information sheet, entitled Information Sheet: International Surrogacy
in India. This was published in response to new surrogacy guidelines issued
by India for foreign nationals traveling to India for surrogacy (New Zealand
Government, Information Sheet: International Surrogacy in India, 2013: 1),
and urges that “any individual considering pursuing international surrogacy
should exercise extreme caution, seek independent legal advice, and keep up
to date with any developments.” (p.1) The Information Sheet reproduces
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relevant parts of the Indian government direction, which introduces more
stringent requirements and conditions applying to international surrogacy in
India, requiring foreign nationals travelling to India for surrogacy to hold a
medical visa, for which there is a narrower eligibility criteria, and specific
conditions must be met before such a visa is granted (p.1). One of the con-
ditions is the provision of a letter from the applicant’s home State government,
stating that the country recognises surrogacy, and that the child or children
born through the surrogacy in India will be permitted entry to that country,
“as a biological child/children of the couple commissioning surrogacy”. The
New Zealand Information Sheet: International Surrogacy in India is absolutely
clear that the New Zealand government cannot produce such a letter, due to
the fact that commercial surrogacy is prohibited under New Zealand law and
New Zealand law does not recognise such a child as the biological child of
the commissioning parents (even if one or both are genetically related to the
child) (p.2). The Information Sheet states that a letter from the New Zealand
government outlining surrogacy law in New Zealand can be requested from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Importantly, this Information Sheet
notes that there is no guarantee that an exit visa will be granted for a child
born in India through international surrogacy, and that this may leave the
child in a highly vulnerable position (the implication being statelessness and
violation of his or her associated rights).
6.1.2 Australia: “Fact Sheet 36a on International Surrogacy Arrangements”
The Australian government published its Fact Sheet 36a on International
Surrogacy Arrangements in 2012, as a web page of the Department of Immigra-
tion and Border Protection. The Fact Sheet outlines Australian law relevant
to international surrogacy situations, aiming to inform persons considering
commissioning international surrogacy as to the risks involved, and require-
ments under Australian law. The Fact Sheet urges persons considering inter-
national surrogacy to seek independent legal advice prior to starting any
process, as well as contacting the Australian immigration office responsible
for the country that the surrogacy would take place in.
The Fact Sheet explicitly notes that as a States Party to the CRC and other
relevant international conventions, Australia is “committed to protecting the
fundamental rights of children” (including preventing the sale or trafficking
of children), and that:
‘Extreme caution is exercised by us in cases involving surrogacy arrangements that
are entered into overseas, so as to ensure that Australia’s citizenship provisions
are not used to circumvent either adoption laws or other child welfare laws.’
The Fact Sheet goes on to highlight specific issues pertaining to the rights of
the child, such as the right of the child to nationality and the requirements




passport. Related to this, the impact for a child of not having legal parents
recognised in relation to it is mentioned. Such an explicit statement relating
to the rights of the child and Australia’s international human rights law
obligations is to be welcomed. The Fact Sheet specifies the Australian states
and territories with legislation making entering into an international com-
mercial surrogacy arrangement a criminal offence, and further states that
sponsorship of a child for a visa to enter Australia by a sponsor who has a
conviction or an outstanding charge for an offence against a child is not
possible (also applicable if the sponsor’s spouse or de facto partner falls into
such a category). Only limited exceptions will be made, and there must also
be “no compelling reason to believe that the grant of the visa would not be
in the best interests of the child”.
The Australian Fact Sheet is predominantly focused on citizenship and
visa issues and laws related to children born through international surrogacy.
As such, its focus on the rights of the child is quite limited to nationality and
family environment (relating to the child’s art 7 rights in the main), as well
as the best interests of the child principle (art 3). The Fact Sheet does not focus
on issues relating to the preservation of the child’s identity, other than the
requirements it sets out around DNA testing to establish legal parentage of
a child born through international surrogacy.
Connected to the Fact Sheet, in 2013 the Australian Government published
a new web page on the Australia High Commission in India’s website, relating
to the (then) new Indian guidelines introducing the requirement for foreign
nationals travelling to India for surrogacy to apply for a medical visa to enter
India. Unlike the New Zealand Information Sheet relating to India, the Austra-
lian webpage does not reproduce excerpted parts of the Indian guidelines.
However, it does include a link to a letter from the Australian Government
(undated), which Australian commissioning parents can download and use
to support their application for an Indian medical visa, if they are satisfied
that they meet the Indian visa requirements. The letter provides information
on the position at Australian law related to legal parentage, citizenship, pass-
ports and entry visas, as well as specifying the Australian states and territories
where it is illegal for residents to enter into an international commercial
surrogacy arrangement. The letter does not clearly state that a child born
through international surrogacy will be permitted entry to Australia as the
biological child of its commissioning parents. Rather, it explains that:
‘Most states and territories in Australia have legislated to regulate surrogacy
arrangements in Australia and have provided for transfer of the legal parentage
of children where the surrogacy arrangement meets the requirements set out in
legislation’
and that to enter Australia to live, a child born through international surrogacy
will have to have Australian citizenship by descent or enter on a permanent
visa. Therefore, the letter is surely not guaranteed to be viewed by the Indian
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
International Commercial Surrogacy and Children’s Rights 117
government as meeting the requirements and conditions specified for eligibility
for the grant of a medical visa for international surrogacy.
6.1.3 United Kingdom: “Guidance: Surrogacy Overseas”
In early February 2014, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth
Office published online its Guidance on surrogacy overseas. This official
guidance is to inform prospective commissioning parents from the UK as to
the issues they should be aware of and may encounter through international
surrogacy (note that the UK Government Border Agency has also published
its own internal guidance for use by entry clearance staff regarding the handl-
ing of international surrogacy visa applications made outside the UK). The UK’s
Guidance: Surrogacy Overseas is a response to the reality that:
‘British Embassies and High Commissions are dealing with an increasing number
of people who are choosing international surrogacy as an alternative route to
parenthood, with more and more parents heading to the US, India, Ukraine and
Georgia to enter into surrogacy arrangements.’
Indeed, last year the UK judiciary continued to urge the government to take
active steps to inform and educate prospective commissioning parents about
international surrogacy, with Mrs Justice Theis observing, obiter dicta, that:
‘The message needs to go out loud and clear to encourage parental order applica-
tions to be made in respect of children born as a result of international surrogacy
agreements, and for them to be made promptly.’ (J v G [2013] EWHC 1432 (Fam),
at [30])
The UK Guidance provides similar warnings as the Australian and New
Zealand guidance, directed at prospective commissioning parents about the
risks of international surrogacy, but is more comprehensive in terms of the
contextual information it provides. The Guidance makes clear that a genetic
link between one of the commissioning parents and any child born through
international surrogacy will likely need to be proven for the granting of British
nationality to the child. The Guidance cautions in relation to the child’s genetic
identity that:
‘Several cases have come to light where there is no genetic link between the
intended parents and the child born through a surrogacy arrangement. We re-
commend that you make sure that you work with a reputable clinic which can
satisfy you at an early stage that the child is genetically linked to you.’ (United





The Guidance predominantly focuses on legal parentage in relation to children
born through international surrogacy, and the steps in relation to nationality,
citizenship and visas for the child that commissioning parents will need to
take in order to be recognised as a child’s legal parent(s). Aligning with art
7 of the CRC, the Guidance specifically discusses how to register a child’s birth
with a British Embassy overseas in instances where a commissioning parent
is able to directly pass on British nationality to a child. Notably, the Guidance
itself is very light on content pertaining to any further protection of the rights
of the child, with a much stronger emphasis on parental rights. The Guidance
makes no mention of the UK’s international obligations relating to the rights
of the child, nor to the CRC itself or the principle of the best interests of the
child. Furthermore, the Guidance includes no mention of any protection
measures or requirements which would have the effect of safeguarding a
child’s right to the preservation of their identity.
However, the Guidance does include an annex entitled “List of documents
required when applying for a passport without registration in surrogacy cases”
(pp. 7-8), which includes, among other things, mandatory provision of evidence
that the commissioning father is the biological father of the child (DNA evidence
may be required); a “surrogacy agreement on official headed paper […] signed
by all parties and dated”; a witnessed “Document signed by the surrogate
mother which confirms that the surrogate mother gives up parental responsibil-
ity and custody of the child.”; the child’s birth certificate as issued by local
authorities; “photographs of the commissioning parents and baby from birth
to time of application; antenatal medical reports and scans from the surrogacy
clinic/hospital covering the entire duration of the pregnancy”; “Letter from
the Head Doctor at the surrogacy clinic setting out the details of the case”;
marriage certificates of the surrogate if she has been married; and “Identity
documents for the surrogate mother, e.g. passports, identity cards, driving
licence”. The requirement for such documentation may well have a positive
impact on upholding and enforcing child’s right to identity, if that information
is properly safeguarded by the State and/or the commissioning parents, for
the child’s future access in later in life.
It is worth noting that the UK Guidance does address the issue of inter-
national commercial surrogacy slightly more explicitly than the Australian
or New Zealand fact and information sheets, alluding to the fact that this may
impact on commissioning parent’s ability to bring a child born through ICS
back to the UK and to be recognised as a legal parent to the child. The Guid-
ance states that:
‘Although you are entering into a surrogacy arrangement overseas, if you intend
to settle in the UK you must comply with UK law. You should be aware that offering
commercial brokering services to set up surrogacy arrangements in the UK is illegal.
You are allowed to pay reasonable expenses to the surrogate mother. These
expenses will be considered by a UK family court when seeking a UK parental order.
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You should bear this in mind when entering into a surrogacy agreement overseas.’
(p. 1)
However, the Guidance makes no mention of guarding against the sale or
trafficking of children, or the UK’s international obligations in this respect.
Information on specific requirements pertaining to international surrogacy
in India is incorporated into the body of the Guidance (p.6). A letter from the
UK government (dated 01 May 2013) appears as an annex, enabling com-
missioning parents applying for a medical visa to India to use this in support
of their application to the Indian government for entry to the country for the
purpose of surrogacy. The letter notes that:
‘the United Kingdom recognises surrogacy in India so long as it meets the condi-
tions set out by the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. The Act
allows for a child to be treated in law as the child of a couple if the child is genetic-
ally related to at least one of the commissioning couple and no money other than
reasonably incurred expenses has been paid in respect of the surrogacy arrange-
ment.’
Therefore, the UK makes clear its line in the sand relating to commodification
of children and human reproduction. The letter emphasises that due to the
varying factual scenarios possible in international surrogacy:
‘the way that a child born as the result of a surrogacy arrangement through an
Indian surrogate mother may be brought into the United Kingdom will depend
on individual circumstances.’ (p. 11).
The letter concludes by specifying the three possible routes for a child born
in India through international surrogacy to UK commissioning parent(s), and
the different entry possibilities arising out of each. Although on the face of
it, the letter it is unclear whether it reaches the threshold for the condition
of supporting material for an Indian medical visa required by the Indian
government, it is certainly more comprehensive than that provided by the
Australian government to date, and it will arguably make the situation pertain-
ing to the nationality of the child in the UK clearer to the Indian government.
7 JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN SELECTED
REPORTED ICS CASE LAW
The above analysis of the various approaches taken across three ICS demand
state jurisdictions utilising quasi-policy measures demonstrates the efforts that
some states are dedicating to create some level of clarity and certainty as to
how they will deal with ICS cases involving their nationals or residents. On




issues pertaining to the rights of the child in ICS, do not yet demonstrate a
comprehensive focus on the rights of the child and measures for protection
of the child in ICS situations. The New Zealand International Surrogacy Infor-
mation Sheet (including Non-binding guidelines) currently appears to go the
furthest towards taking a child-centred perspective to international surrogacy.
In all three national jurisdictions (to a greater extent in some than others), a
regulation gap exists in national law and policy with regard to ICS. It seems
unlikely that this will be filled whilst an international agreement on inter-
national surrogacy is under consideration (see Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Parentage/Surrogacy Project, http://
www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=178). In the meantime,
applications regarding international surrogacy – including ICS – continue to
be heard before family courts in all three jurisdictions; as Table 1 illustrates,
this trend shows no sign of abating. In the absence of both comprehensive
international regulation and clear and harmonious state legislation and policy
on ICS, the courts are playing a crucial role in exercising residual protection
for the rights of the child in ICS situations.
The ethics and economics of ICS can be distracting and to some extent,
irrelevant for courts to consider in reaching decisions related to applications
arising out of international surrogacy situations. Whilst ethical and economic
considerations provide helpful context for developing judicial reasoning, and
indeed, in the area of commodification, useful guidance and frameworks to
view ICS through, Henaghan astutely observes that:
‘In these cases international Family Court Judges need to have the courage to put
the overriding principle in family law, namely the welfare and best interests of
the child, before the politics of the morality and legality of international surrogacy.’
(Henaghan, 2013: 21).
However, the human rights framework is of crucial importance to judicial
decision-making related to international surrogacy situations, given the pro-
tection standards and norms that it sets down and the international obligations
it places on states in regard to the rights of the child. Therefore, in reaching
decisions regarding ICS and international surrogacy situations, to what extent
are the courts in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom taking an
approach that is focused primarily on the rights of the child as identified in
this paper as being critical to realising the child’s best interests in ICS? The
tables below, and associated commentary, seek to provide a brief overview
of this, and to highlight gaps where the international human rights framework
can be better harnessed in future to ensure protection for the child. For further
fact-specific discussion of some of the cases falling within this sample, see
Harland, 2013, and Henaghan, 2013.
In terms of the particular child rights issues of central importance in ICS
and international surrogacy situations, and therefore important for courts to
consider when making a determination in relation to grant of parentage,
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parenting or adoption orders, Table 2 below highlights that the courts in all
three jurisdictions have been strongly concerned with consideration of the
child’s best interests and welfare. This demonstrates a high level of application
of the best interests of the child as one of the five “principles” of the CRC.
Connected to issues of welfare, decisions across the three jurisdictions are also
strong on consideration of the child’s right to grow up in a family environment.
Finally, in relation to the preservation of the child’s right to identity, the
Australian and United Kingdom courts are particularly conscious of this issue
in international surrogacy, as reflected in judgments to date, whilst the New
Zealand courts have given less consideration to this issue. However, given
the critical importance of this right for children in international surrogacy
situations, it would be a positive step for courts to include this as a mandatory
consideration when exercising decision-making powers in applications concern-
ing international surrogacy.
Table 2: Frequency of reference to selected child rights issues in international surrogacy related
judgements, per jurisdiction, 2008-2014 (based on all decisions lodged on relevant legal databases























Table 3 below highlights that courts across the three jurisdictions give very
limited explicit weight to the CRC, by way of specific inclusion of reference
to the Convention or relevant provisions. Including explicit reference to the
Convention would arguably assist in highlighting the importance of the rights
of the child and the international legal framework that exists to support,
facilitate and protect the rights of the child in international surrogacy situ-
ations. Explicit reference to the Convention can serve to assist in strengthening
the legal reasoning of judgments in relation to the rights of the child, and aid
in bringing a human rights lens to the situation of the child, to deal with the
child’s individual situation in a more holistic way, with consideration to their




circumstances of birth. However, judges may feel that explicit reference to
the Convention is unnecessary if the relevant rights-related issues are covered
through the use of other language (for example, the Australian judgments are
relatively strong on the inclusion of the rights as captured in Table 2 above,
yet only one judgment refers explicitly to the CRC), or there may be other
reasons for this lack of inclusion, which are not immediately apparent, but
which may be interesting to explore further with members of the judiciary.
Table 3: Instances of explicit reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in
international surrogacy related judgments, 2008-2014 (based on all decisions lodged on relevant
legal databases up to and including 28 February 2014)
Of 31 total decisions, number of judgments where explicit reference to








As discussed earlier in this paper, given the child’s inability to put forward
their own views in ICS applications coming before national courts and that
they lack agency due to their infancy, and due to the potentially clashing rights
of the child and other parties involved, it is very important for the child to
be independently represented by a trained third party before decision-making
bodies that will determine key aspects of the child’s future. A lawyer for the
child or counsel to assist the court can usefully fill this role. However, Table 4
below highlights that in Australia and the United Kingdom, such representa-
tion is the exception not the rule, which is concerning, given the limitations
this places on the courts’ ability to hear arguments around the best interests
and rights of the child. Positively, the New Zealand Family Court appears
to be more conscious of the important role to be played by such legal counsel,
with over 50% of cases having involved such a representative in relation to
the rights and best interests of the child. The divergence between the courts
in the three jurisdictions in this respect provides a potential opportunity for
the New Zealand Family Court to share best practice with its counterparts
in Australia and the UK and to highlight the value of involving such counsel
to ensure the child’s rights and best interests are appropriately considered.
Moreover, it would be interesting to examine whether this aligns with a
broader trend in approaches in wider family court matters in each jurisdiction,
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Table 4: Instances of decisions relating to international surrogacy where the child’s interests
represented by lawyer for the child or counsel to assist the court, 2008-2014 (based on all
decisions lodged on relevant legal databases up to and including 28 February 2014)
Of 31 total decisions relating to international surrogacy, number of judgments where








Arguably, the above discussion in relation to specific child rights related
aspects of judicial decision making in international surrogacy cases to date
in Australia, New Zealand and the UK paints a concerning picture. However,
to say that this is the whole picture would be inaccurate. The body of juris-
prudence across these three jurisdictions to date highlights courts grappling
with the novel and complex issues of international surrogacy, with judges
placed in the extremely difficult position of considering the situation of
children who have been born through highly complicated circumstances, in
a different state, yet are before the court and essentially needing to “take
children as it finds them” in order to reach decisions (Ellison, 2012: at [87]).
Yet this is not to say that the contextual background to the child’s situation
should not have a bearing on judicial decision-making in these kinds of cases.
It is highly relevant, and where courts encourage inquires into such matters
to be made, the child’s rights may be further upheld and able to be enjoyed
by the child. Furthermore, the courts in all three jurisdictions have begun to
engage with the rights of the child set out by the CRC which are of particular
importance in international surrogacy. There is definitely room for develop-
ment here, with a greater level of consideration and incorporation of reasoning
based on the CRC framework of rights and principles highly likely to benefit
the children whose situations receive consideration by the courts. In this
respect, any efforts by national courts dealing with international surrogacy
cases to embrace and apply the “protective shadow” that the CRC casts over
children (Ellison, 2012: at [84]), through approaches such as human rights
reasoning based on the Convention, and the appointment of legal counsel for
the child, is to be strongly encouraged and commended.
8 CONCLUSION: PLACING THE CHILD’S RIGHTS AND BEST INTERESTS AT THE
HEART OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
This paper has highlighted the impact of the growth of conception cross-border
and explored the clash of rights that is often difficult to avoid. It has covered




proposition that the child is the most vulnerable person in ICS situations, with
attention needing to be paid to how their rights under the international human
rights legal framework are dealt with. The ethical discussion of ICS presented
in this paper – explored in the light of the economic realities of ICS – emphas-
ises that the quandary of ICS in relation to children is the value that is accorded
to them and the protection that attaches as a result. The discussion demon-
strates that simply because there is a commercial element to a transaction does
not automatically mean that it is a bad thing – but that the possibility of taint-
ing something not usually commercialised through the process of commodifica-
tion needs to be guarded against, even in instances of mutually advantageous
trades. The somewhat difficult fact of ICS arrangements only being complete
when a child is provided to commissioning parents cannot be ignored.
The international human rights law framework pertaining to the child has
been shown, therefore, to be a very relevant and helpful tool for focusing on
the child and ensuring their protection in ICS. Particular rights – such as those
to preservation of identity, nationality, a family environment, and various
social and economic rights – are most at risk for children in ICS situations, and
their overall best interests in connection to these deserve more comprehensive
consideration by those involved in the practice at ICS. There is scope for the
“practice of rights”, as relevant to the context of ICS, to grow deeper roots and
for those involved with ICS at all levels to be conscious that “Exercise, respect,
enjoyment and enforcement are four principal dimensions of the practice of
rights.” (Donnelly, 2013: 8) Professional lines of defence – from consular staff,
to social workers, to policy-makers, doctors and judges – can further harness
this rights framework to better protect children.
Approaches amongst Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom
as example “demand” states in relation to ICS show the utilisation of pragmatic,
quasi-policy responses seeking to deal with international surrogacy, and to
draw lines in the sand around what will be condoned in the absence, in many
instances, of clear legislative and policy positions ameliorating residual uncer-
tainty. These approaches have incorporated, to some extent, a child-centred
perspective, but more can be done. In the area of judicial decision-making
around international surrogacy over the past five years, approaches in all three
sample jurisdictions provide a hopeful start towards considering and protecting
the rights of the child; especially given the complex factual scenarios arising
out of international surrogacy situations sometimes light on factual evidence,
and the international regulation lacuna which persists. This body of case law
does demonstrate, however, that practical steps, such as the appointment of
counsel representing the child, can be more frequently taken and that more
rigorous analysis of the child’s situation and best interests in light of their CRC
rights can be incorporated in future given the value of its protective shadow
over children. Future international protection – whether through a Hague
convention or other methods such as bilateral agreements between states, or
the introduction of standards and agreements relating to the treatment of
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parties to ICS, including the child – will contemplate the ethics and economics
through the course of their development, and in coming to fruition will ideally
place strong focus on the rights and best interests of the child.
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6 Unconceived, Unborn, Uncertain
Is Pre-Birth Protection Necessary in International
Commercial Surrogacy for Children to Exercise and
Enjoy Their Rights Post-Birth?
Abstract
Certain rights of children under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
may be negatively impacted once they are born through ICS by actions and
decisions taken prior to their conception and birth. This Chapter focuses
exclusively on this issue. It identifies and examines these preconception and
prenatal challenges to the child’s rights in ICS and contends that due to the
intentional, planned nature of ICS and the involvement of multiple possible
parents, steps must be taken to protect the future child’s rights both preconcep-
tion and prenatally in all ICS arrangements. A suggested approach to pre-
conception and prenatal protection of the future child’s rights in ICS is outlined,
including three basic safeguards that can be practically implemented to ensure
children born through ICS can exercise and enjoy their CRC rights. Together
with the preceding chapters and the ones that follow, this Chapter ensures
this study treats the rights of the child in ICS holistically, considering the ICS
timeline from before birth, during the child’s gestation, and following the
child’s birth.
Main Findings
- No international consensus exists regarding pre-birth rights protection,
as reflected in domestic jurisprudence, regional human rights jurisprudence,
national constitutions and international human rights law.
- However, the CRC leaves open the option of its application to the pre-birth
context; jurisprudence reflects that it is possible for some protection to be
afforded before birth to a future child, without conferring rights pre-birth.
- The CRC should be interpreted dynamically, in light of ICS as a current-day
child rights challenge.
- Decisions and actions taken in the preconception and prenatal stages of
ICS arrangements can impact on the rights of future children born through
individual ICS arrangements.
- Preconception and prenatal decisions and actions taken by commissioning
parents and other actors in ICS arrangements should be taken in line with




that such children can exercise and enjoy their full range of CRC rights,
if and when they are born through ICS.
- A three-pronged set of strategic safeguards is proposed, to help ensure
preconception and prenatal actions and decisions in ICS preserve the oppor-
tunity for future children to exercise and enjoy their rights. These safe-
guards can be practically implemented by ICS actors, despite the lack of
international regulation or agreement concerning ICS as a method of family
formation or of ICS.
Contextual notes
- This Chapter presents new and novel analysis in the ICS context, from a
child rights perspective.
- It is highly relevant to the contemporary child rights challenges arising
in ICS, given that ICS case law across many jurisdictions (both domestic
and regional) continues to reflect the reality that preconception and
prenatal decisions and actions taken in ICS are having significant impacts
on the ability of children to exercise and enjoy their rights once born.
This Chapter has been accepted for publication in The International Journal of
Children’s Rights, Issue 1, 2018 (forthcoming).
1 INTRODUCTION
Human reproduction has experienced marked shifts over the past 40 years,
with medical and technological advances enabling the birth of children in new
ways via assisted reproductive technology (ART). International Commercial
Surrogacy (ICS) is one distinct new method of family formation emerging over
the past decade. Children are created through ICS to fulfil the wishes of ‘com-
missioning parents’ and brought to term by a surrogate ‘mother’ outside the
commissioning parents’ home country. Such children may be genetically related
to one or both commissioning parents, to their surrogate mother or to none
of these parties, instead related to third-party gamete donors (sometimes in
combination with a commissioning parent). ICS blends surrogacy practice with
ART methods in a cross-border setting. The supply-side practice of ICS is
situated in a small number of less developed states and some states in the
United States of America,1 responding to demand from prospective parents
1 E.g. the state of California allows commercial surrogacy and grants pre-birth parentage.
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predominantly from the more-developed world.2 Aside from the involvement
of a surrogate, common factors in all ICS arrangements are their international
nature; the conception of children in a highly intentional, planned way; and
the involvement of multiple parties with potential parentage claims over
resulting children. Furthermore, at the outset, such arrangements are premised
on commissioning parents’ intentions to assume care for the child(ren) once
born and remove them to a different state to reside.
ICS arrangements centre on children that ‘will be’; as such, the practice of
ICS raises questions pertaining to the protection of children’s future rights
during the preconception3 and prenatal4 stages of such arrangements. The
issue of the treatment of unborn children in ICS deserves special attention from
an international human rights law perspective because medical and techno-
logical advances have outstripped national laws and policies, and no inter-
national regulation of ICS currently exists.5 Consequently, children born
through ICS are sometimes born into situations of heightened vulnerability,
in part due to their enjoyment of some of their rights under the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) being restricted by decisions and
actions taken preconception and prenatally.
This paper considers whether children require some level of human rights
protection in ICS before birth, so they can exercise and enjoy the full range
of CRC rights once they are born. It considers how preconception and prenatal
decisions and actions impact the rights of children born through ICS. Focusing
on the specific context of ICS, this paper crucially addresses a gap in scholarship
regarding linkages between decisions and actions concerning children occurring
before they are born and their ability to realise their CRC rights once born.
Given this focus on issues arising preconception and prenatally that can impact
the child’s ability once born to enjoy and exercise their CRC rights, right to
2 E.g. according to some sources, as at 2014 the greatest demand per capita for ICS comes
from commissioning parents in Australia. See: Cooper, M., et al (eds.), Current Issues and
Emerging Trends in Medical Tourism, (Hershey: Medical Information Science Reference, 2015),
147.
3 For the purposes of the discussion in this paper, ‘preconception stage’ refers to the time
before a child is conceived in ICS; commissioning parents may be researching, seeking
advice (for example from medical professionals, legal advisors, surrogacy brokers), making
decisions, and even taking actions to conceive a child through ICS (such as purchasing
gametes), but conception has not yet occurred and therefore the future child is only an
idea.
4 For the purposes of the discussion in this paper and given that ICS arrangements are usually
ART-based, ‘prenatal stage’ refers to the period from which a pre-embryo exists for use
in the ICS arrangement and once the foetus is in utero up until child birth.
5 The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has appointed
an Experts Group with a mandate to explore the feasibility of advancing work on the private





life issues fall largely out of scope.6 However, it is acknowledged that de-
cisions and actions sometimes occur in ICS leading to children not being born.
Despite being outside the scope of this paper, these do raise significant human
rights issues from a child rights perspective.7
A main feature of ICS is its intentional, planned nature as a method of creat-
ing a child. Unlike intercountry adoption – a practice with its roots in provid-
ing pre-existing children in need of care and protection with a family environ-
ment across borders – ICS is a method of family-building centred on creating
new children across borders to meet the desire and demand of commissioning
parents. The fact that ICS also involves multiple parties and occurs across
borders makes it the most complex, risky method of having a child. Therefore,
this paper proceeds from the hypothesis that due to the intentional, planned
nature of ICS, the involvement of multiple possible parents and the potential
impact of preconception and prenatal decisions and actions on the rights of
children born through ICS arrangements, preconception and prenatal protection
of the unborn future child is required in all ICS situations.
To explore this hypothesis, firstly the potential impact of decisions and
actions taken during the preconception and prenatal stages on the CRC rights
of children who are born through ICS are highlighted. This provides a snapshot
of the problem to be addressed. This is followed by analysis of whether inter-
national human rights law provides a basis for protecting the unborn child,
and selected regional human rights jurisprudence and domestic approaches
concerning protection of the unborn (non-ICS) child are analysed. Following
this, the intentional, planned nature of ICS and the associated responsibilities
of the actors involved in ICS are discussed. Based on the foregoing discussion,
focus shifts to the areas in which protection is required preconception and
prenatally in ICS to ensure that particular CRC rights are not an empty promise
for children born through ICS, but rather that they can exercise and enjoy their
CRC rights from birth. Informed throughout by a public international law child
rights framework, this paper concludes by recommending particular preconcep-
tion and prenatal protective safeguards for the rights of future children in ICS,
highlighting the roles and obligations of various parties in this highly conten-
tious area of children’s rights.
6 Given that in instances where the child does not end up being born as a result of an ICS
arrangement, their enjoyment and exercise of rights becomes moot point in the context
of the focus of this paper.
7 The child rights issues arising from decisions and actions in ICS arrangements leading to
children not being born e.g. as a result of multiple embryo transfer and subsequent foetal
reduction, sex selection or abortion on other non-medically necessary grounds merit separate
future research, centring on issues raised under Articles 2 (non-discrimination) and 6 CRC
(right to life, survival and development).
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2 THE IMPACT OF ACTIONS AND DECISIONS IN THE PRENATAL AND PRECON-
CEPTION STAGES OF ICS ON THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN ONCE BORN
In ICS, preconception and prenatal decisions and actions can trigger implica-
tions for the child’s enjoyment and exercise of their CRC rights once born.
Figure 1 below provides a snapshot of the core rights of the child that can
be impacted negatively by problems arising during the prenatal and preconcep-
tion stages of ICS. As illustrated, these cluster around issues relating to the
child’s identity and their protection and participation rights. These core rights
at risk are discussed further below in the contexts of the preconception and
prenatal stages of ICS, highlighting some of the ways these rights impacts are
triggered by actions and decisions before the child is even born.
Figure 1
2.1 Key child rights impacts triggered during the preconception stage of
ICS
During the preconception stage of ICS, the future child is only an abstract
thought, desired by the commissioning parents. Therefore, to start thinking
about the future child’s rights can appear to stretch the concept of human
rights. However, in the ICS context, it is necessary to do so given the reality
that decisions and actions taken before conception can have a clear and signi-
ficant impact on the child’s enjoyment and exercise of their rights from birth
onwards. Regarding some CRC rights, if they are not given forethought and
some protection before birth, they will be rendered meaningless for the child
once born. Decisions made by commissioning parents to use anonymous
CRC rights potentially 
impacted post-birth 
by problems arising 
during preconception 
and prenatal stages of 
ICS
Right to know and be cared 
for by parents (Art. 7)
Right to enjoy highest 
attainable level of health 
(Art. 24)
Right to be free from 
discrimination (Art. 2)
Right not to be sold or 
trafficked (Art. 35)
Right to grow up in a 
family environment (Art. 
9; preamble)





gametes to conceive a child in ICS, and/or an anonymous surrogate mother
to bring the child to term are preconception decisions with far-reaching impacts
on the future child’s rights. Most significantly, these decisions can trigger
severe restrictions on the child’s Article 8 CRC right to preserve their identity
once they are born. In ICS arrangements using anonymous gametes, the child
will not be able to preserve their genetic identity and will be unable to know
their genetic parents, raising an additional breach of their right to know their
parents under Article 7 of the CRC. When anonymous surrogates are involved
in ICS, this has a similar impact on the child’s Article 7 and 8 rights, except
in relation to the biological aspect of the child’s identity (and therefore, their
ability to know the person who carried them to term and gave birth to them).
In instances where the child is born through ICS using anonymous gametes,
an associated implication of being unable to preserve the genetic element of
their identity is that the child will not be able to access health history informa-
tion relating to their genetic parents. This may mean the child remains unaware
of their risk of developing medical conditions or diseases detectable through
genetic health history, and they will remain unable to take preventative
measures relating to such conditions and diseases. This prevents the child from
full enjoyment of their Article 24 right to the highest attainable standard of
health. This may also be the case from a biological perspective regarding the
child’s surrogate mother, in instances where she remains anonymous. The
negative impacts of these preconception decisions and actions on the child’s
Articles 7, 8 and 24 rights will have a lifetime impact on the child once born,
and will be inconsistent with the child’s right under Article 3 CRC to have their
best interests treated as a primary consideration in all actions concerning them
and the principle that all CRC rights must be implemented consistent with the
best interests principle.8
The use of incorrect gametes or embryo is a further problematic situation
which can arise during the preconception stage of ICS, triggering impacts on
the child’s rights once born. This can occur when the gametes or embryo
intended by the commissioning parents for use in the ICS arrangement are
mixed-up with those intended for use in a different ICS or ART arrangement,
leading to a child being born with a genetic makeup different to that intended.
In ICS arrangements where this occurs and the future child was intended to
have a genetic link to one or two of their commissioning parents, this will
mean the child is born without such a link. In mix-up situations where the
child’s genetic parents are unable to be traced, this will lead to a breach of
the child’s Article 8 identity right, their Article 7 right to know their parents
(regarding genetic parents), and in turn, their Article 24 right. Furthermore,
when incorrect gametes or embryo are used in ICS and it is established that
8 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14: The Right of the Child to Have
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the child is not of the genetic make-up intended, this raises the potential of
commissioning parents abandoning the child following his or her birth. If this
occurs, this will arguably breach the non-discrimination principle (Article 2
CRC); the child’s right to grow up in a family environment (established by
Article 9 CRC and in the CRC preamble) may also be at risk; and the abandoned
child may be at risk of child trafficking or sale, which is prohibited under
Article 35 CRC.
2.2 Key child rights impacts triggered during the prenatal stage of ICS
Once the child is in-utero, many actions and decisions may be taken by parties
to and involved with an ICS arrangement leading to negative impacts on the
future child’s rights once born. The child’s enjoyment and exercise of their
CRC rights under articles 2, 7, 8, 9, 24 and 35 will potentially be impacted by
the decisions and actions occurring in each of the following scenarios which
may arise during the prenatal stage of ICS:
- A multiple pregnancy occurs and commissioning parents decide they will
not take one (or more) of the future children in the event they are born.
- Prenatal testing detects the unborn child does not fulfil the particular intent
of the commissioning parents (for example, a different sex to that intended;
disability or serious health condition), and as a result commissioning
parents decide to abandon the ICS arrangement while the child is in-utero
or once the child is born.
- A decision is made by commissioning parents and/or the surrogate to not
prenatally screen for disabilities and serious health conditions, and upon
birth, a disability or serious health condition is detected; the commissioning
parents abandon the child as a result.
- The surrogate and commissioning parents disagree regarding the surrog-
ate’s control/autonomy over health and lifestyle decisions during preg-
nancy, leading to commissioning parents reneging on the ICS arrangement
and abandoning the child before or after birth.
- Commissioning parents decide to renege on the ICS arrangement for any
other reason before or after birth, and in doing so, abandon the child.
One further problematic situation which can arise during the prenatal stage
of ICS is the surrogate reneging on the ICS arrangement and deciding during
pregnancy that she wants to keep the child or children once born. This raises
potential implications for the child’s enjoyment and exercise of their rights
under Articles 7, 8 and 24 once born, if the child is unable to know their
commissioning parents and their genetic parents.
Three factors often determine if the preconception and prenatal problems
highlighted in the above sections arise in an ICS arrangement: the intent and




the surrogate mother’s wishes and control over her reproductive autonomy;
and the nature of the agreement between the parties. However, it is essential
to introduce the rights and best interests of the future child as another deter-
mining factor during the preconception and prenatal stages of every ICS
arrangement. This is crucial given the future child’s centrality to all such
arrangements and their vulnerability regarding their rights and status due
to being conceived and born through ICS.
3 DOES INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PROTECT-
ING THE UNBORN CHILD?
Having outlined the significant challenges to child rights in ICS triggered by
actions and decisions taking place before the child is conceived and born, it
is necessary to consider whether international human rights law provides a
basis for protecting unborn future children in ICS. This section primarily focuses
on whether unborn children have rights under the CRC, before briefly consider-
ing other international human rights law instruments.
3.1 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
None of the CRC’s operative clauses explicitly address whether unborn children
have rights. Article 1, defining ‘child’ is silent on this; Nolan notes “this
‘silence’ of the CRC reflects the absence of a universally agreed-upon age when
childhood begins” (Nolan, 2011, 3); and as Cornock and Montgomery note,
“Given the controversy of deciding when life begins […] this deliberate lack
of definition is not surprising. […] to gain the maximum number of ratifica-
tions, such a contentious issue was always likely to be deliberately obscured
in the drafting process.” (Cornock and Montgomery, 2011, 11) The CRC’s lack
of a definition regarding the start of childhood leaves open the option of
interpreting the CRC as extending to the unborn child; Dorscheidt asserts given
Article 1 “does not mention a minimum age limit, it remains possible that the
Convention also includes the unborn child.” (Dorscheidt, 1999, 309) Janoff
elaborates that “The Article 1 definition allows for several interpretations of
when childhood might begin under the Convention: at fertilisation, at con-
ception, at birth, or at some other point between conception and birth.” (Janoff,
2004, 164)
The CRC preamble includes some guidance regarding the CRC’s application
pre-birth. Preambular paragraph nine includes a statement referencing the
prenatal child, using wording directly lifted from the Declaration of the Rights
of the Child (1924): “Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of
the Rights of the Child […] the child, by reason of his physical and mental
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immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal
protection, before as well as after birth”. Interpreting preambular paragraph
nine consistent with Article 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT),9 it appears the special protection afforded to children applies before
and after birth; the preamble’s wording relating to the unborn child is un-
ambiguous, providing an arguable basis for interpreting the CRC as providing
that some prenatal protection of the unborn child is necessary. This is despite
there being no explicit mandatory requirement of pre-birth protection in
preambular paragraph nine or anywhere else in the CRC. Interpreted in light
of the object and purpose of the CRC – which broadly speaking is the establish-
ment of standards and norms on the protection, participation and promotion
of the rights of the child – this meaning also holds.
However, in the context of the wider CRC text, it is necessary to analyse
the extent to which preambular paragraph nine can be relied on as establishing
a position at international law that rights should be protected pre-birth. This
is especially so given the lack of further explicit mention of ‘before birth’ in
the CRC’s operative provisions. Articles 6 and 24 are the only operative CRC
provisions which can be read as explicitly connecting to “before birth”. Article
6 recognises the child’s inherent right to life and that the child’s survival and
development will be protected to the maximum extent possible by States
Parties. But as Dorscheidt notes, as with Article 1, Article 6(1) “does not
indicate at what point life begins and because of this it is unclear at what
moment the enjoyment of the inherent right to life starts.” (Dorscheidt, 1999,
311)
In establishing the child’s right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health, Article 24 requires States Parties (in pursuing full imple-
mentation of this right) to, among other things, take appropriate measures
to diminish infant and child mortality (Art. 24(2)(b)) and to ensure appropriate
prenatal health care for mothers (Art. 24(2)(d)). As Grover posits, the inclusion
of these provisions indicate that “the child’s right to health encompasses also
the right to proper care prior to birth”. (Grover, 2015, 128). Kilty, arguing in
favour of children knowing the identities of their genetic parents given the
associated health benefits of knowing about health conditions and diseases
they may be genetic carriers of or pre-disposed to, says “one may only decide
to make lifestyle changes when one knows they are required. Information about
one’s predisposition to suffer genetic health problems is easier to obtain when
one knows the identities of one’s genetic parents. For this reason, children
who have been misled or denied information about their genetic parents, [as
a result of the circumstances of their birth] lack information about their genetic
9 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969 requires that
treaties are interpreted in “good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given




health history and, as a result, are at risk of having their welfare choices
compromised.” (Kilty, 2013, 5)
Furthermore, Articles 7 and 8 of the CRC have an implied connection to
the “before birth” reference in preambular paragraph nine. Article 7(1) estab-
lishes the child’s right to know and be cared for by his or her parents as far
as possible, and Article 8(1) stipulates the child’s right to preserve his or her
identity. The object and purpose of these provisions is arguably to ensure that
the child can know their parents and understand where they came from, and
have the opportunity to be able to answer the fundamental human question,
‘who am I?’ (Achmad, 2016). In the ICS context, such provisions only become
meaningfully operative if decisions and actions occurring during the pre-
conception and prenatal stages are consistent with these rights, protecting them
for the future child. If not, the child may experience difficulties exercising and
enjoying their Article 7 and 8 rights once born. For example, these rights
become meaningless in ICS situations where donor gametes are used, if there
is no obligation at the preconception stage to safeguard and preserve donors’
identity information. If such steps are not taken before the child is born to
protect their future rights under Articles 7 and 8, once born, the child will
never be able to know their genetic identity and genetic parents, therefore
unable to exercise and enjoy these CRC rights.
Article 31(1) VCLT states that ‘context’ for the purpose of interpretation of
treaties comprises, “in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes”, among other things “any agreement relating to the treaty which
was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty” (Article 31(2)(a) VCLT). Regarding the CRC, O’Rourke asserts “The
preamble counts. It gives context, weight and importance to what follows.
It established the framework, values and aspirations of those who framed the
document.” (O’Rourke, 2012, 4) Alston tempers this view, stating that the
preamble does not have obligatory force in its own right (Alston, 1990, 169),
a view confirmed by the International Court of Justice that alone, preambular
provisions do not generally amount to rules of law (South-West Africa Cases
(Second Phase) ICJ Rep. 1966, at [50]). Regarding other agreements made
between all parties connected with the conclusion of the CRC, it is notable that
the Open-Ended Working Group (O-EWG) drafting the CRC adopted the follow-
ing interpretative statement regarding inclusion of the ninth preambular
paragraph: “In adopting this preambular paragraph, the Working Group does
not intend to prejudice the interpretation of Article 1 or any other provision
of the Convention by States Parties.”10 Consequently, the door was left open
to interpretations extending CRC protection pre-birth, despite the Convention
itself not requiring it. Given this possibility, a small number of States Parties
10 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on a draft convention on the rights
of the child, (2 March 1989), E/CN.4/1989/48, [43]-[47].
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have lodged reservations or declarations regarding the CRC’s application to
pre-birth issues.11
3.1.1 Convention the Rights of the Child – Travaux Préparatoires
The travaux préparatoires provide further insight regarding the weight to be
accorded to preambular paragraph nine when interpreting the CRC.12 During
negotiation of the CRC, the issue of whether rights should accord before and
after birth divided the states involved (Detrick, 1992, 26); even amongst those
states arguing for rights before birth, there was disagreement over the exact
point at which such protection should commence.13
However, as Detrick outlines, this did not prevent some level of agreement
being reached:
‘… there was just one relevant point on which all could agree: that, as stated in
the Preamble of the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, the child “needs
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, both before
as well as after birth.” Such legal protection could include, but would not require,
the prohibition of abortion. Not without difficulty, the Working Group finally came
to a consensus that explicit reference to the formulation in the Declaration would
be made in the Preamble to the Convention, and that there would be no mention
of minimum age in Article 1.’ (Detrick, 1992, 26)
Despite the wording of preambular paragraph nine, Copelon argues that “This
reflects, at most, recognition of a state’s duty to promote, through nutrition,
health and support directed to the pregnant woman, a child’s capacity to
survive and thrive after birth” (Copelon, 2005, 122), and asserting that the
limited purpose of the words ‘before as well as after birth’ is reinforced by
the O-WEG’s statement regarding interpretation (Copelon, 2005, 122). However,
the fact remains that the possibility of pre-birth protection is in no way ruled
11 Argentina and Guatemala declare an interpretation of Article 1 CRC as applying to human
beings from the moment of conception; the Holy See declares it recognises the CRC as
safeguarding the child’s rights before birth, moreover stating that preambular paragraph
nine is the “perspective through which the rest of the Convention will be interpreted.”
Conversely, China and the United Kingdom’s declarations state that they interpret the CRC
as only applying following a live birth. See: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx
?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed 28 June 2016).
12 Art 32 VCLT states that “recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 (a) leaves the meaning am-
biguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or reasonable.”
13 E.g. Portugal favoured clear definition of the rights of the child applying before birth
(Detrick, S., 1992, 49); Malta and Senegal were more specific, seeking protection of the child’s
rights to begin from conception (a proposal the Holy See would have supported if it had




out by the final CRC text. In the context of ICS, Copelon’s framing of States
Parties’ duties does not go far enough to protect the child’s wider rights under
the CRC; without active protection of the future child’s rights before birth and
conception by both States Parties and other actors in ICS (such as commission-
ing parents and medical professionals), a number of their rights (as already
discussed) are at risk of not being able to be enjoyed and exercised once born.
Copelon’s position is also inconsistent with the Committee on the Rights of
the Child’s long-standing position of requiring States Parties to ensure children
born through ART can know their origins,14 which necessarily requires actions
to be taken preconception to protect the future child’s identity rights so they
are realisable by children in the event they are born.
Given this paper’s focus on ICS, it is significant to note that many O-EWG
delegations supported including a CRC article governing medical experimenta-
tion in the ART context (Alston, 1990, 166). Although no such provision appears
in the final text, one idea discussed was a provision that “would have extended
any protection accorded to children in general to “the conceived, unborn child”
who would have been protected from “genetic experiments and manipulations
injurious this physical, moral or mental integrity or to his health.” (Alston,
1990, 166) However, applying this idea of post-conception, prenatal protection
to the ICS context, it would not go far enough to protect the child’s rights in
situations already identified as arising preconception, negatively impacting
the child’s exercise and enjoyment of rights once born. Despite this, the CRC
framers’ consideration of pre-birth protection in the ART context indicates that
some protection pre-birth is important in the overall child rights rubric. The
fact this was considered over 25 years ago indicates the urgency for the CRC
to now be interpreted in an evolutive and dynamic way15 in light of contem-
porary developments such as ICS, as a living instrument (McGonagle and
Donders, 2015, 153) to ensure children’s rights are protected in such contexts.
On balance, the CRC text reflects compromises on pre-birth protection to
achieve a position acceptable to all states. It achieves this through including
preambular paragraph nine, therefore leaving open the option of prenatal
rights protection; consequently, “The Convention is neutral in neither requiring
nor forbidding formal legal protection of the fetus.” (Hodgson, 1994, 375)
Dorscheidt argues, therefore, that states parties to international human rights
treaties
‘are at liberty to hold whatever view on the unborn child’s legal position they
consider appropriate. Generally, States Parties give substance to this liberty by
14 E.g. see Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Norway,
(25 April 1994), CRC/C/15/Add.23, [10]. However, to date the Committee has not invoked
premabular paragraph nine to support its positon.
15 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8: The Right of the Child to
Protection from Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment, UN.
Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (7 March 2007), [18].
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holding the view that the unborn child derives no legal protection from these
human rights instruments. It is my impression, however, that this prevailing view
has emerged from the fact that during the drafting of many human rights treaties
the legal position of the unborn child was exclusively considered in relation to
abortion. Other prenatal matters were hardly discussed, probably because they
were not identified yet, or simply not familiar to the States’ delegates. Meanwhile,
there is much evidence to the fact that the legal position of the unborn child is not
a one-item issue and needs further elaboration in many other contexts as well.’
(Dorscheidt, 2010, 453)
Taking up Dorscheidt’s call, ICS should be treated as one of these ‘other pre-
natal matters’; by elaborating on the CRC’s application to the child’s situation
both preconception and prenatally in ICS, this paper adds to the body of
scholarship on the possibility of rights protection before birth under inter-
national human rights law.
3.1.2 Other international human rights law instruments
There is no explicit mention of pre-birth rights in the UDHR, ICCPR or the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Nor
are prenatal rights addressed by the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Human Rights. However, both the UDHR and the ICCPR establish the right to
life (Articles 3 and (1) respectively), and the ICCPR explicitly prohibits carrying
out the death penalty on pregnant women (Article 6(5)). The ICESCR states that
“special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period
before and after childbirth” (Article 10(2)), and that States Parties should take
steps necessary for “the provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and
infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child” (Article 12(2)(a)).
Beyond these provisions and the CRC as already discussed, there is little
guidance to be gleaned from international human rights law instruments
regarding how to approach the future child’s rights pre-birth.
Moreover, pre-birth issues have received scant attention in the general
comments of treaty bodies,16 and the Human Rights Committee (‘the HRC’,
receiving communications under the ICCPR) has dealt with very few cases
16 Of the few instances existing are the Human Rights Committee’s observation of the “high
incidence of prenatal sex selection and abortion of female foetuses” in its General Comment
No. 28 on Equality, and its statement in its General Comment No. 6 that “The expression
“inherent right to life” cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the
protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In this connection,
the Committee considers that it would be desirable for States parties to take all possible




concerning the situation of the child pre-birth.17 However, notably the Human
Rights Committee recently published a new draft General Comment on Article
6: Right to life,18 including a number of statements regarding the pre-birth
phase, for example emphasising “the Covenant does not explicitly refer to the
rights of unborn children” ([7]) and asserting that “This omission is deliberate,
since proposals to include the right to life of the unborn within the scope of
article 6 were considered and rejected during the process of drafting the
Covenant.” ([7]fn9) The Committee elaborates that
‘In the absence of subsequent agreements regarding the inclusion of the rights of
the unborn within Article 6 and in the absence of uniform State practice which
establishes such subsequent agreements, the Committee cannot assume that Article 6
imposes on State parties an obligation to recognize the right to life of unborn
children. Still, States parties may choose to adopt measures designed to protect
the life, potential for human life or dignity of unborn children, including through
recognition of their capacity to exercise the right the life [sic], provided that such
recognition does not result in violation of other rights under the Covenant, includ-
ing the right to life of pregnant mothers and the prohibition against exposing them
to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.’ ([7])
This statement aligns with the practice of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child regarding pre-birth issues, in which it has acknowledged the need for
some protection of the unborn child’s rights (for example regarding their right
to know their origins and the recommendation that States Parties “introduce
and strengthen prenatal care”19 for children with disabilities), expressed dis-
approval of practices such as abortion as a form of birth control,20 “discrim-
17 A communication made to the Human Rights Committee concerning the situation of unborn
children in the context of abortion in general in Canada was decided as being inadmissible
for consideration by the Committee. (Communication No. 1379/2005 CCPR/C/84/D/1379/
2005). Of those communications concerning pre-birth issues the Committee has considered
on their merits have been communications concerning, e.g., the situation of a rape victim
who was refused an abortion (Communication No. 1608/2007 CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007)
and the refusal of a therapeutic abortion for a pregnant adolescent despite medical opinions
that her life was in danger as a result of the continued pregnancy (Communication No.
1153/2003 CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003).
18 Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No. 36 Article 6: Right to Life, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/R.3 (1 April 2015).
19 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 9: The Rights of Children with
Disabilities, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/9, (27 February 2007), [53].
20 E.g. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Greece, UN Doc. CRC/C/
15/Add.170 (2 April 2002), [60]; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observa-
tions: Russian Federation, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 110, (10 November 1999), [46]; Commit-
tee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Latvia, UN Doc. CRC/C/ LVA/CO/
2, (28 June 2006), [44].
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inatory elimination of girls before birth”21 and sex-selection,22 but also made
clear its view that in situations where the physical or mental health and well-
being of a pregnant woman is at risk, her rights must be given precedence
over the unborn child’s right to life.23 The draft statement of the Human
Rights Committee also reinforces the CRC’s position of leaving open the option
for States Parties to choose whether to actively protect the child pre-birth.
The Human Rights Committee explicitly clarifies in this draft General
Comment that “the Covenant does not directly regulate questions relating to
the right to life of frozen embryos, eggs or sperms, stem cells or human clones.
States parties may regulate the protection of these forms of life or potential
life, while respecting their other obligations under the Covenant.” ([8]) How-
ever, the Committee also states that the special protection provided by the
prohibition in Article 6(5) ICCPR on carrying out the death sentence on pregnant
women “stems from an interest in protecting the rights and interests of affected
family members, including the unborn foetus and the foetus’s father.” ([50])
By making clear the position at international human rights law that although
not required absolutely, some level of pre-birth protection is important in some
contexts and certainly possible, this draft statement of interpretation is pro-
gressive given its acknowledgement that there is an interest in protecting the
rights and interests of the unborn foetus.
3.2 Treatment of the unborn child in regional human rights instruments
and national constitutions
3.2.1 Regional human rights instruments
Regional human rights instruments focus on pre-birth issues through pro-
visions protecting the right to life. The right to life as established by the ICCPR
is reflected in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the African
Child Welfare Charter and the European Convention on the Protection of
21 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 13: The right of the child to freedom
from all forms of violence, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/13, (18 April 2011), [16]: “The social costs
arising from a demographic imbalance due to the discriminatory elimination of girls before
birth are high and have potential implications for increased violence against girls including
abduction, early and forced marriage, trafficking for sexual purposes and sexual violence”.
The Committee also notes at para 11(i) of General comment 7 early childhood that “Discrim-
ination against girl children is a serious violation of rights. […] They may be victims of
selective abortion...”
22 E.g. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: China, UN Doc. CRC/
C/CHN/CO/2, (24 November 2005), [28]-[29].
23 E.g. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Chad, UN Doc. CRC/C/
15/Add.107, (24 August 1999), [30]. Janoff argues this indicates a developing international





Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but none of these key regional
human rights instruments mention pre-birth rights. However, the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) takes a different approach; as Schabas
notes, “the majority of Member States felt that the life of the unborn should
be protected” (Schabas, 2008, 1059). Therefore, Article 4(1) ACHR says the right
to life “shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of con-
ception.” This provision remains unique within international law.
In the European context, the European Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention) provides some guidance relating to the
preconception and prenatal stages. Although the Oviedo Convention focuses
on the ‘human being’ and (as per its preamble) is aimed at respect for the
human being and ensuring human dignity, it does not define ‘human being’,
and some of its provisions indicate limited prenatal protection should be
afforded to organisms with potential to develop into human beings. For
example, Article 12 restricts the use of predictive genetic tests to health pur-
poses or scientific research linked to health purposes. Article 14 prohibits the
practice of sex selection and refers to the ‘future child’, requiring that “The
use of techniques of medically assisted procreation shall not be allowed for
the purpose of choosing a future child’s sex, except where serious hereditary
sex-related disease is to be avoided.” Article 21 of the Ovideo Convention is
also explicit that “The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise
to financial gain”. Relevant to the preconception stage, Article 18(1) states that
“Where the law allows research on embryos in vitro, it shall ensure adequate
protection of the embryo.”24
3.2.2 National constitutions25
A small number of states take a constitutional approach to the issue of whether
the child receives protection pre-birth. Some constitutions protect unborn
24 The Oviedo Convention does not define what amounts to ‘adequate protection of the
embryo’; however, the Council of Europe’s Working Party on the Protection of the Human
Embryo and Foetus stated in its Report on the Protection of the Human Embryo In Vitro said
that “Even if positions differ on the status of the embryo and the creation of embryos in
vitro, there is general agreement on the need for protection. Measures taken to ensure that
protection and the level of protection may however vary […] measures provided usually
offer protection of the embryo in vitro from the fertilisation stage onwards. The aim in
general is to ensure optimal conditions for fertilisation and embryo culture, and respect
for good medical practice. One of the aims of protection is to ensure that the embryo is
not subjected to experimental procedures that could damage it or put at risk its develop-
mental potential.” (19 June 2003, 8).
25 Initial research for this section was undertaken through keyword searches for the terms
‘abort’; ‘abortion’; ‘child’; ‘children’; ‘conception’; ‘foetus’; ‘human’; ‘life’; ‘terminate’; ‘termin-
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children by prohibiting termination (Uganda;26 Zambia;27 Zimbabwe28) or
by protecting the health of mothers once a child is conceived (Venezuela29).
Others protect unborn children alongside the mother’s right to life (Ireland,30
the Philippines31). However, the most common approach to constitutional
pre-birth protection is a statement that life or the right to life begins32 or state
protection of human life applies from conception.33 Within this group various
nuances are apparent. The Hungarian Constitution (also protecting life from
the moment of conception) is the only national constitution including the term
‘foetus’;34 El Salvador explicitly “recognizes as a human person every human
being since the moment of conception”;35 whereas Madagascar frames pre-
birth recognition within the right to health from conception.36 Beyond these
approaches, the Chilean Constitution uniquely protects “the life of those about
to be born”,37 which Couso et al assert leaves room for regulating abortion
through law (Couso, 2011, 185). Peru has a more extreme position, constitu-
tionally recognising “the unborn child is a rights-bearing subject in all cases
26 Article 22(2), Chapter 4, Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (amended by the Constitu-
tion (amendment) (No. 2) Act, 2005): “No person has the right to terminate the life of an
unborn child except as may be authorised by law.”
27 Article 12(2), Part III, Constitution of Zambia (1991) “No person shall deprive an unborn
child of life by termination of pregnancy except in accordance with the conditions laid down
by an Act of Parliament for that purpose.”
28 Article 48(2), Part 2, Chapter 4, Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013): “An Act of Parliament
must protect the lives of unborn children, and that Act must provide that pregnancy may
be terminated only in accordance with that law.”
29 Article 76, Chapter V, Title III, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (1999)
“The State guarantees overall assistance and protection for motherhood, in general, from
the moment of conception”.
30 Article 40(3)(3), Constitution of Ireland (last amended 29 August 2015), 1937.
31 Section 12, Article II, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987).
32 Article 4, Chapter I, Title II, Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay (as amended 2011),
1992; Article 37, Section I, Chapter I, Title II, Constitution of the Dominican Republic (2010);
Article 26(2), Part 2, Chapter 4, Constitution of Kenya (2010).
33 Article 3, Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala (as amended to 1993), 1985; Article
45, Section 5, Chapter 3, Title II, Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador (2008); also similar,
although not expressed constitutionally, Polish legislation states that every human being
“shall have a natural life as from the time of his conception” (Section 1(1), Law of 7 January
1993 on family planning, protection of human foetuses and the conditions under which
pregnancy is possible) and “The life and health of the child shall be placed under the
protection of the law, as from the time of its conception.” (Section 1(2), Law of 7 January
1993 on family planning, protection of human foetuses and the conditions under which
pregnancy is possible)
34 Article 2, Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (2011): “Every human being shall have
the right to life and human dignity; the life of the foetus shall be protected from the moment
of conception.”
35 Article 1, Title I, Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador (as amended to 2003), 1993.
36 Article 19, Title II, Sub Title II, Constitution of the Republic of Madagascar (2010): “recog-
nises and organises for all individuals the right to the protection of health from their
conception through the organisation of free public health care”.




that benefit him”,38 whilst the Honduran Constitution equates the unborn
with the born (similar to El Salvador’s recognition of the unborn as human
persons from the moment of conception) for the purposes of all rights accorded
within limits established by law.39
Some constitutional courts have, however, held that protection of the foetus
must be balanced with the rights of the pregnant woman. For example, the
Colombian Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional a law giving complete
pre-eminence to the foetus, thereby extinguishing the woman’s fundamental
rights and violating her dignity “by reducing her to a mere receptacle for the
foetus, without rights or interests of constitutional relevance worthy of pro-
tection.” (Sentencia C-355/06, [10.1]) Article 15 of the Slovak Constitution states
that “Human life is worthy of protection even prior to birth”, however the
Slovak Constitutional Court held this must not be interpreted as trumping
the right of a pregnant woman to exercise her rights over her personal auto-
nomy and bodily integrity. (PL. US 12/01 from 4 December, 2007, [10])
The constitutional approaches highlighted above evidence in practice states’
ability to choose whether and to what extent they protect unborn children,
consistent with the margin left open to them by the CRC.
4 JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACHES TO PRE-BIRTH ISSUES
This section highlights leading regional human rights jurisprudence addressing
(albeit limitedly) whether human rights protection can attached pre-birth,
followed by analysis of leading regional and domestic jurisprudence and
statutory approaches to specific preconception and prenatal issues. These
jurisprudential approaches to pre-birth issues provide further insight relevant
when approaching the ICS context.
4.1 Leading regional human rights jurisprudence
The leading regional human rights jurisprudence of most relevance to the
discussion in this paper comes from the Inter-American and the European
Courts of Human Rights respectively; these are briefly discussed below.
4.1.1 Inter-American Court of Human Rights
In the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I-ACHR), Artavia Murillo et al
(“In Vitro Fertilisation”) v. Costa Rica (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, No-
38 Article 2(1), Constitution of the Republic of Peru (as amended up to 2009), 1993.
39 Article 67, Constitution of the Republic of Honduras (as amended to 1991), 1982.
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vember 28, 2012) is the leading case on this issue. The Court explicitly states
that an embryo is not a person for the purposes of Article 4(1) of the ACHR
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, [264]) and clarifies that the protection
of the right to life from ‘the moment of conception’ under the ACHR only has
effect from the time “the embryo becomes implanted in the uterus”(therefore,
Article 4 ACHR is inapplicable prior) (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, [264]).
The Court adopted a gradualist view of pre-birth rights, finding “it can be
concluded from the words “in general” that the protection of the right to life
under this provision is not absolute, but rather gradual and incremental
according to its development, since it is not an absolute and unconditional
obligation, but entails understanding that exceptions to the general rule are
admissible.” (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, [264]) De Jesus argues the
I-ACHR erred in its interpretation of Article 4(1) in Artavia Murillo (De Jesus,
2014, 227), asserting it has “interpreted the right to life from conception in
the most restrictive possible manner, holding that, before implantation, the
human embryo is not a person entitled to human rights protection under the
American Convention, while redefining the term “conception” as implantation,
not fertilisation.” (De Jesus, 2014, 226)
Indeed, if we were to apply this ruling to ICS situations, it would mean
that the rights of the child affected by actions or decisions preconception would
be outside the scope of protection as defined by the Court; this would clearly
have a negative impact on the rights of the child to identity preservation, and
to know their parents once born (depending on the circumstances, their com-
missioning parents, genetic parents, and/or their surrogate mother). The I-ACHR
has not dealt with another case on its merits concerning the issue of when
rights attach pre-birth since Artavia Murillo, however De Jesus may well be
correct that “It is unlikely that Artavia will be deemed to be the final word
on the interpretation [of] the right to life from conception.” (De Jesus, 2014,
248) It would certainly be useful if the Court outlines its reasoning
underpinning its position further; until then, Artavia Murillo arguably stands
as the most forthright contemporary judgment on this topic.
4.1.2 European Court of Human Rights
Despite being issued ten years ago, Vo v. France (App. no. 53924/00, Judgment
(Merits), Court (Grand Chamber) 08/07/2004) remains the leading European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment directly concerning whether Article 2
ECHR (right to life) applies pre-birth. A medical mix-up led to a procedure
being undertaken on the wrong pregnant woman (the applicant), during which
an act of medical negligence occurred, leading to a therapeutic abortion being
necessary to protect her health. As Wicks observes, Vo v. France is unusual
as it does not concern a fact scenario where the interests of the pregnant
woman conflict with the foetus’ interests; rather, the applicant asserted her




dispute concerns the involuntary killing of an unborn child against the
mother’s wishes, causing her particular suffering. The interests of the mother
and the child clearly coincided.” ([87])
The Grand Chamber held Article 2 ECHR inapplicable; it said even assuming
Article 2 applied, no violation of the right to life occurred. ([95]) However,
of particular relevance to the issue of pre-birth protection in ICS is the ECtHR’s
treatment of the issue of whether ECHR protection covers the embryo or foetus.
The ECtHR noted the silence of the ECHR regarding the temporal limitations
of the right to life, and said it was “yet to determine the issue of the “begin-
ning” of “everyone’s right to life” within the meaning of [Article 2 ECHR] and
whether the unborn child has such a right.” ([75])40 Observing no consensus
exists in Europe regarding the nature and status of the embryo or foetus, the
ECtHR said European states do hold a common view that the embryo/foetus
belongs to the human race. ([84]) Importantly, the ECtHR asserted “The poten-
tiality of that being and its capacity to become a person […] require protection
in the name of human dignity, without making it a “person” with the “right
to life” for the purposes of Article 2.” ([84]) Furthermore, the ECHR said the
possibility that “in certain circumstances safeguards may be extended to the
unborn child” ([80]) remains open. Therefore, it is possible the ECtHR will reach
a view in future (on particular facts and balancing the rights of other parties
involved) that human rights protection should be afforded to unborn children
under the ECHR. Indeed, should an ICS situation raising such questions form
the subject of an application to the ECtHR in future, the possibility of reaching
such a view remains open to the Court. Judge Rozakis further asserted in his
separate opinion:
‘Even if one accepts that life begins before birth, that does not automatically and
unconditionally confer on this form of human life a right to life equivalent to the
corresponding right of a child after its birth. This does not mean that the unborn
child does not enjoy any protection by human society, since – as the relevant
legislation of European States, and European agreements and relevant documents
show – the unborn life is already considered to be worthy of protection. But as
I read the relevant legal instruments, this protection, though afforded to a being
considered worthy of it, is, as stated above, distinct from that given to a child after
birth, and far narrower in scope.’ (Separate opinion of Judge Rozakis, Vo v. France,
App. no. 53924/00, Judgment (Merits), Court (Grand Chamber) 08/07/2004)
Finally regarding Vo v. France, the dissenting judgments are significant when
considering the preconception and pre-birth situation of the rights of children
in ICS. Judge Ress notes that the majority in Vo deviates from the prior
approach of the ECtHR’s case law on this issue, which has been based on the
40 Moreover, the Grand Chamber said it was not desirable or possible to “answer in the
abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2
of the Convention.” ([85])
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in eventu or “assuming that” argument. (Dissenting opinion of Judge Ress,
Vo v. France, App. no. 53924/00, Judgment (Merits), Court (Grand Chamber)
08/07/2004, [3]) Judge Ress therefore argues that a foetus may enjoy protection
under the ECHR, especially under Article 8(2) (Dissenting judgment of Judge
Ress, [4]) and that Article 2 is applicable to children even before birth. (Dissent-
ing judgment of Judge Ress, [9]) Judge Mularoni cites the fact that all European
states have special legislative provisions regarding abortion means consensus
exists that the foetus does have some kind of rights requiring protection
(Dissenting opinion of Judge Mularoni joined by Judge Strážnická, Vo v. France,
App. no. 53924/00, Judgment (Merits), Court (Grand Chamber) 08/07/2004).
The preceding discussion highlights the differences existing within regional
human rights law and constitutional approaches to the unborn child. Some
states explicitly assert via constitutional provisions that the unborn child
receives protection pre-birth, whilst others, despite also granting such pro-
tection, balance this with protecting the competing rights of others to avoid
human rights violations. Regional human rights law jurisprudence, albeit
limited in this area, shows that where instruments are not explicit regarding
protection of the unborn child, this does not rule out the possibility of pre-birth
protection; this is consistent with the basis left open by the CRC. Of particular
relevance to this paper’s hypothesis is the fact that base level commonality
exists between many states that unborn life is worthy of some sort of protection
(for example as highlighted in Vo v. France amongst European states). This
is the case even if the protection is much narrower in scope than the protection
attaching to a child once born, and acknowledging that in some instances it
will raise a conflict with the rights of other parties (for example, the child’s
surrogate mother) necessitating a rights-balancing exercise weighing the
competing rights to identify the approach to be taken.
Two concepts raised by the regional human rights jurisprudence discussed
are also relevant for approaching the child’s pre-birth situation in ICS, insofar
as it impacts on their rights once born. The first is the concept of human
dignity, and the idea that given the potentiality of a being once in-utero, pre-
birth protection of the rights it will be entitled to once born is necessary based
on human dignity. This accords with the position that despite not being a
person, a foetus is a being worthy of some protection (despite this not being
absolute), given its potentiality to become a human being. Although this would
only cover the prenatal stage of ICS (that is, once a child is conceived), the
second concept – viewing the future child’s rights through an in eventu argu-
ment – could extend to the preconception stage of ICS. This would lead to
framing the child’s rights pre-birth in ICS (including the preconception stage)
with an approach based on the position that ‘assuming that the child will be
born’, it is in the future child’s best interests that they receive pre-birth pro-
tection that secures, to the greatest extent possible, their ability to exercise and




child’s right to identity preservation should be protected through Article 8
consistent actions and decisions during the preconception stage of ICS, namely
by using donor gametes which are identifiable.
It is also important to acknowledge that protecting the child’s rights most
at risk in ICS due to preconception and prenatal decisions and actions does
not preclude abortion; protecting the child’s rights pre-birth does not mean
the child has an absolute right to life, but rather is directed towards leaving
open the possibility of the child being able to exercise and enjoy their rights
(which may otherwise be violated in ICS through decisions and actions occurr-
ing at the preconception and prenatal stages), in the event that they are born.
If the child does not end up being born, this still does not mean that the child’s
other rights could not have been protected preconception and prenatally in
ICS, given the particular child rights identified as being at risk in ICS, triggered
through situations arising during these pre-birth stages. Protecting the future
child’s rights pre-birth (both preconception and prenatally) so that in eventu
they are born, they can enjoy and exercise these rights, does not mean attribut-
ing rights pre-birth, but rather attributing future rights, given the risks
triggered to the rights already discussed as being placed at risk pre-birth in
ICS. On this basis, in ICS some protection of the child’s future rights preconcep-
tion and pre-birth is required, to prevent these rights being rendered empty
upon birth.
4.2 Selected domestic and regional jurisprudence concerning specific non-
ICS pre-birth issues
Domestic jurisprudential approaches to two non-ICS situations concerning the
impact of actions and decisions during the prenatal stage on the rights of
children once born are worth briefly highlighting, to assess if they might assist
in addressing child rights impacts in ICS stemming from a lack of protection
pre-birth.
4.2.1 Wrongful life legal actions, including those based on failures to undertake
prenatal testing
‘Wrongful life’ legal actions rest on arguments that a failure (for example, of
a medical professional/organisation) to take an action prenatally (such as
genetic screening tests) meant a birth was unable to be prevented, amounting
to a negligent act. Such claims have been rejected by courts in domestic juris-
dictions such as Australia, Germany and the UK. For example, the German
Federal Constitutional Court ruled wrongful life claims unconstitutional
because they conflict with the German human dignity principle (Article 1,
German Basic Law), on the basis that a duty to prevent a child’s birth because
he/she will likely have a condition making his/her life appear valueless raises
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a conflict with tort law duties (normally centring on protecting personal
integrity) (Bundesgerichtshof (Sixth Civil Senate) BGHZ 86, 240, JZ 1983, 447).
However, wrongful life claims brought by children (or on their behalf)
and claims brought by parents in their own right have succeeded in a few
domestic jurisdictions, for example in the Netherlands and some US states.
Of such successful claims, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California
in Turpin v Sortini (31 Cal 3d 220; 643 P 2d 954 (Cal 1982) is notable as it places
great weight on the best interests of the child: “Although in deciding whether
or not to bear such a child parents may properly, and undoubtedly do, take
into account their own interests, parents also presumptively consider the
interests of their future child. Thus, when a defendant negligently fails to
diagnose a hereditary ailment, he harms the potential child as well as the
parents by depriving the parents of information which may be necessary to
determine whether it is in the child’s own interests to be born with defects
or not to be born at all.” (Turpin v Sortini, [233]-[234]) This ruling therefore
stands for the principle that some steps should be taken prenatally to protect
the future child’s best interests once born.
Recently, the South African Constitutional Court delivered a judgment
considering whether “the child may have a claim for patrimonial damages
against a medical expert in circumstances where a prenatal misdiagnosis of
a medical condition or congenital disability deprived the child’s mother of
the informed choice to abort.” (H v. Fetal Assessment Centre [2014] ZACC 34,
[80]) With reasoning heavily emphasising the need to protect the rights and
best interests of the child at birth (for example, at [48]-[52]), the Court held
that wrongful life claims are not inconceivable under the South African Consti-
tution ([52]), and a child’s wrongful life claim may potentially be found to
exist. ([81]) Consequently, the South African Constitutional Court has left open
the possibility of successful wrongful life claims (with the case in question
now returned to the High Court for determination).
The ECtHR has also given judgments in a number of applications concerning
wrongful life claims regarding failures to provide prenatal testing. In Costa
and Pavan v. Italy (App. no. 54270/10 Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction),
Court, Second Section 28/08/2012), the Court held Article 8 applicable regard-
ing refusal of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) screening of an embryo
intentionally created from gametes of cystic fibrosis carriers ([57]). Finding
a violation of Article 8, the Court rejected the Government’s justification of
refusing prenatal screening to protect the health of the child and the pregnant
woman, the dignity and freedom of conscience of the medical professionals
and to guard against eugenic selection ([61]). The Court said “While stressing
that the concept of “child” cannot be put in the same category as that of
“embryo”, it fails to see how the protection of the interests referred to by the
Government can be reconciled with the possibility available to the applicants
of having an abortion on medical grounds if the foetus turns out to be affected




for the foetus, which is clearly far further developed than an embryo, and for
the parents, in particular the woman.” ([62])
R.R. v. Poland (App. No. 27617/04 Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction),
Court (Fourth Section) 26/05/2011) concerned the birth of a child born with
Turner Syndrome after his mother (the applicant) was refused access to pre-
natal genetic testing to confirm foetal abnormalities existed, the likelihood of
which had been detected by ultrasound. The refusal of prenatal testing pre-
vented the applicant taking a decision regarding lawful abortion. The Court
found a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treat-
ment) and Article 8 regarding the applicant’s inability to access medical
procedures enabling her “to acquire full information about the foetus’ health”
([198]) in order to make a decision regarding abortion; the State was obliged
to ensure unimpeded access to prenatal information and testing relating to
the health of pregnant women and foetuses. ([156]-[157])41
These wrongful life cases show that courts have, in some instances, emphas-
ised the need to consider the potential consequences of prenatal actions and
decisions for the future child once born, and upheld the need to take prenatal
actions consistent with protecting the future child’s rights and best interests.
Whilst the court’s approach of emphasising the interests of the child in Turpin
is certainly positive and can be extended to ICS situations, the extent to which
commissioning parents “presumptively consider the [rights and] interests of
their future child” during the preconception and prenatal stages in ICS remains,
without empirical research, unclear. Certainly however, if commissioning
parents did give greater consideration to this and take actions and decisions
aligned with protecting the rights of their future child(ren), many of the
problems identified as arsing during the prenatal stage of ICS and the associ-
ated rights implications for the child post-birth may be alleviated. For example,
this could manifest in commissioning parents choosing not to abandon a child
conceived through ICS in instances where a disability or serious medical con-
dition is detected, or when a multiple birth occurs, given abandoning a child
may not align with protecting the child’s rights.
Drawing on the South African Constitutional Court’s approach too, apply-
ing the need to protect the rights and best interests of the child at birth to the
ICS context, protection of some rights at birth relies on these rights being
protected and preserved before birth and even before conception. This is clear
in relation to the potential impact of actions and decisions occurring preconcep-
tion on the child’s rights relating to identity, health and knowing his or her
parents. Furthermore, by placing importance on the consequences of pre-birth
41 In A.K. v. Latvia, App. no. 33011/08, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), Court (Fourth
Section) 24/06/2014, the ECtHR also found a violation of Article 8 in its procedural aspect.
In this case, the denial of adequate and timely prenatal screening tests prevented the
applicant making an informed decision regarding abortion; she subsequently gave birth
to a child with Down Syndrome.
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actions (or omissions) for the foetus as a future child in Costa and Pavan v. Italy
and R.R. v. Poland, the ECtHR effectively emphasises the need to prioritise the
future child’s rights and best interests (while balancing them with the pregnant
woman’s rights), by requiring certain actions to be taken or avoided pre-birth
to give the child the possibility of a life situation according with their best
interests. In these two cases, a direct line is drawn between the consequences
of what occurs pre-birth for the child’s best interests and health-related rights
post-birth; this is highly relevant to the ICS context regarding the need to
protect the future child’s rights pre-birth, for them to be enjoyed and exercised
post-birth.
4.2.2 Actions of a pregnant woman detrimentally impacting on the unborn child
and future child
The Courts in many jurisdictions have considered the balance to be struck
between the interests of the pregnant woman and her unborn child in instances
concerning pregnant womens’ prenatal decisions which may negatively impact
foetal health or the child’s health once born. Winnipeg Child and Family Services
(Northwest Area) v. G (D.F.) (Canadian Supreme Court) is a leading authority,
concerning whether legal grounds existed to require a pregnant woman to
receive hospital treatment and counselling for drug addiction (without her
consent). The Supreme Court held such actions would amount to forced
treatment and detention, violating her constitutional rights. It held that the
courts do not have authority to require a competent pregnant woman to receive
medical treatment she does not want and that “a judicial intervention designed
to improve the health of the foetus and the mother may actually put both
seriously at risk […] In the end, orders made to protect a foetus’ health could
ultimately result in its destruction.”
Whereas Winnipeg concerned decision-making powers over pregnant
women directed towards protecting unborn children, the UK Court of Appeal
recently dealt with a case brought by a child relating to her mother’s actions
during pregnancy. The child was born with severe brain damage, experiencing
learning, memory, developmental and behavioural problems caused by foetal
alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) (CP (A Child) v. First Tier Tribunal (Criminal
Injuries Compensation) (British Pregnancy Advisory Service/Birthrights and another
intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 1554, [2014] All ER (D) 48 (Dec)). The Court dis-
missed the child’s claim, saying she was not entitled to compensation for the
actions of her mother; her mother had not committed a criminal offence by
excessively consuming alcohol while pregnant. ([44]-[45]) Furthermore, the
Court said grievous bodily harm inflicted on a foetus does not amount to
criminal activity, as grievous bodily harm on a person is required; a foetus
is a “sui generis organism”, not a person. Varney observes the judgment im-
plies “that the right of pregnant women to make their own decisions about




2014, 2) This decision clarifies that in the UK, children with FASD are unable
to claim criminal injuries compensation, as they are not viewed under law
as having been the victim of a criminal act.
However, this decision is questionable from a child rights perspective as
the impacts of FASD experienced by the child have a clear causal link to her
mother’s alcohol abuse while pregnant; to undertake such actions as a parent
undoubtedly runs counter to the child’s best interests, as manifested in the
child’s life following birth. Indeed, some Canadian and US states have passed
legislation or developed jurisprudence establishing that substance abuse during
pregnancy amounts to child abuse.42 Minnesota, South Dakota and Wisconsin
provide examples of states that have gone further, passing legislation establish-
ing substance abuse during pregnancy as grounds for authorising (forced)
civil commitment to a treatment programme (to protect the foetus), (Gutt-
macher Institute, 2016, 1) while Tennessee has legislation establishing substance
abuse during pregnancy as a criminal offence. (Guttmacher Institute, 2016, 1)
The above jurisprudential approaches to the situation of the unborn child
show the continuing legal divergence in this area. However, they are relevant
to the ICS context as they show the possibility for future claims by children
born through ICS based on arguments that they have experienced harm result-
ing from the decisions and actions of their surrogate mothers while pregnant.
In the ICS context, children could arguably also bring claims relating to pre-
birth actions and decisions taken by their commissioning parents and other
third parties, such as medical practitioners, detrimentally impacting on them
once born. This could be envisaged regarding actions and decisions at both
the preconception and prenatal stages. An argument could even be made by
a child relating to the actions of a genetic parent who acted as an anonymous
gamete donor, on the basis of detrimental impacts the child experiences relating
to their identity and health rights and their right to know their parents. How-
ever, given the anonymity of the donor, in practice such claims would need
to be made either against the state or a private actor, such as a fertility clinic/
doctor, arguing they should not have allowed anonymous donor gametes to
be used.
While the claims made in the domestic judgments discussed in this section
have been confined to actions amounting to criminal offending, taking a
progressive child protection approach, there is a strong argument in favour
of ensuring the balance of protection rests in favour of the child’s best interests
in the ICS context, even in situations not constituting criminal offending but
which have a potential lifetime impact on a child’s development and best
42 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada,
Oaklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Wisconsin. See also e.g. the Canadian cases of Re Children’s Aid Society for the District of
Kenora and JL, 134 DLR (3d) 249, 1982 WDFL 390 (Ont Prov Ct) and M(J) v. Superintendent
of Family and Child Services [1983] 4 CNLR 41, (1983) 35 RFL (2d) 364 (BCCA).
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interests. The human rights-based argument that children could make in future
regarding detrimental pre-birth actions and decisions in ICS by surrogate
mothers, commissioning parents and other third parties has the potential to
be highly convincing.
4.2.3 Embryos created through ART
Certain cases concerning embryos created through ART are relevant to the
present focus on ICS. In Evans v. United Kingdom (App. no. 6339/05, Judgment
(Merits), Court (Grand Chamber), 10/04/2007), the ECtHR held that an embryo
does not have independent rights or interests and cannot claim (or have
claimed on its behalf) a right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR (relying on
Vo v. France: the embryo/foetus is not a person) (Evans v. United Kingdom, [54];
[56]). However, more recently in Parrillo v. Italy (App. no. 46470/11, Judgment
(Merits and Just Satisfaction), Court (Grand Chamber), 27/08/2015), the Grand
Chamber observed that stored, unused embryos were part of the applicant’s
(the future child’s genetic mother) identity because they contained her genetic
material, therefore engaging Article 8 ([158]-[159]) (however, no violation was
found). The ECtHR found Article 2 was not at issue on the facts of the case,
but also said human embryos are not possessions.43 The use and control of
pre-embryos created through ART and stored gametes are relatively novel legal
issues internationally,44 continuing to develop. It is possible that the incidence
of cases concerning disputes over the control and use of stored embryos (for
example, by claimants seeking to use embryos against the wishes of their
former partner) will increase. It remains to be seen whether courts will take
into consideration the rights and best interests of the future child (for example,
to know and be cared for by parents; to preserve their identity), or whether
focus will predominantly rest on the wishes of the persons who created the
embryo with their genetic material. In one such case, the Illinois Appellate
Court recently ruled in favour of an appellant seeking to have her own genetic
child against the wishes of her former partner, by using three cryopreserved
pre-embryos created during their relationship (Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL
App (1st) 122975-B). The Court granted the appellant sole custody and control
over the disputed pre-embryos, however, its reasoning for doing so focused
on balancing the interests of the two disputing parties, without reasoning
concerning the potential rights and best interests of any future children born
via successful gestation of the pre-embryos.
43 Within the meaning of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (personal property); therefore the
Protocol did not apply.
44 For discussion, see: Schwartz, M., “Who owns pre-embryos?”, The New Yorker 19 April 2015,





At a general level, while there remains a lot of work to be done to clarify
the legal status of human embryos, the principle made clear in the European
context, that human embryos are not possessions, recognises that some level
of protection (as yet, undefined) is necessary in relation to actions impacting
on embryos, despite their lack of independent personhood. The European
approach appears to be underpinned by the concept of human dignity, given
the potentiality of the embryo to become a future child. The approach of the
Illinois Appellate Court illustrates the need to ensure that the rights and best
interests of the potential future child that could result from the use of embryos
are made central considerations in the ART and ICS context, given the lifelong
impacts the child could experience resulting from decisions concerning the
use of embryos in situations where the competing interests and intentional
decisions of the adults involved may not align with the future child’s rights
and best interests.
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE CHILD’S RIGHTS OF THE INTENTIONAL,
PLANNED NATURE OF ICS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF MULTIPLE POSSIBLE
PARENTS
Analysis in this paper has highlighted the potential impact of preconception
and prenatal actions and decisions on the rights of children born through ICS
arrangements, demonstrating these impacts are tied to the pre-birth actions
and decisions of commissioning parents, surrogate mothers, genetic parents
and other third parties involved in ICS (such as medical professionals). Indeed,
without the involvement of all these parties in ICS, ICS would not have devel-
oped as an alternative method of family-building. In part, it is this involvement
of multiple parties that distinguishes ICS from other methods of family-build-
ing, but more so it is the involvement of multiple potential parents to the child,
combined with the intentional, planned nature of ICS that differentiates it from
other forms of family-building. These factors complicate the future child’s
rights, given their enjoyment and exercise of the key rights already identified
once born is dependent on actions and decisions taken preconception and
prenatally by their multiple potential parents and other third parties to the
ICS arrangement. As already outlined, in ICS it is possible for adult parties to
purposely take pre-birth actions and decisions that contradict the future child’s
rights. Despite the parties to ICS arrangements having the choice whether to
take actions and decisions which will uphold and safeguard the future child’s
rights, sometimes they chose not to. This underscores the need to actively
build-in protection of the child’s rights most at risk preconception and prenatal-
ly, so they have the opportunity to exercise and enjoy these rights once born.
Also, given the complexity arising through the involvement of multiple po-
tential parents, where conflicts arise between these parties pre-birth, these can
have lifelong impacts on the future child.
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The preconception intention and associated planning of the commissioning
parents is the foundation of all ICS arrangements. This places strong responsibil-
ity on the commissioning parents, because they have a choice whether to take
the future child’s rights into account or not, and whether to take actions and
decisions preconception and prenatally which align with the future child’s
best interests and rights. For example, unlike in traditional conception situ-
ations (where, although similar child rights issues such as identity preservation
and the right to know and be cared for by one’s parents may arise), in ICS a
series of intentional and planned steps lead up to the conception and birth
of a child, including many decision points within the control of commissioning
parents in particular. Some examples of pre-birth decision points are whether
to:
- use anonymous or identifiable gametes (preconception stage);
- involve an anonymous or known surrogate mother (preconception stage);
- take responsibility for a child even if they have a disability or serious
medical condition (prenatal stage); and
- take responsibility for multiple children if a multiple pregnancy occurs
(prenatal stage).
In all such instances, commissioning parents intentionally choose to take
actions consistent or inconsistent with the future child’s rights.
Furthermore, applying the Article 18(1) CRC standard of the common
responsibilities of parents “for the upbringing and the development of the
child” and that “the best interests of the child will be their basic concern” in
a dynamic and evolutive manner to the ICS context, commissioning parents
should be seen as having an obligation to consider and act consistently with
the future child’s rights and best interests pre-birth, given their intention to
parent the child. This obligation can arguably also apply to surrogates, given
that they may be characterised as ‘parents’ in ICS, despite the fact they do not
intend to socially parent the child once born. Extending Article 18(1) to its
fullest potential extent in ICS, arguably genetic parents too, have parental
responsibilities regarding the future child; by applying Article 18(1) to genetic
parents in ICS it would, for example, follow that they should choose to only
become genetic parents in ICS arrangements if they are willing to do so on
an identifiable basis and be known by the future child (therefore safeguarding
the child’s rights to identity preservation, to know and be cared for by their
parents and to health). Consistent with Article 18(1) CRC, during the precon-
ception and pre-birth stages of ICS, commissioning parents, surrogate mothers
and genetic parents should therefore take actions and decisions enabling the
future child to exercise and enjoy their rights once born, consistent with their
best interests. In doing so, they should, for example, avoid preconception and
prenatal actions and decisions which may trigger the detrimental impacts on
the child’s identity, health, family environment, well-being and security rights




Given the above, it is clear that this paper’s hypothesis is convincing, that
due to the intentional, planned nature of ICS, the involvement of multiple
possible parents and the potential impact of preconception and prenatal
decisions and actions on the rights of children born through ICS arrangements,
preconception and prenatal protection of the unborn child is required in all
ICS situations. Moreover, it is within the purview of parties to ICS – in parti-
cular, first and foremost, commissioning parents, as well as surrogate mothers
and genetic parents – to ensure that their preconception and prenatal actions
and decisions align with and uphold the child’s future rights.
6 A PROPOSED APPROACH TO PRECONCEPTION AND PRENATAL PROTECTION
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE FUTURE CHILD MOST AT RISK IN ICS
In order to protect the future child’s rights which are at most at risk in ICS
from the negative impacts of preconception and prenatal actions and decisions,
and given that this is permissible under the public international law frame-
work, what kind of pre-birth protection should be provided? While the law
traditionally approaches human rights as attaching from the moment of birth
given the legal parameters of the concept of ‘personhood’,45 the various
approaches discussed under international child rights law, regional human
rights law, domestic legislation and jurisprudence show that the unborn child
can and does benefit from protection before birth to some extent. This shows
that despite no international human rights law instrument explicitly establish-
ing that the unborn child has rights under law, this does not mean that the
unborn child is not to be afforded any protection before birth. On the contrary,
as indicated by the CRC travaux préparatoires and the views of the Committee
on the Rights of the Child, the child can be protected prior to birth in ways
that do not violate the rights of other persons when they potentially conflict
(such as pregnant women); in some instances it is necessary for this protection
to begin before a child’s birth, to ensure certain rights are secured post-birth.
Indeed, the inclusion of the ninth preambular paragraph in the CRC leaves
open the option of pre-birth protection of children. Although state practice
regarding protection of the unborn child is inconclusive as a result, a common
thread running through much of the jurisprudence discussed is that it is
possible for the child to be afforded some protection before birth (without
conferring rights before birth). As has already been established, the problems
and challenges to child rights in ICS triggered by actions and decisions pre-
conception and prenatally are largely caused through involvement of multiple
potential parents and the intentional, planned nature of ICS. Indeed, some of
45 For discussion, see Herring, J., ‘The Loneliness of Status: The Legal and Moral Significance
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the child rights problems triggered during these pre-birth stages have potential
impacts for children’s rights post-birth which are, to some extent, lifelong.
6.1 Framing the future child in ICS through an in eventu approach
It is suggested that a viable approach to protecting the future child’s rights
from impacts triggered during the preconception and prenatal stages of ICS
is taking an in eventu approach to the future child in ICS. This is consistent
with a child rights approach, meaning that the child’s ability to exercise and
enjoy their rights in eventu they are born is preserved, rather than curtailed
by actions and decisions taken before their birth. Such an approach acknow-
ledges that despite not being a legal person before birth, during the prenatal
stage the unborn child is not a nothing, but is a being that could become a
child, entitled to rights in the event that they are born. Moreover, in ICS situ-
ations, given the impact of actions and decisions preconception too, the future
child’s rights must be protected from this earlier stage in order for them to
be able to enjoy and exercise their rights in the event they are born. Through
framing preconception and prenatal actions and decisions in ICS with an in
eventu approach, parties to ICS will be encouraged to consider the potential
impact of these on the future child’s rights and best interests and in turn, on
the multiple potential parents themselves.
6.2 Basic safeguards for protecting the future child in ICS from rights
impacts triggered preconception and prenatally
Informed by an in eventu approach, a three-pronged set of strategic safeguards
is proposed, aimed at protecting the future child in ICS from the negative child
rights impacts once born which have their roots in preconception and prenatal
actions and decisions. These safeguards are informed and underpinned by
international human rights law norms and standards, applying the CRC in a
dynamic manner to ICS as a current-day challenge to children’s rights, using
the opening left by preambular paragraph nine CRC to ensure children born
through ICS are afforded protection of their rights, including those potentially
placed at risk in ICS preconception and prenatally. This set of safeguards is
largely formulated through suggested practical measures which can strategical-
ly influence and shape preconception and prenatal choices and actions of
parties to ICS arrangements, and therefore counter the otherwise negative
implications for a child’s rights once born through ICS. The suggested strategic
safeguards centre on education; professional codes of practice/best practice






Educating parties to ICS arrangements about the child rights implications of
their actions and decisions during the preconception and prenatal stages is
a potentially strong safeguard for the future child’s rights at risk under Articles
2, 3, 7, 8, 23, 24 and 35. Through education, parties can become attuned to
how their actions and decisions preconception and prenatally can trigger
negative impacts on the future child’s rights; they may be more likely to take
actions and decisions upholding and leaving open these rights, instead of
curtailing them.
Education should strategically target some key actors in ICS arrangements
who have a key influence on the child through their decisions and actions
taken during the preconception and prenatal stages: medical professionals,
legal advisors and prospective commissioning parents/commissioning parents.
Education of medical professionals involved in ICS can usefully focus on
developing their understanding of the CRC rights most at risk in ICS through
preconception and prenatal actions and decisions, and the role they play
guiding rights-based actions and decisions in this respect. For example, medical
professionals must understand preconception child rights risks in ICS, parti-
cularly relating to identity preservation and why the use of anonymous gamete
donors and surrogate mothers should be avoided in the best interests of the
future child. During the prenatal stage, it is essential that medical professionals
understand the child rights implications of non-medically necessary foetal
reduction, so this practice does not occur in ICS. The responsibility of ensuring
medical professionals are educated in this way largely rests with CRC States
Parties and domestic and international medical governing bodies. States Parties
and medical governing bodies should disseminate information about the CRC
to medical professionals working in this area, with clear educational guidance
around its relevance and application in the preconception and prenatal ICS
context.
Similarly, educating legal advisors involved in ICS to ensure they under-
stand the child rights risks arising preconception and prenatally in ICS is
essential, so they can provide legal advice to commissioning parents covering
potential child rights implications of preconception and prenatal actions and
decisions for the future child and how this might impact them as parents. Once
educated on the potential child rights implications, legal advisors are, for
example, well-placed to guide and influence commissioning parents to avoid
using anonymous gametes and involving anonymous surrogates. CRC States
Parties and domestic and international legal governing bodies should ensure
legal advisors dealing with ICS understand the CRC’s application in the precon-
ception and prenatal ICS context and their role in ensuring protection of future
children born this way.
Education of prospective commissioning parents/commissioning parents
should be undertaken to empower them with an understanding of their CRC
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responsibilities (framed through Article 18(1)), the rights of the child at stake
and how their decisions and actions preconception and prenatally will impact
the child’s rights and best interests once born. Regarding the preconception
stage, education of prospective commissioning parents should focus primarily
on Article 8 CRC, build their understanding of the principles of non-discrimina-
tion and the best interests of the child, and how they can act to uphold these
rights and principles before conception and birth for the future child. Many
actors have a role to play in educating commissioning parents: legal advisors,
medical professionals and States Parties to the CRC. The provision of accurate
information about the child’s rights and ICS can usefully be disseminated via
a range of methods: meetings, social media and message-boards and via public
awareness campaigns. Such education will encourage commissioning parents
to approach ICS arrangements in a more child-centric manner, considering the
rights and best interests of the future child at all preconception and prenatal
decision points, whilst yielding to the rights of the surrogate where her health
or reproductive autonomy is endangered.
While education is proposed as an important safeguard, it is acknowledged
it has limits as a measure to protect the rights of future children born through
ICS preconception and prenatally. For example, although education can influ-
ence commissioning parents’ decisions and actions, in states without clear
regulation of ICS, they ultimately have broad decision-making freedom over
many of the choices impacting on the future child’s rights and best interests.
This is why domestic legal frameworks and international regulation of ICS with
child rights standards and protective safeguards at their heart must be devel-
oped and implemented in the long-term, to ensure the child’s rights and best
interests are paramount. Such child-centred regulatory approaches may in
practice require that certain aspects of ICS, such as the use of anonymous
gametes, are prohibited.
6.2.2 Professional codes of practice/best practice guidance
In the absence of international agreement on ICS, national governments and
national medical bodies/authorities can play an important role in ensuring
the development and implementation of professional codes of practice/best
practice guidance on processes involved in ICS raising preconception and
prenatal risks to the future child. In particular, professional codes of practice/
best practice guidance is are required to safeguard against situations whereby
gametes and/or embryos are lost or mixed-up and incorrectly implanted in
clinical settings, impacting on the child’s Article 7 and 8 rights in particular
once born. ICS supply-side states have a particular responsibility to ensure such
codes of practice/best practice guidance is developed, establishing clear clinical
standards and processes to be adhered to in ICS. States should do so working
with medical bodies/authorities, and both have a role to play in ensuring the




medical professionals. Demand-side states can also helpfully work with supply-
side states to share best practice knowledge in the establishment of such codes
of practice/best practice guidance.
6.2.3 Inserting the child’s voice and perspective into ICS decision-making and actions
at the prenatal stage
Explicitly inserting the future child’s voice and perspective into ICS decision-
making and actions prenatally is the third aspect of the suggested pre-birth
safeguards for the future child’s rights and best interests. To do so, CRC States
Parties should ensure the appointment of a guardian representing the future
child’s rights and best interests in every ICS arrangement, from the time an
ICS pregnancy is confirmed. It is at this point in time that the future child goes
from being an abstract idea to a potential reality, and it is therefore practicable
to involve a guardian for the future child in decision-making in the ICS arrange-
ment. States Parties to the CRC may also be willing to fund the appointment
of a guardian from this point in time, given the concrete possibility of a child
eventuating from the ICS arrangement. The appointment of such a guardian
for the future child’s rights and best interests would not mean that the interests
and rights of the commissioning parents, genetic parents and surrogate would
be subordinated to the future child’s, but rather that the future child’s rights
and best interests become a central focus of the actions and decision-making
processes of these adult parties, and their rights and best interests are taken
into account in relation to those of the adult parties. As the future child would
not be able to instruct the guardian, the guardian would be appointed on the
basis that they would advocate for and in the best interests of the future child
and their rights. Wherever possible, this mechanism would therefore encourage
the taking of prenatal ICS actions and decisions which protect and leave open
the exercise and enjoyment of rights for the future child. The guardian can
play a crucial role in ensuring that commissioning parents, genetic parents
and surrogates understand why their taking of actions and decisions consistent
with the future child’s rights and best interests will also be of benefit to them
once the child is born, as well as reminding them of their responsibilities in
relation to the future child under Article 18(1) CRC.
It is acknowledged that the viability of implementing the mechanism of
a guardian for the child’s rights and best interests in every ICS situation has
inherent challenges – for example, garnering funding for such a mechanism.
However, appointing an independent person tasked with bringing the future
child’s voice and perspective into all decisions and actions prenatally in ICS
arrangements has a powerful potential protective impact on the future child’s
rights and best interests. Specific focus of the guardian’s attention is likely
to centre on protecting the future child’s rights under Articles 2, 3, 7, 8, 23,
24 and 35 CRC; for example, in relation to ICS situations where commissioning
parents decide prenatally they do not want to take responsibility for children
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from a multiple pregnancy or with a detectable disability or serious health
condition, and where there is a disagreement between the parties to the ICS
arrangement about the wellbeing or care of the future child. The guardian
should be a person with expertise in child rights/child protection, appointed
in the state in which the child is in utero and going to be born in. Locating
the guardian here is the most practical approach, likely to maximise the benefit
of such an appointment; the guardian can be an ‘on-the-ground’ bridge, medi-
ating and communicating between third parties (such as medical professionals),
the surrogate and the commissioning parents, the latter whom are most likely
to be located in their own home state during the prenatal stage). The guar-
dian’s mandate will focus on ensuring the future child’s voice and perspectives
relating to their rights and best interests are infused into all ICS arrangements
and guide all decisions and actions taken within ICS arrangements. Such a
guardian’s role will particularly come to bear in disputed situations between
parties to an ICS arrangement, and would provide a safeguard against the more
extreme possible child rights violations within the ICS context, such as child
trafficking (given that the existence of a guardian appointed to the child would
provide a potential obstacle to commissioning parents taking steps to traffick
a child between countries). Such a guardian could play a useful role in ICS
arrangements postnatally as well, by ensuring the child has someone represent-
ing their rights and best interests in the face of any remaining child rights
challenges they may encounter post-birth, such as unclear legal status,
abandonment, statelessness and multiple parentage claims. It is therefore
envisaged that the guardian’s mandate could either expire once the child’s
legal parentage is established, or alternatively after a post-parentage monitoring
phase (focusing on an assessment of the child’s rights and best interests in
the care of their legal parents) is concluded by the guardian.
The implementation of the suggested three-pronged set of strategic safeguards
preconception and prenatally in ICS is geared towards ensuring that actions
and decisions taken in relation to the unconceived and unborn child do not
have a negative bearing on the future child’s post-birth exercise and enjoyment
of their rights. This should enable the child’s future to remain as open as
possible (Feinberg, 2007), despite their conception and birth through ICS. If
an in eventu approach and the safeguards suggested are implemented, this
will lead to ICS arrangements that are more child-centric, respecting and
upholding the rights and best interests of the future child, reflected in arrange-
ments involving the following preconception and prenatally:
- Use of identifiable gametes and embryos from donors willing to be con-
tacted by the child in the future
- Surrogates acting in a known capacity and willing to be contacted by the
child in the future
- Application of professional codes of practice/best practice guidance in the




- No foetal reduction, other than on the basis of medical opinion it is in the
best interests or necessary for the protection of the mental and/or physical
health and well-being of the pregnant woman or the unborn child
- Clear agreement between the surrogate and commissioning parents regard-
ing decision-making and control over the surrogate’s health care and
lifestyle decisions during the pregnancy, and an agreement on the process
for resolving disputes should they arise
- Clear agreement between the surrogate mother and commissioning parents
regarding the point in time following the child’s birth that commissioning
parents will assume care of the child, and an undertaking from the com-
missioning parents that they will take responsibility for the child regardless
of their sex, disability or health status, and that they will take responsibility
for multiple birth children
- The automatic appointment of a guardian representing the child’s rights
and interests following a confirmed pregnancy, to ensure the future child’s
voice and perspective relating to their rights and best interests informs
all decisions and actions during the ICS arrangement
- In all situations where a decision or action can be taken aligning with the
future child’s rights and best interests, it will be, as long as it does not lead
to a violation of the rights of another party to the ICS arrangement (in such
situations, the rights of the child, despite being paramount, will be appro-
priately balanced with the rights of other parties).
ICS arrangements as outlined above should, therefore, lead to the future child
being able to preserve their identity, grow up in a family environment and
know their parents, and grow up knowing their human dignity has been
respected at all points prior to their birth. Without taking the protective steps
prior to conception and birth in ICS as outlined in this paper, the child’s rights
most at risk from these stages in ICS may be empty upon birth. Leaving
children in ICS without protection of their rights upon birth does not align
with the intention of the CRC framers; therefore, the CRC must be applied before
conception and birth to the future child’s rights in ICS.
In addition to the specific responsibilities identified for CRC States Parties,
legal advisors, medical practitioners and commissioning parents, the import-
ance of implementing the preconception and prenatal measures outlined in
this paper could be promoted by national medical association governing
bodies, particularly those focusing on the practice of ART/surrogacy; they could
also usefully be promoted by private actors providing commissioning parents
with information about ICS or providing ICS services, for example, surrogacy
brokers and companies. At the international level, the ideas proposed in this
paper should inform thinking on a possible international regulatory approach
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
Unconceived, Unborn, Uncertain 167
to ICS, through the work of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Convention
on Private International Law (including its Experts Group).46
Given the focus of the Permanent Bureau on a long-term approach and
possible international agreement relating to ICS, in the short-term, a practice
note drawing on the practical measures suggested in this paper would be a
useful soft law tool, encouraging making the future child’s rights and best
interests the determining factor in ICS arrangements by implementing child-
centric practices in the preconception and prenatal stages of ICS. It would be
helpful if such a practice note includes a checklist for commissioning parents
when considering entering into an ICS arrangement, in order to make sure they
consider the full range of preconception and prenatal issues (as discussed in
this paper) that can impact the future child’s rights and best interests, and
how they can choose to act in a child rights consistent manner. Such a practice
note could be issued, for example, by the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
The promotion of such preconception and prenatal safeguards by an inter-
national body such as the Committee would not necessarily be indicative of
its approval of ICS, but would serve to encourage that when ICS is practiced,
it is undertaken in a manner placing central focus on the future child pre-
conception and prenatally to protect their rights and best interests once born.
7 CONCLUSION
Alston’s statement over 25 years ago that “while there is no basis for asserting
that the notion that human rights inhere in the unborn child had been author-
itatively rejected by international human rights law, there has been a consistent
pattern of avoiding any explicit recognition of such rights” (Alston, 1990, 161)
still holds true in relation to international human rights law. However, given
the CRC leaves open the possibility of protecting the unborn child (in some
domestic jurisdictions, as discussed in this paper, protection is extended to
the unborn child), and having identified negative impacts on the rights of the
child in ICS that begin preconception and prenatally as traversed in this paper,
a dynamic interpretation of the CRC must be taken in light of ICS as a current-
day challenge to children’s rights. This necessitates re-envisaging how and
when some rights – such as the child’s rights to preserve their identity, to
know their parents and to attain the highest standard of health – need to be
protected in the specific context of ICS. As illustrated, if the specific rights of
the child discussed in this paper are not protected preconception and pre-birth
in ICS, they may be rendered meaningless and unable to be exercised by the
child post-birth.





ICS is a distinctive way of family-building, in part given the multiple
potential parents involved, which creates complex, high-risk situations not
only for the adults involved, but the children who are born from these arrange-
ments. Moreover, given the intentional nature of ICS, in ICS there are clear
opportunities both preconception and prenatally for commissioning parents
in particular to safeguard the future child’s rights; after all, it is only due to
the intention of commissioning parents that the surrogate and genetic parents
become involved in ICS. Therefore, in ICS, some protection must be extended
to the future child during the preconception and prenatal stages, so they can
exercise and enjoy their CRC rights once born. As discussed, in ICS this pro-
tection must extend not only to the prenatal stage but also to the preconception
stage, as during this stage key actions and decisions are taken which can shape
the child’s lifetime outcomes relating to their right to preserve their identity
and to know and be cared for by their parents.
By taking an in eventu approach and through the range of ICS actors ident-
ified in this paper implementing the specific strategic preconception and
prenatal safeguards proposed, the future child will have a better chance to
exercise and enjoy their rights than they would have otherwise. This does not
mean that rights are attributed before birth, but rather, the possibility of the
child being able to exercise and enjoy their rights once born is left open for
them, by taking decisions and actions preconception and prenatally that accord
with and are protective of the future child’s rights and best interests. Although
children do not achieve legal personhood until birth, this does not prevent
children being afforded some limited protection prior to birth that will assist
in giving effect to their rights, in the event they are born. By focusing the
suggested safeguards around education, codes of practice/best practice guid-
ance and inserting the child’s voice and perspective into actions and decision-
making at the prenatal stage, despite remaining challenges to implementation,
these are safeguards that are practical and which may have a far-reaching
protective effect on children born through ICS. The aim is to ensure the future
child’s rights and best interests are considered and wherever possible protected
preconception and prenatally (while being balanced with the rights of other
parties), thereby leaving open the possibility of the future child exercising and
enjoying their rights once born. Whilst this may limit the interests of adult
parties to ICS some extent, such an approach is consistent with the spirit and
intent of the CRC, despite the CRC’s framers not envisaging the ICS context. The
safeguards for the future child’s rights and best interests proposed in this paper
rely on a joint approach by actors involved in ICS to the protection of the future
child before conception and birth. However, commissioning parents have a
particularly strong role to play to protect the future child’s rights and best
interests, and to ensure the future child’s human dignity is upheld. Com-
missioning parents should view taking preconception and prenatal actions
and decisions consistent with the future child’s rights and best interests as
part of their parental responsibilities under Article 18(1), in order to leave the
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child’s exercise and enjoyment of rights as open as possible in the event they
are born. Such an approach is consistent with a dynamic and evolutive reading
of Article 18 CRC; moreover, in the CRC context, arguably parental responsibility
to protect the future child pre-birth applies not only to the commissioning
parents, but also the future child’s surrogate mother and genetic parents. Such
a reading provides a holistic approach to the widest possible concept of the
child’s potential parents in ICS.
Despite the fact that international agreement is yet to be reached regarding
whether ICS is a practice that should be allowed to continue, ICS continues to
be practiced (in some states without any regulation), meaning children are
continuing to be conceived and born this way. In the face of this reality and
regardless of the lack of international agreement regarding ICS, the rights of
children born through ICS arrangements must be upheld. This paper has shown
that there are practical mechanisms and practices which can be introduced
now and implemented by a range of actors in ICS, leading to better protection
of the child’s rights. Making the rights of the future child discussed in this
paper meaningful post-birth hinges on these prenatal and preconception
protections outlined being implemented, to give children born through ICS
the best possible chance to secure their rights. The safeguards suggested in
this paper are intended to guide practice, so the detrimental impact of precon-
ception and prenatal actions and decisions on future children born through
ICS is limited. We must leap through the window left open by the CRC to ensure
actions and decisions that are child rights consistent before conception and
birth, to allow all future children in ICS to secure their rights once born, rather
than having them curtailed before they achieve personhood in the eyes of the
law.
REFERENCES
Achmad, C., “Answering the “Who am I?” Question: Protecting the Right of Children
Born Through International Commercial Surrogacy to Preserve Their Identity
Under Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child”,
forthcoming publication, 2016.
Alston, P., “The Unborn Child and Abortion under the Draft Convention on the
Rights of the Child”, Human Rights Quarterly 1990, (12(1)), 156-178.
Copelon, R., et al., “Human Rights Begin at Birth: International Law and the Claim
of Fetal Rights”, Reproductive Health Matters 2005, (13(26)), 120-129, 122.
Cooper, M., et al (eds.), Current Issues and Emerging Trends in Medical Tourism, (Her-
shey: Medical Information Science Reference, 2015).
Cornock, M., and Montgomery, H., “Children’s rights in and out of the womb”,
International Journal of Children’s Rights 2011, (19(1)), 3-19, DOI: 10.1163/157181810
X522351.





De Jesus, L.M., ‘The Inter-American Court on Human Rights’ Judgment in Artavia
Murillo v. Costa Rica and Its Implications for the Creation of Abortion Rights in
the Inter-American System of Human Rights”, Oregon Review of International Law
2014, (16), 225-248, 227.
Detrick, S., The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the
“Travaux Préparatoires”, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992).
Dorscheidt, J.H.H.M., “The unborn child and the UN Convention on Children’s
Rights: the Dutch perspective as a guideline”, International Journal of Children’s
Rights 1999, (7(4)), 303-347, DOI: 10.1163/15718189920494426.
Dorscheidt, J.H.H.M., “Developments in legal and medical practice regarding the
unborn child and the need to expand prenatal legal protection’, European Journal
of Health Law 2010, (17(5)), 433-454.
Feinberg, J., “The Child’s Right to an Open Future”, in R. Curren (ed.), Philosophy
of Education: An Anthology, (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 112-123.
Grover, S.C., Children Defending their Human Rights Under the CRC Communications
Procedure: On Strengthening the Convention on the Rights of the Child Complaints
Mechanism, (Heidelberg: Springer, 2015), 128.
Guttmacher Institute, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 2016, https://www.gutt
macher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/spibs/spib_SADP.pdf.
Hodgson, D., “The child’s right to life, survival and development”, International
Journal of Children’s Rights 1994, (2(4)), DOI: 10.1163/157181894X00259, 369-393.
Herring, J., ‘The Loneliness of Status: J. Herring, The Legal and Moral Significance
of Birth’ in F. Ebtehaj and J. Herring et al. (eds.), Birth Rites and Rights (Hart:
Oxford, 2011).
Janoff, A.F., “Rights of the Pregnant Child vs. Rights of the Unborn under the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child”, Boston University International Law Journal
2004, (22(2)), 163-188.
Kilty, M., “The Right to Know the Identities of Genetic Parents”, Australian Journal
of Adoption 2013, (7(2)), 1-15.
McGonagle, T., and Donders, Y., The United Nations and Freedom of Expression and
Information: Critical Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Nolan, A., Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, Democracy and The Courts (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2011).
O’Rourke, P., “The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Rights of the
Unborn”, Viewpoint: Perspectives on Public Policy 2012.
Schabas, W.A., War Crimes and Human Rights: Essays on the Death Penalty, Justice, and
Accountability, (London: Cameron May, 2008).
Schwartz, M., “Who owns pre-embryos?”, The New Yorker 19 April 2015, http://www.
newyorker.com/tech/elements/who-owns-pre-embryos (accessed 02 February
2016).
Varney, M., “Foetal alcohol syndrome and the right to compensation”, Lexis Nexis
Personal Injury 9 December 2014.
Wicks, E., Human Rights and Healthcare, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 184.
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
7 Securing children’s right to a nationality in
a changing world
The context of International Commercial Surrogacy
and twenty-first century reproductive technology and
twenty-first century reproductive technology
Abstract
The challenge of securing the rights of children to a nationality has manifested
acutely in the context of ICS, where child statelessness has emerged as a prob-
lem. As such, the child’s Article 7 CRC right to nationality is one of the rights
most significantly under threat in ICS. ICS involves children being born in one
state via assisted reproductive technology and the involvement of a surrogate,
who are intended as children of commissioning parents who originate or reside
in another state. Through the application of domestic nationality laws to
children born through ICS, conflict of laws situations are arising, leaving
children stateless and stranded in their birth state, in instances where they
do not acquire the nationality of their birth state. Drawing on theory and
practice utilising case examples, this Chapter examines this challenge, placing
it within the wider context of challenges to the concept of ‘family’ and family
formation in the twenty-first century. This Chapter takes a solutions-based
approach to the problem of child statelessness in ICS, proposing that practical
solutions founded on pre-existing public international law norms and standards
must be implemented now, before the problem of child statelessness in ICS
deepens, further adding to global statelessness.
Main Findings
- As evidenced by case law, children born through ICS may face difficulties
in acquiring nationality in three scenarios in the context of ICS, namely a)
when a lack of recognition of the child’s parentage prevents nationality
acquisition; b) when nationality laws of the child’s birth state and their
commissioning parents’ state of nationality conflict; and c) when a child
is abandoned in his or her birth state by his or her commissioning parents.
- As a result of these situations, the practice of ICS has become a new cause
of statelessness.
- Children who are stateless following their birth through ICS not only
experience a violation of their Article 7 CRC right, but their statelessness




- The absence of international consensus concerning the practice of ICS does
not need to be a barrier to cooperation between States to prevent child
statelessness in ICS.
- It is recommended that the UNHCR, together with the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, issue guidance to States urging them to implement
without delay practical and effective solutions to preventing child
statelessness in ICS, grounded in public international human rights law.
- Such guidance should reflect that a State which is the intended State of
a child’s residence in ICS will grant the child nationality if he or she would
otherwise be stateless, as long as a genetic link between the child and at
least one commissioning parent is proved; and States will grant nationality
to an otherwise stateless child born on their territory through ICS.
Contextual notes
- Since the time this Chapter was written, the risk of child statelessness in
ICS persists. This emphasises the ongoing relevance of this Chapter, and
the need for children’s rights and best interests to guide State decisions
regarding individual children and nationality acquisition in ICS.
This chapter was originally published in L. Van Waas and M. Khanna (eds.),
Solving Statelessness (2016) Wolf Legal Publishing, at 191-224.
1 INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen a growth in children being conceived through
alternative, medically assisted methods as a result of assisted reproductive
technology (ART). This is an area of scientific advancement responding to and
driving the development of new methods of family formation and new family
forms. During this time, International Commercial Surrogacy (ICS) has emerged
as one such family formation method, resulting in families being built across
borders, enabled by ART and surrogate mothers. ICS uses reproductive techno-
logy and leverages globalisation and an international regulatory lacuna to meet
the demand of ‘commissioning parents’ from a range of States, engaging in
ICS for diverse reasons. ICS presents a number of human rights challenges to
the parties involved, most significantly to the rights of children conceived and
born through ICS who are particularly vulnerable given factors such as their
lack of agency in infancy. One such challenge is that children are being born
stateless in some ICS scenarios.
All children, including those conceived and born through ICS, have the
right to acquire a nationality, explicitly established by Article 7(1) of the United
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Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).1 The challenge of
securing a nationality has manifested acutely for children conceived and born
through ICS, where the child does not acquire nationality at birth jus soli (by
birthplace) or jus sanguinis (by descent). In ICS, children are born in one State
to a surrogate mother via the use of ART, but intended as children of ‘commis-
sioning parents’ originating from another State; in most ICS arrangements, such
children are expected to travel to and reside in their ‘commissioning parents’
State of nationality or residence. Due to the application of existing domestic
nationality and citizenship laws, gaps in international and domestic laws and
policies regarding ICS, and a lack of public education about the implications
of birth through ICS for the child’s rights and legal status, such children are
falling victim to conflict of laws and facing difficulties in acquiring nationality
following birth. In some cases children are born stateless, stranded in their
birth State, despite the fact that, as Edwards asserts, “the duty to prevent
statelessness, at least in respect of children, is emerging as a norm of customary
international law”.2
This chapter examines the challenge of securing the child’s right to a
nationality in our changing world, where having a child through ICS is a real
– although sometimes last-resort – option for a growing number of prospective
parents globally. It discusses the various scenarios of child statelessness in
ICS, building an understanding of ICS as a new cause of statelessness occurring
within the broader context of twenty-first century family formation. The wider
human rights implications of statelessness for this group of children are
examined through reference to illustrative cases and situated within the frame-
work of relevant international legal provisions and standards. This chapter
demonstrates that nationality is key to unlocking the child’s wider rights and
that upholding the child’s right to nationality is critical if this group of children
is to receive the rights they are entitled to under international law, consistent
with the principle of the best interests of the child established by the CRC. This
chapter shows that practical solutions to statelessness in ICS are within reach
and should be implemented urgently, before the scale of ICS-caused stateless-
ness grows.3
1 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September
1990, 1577 UNTS 3, Art. 7(1). Nationality is also explicitly referred to as an element of the
child’s identity under Article 8(1) of the CRC.
2 A. Edwards, “The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human rights:
procedural and substantive aspects”, in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds), Nationality
and Statelessness under International Law, Cambridge University Press 2014, p. 29.
3 It is acknowledged that securing the child’s right to a nationality does not present a stand-
alone solution to the broader human rights and legal status challenges faced by children
conceived and born through ICS. As discussed later in this chapter, other challenges to
the child’s rights may well persist, despite the child securing their right to a nationality.
See, e.g. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Application No 65192/11, Mennesson
v. France, 26 June 2014; ECtHR, Application No 65941/11, Labassee v. France, 26 June 2014.




2 UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM
2.1 ICS as a new method of family formation
ICS has become more widely available over the past decade as a new method
of family formation. It involves a person or persons residing in one State (the
‘commissioning parents’) paying money to conceive a child and to have that
child carried to term by a surrogate located in another State. ICS arrangements
are premised on the intention of the ‘commissioning parents’ that the child
will not live and grow up in the State of his or her birth, but rather in the State
in which his or her ‘commissioning parents’ reside. ICS regularly uses ART
techniques and procedures and, since the child is brought to term by a sur-
rogate, is an attractive method of family formation for same-sex couples and
single persons as well as heterosexual couples. Little data has been collected
to date on the numbers of children born through ICS, and gathering accurate
data on ICS remains difficult.
2.2 International Commercial Surrogacy as a new cause of statelessness
ICS has developed over the last decade in a largely unregulated manner, with
particular supply-side growth located in States in Asia such as India, Thailand
and Nepal.4 Demand for ICS is flowing predominantly from ‘commissioning
parents’ living in more developed States such as Australia, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) and the United
States of America.5 The near-certainty of having a child, decreasing inter-
country adoption options6 and the desire of many ‘commissioning parents’
to have their own genetic child or a child who is at least genetically related
to their partner make surrogacy attractive to such parents. The availability
of practices unavailable in their countries of residence, lack of regulation in
supply States and the low cost and relative speed further make ICS appealing.
European Court of Human Rights’ first international commercial surrogacy judgments”,
European Human Rights Law Review 2014, Vol. 6, p. 638-646.
4 Although certain states in the United States of America (USA) are significant ICS suppliers
and have been for much longer, they are not covered in this chapter since children born
in the USA through ICS always receive US nationality as a result of being born on US
territory, so statelessness does not arise.
5 R. Deonandan, “Recent trends in reproductive tourism and international surrogacy: ethical
considerations and challenges for policy”, Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 2015,
Vol. 8, 111-119, p. 115. Australia is said to be emerging as the highest per capita user of
international surrogacy: Chief Federal Magistrate J. Pascoe, “State of the Nation – Federal
Circuit Court of Australia”, Federal Judicial Scholarship 2014, Vol. 21.
6 J-F. Mignot, “L’adoption international dans le monde: les raisons du déclin”, l’Institut
national d’études démographiques Report No. 519, 2015.
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Despite ICS being viewed by many prospective ‘commissioning parents’
as a panacea enabling them to have a child, in practice it is a complex pro-
cedure due to the involvement of multiple parties, ART techniques and pro-
cesses, as well as its trans-boundary character. There is no international regula-
tion of ICS and national laws remain patchy and piecemeal. Therefore ICS
arrangements are often made in contexts with limited legal clarity and certainty
regarding their ultimate outcome. Pre-existing State level surrogacy laws are
often formulated with a view to domestic surrogacy only; in many States such
legislation outlaws commercial surrogacy and is silent on international
surrogacy. While States take diverse approaches in relation to domestic
surrogacy, provisions on this subject fall largely into three categories, namely:
prohibitive (all forms of surrogacy are illegal); limitedly permissive (surrogacy
is allowed in some situations, limited for example to altruistic surrogacy and
situations of medical necessity); or silent (says nothing about surrogacy and
has no policy on surrogacy). Attempts by States to apply these laws to ICS lead
to situations where national laws of the States involved conflict, or where the
gaps in national laws make the situation unclear. In recent years a small
number of States have adopted legislative measures explicitly addressing ICS
and recognising it as a specific form of surrogacy. Some have established
legislative bans on ICS within their territory;7 others make clear that engaging
in ICS amounts to a criminal offence, applying extraterritorially.8 One rationale
underlying such bans on ICS is the argument that ICS amounts to the sale of
children and must be guarded against.
Within this context, ICS has emerged as one of the newest causes of
statelessness in the twenty-first century. Smerdon observes that “[i]nternational
surrogacy arrangements have created paradoxical situations of ‘legal orphan-
hood’ where highly desired surrogate babies with arguably multiple parents
are not recognized by either the child’s country of birth or the country of the
child’s commissioning parent(s)”.9 ‘Commissioning parents’ may enter into
ICS arrangements without comprehending the risk of statelessness for a future
child. The complications surrounding the child’s ability to acquire a nationality
are inherently related to their relationship with their various biological and
‘commissioning’ parents, which may include all those involved with the child’s
conception and/or birth as a ‘commissioning parent’, surrogate mother, or
gamete donor. A child born through ICS may face difficulties in acquiring
nationality in a number of ways. As the three scenarios discussed below show,
7 See, e.g. Thailand’s Protection for Children Born through Assisted Reproductive Techno-
logies Act 2015, http://www.senate.go.th/bill/bk_data/73-3.pdf; for a detailed overview
of the Act, see S. Umeda, Thailand: New Surrogacy Law, Library of Congress, 6 April 2015,
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205404368_text.
8 See e.g. New South Wales (Australia) Surrogacy Act 2010 (2010 No. 102), Sections 8 and
11.
9 U.R. Smerdon, “Birth registration and citizenship rights of surrogate babies born in India”,




the risk of statelessness for children born through ICS depends on the positions
on surrogacy of the birth State, the States of nationality of ‘commissioning
parents’ and the nationality and parentage laws applicable in those States.
2.2.1 Scenario one: Lack of recognition of the child’s parentage prevents nationality
acquisition
Statelessness can occur in ICS where the child’s birth State does not grant
nationality on a jus soli basis and the child is unable to acquire the nationality
of either the ‘commissioning parents’ or their surrogate, as none are recognised
as the child’s legal parent(s). This scenario can arise when there is confusion
regarding who the child’s birth State recognises as a legal parent of the child,
and the ‘commissioning parents’’ State does not recognise them as the child’s
legal parents, leading to no one being recognised as the child’s legal parent(s).
A child can also become stateless under scenario one when the ‘commissioning
parents’’ State of nationality requires the child to have a genetic link to at least
one of the ‘commissioning parents’ to receive that State’s nationality, but DNA
tests are negative.
Scenario one can also arise in instances where the surrogate is not a
national of the child’s birth State, but a third-country national; for example,
until recently, ICS was permitted in Nepal in instances where the surrogate
was not a Nepalese national (but, for example, an Indian national).10 In such
situations, given that Nepal grants nationality jus sanguinis, if the child is not
recognised as a national by the ‘commissioning parent’s’ State of nationality
or the surrogate mother’s State of nationality, the child will be stateless. Finally,
under this first scenario statelessness can occur when the child’s birth State
introduces a temporary or permanent prohibition on ICS within that State
without clarifying the legal status of children currently in utero through an
ICS arrangement, or children born in the State through ICS following the im-
position of such a ban (as arose in Nepal in 201511).
10 Following a Cabinet decision by the Nepalese Government on 18 September 2014, ICS was
allowed in Nepal but prohibited the involvement of Nepalese women as surrogates, the
donation of gametes by Nepalese citizens, and also prohibited the use of surrogacy services
by Nepalese citizens. See R. Parajuli, Surrogacy in Nepal: Threat to reproductive right, The
Himalayan Times, 18 August 2015, http://thehimalayantimes.com/opinion/surrogacy-in-
nepal-threat-to-reproductive-right. However, following a decision by the Nepal Supreme
Court on 18 September 2015, international surrogacy in Nepal is now prohibited. See,
Embassy of the United States, Kathmandu, Nepal, Surrogacy in Nepal, 14 June 2016, http://
nepal.usembassy.gov/service/surrogacy-in-nepal.html.
11 L. Kerin, Australian dad pleads for Government help after twin babies stranded in Nepal,
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2.2.2 Scenario two: Application of conflicting nationality and parentage laws by
child’s birth State and ‘commissioning parents’’ State of nationality
The second scenario in which children conceived and born through ICS can
end up stateless appears, in practice, to be more common than that discussed
in scenario one. Here, children are unable to acquire a nationality following
their birth due to national laws and policies of the child’s birth State regarding
the status of children, parentage and nationality conflicting with those applied
by their ‘commissioning parents’’ State of nationality.
The initial factor leading to children being rendered stateless in this
scenario is that their birth State does not view children born through ICS within
that State as nationals, given that under its laws, they are the legal children
of their ‘commissioning parents’ and therefore regarded as nationals of their
‘commissioning parents’’ State of nationality. Such States do not recognise the
child’s surrogate mother (and her partner, if she has one) as the child’s legal
parents and one or both ‘commissioning parents’ are listed as the child’s
parents on any birth registration document issued by the child’s birth State.
This is the case, for example, in Ukraine12 and in India.13 Children born
through ICS in Ukraine are not able to acquire Ukrainian nationality,14 and
in India such children are usually precluded from acquiring Indian nationality
on the basis of their birth through ICS to foreign ‘commissioning parents’.15
The second part of the recipe leading to child statelessness in this scenario
is that the ‘commissioning parents’’ State of nationality takes the position that
the child is not one of its nationals either. This may be because the ‘commis-
sioning parents’’ State of nationality confers nationality on the basis of jus soli
or places limitations on the transfer of nationality to children born abroad,
and/or because the national law of the ‘commissioning parent’s’ State of
12 Ukrainian law views the commissioning parents as the child’s legal parents in surrogacy
situations. See, Family Code of Ukraine 2004, Art. 123(2) and 139(2).
13 Indian Council of Medical Research and National Academy of Medical Sciences, National
Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision and Regulation of ART Clinics in India, 2005,
para. 3.5.4 states that “the birth certificate shall be in the name of the genetic parents”.
However, the National Guidelines do not have binding force of law in India.
14 Law on Citizenship of Ukraine 2001, Art. 7 states that “a person, whose parents or one
of the parents were citizens of Ukraine at the time of his/her birth is a citizen of Ukraine”.
When combined with the provisions of the Family Code of Ukraine 2004, supra n 12, this
means children born through ICS in Ukraine are unable to acquire Ukrainian nationality
as they are not viewed as having a Ukrainian parent.
15 This has been the clear position taken by the Indian Government, e.g. in proceedings in
the on-going case Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 8714, Union of India and ANR
v. Jan Balaz and others, 2010. However, it is worth noting the wording of India’s Citizenship
Act 1955 section 3(c), which states that every person born in India shall be a citizen of India
by birth where “(i) both of his parents are citizens of India; or (ii) one of whose parents
is a citizen of India and the other is not an illegal migrant at the time of his birth”. Smerdon,
supra n9, p. 345 observes that “the law remains unclear as to whether a child born to an




nationality (and/or residence) concerning the status of children views the
child’s surrogate and her partner (if she has one) as the child’s legal parent(s).
A number of cases illustrate scenario two. A leading case is that of the
Balaz twins who were born in India to an Indian surrogate mother on 4
January 2008 and were stateless from birth.16 The twins are the genetic
children of their ‘commissioning father’, Jan Balaz, and an anonymous third-
party Indian egg donor.17 Their ‘commissioning mother’, Susannne Lohle
(married to Mr Balaz) is not genetically related to the twins. Mr Balaz and
Ms Lohle are both German citizens, and initially sought to gain German visas
for the twins to enter Germany, but the applications were rejected.18 Sub-
sequently these ‘commissioning parents’ sought Indian citizenship for the
twins. However, India viewed the ‘commissioning parents’ as the twins’ legal
parents; without an Indian citizen parent they were unable to acquire Indian
nationality.
Almost two years after the twins’ birth, the High Court of Gujarat ruled
that because the twins were born in India to an Indian surrogate mother, they
could be regarded as having one Indian citizen parent and were entitled to
Indian citizenship under section 3(1)(c)(ii) of the Citizenship Act.19 The Court
further held the twins were entitled to Indian passports, as denying them
passports would not fall within the grounds of refusal of passports under the
Indian Passports Act.20 However, the twins’ statelessness persisted because
the Indian government continued to take the position in subsequent Supreme
Court proceedings that the ‘commissioning parents’ were the legal parents
and therefore the twins could not acquire Indian nationality.21 Following
protracted attempts by the ‘commissioning parents’ to leave India with the
twins (during which time the German government took a hard-line approach,
in line with the German prohibition on surrogacy),22 an ad hoc solution was
16 High Court of Gujarat at Ahmemebad, Letters Patent Appeal No. 2151, 2009 in Special
Civil Application No. 3020, 2008 with Civil Application No. 11364 Of 2009 in Letters Patent
Appeal No. 2151, 2009 with Special Civil Application No. 3020, 2009, Jan Balaz v. Anand
Municipality and ANR, 2009, para. 3.
17 Ibid., para. 2.
18 As surrogacy is illegal in Germany: Embryonenschutzgesetz 1990 (Act on the Protection
of Embryos, Germany), section (1)(1)(7).
19 Jan Balaz v. Anand Municipality and ANR, supra n16, para. 17.
20 Ibid., para. 17-18. In para. 22, the Court held that “[w]e, in the present legal frame-work,
have no other go [sic] but to hold that the babies born in India to the gestational surrogate
are citizens of this country and therefore, entitled to get the passports”.
21 Smerdon, supra n9, p. 347.
22 See, e.g. the comments of the then German Ambassador to India, Thomas Mataussek in
K. Schoch, Deutschland verweigert indischer Leihmutter die Einreise, Sudwest Presse, 4
March 2010, http://www.swp.de/ulm/nachrichten/politik/Deutschlandverweigert-indi
scher-Leihmutter-dieEinreise;art4306,389187 See also the comment by Ambassador Mataussek
regarding the possibility of granting the twins a German entry visa: “We have to be very
careful. We don’t want to set a precedent […] We don’t want to encourage people to go
down this path. This is not the way to put children into the world.” Reported in R. Bhat-
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reached, enabling the intercountry adoption of the twins by the ‘commissioning
parents’.23 Exit documentation was then issued by the Indian government,
along with a one-off German entry visa.24
Three other cases similar in nature to the Balaz case and falling under
scenario two demonstrate the contexts in which measures are needed to avoid
statelessness in ICS. The Volden twins were stateless from their birth in India
on 24 January 2010,25 resulting from an ICS arrangement commissioned by
a single Norwegian woman using an anonymous Danish sperm donor and
anonymous Indian egg donor.26 They remained stateless in India for over
a year given the Indian position on legal parentage and nationality in ICS,
combined with the Norwegian legal position that the twins were not Nor-
wegian nationals given their birth to an Indian mother in India27 and the fact
that surrogacy is not permitted in Norway.28 It was not until 15 March 2011
that Norwegian immigration authorities decided, on an exceptional basis, that
they could enter and reside in Norway.29 In May 2011 a Norwegian court
granted the twins’ ‘commissioning mother’ guardianship of the twins, including
financial and legal responsibility, but did not recognise her as the twins’ legal
mother. As a result the twins did not acquire nationality at this point and
therefore remained stateless in Norway.30 The case of X and Y (Foreign
nagar, Germany might consider visas for surrogate twins, DNA India News, 5 January
2010, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-germany-might-consider-visas-for-surrogate-
twins-1331021.
23 A. Malhotra and R. Malhotra, “All Aboard For the Fertility Express”, Commonwealth Law
Bulletin 2012, Vol. 38(1), p. 33.
24 Smerdon, supra n9, p. 351 If the twins’ intercountry adoption was fully concluded, it can
be assumed the twins acquired German nationality through this process; however, no
evidence is publicly available confirming that this occurred. Proceedings in the Supreme
Court of India remain pending in this case, with the Court yet to rule on the substantive
issue of the acquisition of a nationality by children born through ICS in India: http://
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/clist_bm/2012/bm_dl25022015.pdf, case 101.
25 S. Lysvold et al., Kari Ann Volden får komme hjem, Norsk rikskringkasting (NRK), 16 April
2011, http://www.nrk.no/nordland/kari-ann-volden-far-komme-hjem-1.7596488.
26 D. Deomampo, “Defining Parents, Making Citizens: Nationality and Citizenship in Trans-
national Surrogacy”, Medical Anthropology 2014, Vol. 34(3), p. 14, n. 5.
27 M. Melhuus, Problems of Conception: Issues of Law, Biotechnology, Individuals and
Kinship, Berghahn Books 2012, p. 84. Norway regarded the twins’ Indian birth mother as
their legal mother, applying Norway’s Children Act 1981 (Act No. 7 of 8 April 1981), section
2. Also relevant is Norway’s Act on Biotechnology 2003 (Act No. 100 of 5 December 2003),
sections 2-15, the effect of which is that it is prohibited to implant embryos into a woman
other than the egg donor herself.
28 See Norwegian Government, Surrogacy, 23 January 2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/
topics/families-and-children/innsiktsartikler/surrogate-maternity/id660199.
29 Lysvold et al., supra n25.
30 B. Johansen and B.M. Pettersen, Volden får beholde tvillingene, NRK, 7 May 2011, http://
www.nrk.no/nordland/volden-far-beholde-tvillingene-1.7622605. It remains unreported




Surrogacy)31 concerned twins born stateless in Ukraine, commissioned by
British ‘commissioning parents’ using the ‘commissioning father’s’ sperm and
anonymous donor eggs.32 The twins’ statelessness occurred given the applica-
tion and subsequent conflict of the Ukrainian and UK legal regimes relating
to surrogacy and nationality.33 UK law viewed the twins as Ukrainian
nationals with their legal parents being their birth mother and her partner,34
while Ukrainian law stipulates that children born through surrogacy in Ukraine
are the legal children of their ‘commissioning parents’ and therefore not
entitled to Ukrainian nationality.35 The twins were only able to leave Ukraine
and enter the UK due to the UK granting them discretionary leave to enter for
one year under exceptional circumstances following DNA tests proving the
existence of a genetic link between the twins and their ‘commissioning
father’,36 however, even once the twins had entered the UK and their ‘com-
missioning parents’’ had been granted a parental order under UK law, they
remained stateless.37 Finally in relation to scenario two, Samuel Ghilain was
born in Ukraine on 28 November 200838 through an ICS arrangement com-
missioned by a Belgian same-sex couple using the sperm of one ‘commissioning
father’ and anonymous donor eggs.39 Given the application of Belgian and
Ukrainian laws, Samuel was born stateless,40 stranded in Ukraine for over
31 UK High Court of Justice Family Division, Case No. FD08P01466, Re: X & Y (Foreign
Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam).
32 Ibid., para. 4.
33 E. Nelson, “Global Trade and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Regulatory Challenges
in International Surrogacy”, The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2013, Vol. 41(1), p.
246; L. Theis, N. Gamble and L. Gheavaert, “Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy): ‘A Trek
Through a Thorn Forest’”, Family Law, March 2009, p. 239.
34 UK, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 1990 c. 37, section 27 defines the mother
as “The woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of
an embryo or of sperm and eggs”.
35 Mr. Justice Hedley was explicit about the twins’ statelessness, summarising the effect of
the application of these conflicting laws to the twins as meaning that they “were effectively
legal orphans and, more seriously, stateless”. X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), supra n31, para. 9.
36 Ibid., para. 10.
37 Mr Justice Hedley noted that “the grant of a parental order does not of itself confer citizen-
ship although the evidence suggests that it is very unlikely to be denied if sought.” Ibid.
38 Associated Press, Baby, stranded in Ukraine, to join Belgian parents, Fox News, 21 February
2011, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/02/21/baby-stranded-ukraine-join-belgian-
parents-1916799428.
39 I.G. Cohen, Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism, Law and Ethics, Oxford University
Press 2014, p. 376.
40 T. Lin, “Born Lost: Stateless Children in International Surrogacy Arrangements”, Cardozo
Journal of International and Comparative Law 2013, Vol. 21, p. 547 explains “Because
Belgian law is silent on the legality of surrogacy, the Belgian government denied Samuel
citizenship on the grounds that it had no legal basis to recognise the Ukrainian birth
certificate, despite the fact that Samuel’s biological father is a Belgian citizen. Samuel also
could not be a Ukrainian citizen because Ukrainian law recognises the intended parents
as the child’s legal parents.”
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two years, finally acquiring Belgian nationality after protracted legal proceed-
ings.41
2.2.3 Scenario three: Children abandoned by commissioning parents
The third scenario whereby children conceived and born through ICS are
stateless is when they are abandoned in their birth State by their ‘commission-
ing parents’. In this scenario, ICS arrangements are not completed due to
‘commissioning parent(s)’ deciding they do not want to parent the child they
commissioned. Abandonment may occur either during the pregnancy or
following the child’s birth. If a child is abandoned by their ‘commissioning
parents’ following birth in a State where they are unable to acquire nationality
due to nationality laws based on jus sanguinis and the view that the ‘com-
missioning parents’ are the child’s legal parents, they are likely stateless and
parentless.
Examples of this third scenario of child statelessness in ICS are more
difficult to detect than those falling under scenario two, given that without
‘commissioning parents’ involved, they may be less likely to come before
national courts for resolution; moreover, cases falling under scenario three
may not come to the attention of the authorities in either the child’s State of
birth or the ‘commissioning parents’’ State of nationality and/or residence
at all. However, one case reported by the media involved a child abandoned
in India by Australian ‘commissioning parents’. In this case, following the birth
of twins – a boy and a girl – their ‘commissioning parents’ decided they only
wanted to take the girl home to Australia. As they already had a son, the girl
would complete their family and they could not afford to support both the
twins.42 The Australian government warned the ‘commissioning parents’ that
the boy could be left stateless if they did not apply for Australian citizenship
for him43 (given the application and effect of Indian and Australian laws
concerning nationality and parentage in ICS situations). However, the ‘com-
41 D. Melvin, Boy stuck 2 years in Ukraine arrives in Belgium, The Washington Post, 26
February 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/26/
AR2011022601088.html. The Brussels Court of First Instance formally recognised the genetic
link between Samuel and one of his ‘commissioning fathers’, see ,C. Kindregan and D.
White, “International Fertility Tourism: The Potential for Stateless Children in Cross-Border
Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements”, Suffolk Transnational Law Review 2013, Vol. 36(3),
p. 617. The Belgian government complied with the judgment, granting Samuel a passport,
see, Kingdom of Belgium Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation,
Steven Vanackere – surrogate motherhood, 18 February 2011, http://diplomatie.belgium.be/
en/Newsroom/news/press_releases/foreign_affairs/2011/02/ni_1802110_vanackere_
surrogate_motherhood.
42 J. Ireland, Fresh surrogacy concerns over boy abandoned in India, Sydney Morning Herald,






missioning parents’ took no such action and the boy was left stateless and
parentless in India.44
2.3 Key findings distilled from the three ICS child statelessness scenarios
and associated cases
The three scenarios and associated cases discussed above highlight the contexts
within which child statelessness can arise in ICS. They show that children
conceived and born through ICS may face difficulties securing a nationality
following birth in a number of ways which connect to gaps and conflicts in
national laws in ICS supply and demand States relating to legal parentage and
nationality and the available modes of nationality acquisition. Indeed, child
statelessness in ICS is often linked to challenges faced by the child regarding
legal recognition of their parentage. The cases discussed show that when a
conflict between parentage laws of the various States involved in an ICS
arrangement occurs, the child is likely to be without legal parentage for a time.
This in turn impacts on children’s ability to acquire a nationality if they are
born in a State which does not allow nationality acquisition by jus soli. How-
ever, the cases also highlight that even if legal parentage is established in ICS
cases, this does not automatically lead to nationality for the child. Therefore,
while there are strong connections between parentage and nationality issues
in ICS cases, legal recognition of parentage does not always lead to a child
gaining nationality.
The scenarios discussed illustrate the non-existence in many jurisdictions
of domestic legislation and policy explicitly designed to apply to ICS situations.
In the majority of States, no national laws have been adopted explicitly
addressing ICS situations, including issues such as the child’s nationality when
conceived and born through ICS. Therefore, many States are attempting to fill
a legal vacuum by applying domestic laws which legislators did not envisage
applying to ICS situations. The three scenarios also bring into sharp relief the
gaps at the international level regarding ICS. No international law explicitly
addresses or regulates ICS, and to date no international agreements have been
reached between States regarding the practice.
The cases are further significant given that they are representative of the
reality that when statelessness occurs in ICS situations, it occurs from birth.
As de Groot observes, birth is a key moment for children regarding nationality:
“[t]he pivotal juncture in guaranteeing a person’s right to a nationality is the
moment of birth. If a child does not secure a nationality at birth, he or she
44 S. Hawley, S. Smith and M. McKinnon, India surrogacy case: Documents show New South
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may be left stateless for many years, or even a lifetime – with severe conse-
quences.”45 The cases also highlight the wide range of factual variances in
ICS situations: no ICS arrangement is exactly the same as another, given factors
such as the States involved and therefore which national laws apply, whether
or not the States have clear positions on nationality of children in ICS, and the
status of the ‘commissioning parents’ both in relation to each other (hetero-
sexual married; heterosexual unmarried; same-sex) and whether or not a
commissioning parent shares a genetic link with the child.
2.3.1 Examining the wider child rights impacts of child statelessness in ICS
Significant findings relating to the wider child rights impacts of statelessness
in ICS can be identified based on the outcomes in the cases discussed above.
The first is that in all the cases, the actions taken by the States involved were
inconsistent with the principle of the best interests of the child. Moreover, in
all the cases, the children were arguably discriminated against on the basis
of their birth status tied to their birth through ICS given (in many instances)
the uncertain nature of ICS under national law, with this status being the basis
for decisions leading to their statelessness.
A further finding regarding the child rights consequences highlighted by
these cases is that nationality is important to access many of other rights
guaranteed to all children by the CRC given the interlocking and interdependent
nature of rights. As de Groot notes, “Childhood statelessness threatens access
to education, an adequate standard of living, social assistance, health care and
other specific forms of protection to which children are entitled”.46 As a result
of their statelessness, the children’s freedom of movement outside their State
of birth was restricted in all the cases discussed. Statelessness also meant all
of the children had a highly uncertain legal status (in some cases for years),
and were unable to gain social security and the State support services that
they would have been entitled to from their birth State if they were recognised
as nationals. Mr Justice Hedley noted in the case of X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy)
that “the children had no rights of residence in or citizenship of the Ukraine
and there was no obligation owed them by the state other than to accom-
modate them as an act of basic humanity in a state orphanage”.47
Another result of statelessness in ICS evident in the cases discussed is that
this sometimes leads to the children being separated from their ‘commissioning
parents’ and prevented from having a relationship with the very people who
are often the only adults wanting to parent the children. The Balaz twins were
45 G.R. de Groot, “Children, their right to a nationality and child statelessness”, in A. Edwards
and L. van Waas (eds), Nationality and Statelessness under International Law, Cambridge
University Press 2014, p. 144.
46 Ibid.




separated from their ‘commissioning mother’48 and in the judgment of X and
Y (Foreign Surrogacy) it was observed that the twins “were marooned stateless
and parentless whilst the applicants could neither remain in the Ukraine nor
bring the children home”.49 Both Samuel Ghilain’s ‘commissioning parents’
were unable to remain in Ukraine, and he was initially placed with a foster
family. Later, when they were unable to continue to finance this care he was
placed in an orphanage for a year.50 If we are to view the child’s ‘commission-
ing parents’ as the child’s parents, being separated in this way impacts on
the child’s right under Article 7 of the CRC to know and be cared for by his
or her parents as far as possible.
A final child rights impact illustrated by the cases discussed is that such
children are at risk of being trafficked or becoming the subject of illegal cross-
border movement. While the risk from third parties should not be under-
estimated, in several cases ‘commissioning parents’ themselves have taken
desperate measures in their attempts to secure the child’s exit from their birth
State and entry into their intended State of residence. Samuel Ghilain’s ‘com-
missioning parents’ made a (failed) attempt to smuggle him out of Ukraine
in March 201051 and the Volden twins’ ‘commissioning mother’ falsified an
adoption application to the Norwegian government.52
The fact that children are stateless as a result of their birth through ICS
means that their rights under international law are being breached; the next
section focuses on the standards and norms under international law governing
the child’s right to acquire a nationality, which help inform how we can secure
the child’s right to nationality in ICS.
48 Relief for German surrogate twins, The Times of India, 17 March 2010, http://
www.timesnow.tv/Relief-for-German-surrogate-twins/articleshow/4340782.cms. While
it is unclear why the twins’ ‘commissioning mother’ did not stay in India with them, the
practical reality in such situations is that financially it may be untenable to remain away
from home and work for extended periods of time, or travel visas to remain in the child’s
State of birth may expire.
49 X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), supra n8, para. 10.
50 Baby, stranded in Ukraine, to join Belgian parents, supra n38.
51 Ibid. The abduction or trafficking of children is prohibited under international law see, e.g.
CRC, supra n1, Art. 36.
52 C. Kroløkke, “From India with Love: Troublesome Citizens of Fertility Travel”, Cultural
Politics 2012, Vol. 8(2), p. 318.
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3 INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE A
NATIONALITY
3.1 General nationality provisions and nationality provisions pertaining
specifically to children
Article 15(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)53 estab-
lishes the right to nationality as a universal right; Article 15(2) further states
that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of nationality. Subsequent international
human rights law instruments have confirmed and elaborated on Article 15
of the UDHR with specific reference to children. Article 24(3) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) asserts that “every child has
the right to acquire a nationality”;54 Article 29 of the International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families provides that “Each child of a migrant worker shall have the right
to […] a nationality”.55 Regional human rights instruments also recognise the
right of the child to a nationality, with the American Convention on Human
Rights and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child guar-
anteeing nationality to children on a jus soli basis where they would otherwise
be stateless.56
The CRC also addresses the child’s right to nationality. Article 7(1) restates
the right of the child to acquire a nationality, alongside the right to, as far as
possible, know and be cared for by his or her parents, and stipulates that the
child “shall be registered immediately after birth”. Importantly, Article 7(2)
is directed towards guarding against statelessness, requiring States Parties to
“ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national
law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this
field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless”.
Two of the central principles of the CRC are important to note regarding
the child’s right to nationality insofar as they colour how the child’s rights
should be interpreted and implemented. Article 2 establishes the principle
53 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, Adopted and proclaimed by
General Assembly resolution 217 A (III), Art. 15.
54 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, entry into force
23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 24(3).
55 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, 18 December 1990, entry into force 1 July 3002, A/RES/45/158,
Art. 29.
56 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, entry into force 18 July 1978,
OAS Treaty Series No. 36, Art. 20; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
11 July 1990, entry into force 229 November 1999, OA DOC. CAB/LEG/24.9.49, Art. 4 and
6(3). In Europe, European Convention on Nationality, 6 November 1997, entry into force
1 March 2000, ETS 166, Art. 6(2) requires States Parties to provide under their domestic
law for nationality to be acquired by children born on its territory who do not acquire




of non-discrimination, with the inclusion of ‘birth or other status’ in Article
2(1) providing scope for the application of this provision to ICS situations. The
‘best interests of the child’ principle enshrined in Article 3(1) of the CRC,
establishes that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration”. De Groot notes that “the almost universal ratification
of the CRC suggests that an otherwise stateless child should acquire the nation-
ality of the country of birth immediately at birth or as soon as possible there-
after”.57 This is also reflected in the Dakar Conclusions which are based on
the idea that from the moment of their birth it will never be in the child’s best
interests to be stateless given the adverse associated consequences.58 Applying
the principle of the best interests of the child to children seeking to acquire
nationality in ICS when they would otherwise be stateless means that in making
decisions regarding whether or not a child can acquire a particular nationality,
the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration.59
3.2 Key provisions in the Statelessness Conventions
While the 1930 Hague Convention on certain questions relating to the conflict
of nationality laws (1930 Hague Convention) asserts that “[i]t is for each state
to determine under its own law who are its nationals”60 and that “[a]ny
question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State
shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State”,61 as indicated
above, subsequent international human rights law instruments have imposed
limits and obligations in relation to the freedom of States in this regard. A
number of limits on a State’s discretion in nationality matters exist, “derived
either from general principles, custom or treaty obligations include: (i) the
prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of nationality; (ii) non-discrimination
in nationality matters; and (iii) the duty to avoid statelessness”.62 The Conven-
tion on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961 Convention)63 aims to give effect
to the universal right to nationality and the customary norm that statelessness
57 de Groot, supra n45, p. 150.
58 UNHCR, Expert Meeting – Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Preventing
Statelessness among Children (‘Dakar Conclusions’), September 2011, para. 5.
59 The importance of the best interests of the child to such cases was discussed by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Mennesson v. France, supra n3. This is discussed further
in section 4.3.1 of this chapter.
60 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 13 April
2013, League of Nations Treaty Series vol 179, p.89, No. 4137, Art. 1.
61 Ibid., Art. 2.
62 Edwards, supra n2, p. 25.
63 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, entry into force 13 December
1975, 989 UNTS 175.
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should be avoided. It sets out a framework codifying the norms and standards
relating to the conferral of nationality and limiting or eliminating circumstances
in which the operation of national laws may result in statelessness.
The provisions of the 1961 Convention most relevant to ICS situations are
those dealing with the prevention of statelessness at birth. Article 1(1) of the
1961 Convention sets out a clear primary safeguard integral to the prevention
of statelessness at birth: “[a] Contracting State shall grant its nationality to
a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless”. Applying
this principle to the ICS context means that birth States of children conceived
and born through ICS should, in situations where the child would otherwise
be stateless, grant the child nationality. Therefore, Article 1(1) is potentially
a very powerful tool in the ICS context. The 1961 Convention stipulates that
such a grant of nationality can occur at birth64 or later as a result of an
application lodged on behalf of the child.65 However, to avoid statelessness
in ICS situations, ideally a grant needs to occur at or soon after the child’s birth.
If the child is able to leave their State of birth prior to acquiring a nationality
(i.e. if the ‘commissioning parents’’ home State grants the child entry but not
nationality), statelessness will not be avoided. States must, therefore, pay close
attention to implementing the requirement under the CRC that nationality
should be able to be acquired immediately after birth.
Although Article 1(1) of the 1961 Convention offers a potentially powerful
mechanism to prevent statelessness in ICS situations, it is dependent on ICS
supply States which are States Parties to the 1961 Convention and implement-
ing this obligation, or on ICS supply States adopting this protection even though
they are not Parties to the Convention. Currently, some of these States are not
States Parties to the 1961 Convention.66 However, Article 1(1) of the 1961
Convention should be viewed as codifying an important aspect of the custom-
ary norm that statelessness should be prevented; non-Contracting States to
the 1961 Convention should be encouraged, in situations where a child would
otherwise be stateless – including in ICS situations – to apply the safeguard
established in Article 1(1), to implement their duty to prevent statelessness
and secure the universal right to nationality. Such an approach is consistent
with Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the CRC.
Beyond the safeguard established by Article 1(1), the 1961 Convention
incorporates further provisions directed at ensuring that no one falls through
the cracks when it comes to nationality. Article 4(1) establishes that “[a] Con-
tracting State shall grant its nationality to a person, not born in the territory
of a Contracting State, who would otherwise be stateless, if the nationality
64 Ibid., Art. 1(1).
65 Ibid., Art. 1(b).






of one of his parents at the time of the person’s birth was that of that state”.
Article 1(4) codifies another relevant safeguard: “[a] Contracting State shall
give its nationality to a person, otherwise stateless, who is legally precluded
from assuming his/her birth nationality, where that State’s nationality was
held by either parent at the time of the birth”. Both Article 4(1) and Article
1(4) rely on children securing the nationality of the State of one of their parents.
The application of these safeguards to children who are otherwise stateless
in ICS situations may therefore be problematic, since these provisions would
require proof of the connection between the child and a parent in order for
the child to benefit from their protection. The 1961 Convention does not
envisage the possibility of a lack of clarity or agreement regarding the child’s
parentage through situations such as ICS; however, as discussed earlier in this
chapter, when born through ICS, children may have multiple potential parents
and may not be genetically related to their ‘commissioning parents’. Therefore,
while it is the child’s ‘commissioning parents’ who in most ICS cases seek
recognition as the child’s legal parents and try to secure the child the same
nationality as their own, it might be difficult to establish that the ‘commission-
ing parents’ should be recognised as the child’s parents. This raises a potential
hurdle to applying the safeguards of Articles 4(1) or 1(4) of the 1961 Conven-
tion to children born through ICS who are otherwise stateless.
4 SECURING THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO NATIONALITY IN ICS
4.1 The limitations of the solutions applied in the cases discussed
The actions and inaction of the States involved in the cases discussed in this
chapter suggest that solving statelessness and preventing it in the three
scenarios discussed in section two is not currently a priority among States.
This is despite the acute risk of statelessness for children conceived and born
through ICS in States where they will not automatically receive nationality on
the basis of jus soli. Solving this problem is dependent on States being willing
to take steps to prevent statelessness for children born through ICS. On the
supply-side of ICS, States may be hesitant to take on the perceived burden of
granting nationality to children born through ICS in their territory who would
otherwise be stateless, given the potential costs involved and its associated
politically unpalatable nature. However, under the customary international
norm that statelessness is to be avoided, all States have a responsibility to give
effect to the right to nationality. In this context it should be noted that neither
India nor Ukraine have a general safeguard in their nationality law ensuring
the right to nationality of otherwise stateless children born in the State. India’s
long-awaited legislation regarding ICS continues to languish in the Indian
parliamentary system, the contents of the latest draft of the Assisted Reproduct-
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ive Technology (Regulation) Bill (2013) remain publically unknown.67 How-
ever, earlier drafts have not included provisions relating to the child’s national-
ity.
With respect to States on the demand-side of ICS, there are a number of
implications for nationality policy and legislation stemming from some of the
cases discussed in this chapter. However, the responses of these States to the
cases do not indicate a willingness to take a prevention approach to
statelessness in ICS situations.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child asked the German government
to “provide measures taken by the State party to address the rights of children
residing in the State party territory but whose surrogate mothers are not from
the State party […] please provide information on measures to prevent children
in such situations from becoming Stateless”.68 Germany responded by out-
lining that pursuant to Section 4(1) of the Nationality Act, children attain
German citizenship by birth when one parent is a German national and that
on the basis of Section 1591 of the Civil Code, the mother of a child is always
the woman who bore the child; moreover Section 1592(1) establishes the child’s
father is the mother’s husband (at the time of the child’s birth). Germany said
“In order to derive a claim to German citizenship from a (German) sperm
donor, it is not sufficient to simply determine biological paternity by submitting
a DNA analysis, parentage must be determined in the legal sense”,69 and that
“Even if a child born in a foreign country to a surrogate mother generally does
not attain the genetic father’s (German) citizenship by birth, it is still not
stateless, since as a rule, it at least attains the mother’s citizenship”.70 Ger-
many’s response is problematic, failing to address the reality of the situation
in the Jan Balaz case, since States such as India do not recognise the surrogate
mother as the child’s legal mother and therefore do not grant nationality on
the basis of a jus sanguinis relationship with the surrogate mother, leaving the
child stateless. Unfortunately, the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s
Concluding Observations did not follow-up on this issue.71
The case of the Volden twins triggered public debate in Norway regarding
ICS and new family forms facilitated by ART. Human rights lawyer Gro Hille-
stad Thune argued that by rejecting Ms. Volden’s adoption application Norway
67 A. Malhotra, Ending discrimination in surrogacy laws, The Hindu, 3 May 2014, http://www.
thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/ending-discrimination-in-surrogacy-laws/article5970609.ece.
The most recent publicly available version of Bill is the 2010 version: http://icmr.nic.in/
guide/ART REGULATION Draft Bill1.pdf.
68 Committee on the Rights of the Child, List of issues in relation to the combined third and
fourth periodic reports of Germany, 23 December 2013, CRC/C/DEU/3-4, para. 7.
69 Committee on the Rights of the Child, List of issues in relation to the third and fourth
periodic reports of Germany: Addendum, Replies of Germany to the list of issues, 23
December 2013, CRC/C/DEU/Q/3-4/Add.1, para. 43.
70 Ibid., para. 45.
71 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined third




had inflicted statelessness on the twins, in breach of international law.72 She
further criticised the government for attaching little weight to the children’s
rights and interests, noting that the children themselves did not ask to be
born.73 However, Budfir (Norwegian Directorate of Child Welfare and Adop-
tion) said because of the commercial nature of the surrogacy arrangement,
it fell under the international definition of sale of children74 and approving
the adoption would be inconsistent with the CRC. Budfir held the view that
significant public interests outweighed the interests of the twins in the case
and said rejecting the adoption application would set an example discouraging
other prospective ‘commissioning parents’ from entering into ICS arrangements.
Hillestad Thune argued that Bufdir was wrong to use the CRC to justify its
decision rather than using it to protect child rights; she said the balance should
have led to a decision ensuring that the children were placed in a safe situation
as regards their care.75
Despite the position taken by the Norwegian government in the Volden
case, Norway subsequently passed ‘provisional’ (temporary) legislation dealing
directly with the nationality of children born through ICS with the involvement
of Norwegian ‘commissioning parents’. Article 5(a) was added to the Nor-
wegian Nationality Act,76 which refers to a provisional law passed at the same
time pertaining to transfer of legal parenthood for children born abroad to
surrogate mothers.77 Article 5(a) has the effect that children born through
ICS to a Norwegian ‘commissioning parent’ who are residing in Norway and
whose legal parenthood is transferred to a Norwegian national automatically
become Norwegian nationals (if the child is under 18 years at the date of the
decision on legal parenthood). However, applications for transfer of legal
parenthood under the temporary parenthood legislation had to be made by
01 January 2014.78 The effect of these laws is therefore likely to have been
quite limited in practice. Olsen notes “[t]he law was passed to secure the rights
of children born by surrogate mothers before a more permanent legal solution
is decided by the Norwegian Parliament. It is still unclear what a more perma-
72 N.M. Smith Rustad and G. Pettersen, Mener norske myndigheter gjør tvillinger statsløse,
NRK, 23 March 2011, http://www.nrk.no/fordypning/statslose-tvillinger-1.7553860.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of
children, child prostitution and child pornography, 25 May 2000, entry into force 18 January
2002, Article 2(a).
75 Smith Rustad and Pettersen, supra n72.
76 Temporary amendment to the Norwegian Nationality Act (Lov om norsk statsborgerskap
(statsborgerloven)) June 10 2005, passed by the Stortinget 8 March 2013.
77 Temporary law on the transfer of parenthood for children in Norway born through a
surrogate mother abroad (Midlertidig lov om overføring av foreldreskap for barn i Norge
født av surrogatmor i utlandet mv), passed by the Stortinget 8 March 2013.
78 Ibid., Art. 4.
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nent solution may look like as surrogacy is at present not legal under Nor-
wegian law”.79
In the UK, in the years since X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), the UK government
has issued policy guidance on nationality for children in ICS situations involv-
ing British ‘commissioning parents’.80 This makes clear that “[e]ven if the
surrogate mother’s home country sees the commissioning couple as the
‘parents’ and issues documentation to this effect, UK law and the Immigration
Rules will not view them as ‘parents’. Only where the surrogate mother is
single is there a chance of UK law viewing the sperm donor/commissioning
male as the legal ‘father’”.81 Therefore, even in instances where ‘commission-
ing parents’ are named on birth certificates in the child’s birth State, “a baby
born to a foreign national surrogate mother who is married will not be auto-
matically eligible for British nationality”.82 The guidance outlines a number
of situations and the relevant steps which can be taken for the child to acquire
British nationality.83 Some of these envisage children entering the UK while
they are stateless and subsequently having their legal parentage regularised
through a parental order (under section 30 of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 2008), with the possibility of applying for British nationality
based on this recognition of the parent-child relationship. However, in
instances where the child has no genetic link to a British ‘commissioning
parent’, the guidance states that recognition of legal parentage in the UK will
not be possible;84 the child will not be able to acquire British nationality. This
means that not all children born through ICS will have the possibility of
acquiring nationality.
Finally, in Belgium the resolution of Samuel Ghilain’s case did not trigger
a discussion of the wider implications of the case. Given that the resolution
to Samuel’s statelessness was a passport issued under Ministerial discretion,
it remains true that “the legal and nationality status of a child born abroad
79 E.D.H. Olsen, Update on 2012 and 2013 Revisions of Norwegian Citizenship Law: Procedural
issues and citizenship for infants born abroad to surrogate mothers, Citizenship News,




80 See U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Surrogacy Overseas, June 2014 https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/324487/
Surrogacy_overseas__updated_June_14_.pdf and U.K. Home Office, Inter-country Surrogacy
and The Immigration Rules, 1 June 2009, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/261435/Intercountry-surrogacy-leaflet.pdf.
81 Ibid., p. 2.
82 Ibid., p. 2.
83 Ibid., pp. 6-11.
84 Ibid., para. 50 reads “If you know that neither of you will be able to provide any genetic
material towards the creation of a child, you will not be able to commission a child under




in a commercial surrogacy arrangement to a Belgian citizen is completely
uncertain”.85
4.2 Possible solutions to child statelessness in ICS
4.2.1 Jus soli based solutions
One possible solution to the challenge of securing the child’s right to acquire
a nationality in ICS is the implementation of the safeguard established by
Article 1(1) of the 1961 Convention in conjunction with Article 7 CRC, by the
birth States of such children. This means all children born through ICS in the
territory of a State would acquire the nationality of that State at birth if they
would otherwise be stateless, resulting in the outcome that no child is born
stateless through ICS. This solution would ensure at least one State recognises
the child as a national, avoiding discrimination on the basis of the child’s birth
status and resolving any conflict of domestic nationality laws. It would also
ensure that children who have no genetic link to their ‘commissioning parents’
or who are abandoned by their ‘commissioning parents’ in ICS situations are
not left without nationality as a result of their ‘commissioning parents’’ actions.
As already indicated, to be fully effective in avoiding statelessness in ICS, this
would need to be an automatic conferral of nationality at birth or soon after
birth.
From a statelessness prevention perspective, this solution would mean all
the instances of child statelessness in the cases discussed would have been
avoided, enabling the children to secure their right to nationality under Article
7(1) CRC. Although not all States are States Parties to the 1961 Convention and
therefore bound by its provisions, it is suggested that all States should imple-
ment Article 1(1) including for children born on their territory through ICS.
Such a solution is consistent with the customary norm that statelessness should
be avoided and that all States have a duty to give effect to the universal right
to nationality.
However, there are some limitations to this first proposed solution. It
centres on avoiding statelessness, and is therefore a solution founded on a
safeguard rather than a positive recognition of the child’s right to a nationality.
More problematic is the underlying premise of all ICS arrangements that the
‘commissioning parents’ intend the child to reside with them. Therefore, the
child’s acquisition of the nationality of their birth State on a jus soli basis does
not align with the intention upon which ICS arrangements are premised, and
may have limited practical benefit and effect for children in ICS, other than
preventing statelessness. Although the fact they have a nationality may enable
85 Kindregan and White, supra n41, p. 618.
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them to gain a passport and travel to their ‘commissioning parent’s’ State of
nationality or residence, once in that State, given their foreign-national status,
they may not have access in practice to social and health services, education
and social security.86 In such situations, the child will continue to be in a
position of legal insecurity with consequent impact on his or her life and access
to services, inconsistent with his or her best interests; ultimately, the child may
not retain the right to reside in his or her ‘commissioning parents’’ State of
nationality or residence after a certain duration or at a certain age, depending
on applicable national laws.
Although this chapter has not discussed in detail the decision of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Mennesson v. France87
because it did not involve child statelessness, in the search for solutions it is
worth noting some key principles reflected in that judgment. The case dealt
with twins who acquired US nationality at birth (as a result of the USA’s jus
soli law) but who were not recognised as nationals by France (their ‘commis-
sioning parents’’ State of nationality), since surrogacy is illegal in France.88
The Mennesson twins lived as foreign nationals in France for the first 15 years
of their lives until the ECtHR decision was implemented in 2015.89 The ECtHR
found a violation of the twins’ right to respect for private life under Article
8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms.90 Key elements of the judgment relating to the child’s right
to nationality and not to be stateless are:
- The child’s right to identity is a central aspect of the right to respect for
private life, and essential parts of this are legal parentage and national-
ity;91
- Uncertainty regarding the acquisition of the nationality of their State of
residence, consistent with that of their ‘commissioning parents’ is likely
to have a negative impact on children’s ability to form their identity;92
86 This is what happened to the twins in the case of Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France
supra n3; the children involved in these cases were born through ICS in the USA in 2000
and 2001 and gained US nationality upon birth. However, France (their ‘commissioning
parent’s’ State of nationality) refused to register the children in France and recognise them
as French nationals. The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of the
children’s right to respect for private life.
87 Mennesson v. France, supra n3.
88 Ibid., para. 18-25.
89 For details of the implementation of the judgment by France, including the delivery of
certificates of French nationality to the Mennesson twins see, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?CaseTitleOrNumber=mennesson&State
Code=&SectionCode.
90 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
4 November 1950, entry into force 3 September 1953, ETS 005.
91 Mennesson v. France, supra n3, para. 96-101.




- The existence of a biological (genetic) link between a child and a ‘commis-
sioning parent’ is another important aspect of identity that should be
recognised under law. Not to do so fails to reflect the reality of the child’s
situation and has a negative impact on the child’s identity formation;93
and
- The best interests of the child must be appropriately weighed and
upheld.94
The ECtHR is clear that legal recognition of both nationality and legal parentage
in the State in which children reside is likely to be in their best interests, even
where surrogacy remains illegal in a given State. The ECtHR is therefore of the
view that the acquisition of nationality on a jus soli basis is unlikely to be
enough to give effect to the child’s best interests under the CRC in ICS situations
where the child is intended to reside and grow up in a different State.
However, it is important to recognise that this solution is likely to be
consistent with the best interests of the child in instances of scenario three,
where the child is abandoned by ‘commissioning parents’ in the State of birth
either before or after birth through ICS. Given the uncertainty in scenario three
situations regarding whether the ‘commissioning parents’ State of nationality
will assume responsibility for the child’s care and protection, it is likely to
be in the children’s best interests to acquire the nationality of the birth State,
given that in the foreseeable future following their abandonment they will
remain in and be reliant on that State to give effect to their rights under the
CRC. Therefore, the first proposed solution – whilst having significant asso-
ciated limitations – remains important to bear in mind for situations of child
abandonment in ICS. It may also be relevant in situations where the child has
no genetic link with the ‘commissioning parents’, as discussed below.
4.2.2 Jus sanguinis based solutions
An alternative approach which could overcome the limitations inherent in
the first proposed solution is for the State of residence of the ‘commissioning
parents’ (that is, the State they intend the child to live with them in) to grant
the child nationality jus sanguinis, either pre-birth through a court order
granting nationality prospectively in the event that the child is born, or after
birth. This would not only result in the child being able to secure the right
to a nationality, but the nationality acquired would be more aligned with best
interests in terms of the child’s lifetime outcomes. The acquisition of nationality
jus sanguinis presupposes that the ‘commissioning parents’’ State of nationality
recognises that a parent-child relationship exists between the child and at least
93 Ibid., para. 100.
94 Ibid., para. 99.
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
Securing children’s right to a nationality in a changing world 195
one of their ‘commissioning parents’.95 A pre-birth grant, contingent on the
child’s birth with a proven genetic link to a ‘commissioning parent’, is an
attractive option as it would secure legal certainty for the child regarding
nationality status. It has the benefit of putting the process of nationality
acquisition in motion at the earliest possible stage (that is, prior to the child
being born), making the acquisition of nationality a non-issue for the child
once born (as long as a genetic link can be proved, so in practice, nationality
would be acquired shortly after birth). However, securing the child’s national-
ity jus sanguinis via a pre-birth grant contingent on a genetic link being proved
post-birth may well be cumbersome to implement in practice. Additionally,
this would be a completely new approach, outside the usual methods of nation-
ality acquisition at birth.
A solution centring on a post-birth jus sanguinis grant of nationality may
be more workable and sit more comfortably with existing legal norms regard-
ing conferral of nationality. As previously mentioned, this has been the solution
applied by some ICS demand States on an ad hoc basis to regularise the nation-
ality status of children born through ICS in a foreign territory but who have
entered and reside in their State. The Council of Europe (CoE) has also sug-
gested this to avoid statelessness in international surrogacy.96 Principle 12
of CoE Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)13 proposes that “[i]f the child-parent
family relationship is recognised in the state of nationality of the commission-
ing mother or father the provisions of that state on the acquisition of national-
ity jure sanguinis have to be applicable. The child will be fully integrated into
the family of the ‘commissioning parents’, which justifies – as in the case of
adopted children – the acquisition of the nationality of the parents.”97
However, Principle 12 does not go as far as ensuring that all children born
through ICS will have the right to a nationality on a jus sanguinis basis. The
CoE states that “[i]t should be stressed, however, that principle 12 does not
oblige the recognition of the child-parent relationship as an automatic conse-
quence of the use of surrogacy. Whether such recognition takes place depends
on the private international law and, if applicable, the domestic law of the
country of the commissioning parents.”98 The fact that this is not a compre-
hensive safeguard is further stressed by the caveat that “[t]he principle simply
95 From a best interests of the child perspective, it remains questionable whether it will always
be in the child’s best interests to be in the care of their ‘commissioning parents’. For
example, in instances where a child’s ‘commissioning parent’ has previous convictions for
child abuse or sexual abuse, it is unlikely that a best interests of the child assessment would
lead to the child remaining in their care. However, a balancing exercise will likely be
necessary, especially in instances where the child is genetically related to such a person.
However, this is outside the scope of this chapter.
96 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)13 and explanat-
ory memorandum of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the nationality of
children, adopted 9 December 2009, CM/Rec(2009)13.
97 Ibid., Explanatory Memorandum, para. 32.




underlines that if recognition takes place this should also have consequences
in nationality law”.99
Moreover, there are significant limitations to the efficacy of a solution based
on a jus sanguinis mode of acquisition to the challenge of securing nationality
for children in ICS. As the CoE has identified, this relies on the recognition
of the ‘commissioning parents’ legal parentage. This raises a large problem
in the ICS context, given that a blood tie will not always exist between ‘commis-
sioning parents’ and the child, because of the involvement of third-party
gamete or embryo donors. This puts such children without a genetic link to
their ‘commissioning parents’ beyond the reach of a solution based on acquisi-
tion of nationality jus sanguinis in instances where ‘commissioning parents’
are not recognised as the child’s legal parents in States requiring such a genetic
link to be in existence in order to recognise legal parentage. Although States
requiring a genetic link to at least one ‘commissioning parent’ in order to
recognise legal parentage and nationality in ICS have not explained the
rationale underpinning this requirement, one possible reason is the need to
avoid the sale of children. The strict genetic link requirement of some States
exposes the limitations of such a jus sanguinis solution to avoiding child
statelessness in ICS. For children born through ICS, nationality acquisition
contingent on legal parentage will not be feasible in all cases, given the com-
plexities arising from the multiple possible ‘parents’ involved, and the inability
to guarantee a blood tie/genetic link between at least one ‘commissioning
parent’ and the child. Furthermore, single female ‘commissioning parents’ or
same-sex female ‘commissioning parents’ may in some instances be unable
to confer nationality by descent on the child even if they have a genetic con-
nection, given the discriminatory nature of some States’ nationality laws.
In situations where nationality is acquired jus sanguinis either pre- or post-
birth, in practical terms it may be some days or weeks after a child is born
before the acquisition of nationality can be confirmed, given that States may
require proof of a genetic link through DNA testing in ICS situations. Further-
more, it is important to recognise that a post-birth grant of nationality jus
sanguinis after the child has already entered and is residing in the ‘commission-
ing parents’’ State of nationality and/or residence does not resolve the problem
that in order to have entered and be residing in that State, the child may have
had to secure an entry permit or a visa for that State, which may be time-
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4.2.3 A practical and effective solution and residual secondary safeguards to secure
the child’s right to nationality in ICS
The above discussion highlights that it is difficult to find a solution centring
on a positive obligation to ensure a child’s right to acquire a nationality.
Acquisition of nationality jus soli has the advantage of securing the child’s
right to a nationality from birth, thereby preventing children born through
ICS being stateless at birth. Beyond this, however, having secured the national-
ity of their birth State may have little practical benefit for children who reside
in their ‘commissioning parents’’ State of nationality, since as foreign nationals
they will remain without the full protection flowing from nationality of that
State. It may not align with what is in the child’s wider best interests, in terms
of giving effect to rights under the CRC and safeguarding lifetime outcomes.
Indeed, as the Mennesson v. France illustrates, significant issues around the
child’s identity may remain. However, acquisition of nationality jus sanguinis
is dependent on recognition of the ‘commissioning parents’’ legal parentage.
Although this solution is likely to be more consistent with the best interests
of the child, the weakness of a jus sanguinis approach to securing the child’s
nationality in ICS is that recognition of ‘commissioning parents’ as legal parents
is far from guaranteed, for example due to the lack of a genetic link between
the child and one or both of the ‘commissioning parents’.
On the basis of the preceding discussion of possible solutions to secure
nationality for children born through ICS who would otherwise be stateless,
the optimum solution is one which not only guarantees the right to a national-
ity, but also avoids discrimination on the basis of birth status and aligns with
and gives effect to the best interests of the child. On balance, nationality
acquisition based on a jus sanguinis approach is preferred in the context of
ICS. This could be undertaken on a pre-birth or post-birth basis; however, the
ultimate aim should be to ensure that the child secures nationality as soon
as possible following birth, thereby limiting the time during which the child’s
nationality is uncertain.
As the optimum solution outlined above will not secure nationality for
all children in ICS (where a genetic link does not exist with ‘commissioning
parents’ or the child is abandoned by ‘commissioning parents’), implementing
additional safeguards is necessary to avoid child statelessness in ICS. In such
situations, birth States should apply the principle codified in Article 1(1) of
the 1961 Convention to ensure that otherwise stateless children born in their
territory through ICS acquire nationality. For this group of ICS children, this
mode of nationality acquisition is most likely to be consistent with their best
interests as it will mean they are not stateless, even though the acquisition
of nationality will not necessarily have the effect of resolving other aspects
of their situation. For children without a genetic link to their ‘commissioning
parents’, this will mean they have a nationality, but it will not necessarily lead




applying this solution will mean they are recognised as nationals of the State
they are likely to remain in, even if their wider legal status in terms of guard-
ianship remains uncertain.
Given the gaps in international guidance and the need for cooperation
between States in the context of ICS,, an international agreement would be
helpful in ensuring that safeguards are in place in all States. An instrument
or guidance developed under the auspices of an international organisation
with global reach in the area of nationality and statelessness would provide
a useful starting point, as it would provide States with information on how
to approach ICS situations to ensure that statelessness is avoided and the best
interests of the child are protected. Such an instrument or guidance document
should reflect and re-assert the pre-existing international law norms codified
in the 1961 Convention and the CRC. Eventually it may be useful for States
to negotiate a legally binding agreement, which and could for example take
the form of a protocol to the 1961 Convention. However, in the first instance
any new tools to address the problem of statelessness in ICS need to be simple
and flexible enough to encourage as many States as possible to take action
to prevent children from being born stateless through ICS. The development
of non-legally binding guidance could thus provide a useful initial roadmap
for States to follow in ICS situations where they are faced with children who
would otherwise be stateless.
In light of these observations, UNCHR may wish to consider the possibility
of issuing guidance on securing nationality for all children in international
surrogacy situations so as to avoid childhood statelessness. This would help
to shine a spotlight on child statelessness as a particular problem within ICS
and to identify ways in which problems can be avoided. This could happen
in the short-term without having to wait for long-term international agreement
on the broader practice of ICS (a matter more suited to the mandate of the work
of the Experts Group relating to international surrogacy convened by the
Hague Conference on Private International Law100). Ideally, UNHCR would
prepare and issue this guidance in cooperation with the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, as this would send a strong message to States regarding
the need to take cooperative, targeted action to solve the problem of child
statelessness in ICS. Such guidance should rest on the principle of shared State
responsibility and encourage States to cooperate to ensure that all children
born through ICS can secure a nationality, consistent with their right under
Article 7(1) of the CRC. Substantively, it is suggested the guidance reflect the
following:
1) A State which is the intended State of a child’s residence will, either prior
to the birth of that child through ICS or as soon as possible following birth,
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long as a genetic link between the child and one of his or her ‘commission-
ing parents’ is proved.
1(1) In order to ensure that the child is able to acquire nationality as soon
as possible after birth through ICS, DNA testing will be made available
immediately following the child’s birth.
2) States will grant nationality to an otherwise stateless child born on their
territory through ICS. The child should be assumed to be stateless if he or
she:
a. has no genetic link to either of their ‘commissioning parents’ on the
basis of DNA testing; or
b. is abandoned pre- or post-birth by their ‘commissioning parents’ in
the territory of the birth State, regardless of whether or not he or she
has a genetic link to his or her ‘commissioning parents’.
Guidance of this kind can function perfectly well despite the current absence
of international agreement on the legality or illegality of ICS. Currently, given
the wide divergence of views among States regarding the practice of ICS,
achieving consensus on this issue itself remains extremely challenging. How-
ever, as children continue to be conceived and born through ICS, this lack of
consensus on the practice of ICS itself should not hinder States from cooperating
to solve the particular problem of child statelessness, consistent with inter-
national principles concerning the right to nationality and the importance of
avoiding statelessness.
5 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE A NATIONAL-
ITY IN ICS
This chapter has provided an overview of the problem of child statelessness
in the context of ICS and the challenges associated with securing the child’s
right to acquire a nationality in this setting. ICS has emerged as a new cause
of statelessness at a time when the international community is seeking to
galvanise around the goal of eradicating statelessness by 2024. Statelessness
has a negative impact on children’s ability to access other human rights and
thus diminishes their chances for better futures.101 However, the push and
pull factors drawing ‘commissioning parents’ to engage in ICS in situations
leading to child statelessness remain, and the conception and birth of children
through ICS in is unlikely to end anytime soon.
Despite the considerable complexities involved, children do not need to
be born stateless in ICS. The solutions proposed in this chapter provide an
approach to addressing the challenge of ensuring the right to acquire a nation-
101 United Nations Secretary General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: The United




ality is secured for every child born through ICS. Such an approach is consistent
with the objective that no child should be born stateless and, as Boll observes,
“a grant of nationality has important practical as well as emotional conse-
quences for the individual”.102 While the proposed solutions rely on States
prioritising the rights of children born through ICS, they are intended to be
practical and achievable, without States needing to make comprehensive
changes to their nationality and parentage laws. If applied to the cases of child
statelessness in ICS discussed in this chapter, statelessness would have been
prevented in all instances. Implementation of the guidance outlined in this
chapter would ameliorate the vulnerability of such children by providing a
degree of certainty as regards acquisition of nationality, drawing on the frame-
work provided by international human rights law. This would enable the child
to establish the nationality element of their identity, and will facilitate access
to other rights.
In the long-term, States should consider the harmonisation of national laws
and policies regarding the nationality of children born through ICS.
Harmonisation on an international scale in this regard would be a complex
and challenging task. It must be informed by the principle of the best interests
of the child and the right of every child to acquire a nationality. Any develop-
ment of an international agreement addressing or regulating ICS (which is
certainly desirable if a comprehensive solution to the problems arising from
ICS is to be found) will need to grapple with larger questions concerning
whether forming families through the practice of ICS is consistent with inter-
national human rights standards and norms, States’ policy preferences and
whether and to what extent States are willing to facilitate ICS. Given that such
discussions could take years, if not decades, it’s important that action be taken
sooner, ideally by UNHCR and the CRC in concert, to at least provide States
with guidance about practical steps to prevent children being born stateless
in ICS.
102 A.M. Boll, Multiple Nationality and International Law, Brill 2007, p. 11.
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8 Answering the “Who am I?” Question
Protecting the Right of Children Born Through
International Commercial Surrogacy to Preserve Their
Identity Under Article 8 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Abstract
This Chapter deals with the child’s right to identity preservation as established
by Article 8 CRC, in the context of ICS. Like the child’s right to nationality, the
right to identity preservation is one of the child’s rights most at risk in ICS
and is at the heart of the child rights challenges arising through ICS, given the
wider impact identity has on the child’s lifetime outcomes. Although national-
ity is an element of identity, it is just one of many elements in this respect.
This Chapter identifies other elements of child identity endangered in ICS, as
well as examining why identity preservation is so important in the ICS context.
This discussion is grounded in Article 8 CRC, regional human rights juris-
prudence, and draws on lessons from adoption, donor-conception and domestic
surrogacy. This Chapter therefore provides the closest examination yet of the
child’s identity preservation right in ICS situations. Measures are proposed
to implement Article 8, to be undertaken by states and other key actors in ICS.
It is made clear that unless these are actioned, children born through ICS may
never be able to answer the fundamental question of ‘Who am I?’, leaving them
in a position contrary to their rights under international human rights law,
in particular, the CRC.
Main Findings
- The elements of a child’s identity are not limited to those explicitly men-
tioned in Article 8(1) CRC. As demonstrated through relevant jurisprudence,
as well as nationality, the genetic and biological, personal narrative, and
cultural elements of the child’s identity are particularly at risk in ICS.
- Key lessons from donor-conception, adoption and domestic surrogacy
indicate that in the context of ICS, it is crucial that identity information is
collected and preserved on behalf of children conceived and born through
ICS, and that such children are made aware of the existence of that identity
information and have access to it in line with their evolving capacities.
- Commissioning parents have a significant first-line-of-defence role to play




decisions in the preconception, prenatal and post-birth stages of ICS consist-
ent with safeguarding the child’s rights and best interests.
- Medical professionals also occupy a powerful position regarding the
safeguarding of the child’s Article 8 right in ICS. Most significantly, in order
to protect the future child’s identity preservation right, only identifiable
gamete donors and surrogate mothers (both who are willing to be contacted
by a future child) should be permitted to be involved in ICS arrangements.
- CRC States Parties should take care to protect and promote the right to
identity preservation for children conceived and born through ICS. A
practical way that States can do so is by facilitating the compilation and
provision of an identity dossier for children born through ICS; longer-term,
an inter-state cooperation system of identity protection would give children
born through ICS the best chance of having their identity preservation right
effectively protected.
Contextual notes
- Children are continuing to be born through ICS, including through the use
of anonymous donor gametes, and in some instances, the involvement of
anonymous surrogate mothers; as long as ICS continues to be practised
in ways that do not seek to protect the child’s right to identity preservation,
the issues raised in this Chapter will persist.
An earlier version of this Chapter was submitted to Human Rights Law Review
for publication.
1 INTRODUCTION
The birth of children through international commercial surrogacy (ICS) has
developed over the last decade as a distinctly twenty-first century phenom-
enon.1 It presents challenges to human rights and to the concept of ‘family’.
Particular challenges exist to the rights of the child conceived and born as a
1 For the purposes of this paper, International Commercial Surrogacy is the practice involving
the conception and birth of a child intended for a person or persons (commissioning parents)
in one state (demand state) but born in another state (supply state) to a surrogate mother.
In all instances ICS involves a transfer of money between some of the parties involved.
The child may or may not be genetically related to one or both of the commissioning parents
or to the surrogate. For further background context on ICS, see Hague Conference on Private
International Law, A Study of Legal Parentage and the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy
Arrangements, Preliminary Document No. 3 C, March 2014, available at: www.hcch.net/
upload/wop/gap2015pd03c_en.pdf [last accessed 01 June 2015]; Achmad, ‘Contextualising
a 21st century challenge: Part One, Understanding international commercial surrogacy and
the parties whose rights and interests are at stake in the public international law context’
(2012) 7 New Zealand Family Law Journal 190-198.
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result of ICS arrangements. Challenges to the child’s right to preserve their
identity, established under Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC),2 are at the heart of these. Identity is a broad concept
constituted of many different and often overlapping elements; for children
in ICS, identity is complicated by the circumstances of their conception and
birth. In some cases, children are born through ICS without an identity recog-
nised under law, due to gaps in legal regulation and the application of conflict-
ing domestic laws. Children are also being born through ICS who, despite
having a legal identity, are unable to preserve specific elements of their ident-
ity. Consequently, such children are unlikely to be able to fully preserve their
identity. It appears that in many ICS arrangements, limited thought is given
by the multiple adults involved to the child’s future identity and how to pro-
tect it. This occurs despite all children having an explicit right to preserve their
identity under Article 8 of the CRC, leaving this group of children highly vul-
nerable regarding their ability to exercise this right.
Taking a public international law perspective and a child rights approach,
this paper argues for the protection of the child’s Article 8 right in the context
of ICS. Whilst Article 7 of the CRC is also relevant to this discussion and is
touched upon, it has been dealt with by the author comprehensively in a
separate paper,3 and therefore this paper takes Article 8 as its primary frame-
work to examine issues relating to the child’s identity in ICS. This is given the
explicit focus of Article 8 on the child’s right to preserve their identity and
its broader framing of identity which is helpful in the ICS context. Section 2
hones in on three elements of identity that are particularly at risk in ICS situ-
ations. This analysis provides an entrée to the discussion presented in Section 3,
highlighting why the child’s right to preserve identity is of such importance
in the ICS context.
Section 4 then provides a framework through which to view the child’s
right to preserve their identity under international law. The main focus here
is analysis of Article 8 of the CRC. This forms the basis for an overview of the
broader human rights law framework pertinent to the child’s right under
Article 8. Reference is included to relevant work of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child and jurisprudence from regional human rights systems
elaborating on the nature and content of the child’s right to identity preserva-
tion. Emphasis is placed on the child’s identity from a genetic and biological
perspective, given the reality that these are elements of identity that children
conceived and born through ICS are likely to face challenges in preserving.
2 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, 1577 UNTS 3.
3 Achmad, “Securing children’s right to a nationality in a changing world: the context of
international commercial surrogacy and twenty-first century reproductive technology”,
accepted for publication in Laura van Waas, Melanie Khanna and Mark Manly (eds.), Solving




Section 5 places the legal framework in context, focusing on case examples
demonstrating how children conceived and born through ICS have had their
right to preserve identity placed at risk and in some instances, violated. Sec-
tion 6 considers key lessons from donor-conception, adoption and domestic
surrogacy relevant to the child’s identity preservation right in ICS. These key
lessons stress the potential implications of not upholding the child’s Article 8
right in ICS. Drawing on these lessons as well as the international human rights
legal framework and some of the challenges faced by children in exercising
their Article 8 right in the ICS context to date, Section 7 clarifies what the child’s
right to preserve identity looks like when upheld in ICS situations, suggesting
practical measures of implementation of Article 8 in this specific context.
Section 8 concludes by making clear that as is the case for children as a group
in general, the right to preserve identity is essential for all children who are
conceived and born through ICS as an alternative method of family formation.
2 THE ELEMENTS OF CHILD IDENTITY AT PARTICULAR RISK IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
The concept of identity is potentially broad and by nature, multifaceted.
Indeed, one definition of ‘identity’ contained in the Oxford English Dictionary
is ‘Who or what a person or thing is; a distinct impression of a single person
or thing presented to or perceived by others; a set of characteristics or a
description that distinguishes a person or thing from others.’4 Considering
the situation of children conceived and born through ICS, it is first necessary
to highlight which of their facets of identity are particularly at risk. This section
introduces three specific elements of identity: the genetic and biological;
personal narrative; and cultural elements. Although other elements of identity
exist (for example, nationality) and fall under Article 8 (as discussed later in
section 4(C)), these three elements are distinguished in this paper because of
their particular relevance to child identity in ICS and the vulnerability of these
elements within this context.5 Highlighting these three elements of identity
in this section begins to illustrate how the child’s identity preservation right
is at risk in ICS, allowing for these elements to then inform the discussion of
the child’s right to identity preservation in the ICS context in the remaining
sections of this paper.
4 Oxford English Dictionary Online, ‘Identity, n.’ March 2015, available at: www.oed.com/
view/Entry/91004?redirectedFrom=identity [last accessed 01 June 2015].
5 Given the focus of this paper on the genetic and biological, personal narrative and cultural
elements of the child’s identity in ICS situations, this paper does not discuss the child’s
right to a nationality. This topic is being addressed separately in a chapter by the author
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2.1 Genetic and biological
From the point at which a child is conceived through ICS and continuing after
their birth, his or her identity rights are potentially at heightened risk of
breach. The likely complexity of the child’s genetic makeup and biological
antecedents is the root of the precariousness of the child’s identity preservation
right. This is because it is not unusual to have a factual scenario such as the
following example (where different states could be substituted): a child is
conceived and born through ICS resulting from an ICS arrangement initiated
by commissioning parents (either same-sex or heterosexual) from New Zealand
using donor sperm originating from a sperm donor in Denmark, donor eggs
originating from an egg donor in the United States, and a surrogate mother
in India. Consequently, establishing parentage in both fact and at law in ICS
situations is often the first challenge to the child’s identity preservation right,
given their birth to a surrogate and the reality that they are unlikely the full
genetic child of the person(s) intending to socially parent the child (due to
the use of donor gametes). Furthermore, in some cases the child will have no
genetic relationship to their commissioning parents, and when donor eggs
or embryo are used, no genetic relationship to their surrogate mother (indeed,
many ICS children are conceived using the sperm of the commissioning father,
along with donor eggs).6 When ICS arrangements involve anonymous donor
conception (meaning the full identity of one or two gamete donors or embryo
donors are unknown), the child’s preservation of identity becomes impossible
from a genetic perspective. Therefore, depending on the exact circumstances
of an individual ICS arrangement, the impact of the complexity of the child’s
genetic parentage on their ability to exercise their Article 8 right varies.
Moreover, even in instances when identity information is available about
the child’s genetic parentage vis-à-vis donors, the preservation of this informa-
tion and the child’s access to it largely depends on commissioning parents
disclosing the child’s conception and birth circumstances to them and this
identity information being safeguarded for the child’s future reference. The
extent to which such information is preserved will also impact the child’s
identity preservation right; for example, whether health history information
about genetic parent(s) is preserved. Not preserving information about this
sub-element of a child’s genetic identity may have long-term negative impacts
for the child, such as not being aware of genetic markers placing them at
higher risk of a hereditary disease or medical condition.
6 Whilst no data exists on how many children have been conceived and born through ICS
as a result of the sperm of the commissioning father being combined with donor eggs to
form an embryo and transplanted into the surrogate mother, a survey of reported judgments
in ICS matters in the Australian, New Zealand and England and Wales jurisdictions




Additional to risks raised through donor genetic parentage, children con-
ceived and born through ICS may face challenges in preserving the biological
element of their identity relating to their birth mother. She is the person who
is the child’s biological carrier and who sustains their development from foetus
to child. This includes the transfer of bodily fluids such as blood and other
nutrients; research has demonstrated that the period in utero has a direct
impact on the child’s health outcomes.7 Yet this woman is not intended to
assume the role of mother to the child in a social sense; often she is not
intended to have any ongoing involvement with the child. If commissioning
parents do have knowledge as to the identity of and identifying information
about the child’s surrogate mother, they may still chose not to disclose this
to the child. Even if a child knows about their ICS arrangement and the identity
of their birth mother, it will be difficult to access or obtain further information
about her if it has not been preserved. Not preserving this biological element
of the child’s identity (despite the likely importance of a birth narrative and
understanding of who gave birth to them) means that later in life, children
may search for information relating to their birth mothers to try to preserve
this element of their identity. Such efforts may encounter further practical
difficulties due to the birth taking place in a different country (and perhaps
a different culture) than the one they are growing up or have grown up in;
tracing their surrogate mother is unlikely to be straightforward, and more so
if her current contact information is not maintained in the years following the
child’s birth. At the extreme, when surrogates act completely anonymously,8
it will be impossible for children to know who their birth mother was.
Ironically, the child’s right to preserve their identity in ICS may be further
challenged by decisions and actions taken to establish the child’s legal parent-
age following their birth. This can happen when the child’s legal parentage
is established (for example, through domestic law mechanisms such as adop-
tion orders and parentage orders), but no concurrent action is taken to protect
information about their genetic and biological parentage and to therefore
preserve the genetic and biological elements of their identity relating to donors
and/or their surrogate mother. Establishing the child’s legal parentage provides
them legal certainty and status. But depending on the child’s genetic makeup
and given their birth to a surrogate mother, it does not provide the full picture
regarding their parentage and family relations. Unless information about these
elements of their identity is preserved, children in ICS may have a false or only
7 E.g. Gluckman et al., ‘Effect of In Utero and Early-Life Conditions on Adult Health and
Disease’ (2008) 359 The New England Journal of Medicine, 61-73; Pembrey et al, ‘Human
transgenerational responses to early-life experience: potential impact on development, health
and biomedical research’ (2014) 51 Journal of Medical Genetics, 563-572.
8 In some ICS situations, surrogates are kept completely separate from the commissioning
parents and the ICS arrangement is premised on this anonymity, i.e. they never meet each
other and commissioning parents only get provided with limited information about the
surrogate, such as age, ethnic background and number of previous children.
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partial understanding of the elements of their identity relating to their genetic
and biological parentage and family relations.
2.2 Personal narrative
Connected to whether children have the option of knowing about their birth
mother and genetic parents and accessing information about their genetic and
biological elements insofar as it enables them to preserve their own identity,
the child’s opportunity to form their own personal narrative may also be at
risk in ICS situations. Identity is often shaped by the question ‘Who am I?’.
A central aspect involved in answering this and preserving one’s identity is
being able to know about one’s own birth; information such as where, when,
how and who was present. Therefore, personal narrative as an element of
identity is broader than the genetic and biological element discussed previous-
ly. Genetic and biological aspects can form part of the child’s personal narrat-
ive, but personal narrative as a distinct element of identity draws in many
other aspects connected to a child’s identity, such as their circumstances of
birth and key care decisions made concerning them in their infancy. These
are aspects contributing to a child’s personal narrative that the child themselves
has no agency to know independently. Whilst personal narrative is an element
of identity which is added to over the course of an individual’s lifetime, aspects
which are accumulated early in life through events or actions from that time
can be said to form a crucial basis for one’s personal narrative, given their
formative impact.
For example, if a surrogate in an ICS arrangement does not share personal
information (for example such as name, age, ethnicity, language, contact
details) about herself with the child’s commissioning parents or allow this to
be collected and stored for the child’s future access, it is likely that any ques-
tions the child has in future regarding their birth circumstances will be left
unanswered or not be fully representative of the reality. This is a real risk in
ICS given the high incidence of ICS arrangements conducted through third
parties such as surrogacy brokers or agencies, meaning commissioning parents
may have inaccurate or no knowledge of the identity of the surrogate mother.
This gap in a child’s personal narrative will therefore have the effect of pre-
venting some children born through ICS from preserving this aspect of their
identity.
2.3 Cultural
Because ICS leads to children being born to surrogate mothers in supply states
that they are not intended to remain in, the cultural element (including cultural




may also be at risk. If children born through ICS are unable to have information
preserved about these parts of their own personal history, it may prevent them
from being able to fully exercise and realise their Article 8 identity preservation
right. When children born through ICS learn later in life that they were inten-
tionally born through ICS in a state with a different culture and language from
the one that they are growing up in or have grown up in, they may experience
a sense of cultural dislocation or questioning, similar to that which has been
experienced by some children adopted intercountry. However, children born
through ICS may also contend with the overlay of the fact they were inten-
tionally born into the culture and heritage of one country, but always intended
to be removed from the immediate culture and heritage of their birth-place.
The culture and heritage disconnection may have greater bearing on the child’s
ability to preserve their identity consistent with Article 8 for children who
remain in their birth country whilst waiting for their status to be recognised
or regularised. During such a period – which can span beyond weeks into
months and even years – children may become accustomed and grow attached
to certain cultural aspects of their birth place. For example, this may include
the local language, if they are exposed to it regularly during infancy.
The ethnicity aspect of the child’s cultural identity element is also at risk
of not being preserved in ICS. This happens if the ethnicity of one or both of
their genetic parents is different to the ethnicity the child will grow up in, and
biologically, regarding their surrogate mother. The preservation of this element
of the child’s identity is dependent on information being protected about the
child’s genetic and biological ethnicity and the child having the opportunity
to access this information. The child may experience a sense of ethnic disloca-
tion and questioning regarding their genetic and/or biological ethnicity;
regarding their genetic ethnicity, the child may also experience a sense of
dislocation regarding their culture and heritage relating to this and may search
to preserve it.
The three elements of the child’s identity discussed above as being central
to how the child’s Article 8 right is at risk in ICS situations are interrelated.
These elements will be elaborated on throughout the forthcoming analysis
in this paper. It is important to recognise that identity and what this constitutes
for an individual evolves over time; the formation of identity takes place to
some extent over the timespan of an individual’s lifetime. Whilst some elements
of identity remain static, such as those more closely linked to the origins of
an individual, there will be others which are socially acquired through an
individual’s life and lived experiences. However, the static elements of identity
and the elements of identity acquired over time may not be any harder to
preserve than one another. For example, whilst a child conceived and born
through ICS may face challenges in preserving their genetic and/or biological
identity, they may also find themselves unable to preserve elements of their
family life, such as who they were raised by for certain periods of time in their
early life, depending on the circumstances they are in. Furthermore, from a
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chronological perspective, timing itself can impact the child’s ability to exercise
their Article 8 right. Many elements of identity, including the genetic and
biological and personal narrative elements can be preserved or begin to be
preserved in relation to a child prior to their birth. Following birth, the pre-
servation of these elements should continue, given they cut across the pre-birth
and post-birth time periods. Some other elements of identity are attached to
birth and should therefore start being preserved at that time, such as the
circumstances of the child’s birth, and the cultural elements of their identity.
3 THE CHILD’S PERSPECTIVE: WHY THE RIGHT TO IDENTITY PRESERVATION
IS IMPORTANT IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
Whilst all children, regardless of their situation have a right to identity pre-
servation under Article 8 of the CRC, some children face situations making
their ability to secure this right more challenging, heightening their vulnerabil-
ity regarding a breach of their Article 8 right. Children born through ICS fall
into this category; it is therefore necessary to examine the reasons why the
right to identity preservation is of such importance for this group of children.
3.1 Potential impact of conception and birth circumstances through Inter-
national Commercial Surrogacy on children
The potential impact of the child’s conception and birth circumstances through
ICS on their subsequent ability to preserve their identity is significant. A child
born through ICS is likely to have conception and birth circumstances which
are complex due to the involvement of multiple parties (some of whom may
be anonymous), the nature of their conception and birth through surrogacy,
and added to this, being born in one state but with the intention that they
will be taken to live in another state during infancy. Therefore, the particular
complexities of a child’s conception and birth through ICS challenge the pre-
servation of certain aspects of their identity.
In the first instance, this is due to the multiple possible parentage claims
relating to the child, involving genetic, biological and commissioning (intend-
ing) parents. The situation is complicated further by conflicting domestic laws
and laws which are out-dated and are ill-equipped to deal with multiple
possible parentage claims in ICS. In situations where genetic parents (gamete
or embryo donors) and/or biological parents (surrogates) act anonymously,
or in instances where commissioning parents abandon a child in ICS pre or
post-birth, the child may be left with a highly unclear picture of the parentage
aspect of their identity. This may have ongoing, life-long implications for the




parents essentially means contactability;9 without the ability to identify and
contact their genetic, biological or commissioning parents, an element of the
child’s identity remains unable to be preserved. This may have an impact on
the child’s ability throughout their life to establish their own personal narrative
and understand their own story of who they are. Indeed, stripping away a
child’s possibility of self-determinism in this regard concerning their identity
positions the child in a potentially negative space, inconsistent with the best
interests of the child principle.10 Eekelaar asserts that ‘Self determinism is
a mode of optimally positioning children to develop their own perceptions
of their well-being as they enter adulthood: not of foreclosing on the potential
for such development.’11 When children born through ICS ask the question
‘Who am I?’, the circumstances of their conception and birth through ICS will
likely impose some limitations on their ability to gain full answers, thereby
preventing them from being optimally positioned for self-determinism regard-
ing their identity, as their ability to preserve their identity consistent with
Article 8 of the CRC will be restricted.
At the more practical level, this may impact the child’s health rights, by
limiting their knowledge of their personal health and medical history connected
to their parents. In instances where a child is born through ICS and the genetic
and biological aspects of their identity are not preserved through the collection
and protection of associated information, their ability to establish whether they
are, for example, predisposed to genetic diseases or at risk of specific medical
conditions detectable through genetic and biological parentage will be cur-
tailed. As Cowden notes,
‘People have an interest in accessing genetic and medical information about their
genetic parents. It is in a child’s interests to have knowledge of congenital diseases
or traits that run in her (genetic) family. This is important for diagnosing and
treating disease, and also for making fully informed family-planning decisions.
False assumptions regarding one’s medical history can lead to an individual being
misdiagnosed, unknowingly forgoing important care or undergoing unnecessary
treatment. This concern seems to constitute an interest worthy of protection.’12
Moreover, anonymity in ICS removes the child’s opportunity to preserve the
wider family relations element of their right to preservation of identity under
Article 8. Children who are in this situation will be unable to know if they
7 Van Hoof and Pennings, ‘Cross-Border Reproductive Care Around the World: Recent
Controversies’, in Botterill, Pennings and Mainil (eds), Medical Tourism and Transnational
Health Care, (2013) 98, at 106.
10 As established in Article 3 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child supra n 2.
11 Eekelaar, ‘Interests of the Child and the Child’s Wishes: The Role of Dynamic Self-Deter-
mination’ (1994) 8 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 42 at 58.
12 Cowden, ‘No Harm, No Foul: A Child’s Right to Know Their Genetic Parents’ (2012) 26(1)
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 102 at 107.
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have genetic half-siblings. Such siblings may well exist, also born through
donor-conception ICS or non-surrogacy donor-conception ART, or as the natural
children of donors involved in ICS. In instances where ICS children are
abandoned by commissioning parents, it is unlikely that they will ever have
knowledge of their intended siblings, if they already exist as previous children
of commissioning parents.
3.2 The implications for the child of being removed from their state of birth
It is a common feature of all ICS arrangements that the child will be born in
a state which they are never intended to live in – from before the child’s birth,
it will be the intention of the commissioning parents that the child (once born)
will travel with them to live in another state. This aspect of the child’s birth
circumstances is, therefore, complicated and has the potential to impact negat-
ively on the child’s ability to enjoy their Article 8 right. Given that in many
cases, the supply of ICS flows from supply states in the less-developed world
to more developed demand states, it is likely therefore that many children
born through ICS will be born in a place and culture very different from that
which they are intended to spend their childhood in. Even in ICS arrangements
where the flow is between supply and demand states both located in the
developed world, the fact remains that the child is intended to be born in one
state and moved to another following birth. Whilst the cultural disjunction
between the two states may not be as marked, differences will still exist. This
cultural disconnect that is imposed on the child can have serious implications
for the child’s right to preserve their identity.
This is especially so given that not only is the supply state the child’s place
of birth and therefore of significance regarding their personal origins, but also
the fact that the child is born to a surrogate who likely originates from and
resides in that state. The links that the child has to their state of birth are
important from a cultural rights and personal narrative perspective, regardless
of whether the child has a link to the state through their genetic parentage.13
Therefore, it is the child’s likely double link to their state of birth through both
the fact of their birth in that state, and their birth to a surrogate mother origin-
ating from that state that distinguishes children conceived and born through
ICS from children who are not born through ICS, but who are born in a different
state to that of their own natural parents.
Due to this reality, all children born through ICS may experience some level
of identity dislocation or questioning if they learn (later in life) about their
13 However, in ICS situations where a child has a genetic link to a third (and potentially
fourth) state which is not their state of birth (e.g. the state of a third-party egg or sperm





circumstances of birth to a foreign surrogate in a state distant from that which
they are living and growing up in. The state in which the child has grown
up in or is residing in will have become a part of their identity, yet learning
they originated in a different state will introduce a new dimension of identity
for the child and may cause them to question the extent to which the elements
of their identity connected to their birth-state has been preserved. This ex-
perience may traverse the culture, language and ethnicity elements of the
child’s identity and may leave a child feeling uncertain of their identity. It
is therefore extremely important to ensure that information about these aspects
of the child’s identity is preserved and made available for the child, to give
them the option of knowing and help them in understanding and establishing
these aspects of their identity.
Of course, this will not necessarily be a universal experience for children
born through ICS. Some children may never question this aspect of their
identity. Some children will never become aware of the circumstances of their
conception and birth through ICS (because they are not told), whilst some may
decide that this is not an element of their identity that they want to preserve
through learning about their circumstances of birth and information regarding
the cultural elements of their identity (given they are not interested, or do not
feel this is necessary for their own identity preservation).
For children who end up spending an extended period of time in their
birth-state after birth through ICS – that is, a number of months or years
because they are stateless or for other reasons – the impact of being removed
from their birth-state to another state part-way through their early childhood
may have more significant implications. This is because during the first few
formative months or years of the child’s infancy, they will have grown accus-
tomed to the culture, language and ethnic specificities of the state of their birth.
They may therefore experience a greater cultural disconnect later in life which
could impact on their identity. Whether the child is able and supported to
preserve these elements of their identity once they are removed to the home
state of their commissioning parents will be influential in this regard. This
holds true for children who are not conceived and born through ICS, but who
are born in one state and then move to another, or who move from state to
state during their childhood. However, the situation of children born through
ICS can be distinguished from these other situations based on two factors
always present in ICS situations. The first is that in ICS, there is always an
intentional decision made by commissioning parents to have a child born in
a specific state. Secondly (as outlined above), there is always an intentional
decision made to have a child born to a surrogate mother in that state. Taken
together, these factors establish a link between the child and their birth-state,
which is also likely to be the state of their surrogate mother.
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4 THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO PRESERVE THEIR IDENTITY: ARTICLE 8 OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND
BEYOND
The child’s right to preserve their identity is explicitly established under
international human rights law. Article 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) is the crucial starting point in framing discussion of the
child’s identity in the ICS context.14 As Doek observes, ‘Article 8 of the CRC
is a unique international human rights provision. There is no other inter-
national (or regional) human rights treaty that contains a provision similar
to Article 8.’15 Article 8(1) sets out the core of the right: ‘States Parties under-
take to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including
nationality, name and family relations as recognised by law without unlawful
interference.’16
In situations when children are illegally deprived of identity, States Parties
have additional obligations, set out in Article 8(2): ‘Where a child is illegally
deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establish-
ing speedily his or her identity.’17
Article 8 was drafted and adopted in a very different time to our current-
day context. Now, having a child through methods involving scientific inter-
vention and in reliance on globalisation is a reality. The drafters of the CRC,
whilst aware of some of the possibilities of assisted reproductive technology
(ART), were only just beginning to imagine the potential implications of concep-
tion and birth via such methods for child rights.18 In drafting Article 8 (as
well as the rest of the CRC), the drafters did not envisage a world where ICS
– let alone the various permutations of ICS arrangements19 – would be some-
thing engaging the rights of the child and be dealt with under the Convention
itself. Having acknowledged this, it is important to further consider the context
in which Article 8 of the CRC was drafted and adopted, before turning to the
content and interpretation of the child’s Article 8 right in the ICS context.
14 Article 8 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child supra n 2.
15 Doek, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 8-9:
The Right to Preservation of Identity and The Right Not to Be Separated From His or Her Parents
(2006) at 5. Detrick further characterises Article 8 as ‘an innovative international human
rights provision’. Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child (1999) at 162.
16 Article 8(1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child supra n 2.
17 Article 8(2) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child supra n 2.
18 As Hodgson notes, this was a time of experimentation in in vitro fertilisation techniques
and genetic engineering in many States. Hodgson, ‘The International Legal Protection to
of the Child’s Right to a Legal Identity and the Problem of Statelessness’ (1993) 7 Inter-
national Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 255 at 265.




4.1 The development of the child’s right to preserve identity
Article 8 was one of several new rights that the CRC established under inter-
national human rights law.20 Cerda asserts that the text of Article 8 (as finally
adopted) ‘represents a negotiated compromise.’21 Cerda explains the tensions
inherent in the negotiations of Article 8 saying that ‘On the one hand, some
countries attempted to include a new legal norm inspired by certain regrettable
experiences. Other countries, however, while not denying this phenomenon,
were chiefly concerned that the text should be acceptable in their national
legislatures.’22
The travaux préparatoires of the CRC provide a helpful supplementary means
of interpretation when considering the development and content of Article 8.23
The travaux assist, among other things, in understanding why the child’s right
to preserve their identity is included in the CRC as a specific right, separate
to the child’s Article 7 rights to nationality, birth registration and to know and
be cared for by their parents. Article 7(1) of the final text of the CRC states that
‘The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible,
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.’24 It is evident from
the final wording of the text of Articles 7 and 8 that although Article 8 deals
explicitly with the child’s right to preserve their identity, there is an inter-
section and to some extent overlap between the child’s Article 7 and Article 8
rights, clear upon an ordinary meaning reading of the text of both articles.
The aspects of the child’s rights stated in Article 7(1) are certainly elements
(or able to be construed as elements) of the child’s identity, a concept which
the child has a right to preserve under Article 8; indeed, some of these
elements are explicitly mentioned again in Article 8(1). However, what is made
clear by the distinction between the two Articles is that the aspects of the
20 For discussion of some of the other ‘new’ rights introduced by the CRC, see Cerda, ‘The
Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: New Rights’ (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly
115-119.
21 Ibid. at 116.
22 Ibid. at 115.
23 Detrick (ed), The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the “Traxaux
Préparatoires” (1992). Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155
UNTS 331 sets out the general rule of treaty interpretation, namely that ‘A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ Articles 31(2)-(4)
further set out the context for the purpose of the interpretation of treaties, and Article 32
specifies supplementary means of interpretation. Article 32 covers the use of the travaux
préparatoires, specifying that ‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: a) leaves the meaning am-
biguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.’
24 Article 7(1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child supra n 2.
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child’s rights to which Article 7(1) focuses on protecting are important in their
own right, independent of the child’s right to preserve their identity under
Article 8(1). Furthermore, the wording of Article 8 (as explored further below)
regarding the child’s right to preserve their identity is not a right which is
tethered to a restricted concept of identity, but rather the Convention’s drafters
left open the possibility of a broadly characterised concept. Article 8 does,
however, have a reinforcing and broadening effect in relation to Article 7.
Article 8 reinforces the child’s right to knowledge relating to their parents set
down by Article 7(1), by establishing the child’s right to identity and including
in this the wider element of family relations, thereby having a broadening
effect beyond a focus solely on parents.
The interrelationship between Articles 7 and 8 is important to note in the
context of ICS, especially given the inherent limitations and challenges that
a child may face when conceived and born through ICS in preserving, for
example, the genetic and biological elements of their identity.25 This may
mean that they not only face challenges in exercising their Article 8 right to
preserve their identity, but also their Article 7 right regarding its focus (in
part) on the child’s right to know and be cared for by their parents. For
example, in the ICS context, as well as the child’s commissioning parents, the
child’s genetic parents and birth mother may be understood as ‘parents’ on
the basis of their genetic and biological links, yet they are not intended to have
a legal child-parent relationship. Indeed, they may remain unknown. Tobin
states that Article 7 “exists as recognition of the potential that the identity of
a parent may be unknown for a variety of reasons and it is thus impossible
for a child to know that parent or indeed parents. As a result, article 7 should
be interpreted to create a presumption in favour of providing children with
access to information about their biological parents before they turn 18 where
this is logistically possible, that is, if the information is available.”26 However,
as Buck notes, the term ‘parents’ in Article 7(1) is potentially contentious in
nature and scope.27 This may be particularly the case in ICS situations, given
the multiple potential parents involved in the conception and birth of a child
through ICS. Whereas Article 7(1) refers to the child’s parents, Article 8(1) has
an explicit focus on identity and instead of ‘parents’ includes the broader
notion of ‘family relations’ as one of the explicitly stated elements of identity.
Therefore whilst Article 7 is of relevance, this paper focuses on Article 8 as
25 Interestingly, Detrick noted in 1999 that ‘… the interpretation of this right, especially
considering the qualifying phrase “as far as possible” may be subject to controversy, also
given the developments in the application of biology and medicine.’ Detrick, supra n 15
at 153.
26 Tobin, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Rights and Best Interests of Children
Conceived Through Assisted Reproduction (Victorian Law Reform Commission, August 2004)
at 37, available at: www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/Tobin%2Bpaper%2B
FINAL.pdf [last accessed 01 June 2015].




its primary framework for dealing with the child’s identity in the ICS context.
Situating the discussion within the Article 8 framework is a useful approach
given it is not restricted to parents, which may be a contested notion in ICS
arrangements.
Regarding the genesis of Article 8, the travaux shows the idea for the
provision stemmed from the Argentinian delegation’s proposal to the open-
ended Working Group in 1985.28 Argentina advocated for inclusion of a
specific article securing the child’s right to identity to cover what it described
as ‘the legal void which otherwise would exist in the convention on the rights
of the child.’29 However, a number of other countries viewed this proposal
for a new right regarding identity as problematic;30 through the revision
process, the word ‘family’ was removed and further revisions made to avoid
duplication with other draft Convention provisions. Article 8 as it appears
in the Convention was adopted by the Working Group (at second reading)
in 1989.31
The potential intersection of the child’s rights with what were, at the time
of the drafting of the CRC, new assisted reproductive technologies, proved a
contentious issue during the negotiation of the text of Article 8. The tension
largely arose between the primacy of adult interests regarding confidentiality
and anonymity of parents on the one hand, and the interests of the child to
know their origins (including genetic and biological elements) on the other.
For example, Czechoslovakia said it would ‘maintain confidentiality of the
child’s origin in cases involving artificial fertilisation and certain adoption
procedures based on the principle of anonymity’,32 whilst Mexico advocated
28 Detrick (ed), supra n 23 at 292. The proposal was introduced as article 9 bis, with the
following text: ‘The child has the inalienable right to retain his true and genuine personal,
legal and family identity. In the event that a child has been fraudulently deprived of some
or all of the elements of his identity, the State must give him special protection and assist-
ance with a view to re-establishing his true and genuine identity as soon as possible. In
particular, this obligation of the State includes restoring the child to his blood relations
to be brought up.’ As per Considerations 1986 Working Group (1986) E/CN.4/1986/39 at
para 33.
29 Detrick (ed), supra n 23 at 293. Argentinian advocacy on this issue had its roots in the
historical experience of children who had been forcibly disappeared during the Argentinian
military junta in the late seventies and early eighties. As per Considerations 1986 Working
Group (1986) E/CN.4/1986/39 at para 38.
30 Norway, the Netherlands, Austria, United States, Canada, Australia and Mexico raised
concerns in reaction to the Argentinian proposal. See Detrick (ed), supra n 23 at 291-296.
Argentina’s original proposal focused on the protection of the child’s ‘true and genuine
personal, legal and family identity.’ A number of other state delegations submitted the
view that the concept of ‘family identity’ was unknown in their legal systems. Australia
was one such state and proposed deleting the word ‘family’ from appearing before the
word ‘identity’. As per Considerations 1986 Working Group (1986) E/CN.4/1986/39 at para
48.
31 Detrick (ed), supra n 23 at 296. as per UN Doc E/CN.4/1989/29/Rev.1 at 6.
32 Detrick, supra n 15 at 154.
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from the child’s perspective: ‘The representative of Mexico stated that the
wording should be more explicit as to the commitments made by the States
under paragraph 1 and that the biological elements of the identity should also
be included.’33 Ultimately, Article 8 does not explicitly refer to the genetic
and biological elements of a child’s identity, given the concern of some states
regarding the implication of applying such a provision to ART situations in
practice, in a climate which was still widely premised on anonymity in both
donor-conception and adoption.
Despite this, it is significant that the CRC drafters touched on issues about
(then) new reproductive technologies in relation to the child’s right to preserve
identity. Whilst Hodgson describes the fact that the CRC text does not address
questions of paternity and filiation as a somewhat curious omission,34 he
points out that the very reasoning for including Article 8 in the CRC serves
as a foundation for understanding the provision as being applicable to those
aspects of the child’s identity based on biological and genetic links between
children and adults:
‘That the original Argentinian proposal was concerned with the protection of the
child’s ’true and genuine personal, legal and family identity’ supports the pro-
position that the provision is also concerned with the biological or blood relation-
ship of natural parent and child. Some reference might usefully have been made
to possible procedures for the acknowledgment or recognition of parenthood. […]
Thus, a number of aspects of Article 8(1) remain open-ended, to be interpreted
as a matter of discretion in light of national practices and needs.’35
As will be discussed further in section 4.3.1 below, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child has, in some of its concluding observations, elaborated
on how elements of a child’s identity such as the genetic element should be
approached under the CRC.
4.2 The concept of ‘preserving’ identity under Article 8(1) of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child
It is important to underscore that the child’s Article 8(1) right is not to identity
per se, but to preserve identity. Hodgkin and Newell state that ‘preserve’
‘implies both the non-interference in identity and the maintenance of records
relating to genealogy, birth registration and details relating to early infancy that
the child could not be expected to remember. Some of these are beyond the scope
33 Detrick (ed), supra n 23 at 296 as per Considerations 1986 Working Group (1986) E/CN.4/
1986/39 at para 336.





of the State, but measures should be taken to enforce detailed record-keeping and
preservation of records (or, in the case of abandoned children, preservation of
identifying items) where children are refugees, abandoned, fostered, adopted or
taken into the care of the State. Equal care must be taken to ensure such records
are confidential.’36
That Article 8 is a right to preserve identity is particularly relevant in the ICS
context. While it is true that some children born through ICS will be precluded
from establishing elements of their identity – such as nationality – it is the
preservation of other elements of the child’s identity which can be effected
through the maintenance of detailed and accurate records from the time of
birth through their early infancy. Despite this, currently such an approach
is not the norm in ICS situations, as will be made clear later in this paper. As
already mentioned, identity is a broad concept which can evolve and grow
over the course of a human lifetime. Preserving identity is, therefore, an
ongoing exercise, but for children conceived and born through ICS, it is the
preservation of identity from conception and post-birth that is most acutely
at risk, especially given these are elements of their identity that children cannot
be expected to independently preserve themselves.
4.3 The content of the right to preserve identity under Article 8(1) of the
CRC
The CRC text gives some shape and content to the concept of identity through
explicitly listing some elements of identity – nationality, name and family
relations – in Article 8(1). That these constitute elements of the child’s right
to preserve their identity is therefore not controversial. However, these
elements are prefaced with the word ‘including’, indicating that Article 8(1)
provides a non-exhaustive list of elements constituting identity, and that other
elements are not excluded.37 Hodgson notes that ‘The insertion of the word
’including’ between ’identity’ and ’nationality’ in Article 8(1) demonstrates
that these enumerated attributes are merely illustrative; other attributes of
identity might fall within the ambit of the provision. [..]Indeed, the insertion
of the word ’including’ into the text of Article 8(1) was recommended by the
United Nations Secretariat ’so that other elements of identity will not be
excluded.’38 Both Cerda and Doek elaborate on this point. Cerda notes that
concepts evolve and therefore Article 8 should extend to cover identity of
36 Hodgkin and Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(United Nations Children’s Fund, 2007) at 115.
37 Detrick, supra n 15 at 163.
38 Hodgson, supra n 18 at 265 as per Technical Review of the Text of the draft Convention on the
Rights of the Child: Additional Comments and Clarifications by the Secretariat E/CN.4/1989/WG.
1/CRP. 1/Add 1(14 November 1988) at 7 para 22.
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children born in new ways;39 Doek asserts that ‘the Convention is a living
instrument and its interpretation should reflect new developments that may
arise in the area of children’s rights’40 and furthermore ‘The Convention must
be interpreted in the light of the present-day conditions.’41
Approaching the CRC as a living instrument to be interpreted in light of
new developments in the area of children’s rights (such as children being born
in new ways, including through ICS), means it is necessary to consider what
further elements of identity can fall within Article 8. It is now widely accepted
that when read together, Article 8 and the wider Convention text actually
protect a much broader array of elements constituting the child’s identity, such
as sexual orientation and the right to their own culture (for example in the
intercountry adoption context).42 Hodgkin and Newell provide a comprehens-
ive list of elements they see as fit for inclusion in what constitutes identity
under the CRC, namely the child’s personal history since birth (including
information such as where the child lived, who they were in the care of, the
reasons for crucial decisions relating to them); the race, culture, religion and
language of the child (these aspects are also supported by Articles 20 and 30
of the CRC); and the physical appearance, abilities, gender identity and sexual
orientation of the child.43
Here it is further useful to note the Hague Convention on the Protection
of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption,44 an
international child law instrument including explicit provisions relating to
the child’s identity right. Articles 16 and 30 focus on ensuring preservation
of the child’s identity under the Hague adoption process. Article 16 specifies
that the Central Authority of the child’s state of origin must, after being
satisfied that a child is adoptable, prepare a report including ‘information about
his or her identity, adoptability, background, social environment, family
history, medical history including that of the child’s family, and any special
needs of the child.’45 The Central Authority must also ‘give due consideration
to the child’s upbringing and to his or her ethnic, religious and cultural back-
ground’.46 Article 30 establishes the obligation on all contracting states to
the Convention to ‘ensure that information held by them concerning the child’s
origin, in particular concerning the identity of his or her parents, as well as
39 Cerda, supra n 20 at 116-117.
40 Doek, supra n 15 at 3.
41 Ibid. at 10.
42 CRIN, ‘Article 8: Preservation of Identity’ available at www.crin.org/en/home/rights/
convention/articles/article-8-preservation-identity [last accessed 01 June 2015].
43 Hodgkin and Newell, supra n 36 at 115.
44 Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-
country Adoption 1993.
45 Article 16(1)(a), supra n 44.




the medical history, is preserved.’47 Contracting states are required to ensure
that the child (or their representative) ‘has access to such information, under
appropriate guidance, in so far as is permitted by the law of that State.’48
By placing emphasis on the child’s identity and specific at-risk elements
of identity, the Hague Convention highlights aspects of the child’s identity
requiring preservation in intercountry adoption. Taken together, these pro-
visions of the Hague Convention set out a clear framework for preserving the
child’s identity in intercountry adoption situations, giving flesh to the bones
of Article 8 and other identity-related provisions of the CRC. These identity-
related provisions of the Hague Convention interact with the CRC, giving
further shape to the content of the child’s right to identity under Article 8 in
practice along with Articles 7, 20 and 30 of the CRC.49
The above discussion indicates that the child’s Article 8(1) right to preserva-
tion of identity is certainly broader than the elements mentioned explicitly
in the text of Article 8(1). Interpreting Article 8(1) of the CRC in this way applies
a dynamic interpretative approach, in light of contemporary developments.
The additional elements of identity highlighted throughout this section are
potentially of relevance for a child conceived and born through ICS. However,
personal history since birth, culture, ethnicity and language elements of identity
are of increased importance for children born through ICS. This is because they
may well be elements of their identity which they face difficulties in preserv-
ing, given the fact of their conception and birth through ICS. But what of the
biological and genetic elements of the child’s identity? These are further
elements of identity which are acutely at risk of not being preserved in the
case of children born through ICS, but are elements not explicitly mentioned
in Article 8. Given this, it is important to more closely consider whether these
can be said to constitute elements of identity of the child under Article 8(1)
of the CRC.
4.3.1 The child’s identity from a biological and genetic perspective
In considering whether the biological and genetic elements of a child’s identity
fall within the coverage of the right provided by Article 8(1) of the CRC, guid-
ance can be drawn from a number of sources. The first is the United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child (the Committee). Although there is no
definitive, comprehensive interpretative guidance on Article 8 as the Committee
has not issued a General Comment on Article 8, the Committee has made some
47 Article 30(1), supra n 44.
48 Article 30(2), supra n 44.
49 Article 20(3) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child supra n 2 states that
care solutions for a child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environ-
ment should pay due regard to ‘the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing and
to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background’; Article 30 makes clear
that children have a right to enjoy their own culture and to use their own language.
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relevant references and observations regarding the concept of identity in the
course of its work. A starting point is that the Committee has a long history
of emphasising the importance of protection of information regarding a child’s
biological family, and the child’s ability to access that information.50 In some
instances such as adoption, the Committee has directly stated the importance
of the child’s right to identity and articulated the ‘right of the child to know
his or her biological parents’.51 The Committee takes the position that under
the CRC, the concept of knowledge of origins goes beyond a child knowing
their legal parent(s), placing an emphasis on biology.52 Additionally, the
Committee has extended the child’s right to know their biological origins
beyond parents to wider family relations. In its Concluding Observations
regarding the Holy See in 2014, the Committee noted that the State party must
take ‘into full account the right of children to know their biological parents
and siblings’.53
Addressing the situation of children in the context of assisted reproductive
technology (ART), the Committee has, since the mid-1990s, issued concluding
observations containing statements regarding the child’s right to identity
preservation when conceived and born ART. Considering the early Danish
approach to ART which was based on donor anonymity, the Committee re-
sponded that ‘Concerning the right of a child to know his or her origins, the
Committee notes a possible contradiction between this provision of the Conven-
tion and the policy of the State party with respect to artificial insemination.’54
The Committee made similar remarks regarding Norway’s then policy of
keeping sperm donor identity secret, again referring to the child’s ‘right to
know his or her origins’.55 Moreover, the Committee in its 2002 Concluding
Observations on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
expressed concern that ‘children born in the context of a medically assisted
fertilization do not have the right to know the identity of their biological
50 E.g. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Guidelines for periodic reports (1996) UN
Doc. CRC/C/58) at para 24: ‘having access to information concerning its biological family’
is listed by the Committee as something the Committee wants to know about in periodic
reporting under the Convention in relation to the minimum legal age defined by national
legislation.
51 Ibid. at para 83.
52 Clark, ‘A Balancing Act? The Rights of Donor-Conceived Children to Know Their Biological
Origins’ (2012) 40(3) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 619 at 627.
53 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding the Holy See,
25 February 2014, CRC/C/VAT/CO/2, at para 36, addressing the situation of anonymous
abandonment of babies in baby-boxes.
54 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Denmark, 15
February 1995, CRC/C/15/Add.33, at para 11.
55 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Norway, 25 April




parents.’56 Significantly, it recommended that ‘the State Party take all neces-
sary measures to allow all children, irrespective of the circumstances of their
birth, and adopted children to obtain information on the identity of their
parents, to the extent possible.’57
Considering the Committee’s approach to the child’s right to preserve
identity from a biological and genetic perspective, Clarke’s assessment that
‘The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child appears to interpret
the CRC as bestowing a clear right to donor-conceived children to knowledge
of their genetic identity’58 is valid. Doek further asserts that ‘in the light of
the present day developments and a dynamic interpretation of the CRC, it can
be considered to include in the right to preserve your identity, the right to
be informed about your (biological) origins. At the same time, it is a matter
of respect for the rights of donors to protect them from any legal or financial
responsibility for the child conceived with their assistance.’59 It is this require-
ment for a balancing of rights and interests that is likely, therefore, to be the
reason why the Committee has sometimes couched its position in the terms
of ‘to the extent possible’.
Despite not having addressed the issue of child identity preservation in
ICS, for the first time the Committee recently commented on the child’s right
to identity in the context of domestic surrogacy. In Concluding Observations
regarding Israel, the Committee expressed concern regarding the child’s
identity rights when born through surrogacy in Israel.60 It recommended that
‘… in the regulation of assisted reproduction technologies, particularly with
the involvement of surrogate mothers, the State party ensure respect for the
rights of children to have their best interests taken as a primary consideration
and to have access to information about their origins.’61 The Committee did
not elaborate as to the exact content of such information. However, based on
its previous observations regarding the importance of biological origins, at
a minimum it is reasonable to say that the Committee is expressing an expecta-
tion that children born through surrogacy will be ensured access to information
about their biological origins – therefore information about their genetic parents
and biological siblings. Interestingly, the Committee did not couch this expecta-
tion in terms of ‘to the extent possible’. This may signal a development in the
Committee’s position on the provision of origin information to children con-
ceived and born through alternative methods of family formation; arguably
56 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 09 October 2002, CRC/C/15/Add.188,
at para 31.
57 Ibid. at para 32.
58 Clark, supra n 52 at 628.
59 Doek, supra n 15 at 12.
60 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Israel, 04 July
2013, CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, at para 33.
61 Ibid. at para 34.
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the Committee is saying that in surrogacy situations, the child should have
access to information about their origins. Furthermore, the open-ended nature
of the wording chosen by the Committee allows an argument to be made that
for children born through surrogacy, access to information about their origins
should extend to identity information from a wider personal history perspect-
ive. For example, preserving and allowing the child to access information about
the circumstances of their conception and birth through surrogacy, including
who was involved (such as the surrogate, the commissioning parents, donor/
genetic parents and medical professionals), where and why could form an
important part of the child’s personal narrative in later life, helping give shape
to the child’s right to preserve their identity under Article 8(1).
The above work of the Committee demonstrates that it is clearly of the
view that the biological and genetic elements of identity fall within the child’s
Article 8 right. Tobin posits that ‘on balance, international law supports a
presumption in favour of allowing a child to receive information identifying
his or her biological parents. This right is not absolute and must be balanced
against a biological parent’s right to privacy. It also remains subject to the
overriding caveat that the release of identifying information must not be
contrary to the child’s best interests.’62 Given that the balancing of rights
between the child and other parties involved in ICS is complex and such a
significant issue from a rights perspective, it will be considered by the author
in a separate paper. However, it is indeed true that the Committee makes clear
that it is usually in the best interests of the child to protect and preserve the
biological and genetic elements of all children’s identities, including where
the child is conceived and born outside of a natural conception and birth
situation. Whilst the Committee has not yet directly commented on the child’s
right to preserve their identity in the context of ICS either in relation to Article
8 or 7, its comments in related contexts analysed above form a very strong
indication that the Committee would likely take the position that in ICS situ-
ations, the child’s right to preserve identity under Article 8(1) covers the
biological and genetic elements of their identity (thereby reinforcing the child’s
Article 7 right to know and be cared for by their parents). Albeit made in the
context of domestic surrogacy, the recent comment from the Committee on
domestic surrogacy in the Israeli context is indicative of the importance the
Committee places on the child’s right to preserve their identity in surrogacy
situations. It provides insight into the Committee’s possible future approach
to the child’s preservation of identity in ICS situations.




4.4 The right to identity in regional human rights jurisprudence
Additional to the guidance from the Committee on the Rights of the Child,
in order to further understand what constitutes a child’s identity, reference
to selected jurisprudence from regional human rights systems is elucidating.
In the jurisprudence referred to below from the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, the content of
‘identity’ has been confirmed and elaborated upon. This jurisprudence is of
significant relevance to the focus of this paper on the child’s right to preserve
identity in the context of ICS, given that it confirms that identity is constituted
of multiple elements and that it is an essential aspect of an individual’s human
rights with lifelong impact.
4.4.1 Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The American Convention on Human Rights63 does not explicitly include
the right to identity. Yet the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
addressed the right to identity in its jurisprudence, for example in Serrano-Cruz
Sisters v. El Salvador,64 a landmark case concerning children who were the
victims of enforced disappearance by the Salvadoran army. Dissenting in
Serrano-Cruz, Judge Cançado Trindade asserts the essential nature of identity
to humans:
‘Without a specific identity, one is not a person. The individual is constituted as
a being that includes his supreme purpose within himself, and realizes this through-
out his life, under his own responsibility. In this optic, safeguarding his right to
an identity becomes essential.’65
Judge Ventura Robles (also dissenting in Serrano-Cruz) further emphasises that
as well as being essential in nature, the right to identity allows individuals
to access personal and family information that can enable the construction
of personal history and biography.66 Judge Robles highlights the interrelated
and symbiotic relationships between different members of a family and the
importance of identity of each member of such a group in relation to the
63 American Convention on Human Rights 1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36.
64 Case of Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador IACtHR Series C 120 (2005).
65 Ibid. dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, at para 15.
66 Ibid. dissenting opinion of Judge Ventura Robles on the Third Operative Paragraph at para
138, stating: ‘Given that the exercise of the right to identity allows the individual to have
access to personal and family information that will enable him to construct his own personal
history and biography, the Court considers that the right to identity is an essential element
of the life of all individuals and not only of children; moreover, its exercise is essential
for establishing relationships with the different members of the family, and between each
individual and society and the State.’
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others,67 observing that the Inter-Amercian Court of Human Rights has
recognised that everyone has a right to identity, and this is
‘a complex right which, on the one hand has a dynamic aspect linked to the evo-
lution of the personality of the individual, and includes a series of attributes and
characteristics that allow each person to be individualized as unique. Personal
identity starts from the moment of conception and its construction continues
throughout the life of the individual, in a continuous process that encompasses
a multiplicity of elements and aspects which exceed the strictly biological concept
and correspond to the biographical and “personal reality” of the individual. These
elements and attributes, which comprise personal identity, include such varied
aspects as a person’s origin or “biological reality,” and his cultural, historical,
religious, ideological, political, professional, family and social heritage, as well as
more static aspects relating, for example, to physical traits, name and nationality.’68
Concerning the elements of identity, Judge Cançado Trindade also identified
various elements, saying that ‘The right to identity presumes the right to know
personal and family information, and to have access to this, to satisfy an
existential need and safeguard individual rights. This right also has an im-
portant cultural (in addition to social, family, psychological and spiritual)
content, and is essential for relationships between each individual and the rest
of society, and even for his understanding of the outside world, and his place
in it.’69 All of these are highly relevant to the child’s situation in ICS, as
traversed earlier in Sections 2 and 3; indeed, giving effect to Article 8 CRC in
practice amounts to ensuring the child is able to have a full picture of all the
strands of their identity ‘reality’, based upon the various elements of identity.
4.4.2 European Court of Human Rights
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is also helpful in
understanding what can be said to constitute the various elements of identity
from a human and child rights perspective under international law. Like the
ACHR, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) does not explicitly include a right to preserve
identity. However, Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to respect for private
and family life and the ECtHR has held, in a number of leading decisions, that
67 Ibid. dissenting opinion of Judge Ventura Robles on the Third Operative Paragraph at para
176, stating: ‘Family relations and co-existence, and also the given name and surnames
of a person, are essential for forming and preserving the identity of the individual. These
elements of the right to identity are essential for both the children and the adult members
of a family, given that the identity of each of the members affects and has an influence
on that of the others, and also on their relationship with society and with the State.’
68 Ibid. dissenting opinion of Judge Ventura Robles on the Third Operative Paragraph at para
132.




the right to identity falls within the scope of the rights protected under Article
8 of the ECHR.70 Viewing the right to identity as a matter of importance for
all human beings in terms of their own personal development, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court held in Odievre v. France that the Convention
protects a vital interest ‘in obtaining information necessary to discover the
truth concerning important aspects of one’s personal identity, such as the
identity of one’s parents, birth, and in particular the circumstances in which
a child is born, forms a part of a child’s, and subsequently the adult’s, private
life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.’71 The fact that the European
Court specified as an element of identity ‘the circumstances in which a child
is born’ is of particular relevance to children born through ICS. Of further
significance in this context, the Court elaborated in Odievre that people ‘have
a vital interest, protected by the Convention, in receiving the information
necessary to know and to understand their childhood and early develop-
ment.’72
This emphasis on a person receiving a broad range of information as
necessary to both know and understand these aspects of their identity is again
significant. The Court’s judgment in Odievre was applied by the Court in
Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, which underscored both the importance of the circum-
stances of birth and access to information ‘necessary to discover the truth
concerning important aspects of one’s personal identity, such as the identity
of one’s parents.’73 Applying its earlier judgments in Mikulic v. Croatia74 and
Gaskin v. The United Kingdom,75 the Court said that an individual’s entitlement
to such information is of importance because of ‘its formative implications
for his or her personality’.76 The Court, however, has made clear that the right
to identity is, in its view, not absolute. As the Court held in SH and Others
v. Austria, a balance must be struck between private and public interests
involved; in that particular case it found that the Austrian legislator could
‘find an appropriate and properly balanced solution between competing
interests of donors requesting anonymity and any legitimate interest in obtain-
70 E.g. the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Odievre v. France
Application No 42326/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 13 February 2003 at para 29 held
that: “Article 8 protects a right to identity and personal development, and the right to
establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world.”
71 Odievre v. France, Application No 42326/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 13 February 2003
at para 29.
72 Ibid. at para 42.
73 Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, Application No 23890/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 20 December
2007 at para 45.
74 Mikulic v. Croatia, Application No 53176/99, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 07 February 2002.
75 Gaskin v. United Kingdom, Application No 10454/83, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 07 July
1989.
76 Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, Application No 23890/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 20 December
2007 at para 45.
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ing information of a child conceived through artificial procreation with donated
ova or sperm.’77
In this connection however, it is worth mentioning a decision outside the
European Court context but which is notable given that it may represent a
shift among European countries towards adopting a more progressive stance
regarding the child’s right to preserve their identity. Indeed, if it does signal
a shift, it is a shifting of the balance strongly towards the child knowing their
biological and genetic origins in all situations, outweighing competing interests.
This is the recent decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice
of Germany) which held that all children, regardless of their age, have a right
to know their origins, including the identity of anonymous sperm donor
fathers.78 The Court said that this information may be important for the
development of the child’s personality.79 With regard to the balancing of
interests involved, the Bundesgerichtshof held that in the majority of cases,
the child’s rights to know their origins and to know their parents will be
greater than that of the donor’s right to privacy.80
Recently too, the European Court of Human Rights has begun to engage
with the issue of the child’s right to preservation of identity under the rubric
of Article 8 of the ECHR in the specific context of ICS. The broader significance
of these decisions have and will be dealt with elsewhere;81 for the purposes
of this paper it is important to touch on the Court’s approach to date in dealing
with identity rights for children born through ICS. The judgments in Mennesson
v. France82 and Labassee v. France83 represent the first time the Court dealt
with ICS matters. The Court in Mennesson, recalling its earlier jurisprudence
relating to identity rights, held that respect for private life under the Conven-
tion requires that individuals can establish their personal identity, which
includes their filiation.84 Regarding the Mennesson twins, the Court found
that France had erred in not recognising the biological link between the
children and their commissioning fathers, and that the indeterminacy of this
non-recognition (and resulting situation of non-recognition of French national-
ity, another important element of identity) would likely have a negative impact
on the development of their identities.85 It held that being deprived of a legal
relationship with their proven biological fathers was incompatible with the
77 SH and Others v. Austria, Application No 57813/00, Merits and Justification, 03 November
2011 at para 84.
78 Judgment of the XII. Civil Division from 28 January 2015 – XII ZR 201/13.
79 Ibid. at 16 at para 41.
80 Ibid. at 21-23 at paras 54-59.
81 E.g. see Achmad, ‘Children’s rights to the fore in the European Court of Human Rights’
first international commercial surrogacy judgments’ (2014) 6 European Human Rights Law
Review 638-646.
82 Mennesson v. France, Application No 65192/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 June 2014.
83 Labassee v. France, Application No 65941/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 June 2014.
84 Mennesson v. France, supra n 81 at para 96.




children’s best interests, and that France had exceeded its margin of appreci-
ation.86
In its judgment in Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy,87 the Court has again
dealt with the identity aspect of the child’s right to private life in an ICS
situation. In this case however, unlike the situations in Mennesson and Labassee,
the Court was confronted with a child, Teodoro who was born through ICS
but is not genetically related to either of his commissioning parents.88 The
Court in its judgment observes that as a result of this fact and the subsequent
actions of the Italian government, Teodoro was effectively left without an
identity for over two years.89 In recognising this, it appears that the Court
was referring to the child’s legal identity. Of course, Teodoro’s personal history
developed during this time, contributing to his identity, although the extent
to which these were preserved for him by the adults involved in his care is
unclear. The Court said that at a practical level as well as a developmental
level, his lack of (legal) identity caused Teodoro disadvantage,90 inconsistent
with his rights under the CRC. He had been issued with a new legal identity
– in terms of his birth certificate and nationality – and placed in foster care.
Since that time, the Court held that he had developed a bond with his foster
family, and therefore Italy was not required to return him to his commissioning
parents, who had no genetic relationship to him.91 This was despite his com-
missioning parents intending that there would be a paternal genetic link with
Teodoro when they embarked on their ICS arrangement. The facts of Teodoro’s
situation are illustrative of the myriad complex risks to children who are
conceived and born through ICS. Moreover, that a new legal identity was
essentially created for Teodoro raises the question to what extent this identity
was in sync with his original identity, and raises the spectre of elements of
his original identity – such as his own personal narrative regarding his con-
ception and birth and the fact his conception was instigated by his commission-
ing parents – having been erased at law through the creation of his new legal
identity. However, the facts of Teodoro’s personal history and therefore par-
ticular elements of his identity have been preserved through documentation
in the various court judgments pertaining to his situation. Despite this, there
is currently no guarantee that all children who end up in similar situations
through ICS will have such elements of their identity preserved.
Taken together, the European judgments canvased above provide a plat-
form for recognising the importance of the child’s right to preserve their
identity, and that this right encapsulates the elements of genetic and biological
86 Ibid. at para 99-100.
87 Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, Application No 25358/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27
January 2015.
88 Ibid. at paras 19, 22.
89 Ibid. at para 85.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. at para 88.
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origins. The decisions largely indicate that from a rights balancing perspective,
the right of the child to preserve their identity to the fullest extent possible
is likely to outweigh the right of donors to privacy. This sends a strong
message that from a best practice perspective, gamete donors involved in ICS
should be identifiable to enable the child to preserve their identity. The Court’s
decision in Paradiso and Campanelli indicates that the Court views the concept
of identity as evolving and adapting over time depending on the child’s
circumstances, but that some elements of identity remain static, such as genetic
parentage. However, the Court in this case did not explicitly consider how
the elements of a child’s identity relating to the child’s personal narrative about
their origins should be preserved, such as the circumstances of their conception
and birth as they relate to the intention of their commissioning parents.
5 HOW THE CHILD’S ARTICLE 8 RIGHT HAS BEEN BREACHED IN INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY SITUATIONS
The cases examined below place the preceding discussion in context and are
illustrative of the ways various elements of the child’s identity can fail to be
protected in ICS, preventing the child from preserving their identity, incon-
sistent with their best interests.92 In some cases, based on the child’s specific
circumstances, a particular element of the child’s identity is emphasised.
However, in all the cases below, more than one of the child’s elements of
identity has failed to be preserved, impacting negatively on the child’s ability
to exercise their Article 8 right and to benefit from the protection it is intended
to provide.
5.1 Volden twins
Twins Adrian and Mikael Volden were born in India in 2010 to an Indian
gestational surrogate mother, commissioned by a single Norwegian woman.93
The twin’s genetic parents are allegedly an Indian egg donor and a Scan-
dinavian sperm donor, both anonymous.94 Conflicting Indian and Norwegian
nationality and parentage laws left the twins stateless for their first 15 months,
stranded in India; their Article 8 right has been breached in a number of ways
because of the circumstances of their conception and birth through ICS. As
92 Article 3, Convention on the Rights of the Child supra n 2.
93 Roy, ‘Stateless twins live in limbo’ Times of India (2 February 2011) available at: www.timesof
india.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Stateless-twins-live-in-limbo/articleshow/7407929.cms
[last accessed 01 June 2015].
94 Ibid. However, Melhuus states that the nationality of the gamete donors is unknown. See





well as being stateless without a nationality for an extended period (one of
the explicit elements of identity under Article 8), even since the twins gained
Norwegian nationality, they remain unable to preserve their genetic identity,
given their genetic parents donated gametes anonymously. This further means
they are unable to preserve their genetic health history, culture and heritage.
Regarding their culture and heritage related to their birth place and their birth
mother, Adrian and Mikael remained in India, their birth country during their
early infancy.95 Although their commissioning mother cared for them in India
during this time, they may have experienced the culture and language of their
birth place and of their birth mother. They were then transferred to Norway,
a state with a very different culture and language. Therefore, these identity
elements associated with their birth place and birth mother may be challenging
for them to preserve. Depending on how their commissioning mother ap-
proaches these issues later in their lives, these elements of their identity may
be difficult for the twins to deal with as they seek to make sense of their
identity and preserve it.
5.2 D and L (Surrogacy)96
This case in the Family Division of the United Kingdom High Court concerns
twin boys, D and L, born to a surrogate mother in India and a male same-sex
couple residing in the UK.97 Genetically, D and L are the children of one of
their commissioning parents and an anonymous Indian egg donor.98 Given
their genetic mother’s anonymity, the twins are unable to preserve half of their
genetic identity and related sub-elements such as medical history, ethnicity,
culture and heritage. However, D and L (Surrogacy) is particularly notable as
it highlights the practical limitations in preserving biological identity elements
relating to children’s birth mothers in ICS. Whilst the twin’s commissioning
parents had information they believed was identifying information about the
surrogate, they could not locate her following the twins’ birth. An agent
seeking to locate her told the Court:
‘I am sorry to inform you that I could not locate Miss B. The address provided
by the clinic where Miss B should be residing… is not the place where she lives.
[…] Nobody there had any knowledge of Miss B or where she is living now. I have
shown neighbours [identity] card of Miss B and they did not recognise her. I could
not find out where she lives now.’99
95 Lysvold, ‘Kari Ann Volden får komme hjem’ NRK (15 April 2011) available at: www.nrk.no/
nordland/kari-ann-volden-far-komme-hjem-1.7596488 [last accessed 01 June 2015].
96 D and L (Surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631 (Fam).
97 Ibid. at paras 2 and 8.
98 Ibid. at para 6.
99 Ibid. at para 14.
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This illustrates the precariousness of preserving this element of the child’s
identity in ICS; the risks of surrogate mothers providing false or inaccurate
identity information, failing to update contact information or simply acting
anonymously and therefore placing this element of the child’s identity beyond
reach are real.
5.3 Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy100
This case, already mentioned in section 4D(ii) above concerns a child, Teodoro,
intended to be the genetic child of one of his commissioning parents, but who
was born genetically unrelated to either. Teodoro’s genetic parents remain
unknown; his birth mother has no on-going involvement with him; the Italian
state has removed Teodoro from his commissioning parents and he is now
the legal child of persons who were in no way involved in the ICS arrangement.
The case therefore raises questions regarding the family relations element of
Teodoro’s identity. Whilst the European Court of Human Rights found
Teodoro’s removal from his commissioning parents violated Article 8 of the
European Convention,101 it concluded he was attached to his new carers and
should remain with them.102 Yet this child has particularly complex family
relations given the multiple parties involved in his ICS arrangement from
genetic, biological and social perspectives. They each form an important part
of the family relations element of his identity; they relate to particular periods
in his life and have a bearing on his personal narrative and other elements
of his identity, all of which may have an enduring impact on his life. They
are elements of his identity which should be preserved consistent with
Article 8.
Furthermore, the judgment highlights that although Teodoro received a
new identity under law, he was without a legal identity for over two years.103
However, the judgment does not point out that elements of his identity such
as genetic identity (including medical history, ethnicity, culture and heritage),
biological identity (relating to his surrogate mother, such as her culture,
ethnicity and medical history) and cultural identity relating to his birth place
have not been preserved, and that consequently he will be unable to preserve
his identity consistent with Article 8 CRC. At best, these elements of Teodoro’s
identity have failed to have been preserved, and at worst, erased.
100 Supra n 87.
101 Supra n 87 at para 87.
102 Supra n 87 at para 88.




5.4 In the Matter of an Application by DMW and KW to adopt a male
child104
In this New Zealand case, a child, A, was born to a surrogate mother in
Thailand and to New Zealand commissioning parents DMW and KW. A was
intended as the genetic child of Mr DMW and Mrs KW’s niece, Ms KP, through
an embryo created from their gametes.105 However, DNA testing revealed
A is genetically unrelated to Mr DMW and Ms KP (likely due to clinical error);
his genetic parents remain unknown (testing also excluded A’s surrogate
mother as his genetic mother).106
Mr DMW and Mrs KW indicated to the Court they committed to parenting A,
despite sharing a genetic connection with him;107 intercountry adoption was
the only avenue which remained open to them to pursue to establish a parental
relationship to A. Similarly to Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, this case demon-
strates the precarious nature of the child’s family relations and genetic identity
preservation in ICS situations. A will never be able to preserve his genetic
identity and related sub-elements; his birth certificate effectively confirms this
lack of preservation, stating his surrogate mother as his mother, along with
‘unknown’ in the ‘father’ field. There will remain a large part of his personal
narrative that will never be able to be preserved as a result of the impossibility
of gaining information which preserves his genetic and associated cultural
identity elements.
***
To date, relatively little explicit judicial attention has been given to the child’s
Article 8 right in situations concerning ICS children before domestic courts
and regional human rights courts. That courts are seemingly not choosing to
engage more extensively with this aspect of the child’s rights is unfortunate.
Article 8 provides a clear basis for Courts to do so, and given the centrality
of the child’s right to preserve their identity to their best interests in ICS, the
child’s Article 8 right should receive judicial attention in all ICS cases. Where
possible, courts should seek reports on this issue from independent experts,
and highlight the findings of such reports in judgments. This would emphasise
the significance of the child’s Article 8 right in this context and highlight the
need to take steps to protect and uphold the child’s identity preservation right.
In the regional arena, the European Court of Human Rights has been the only
court to engage with the issue in its Mennesson, Labassee and Paradiso judg-
ments. In the domestic sphere, the Australian jurisdiction currently leads the
way in terms of explicit judicial consideration of this issue. In a number of
104 In the Matter of an Application by DMW and KW to adopt a male child [2012] NZFC 2915.
105 Ibid. at para 2.
106 Ibid. at paras 5-6.
107 Ibid. at para 10.
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recent ICS judgments, Australian courts have drawn attention to the issue,
emphasising the importance of protecting the of the child’s ability to preserve
their identity in ICS situations. Three leading cases are illustrative in this
connection.
Mason & Mason and Anor108 is the leading authority in this respect, con-
cerning E and W, twins born to an Indian surrogate in India and Australian
male commissioning parents. The twins are genetically the children of one
of the commissioning fathers and an anonymous egg donor. The Australian
Family Court’s judgment considers the twin’s identity and their best interests
from a number of perspectives, referencing the findings of a report by a family
consultant to the Court (all of which the Court accepted). The consultant noted
the twins may, at some stage in their life, have ‘an intense, emotional identity
crisis’109 relating to the fact they were born through a surrogacy arrangement
‘by mothers they are unlikely to know’.110 They will face issues in their lives
‘however well-armed with positive parent-child relationships.’111 Despite
this, the consultant noted the commissioning parents commitment (at the time
of her report) to openness regarding the children’s situation may be ‘a protect-
ive factor for the twins, alongside the development of secure and healthy
parent-child relationships’,112 combined with the fact the commissioning
parents had actively sought to connect with families in similar positions, which
may lead to positive friendship groups over time.113 Amongst the issues the
twins will face, however, the consultant identified ‘the cultural issues from
being genetically half Indian’114 and ‘identity issues from having no or very
limited contact with their donor mother and their surrogate mother’.115
Further relating to the twin’s cultural identity, the family consultant said that
they may benefit from spending time amongst Indian families in Australia,
such as though Indian festivals and celebrations.116 The consultant stated
‘…The diversity of Indian culture means the different experience according
to religious background, and this may be an issue the children will want to
explore at some point.’117 She went on to observe that as in adoption,
‘the twins may potentially face a more complicated task of making sense of their
place in the world because they have grown up in a family whose parents faces
do not look like theirs and without experiencing their “mother”, and her culture.
There may be times in the children’s lives when they will be pre-occupied with
108 Mason & Mason and Anor, [2013] FamCA 424.
109 Ibid. at para 67.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid. at para 64.
112 Ibid. at para 67.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid. at para 64.
115 Ibid.





this task. They may seek contact with their mothers at significant life cycle trans-
itions. It is also possible that it may never be an issue for the twins.’118
The consultant drew attention to the argument that ‘a child’s genetic identity
forms part of a child’s history.’119 She said that
‘There may be medical advantages in the children knowing their parentage. The
donor mother and [the birth mother] and their families will, apparently, be unlikely
and/or unable to seek out [the children]. There may be significant class issues
separating the families which may well be apparent to the children as they explore
their Indian backgrounds further. The twins may realise that their mothers and
any half siblings experienced life very differently to them.’120
Regarding the latter point, the family consultant said that this was something
the twin’s commissioning parents could help them to understand and
approach.121
The second Australian case, Ellison and Anor & Karnchanit,122 although
not including as extensive emphasis on identity issues as Mason & Mason, does
focus on the significant nature of the impact of not preserving elements of
the child’s identity in ICS situations. Ellison concerns twins born in Thailand
to a Thai surrogate mother and Australian commissioning parents, Mr Ellison
and Ms Solano. They are the genetic children of Mr Ellison and an anonymous
egg donor. The Australian Family Court held that granting a declaration of
legal parentage to Mr Ellison was appropriate as it recognised the reality of
the children’s lives and their genetic link to their biological father123 and ‘may
well be of the greatest significance to the child in establishing his or her
lifetime identity.’124 Yet the Court acknowledged that the twins share half
their genetic identity with their genetic mother, who it observed will most
likely remain unknown.125 The Court elaborated that ‘Although it is almost
certain that the children will never know their biological or birth mother, it
is not within the Court or the applicants’ power to coerce those women to
establish or maintain a relationship with the children.’126 However, the Court
was clear in its view that this ‘may raise issues for the children as they
mature’.127




122 Ellison and Anor & Karnchanit [2012] FamCA 602.
123 Ibid. at para 101.
124 Ibid. at para 91.
125 Ibid. at para 115.
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Honing in further on the twin’s birth mother, the Court noted she
‘has made it plain that it is her wish not to be involved in the children’s upbringing.
The applicants have her contact details and are committed to maintaining contact
with her if this is what she wants. They have secured her agreement that she receive
photographs of the children and to meet with the applicants and children when
they visit Thailand.’128
In this respect, it is positive that in this case the commissioning parents evid-
ently gave thought to how to preserve the child’s biological identity relating
to their birth mother. Moreover, based on the report of a family consultant,
the Court said it ‘was clear that the applicants had given considerable thought
to future issues, including those of identity and culture.’129
Finally, the judgment of the Family Court of Australia in the case of Fisher-
Oakley v. Kittur130 is representative of the overriding judicial concern being
expressed from a legal perspective by the Family Court of Australia regarding
children being conceived and born through ICS in general,131 and explicitly
in relation to the child’s right to identity preservation in ICS situations. The
case concerned a child born in India to an Indian surrogate mother and Austra-
lian commissioning parents, Mr X and Mr Y.132 Despite no DNA evidence
being put before the Court, one of the commissioning parents is said to be
the child’s genetic father.133 It is unclear who the child’s genetic mother is,
as there is no mention of her in the judgment. However, Justice Cronin
described the child’s Indian birth certificate as being ‘curious and unusual’,134
given it cites the name of the child’s mother as ‘Mrs Not Known’.135 Further
regarding the child’s identity, Justice Cronin pointedly stated that:
‘Whatever things people say about the future and their intentions, one has to be
somewhat cynical about just how those things will unfold for a child born into
this commercial arrangement. This is a new area for the law in an environment
where science is far ahead of what lawmakers seem to be contemplating. I have
no idea what this child will face in 15 years time if cultural issues arise or his issues
about identity become a crisis. I have no idea what would happen in the event
that the birth mother suddenly changed her mind and wanted to have some
involvement in the child’s future. All of those questions remain unanswered.’136
128 Ibid. at para 115.
129 Ibid. at para 122.
130 Fisher-Oakley & Kittur [2014] FamCA 123.
131 Ibid. at paras 5; 27.
132 Ibid. at para 1.
133 Ibid. at para 13.
134 Ibid. at para 16.
135 Ibid.




6 LEARNING LESSONS FROM DONOR-CONCEPTION, ADOPTION AND DOMESTIC
SURROGACY FOR THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO PRESERVE IDENTITY IN INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY SITUATIONS
Against the above discussion of the importance of the right to identity pre-
servation for children born through ICS and the reality that children conceived
and born this way are not always able to exercise their Article 8 right (or have
it upheld for their protection), it is useful to draw out some key lessons from
donor-conception, adoption and domestic surrogacy. These are relevant to
the child’s identity situation in ICS given the overlap between some of the
challenges in common between these alternative methods of family formation.
In some instances there are directly analogous lessons to be learnt, so children
conceived and born through ICS avoid experiencing the same challenges as
these other groups of children have experienced.
6.1 Domestic systems of donor-conceived children and lessons for the
child’s right to preserve identity in ICS
Studies focussing on the experiences of donor-conceived children highlight
some central emergent themes relevant in the context of the child’s right to
preserve identity in ICS. One such theme is the role of secrecy and non-dis-
closure in donor-conceived peoples’ lives and its impact. For donor-conceived
people, secrecy and non-disclosure appears to function at two levels: regarding
information about the nature of the child’s conception, and information relating
to the identity of gamete donors. As Cowden observes, ‘Non-disclosure gen-
erates strong risks for the donor-conceived child […] even if these risks could
be mitigated, children have a right to be treated with respect and truth-telling
about information regarding one’s life course is intimately tied up with respect
for an individual’s identity.’137 Cowden therefore rejects the argument that
non-disclosure and secrecy relating to donor conceived children is acceptable
on the basis of the ‘no harm, no foul’ rule, given the child rights rooted
position that we should always engage in actions that respect the child.138
The negative nature of secrecy and non-disclosure is borne out in empirical
studies involving donor-conceived people,139 and resonates strongly with
137 Cowden, supra n 12 at 103.
138 Ibid. at 116-118.
139 E.g. Turner and Coyle, ‘What does it mean to be a donor offspring? The identity experiences
of adults conceived by donor insemination and the implications for counselling and therapy’
(2000) 15 Human Reproduction 2041 at 2049 state that: ‘A consistent finding within the study
was the negative and ongoing effects of withholding secrets’; furthermore, a longitudinal
study of donor-conceived people found that non-disclosure can lead to them never knowing
they have genetic siblings. Golombok emphasises that research has shown the importance
and significance of knowing siblings and their wider family relations for donor conceived
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Freeman’s assertion that the child’s right to identity when born via ART is ‘a
right not to be deceived about one’s true origins.’140 Furthermore, a donor-
conceived person’s ability to seek and access information regarding their donor
parent(s) hinges on an initial disclosure of information about the true nature
of their conception.141 If children in ICS are not informed about the nature
of their conception and birth, their ability to seek and access information to
preserve their identity will be similarly compromised; Tobin observes that
contemporary research ‘appears to favour a climate of openness and honesty
rather than secrecy and denial with respect to children who are raised in
families where their social parents are not necessarily their biological
parents.’142
Access to identity information is the second level at which secrecy and
non-disclosure function in the lives of donor-conceived people. Moreover,
ensuring donor-conceived persons are able to access identifying information
appears to be crucial so they can preserve their own identity.143 Drawing
persons: Golombok, Modern Families (2015) 112-114. See also Golombok, ‘Families created
by reproductive donation’ (2013) 7 Child Development Perspectives 61-65. Blyth notes that
participants in one study of donor-conceived adults ‘expressed very firmly that those who
built their family using donor gametes should tell their child(ren) about their genetic
heritage as early as possible.’ See Blyth, ‘Discovering the ‘Facts of Life’ Following Anonym-
ous Donor Insemination’ (2012) 26 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 143 at
153. However, Golombok’s study showed that whilst increasing numbers of parents intend
to tell their children about their donor conception, many never make the disclosure. As
Adams notes, ‘the rights of donors to anonymity can still override a donor conceived
person’s right to information, depending on what era and jurisdiction he or she was
conceived in. Additionally, the right of parents to deceive a child of his or her origins is
universal in all jurisdictions and eras. In effect, the offspring’s postulated right is subject
to various regulations and laws as well as the choices of the participating adults. Sub-
sequently, the freedom of procreation in this context has the potential to adversely affect
the rights of donor-conceived offspring.’ Adams, ‘Conceptualising a Child-Centric Paradigm:
Do We Have Freedom of Choice in Donor Conception Reproduction?’ (2013) 10 Bioethical
Inquiry 369 at 370.
140 Freeman, ‘The New Birth Right? Identity and the Child of the Reproduction Revolution’
(1996) 4 International Journal of Children’s Rights 273 at 291.
141 As Blyth and Frith note, ‘Donor-conceived people’s ability to access information to which
they are entitled is entirely dependent on their awareness of the nature of their conception
and this is clearly compromised if parents do not tell their children about their conception
in the first place.’ See Blyth and Frith, ‘Donor-Conceived People’s Access to Genetic and
Biographical History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting
Disclosure of Donor Identity’ (2009) 23 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family
174 at 185.
142 Tobin, supra n 26 at 43.
143 Turner and Coyle, supra n 139 at 2047. This study found that non-identifying information
was insufficient, as without it donor-conceived participants experienced loss and grief about
being prevented from knowing their biological origins and knowing their genetic fathers.
They believed they had a right to search for and receive identifying information about their
missing genetic parent, and also experienced a sense of abandonment and attributed




on testimony from donor-conceived people,144 Cowden further notes that
preventing a child from accessing identifying information can lead to psycho-
logical harm and loss of identity, described as ‘genealogical bewilderment’
arising from being prevented from knowing the part of the identity they inherit
through genetics and biology.145 On the other hand, through enabling donor-
conceived people to access identifying information about their donor parent(s),
they can fill a void that was once empty and establish their own sense of
identity.146
There are strong parallels to be drawn between the lessons from donor-
conception and the situation faced by children born through ICS regarding
the protection of their Article 8 right. These clearly relate to the genetic and
personal narrative elements of the child’s identity. The lesson from donor-
conception that secrecy and non-disclosure regarding the child’s conception
cuts against the concept of respect for children and their best interests – and
may cause children harm – equally applies in ICS. As Tobin notes, the CRC
Committee’s statements regarding the inconsistency between the child’s right
to know their genetic origins and national regimes permitting anonymous
gamete donation indicate the Committee’s ‘strong presumption in favour of
the full disclosure of a child’s genetic/biological parents’.147
Furthermore, the other lesson from donor-conception, that donor-conceived
people should have identifying information about their genetic parents (or
at least information which allows them to understand their genetic origins)
protected for them so they can access it, is crucial to bear in mind in ICS.
However, for children born through ICS, as well as information about their
genetic parents, they should also be able to access information about the
woman who carries them biologically and births them. As with donor-concep-
tion, in ICS it will be necessary for children to first learn about the circum-
stances of their conception and birth in order to then have the choice whether
to seek access to information preserving their identity. Here, the child’s social
parents (most likely their commissioning parents) and identity information
protection and access systems will have critical roles to play.
144 Cowden, supra n 12 at 110.
145 Ibid. at 109-110.
146 Ibid. at 111. The findings of Blyth’s study involving donor-conceived adults support this
view. This group strongly advocated for the use of gametes only from donors willing to
be identified by their offspring. Some study participants advocated including relevant
information about their donor parent(s) on birth registration documents in instances where
privacy could be maintained and it would not preclude them from choosing to tell others
about the nature of their conception on their own terms. See Blyth, supra n 139 at 153.
147 Tobin, supra n 26 at 37.
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6.2 Adoption systems and lessons for the child’s right to preserve identity
in ICS
A sea-change has occurred over the past twenty years in adoption practice
regarding child identity preservation, with a near world-wide shift from closed
to open adoption systems.148 Marshall, contrasting this openness with the
fact that donor-conception systems in many states continue to be characterised
by their closed, anonymous nature, says the global experience of adoption
‘suggests a strong encouragement to tell children about the way they were
conceived.’149 Fortin elaborates that knowing about their birth circumstances
as soon as possible provides the child a sense of continuity, their own bio-
graphy, and alleviates the negative impact of bewilderment later in life caused
by concealing the truth.150 Fortin further notes that ‘Research carried out
in the context of adoption practice suggests that adopted children have a
psychological need to know the true identity of those who brought them into
the world.’151
Although there are limits to drawing analogies between adoption and ICS
given that adoption is a protective measure concerning pre-existing children,
whereas ICS is a practice which itself creates new children, such an approach
based on openness is equally applicable to donor-conceived children and
children born through ICS. The ‘genealogical bewilderment’ children can
experience when they grow up in the care of people who are not their birth
parents but discover the real circumstances of their birth and infancy was first
articulated by Sants in 1964, continues to hold value in our current day con-
text.152 The situation of children placed for adoption either from birth or early
infancy is particularly relevant to the child’s right to preserve identity in ICS.
As Brodzinsky et al assert, ‘When children are placed in infancy, they have
no memory of the birth parents and may have little or no access to information
about them. In these situations, what is lost is also unknown, which too often
sets the stage for the development of distorted perceptions about one’s back-
ground.’153 For a child conceived with the gamete(s) of donors and born to
a surrogate through ICS, and for whom these elements of their identity are
148 Richards notes that ‘Adoption research and current practice recognise that acknowledging
biological heritage is in a child’s best interest. This contrasts with earlier held views, where
many people believed it was best to hide children’s origins’. See Richards, ‘What the map
cuts up the story cuts across: Narratives of belonging in intercountry adoption’ (2012) 36
Adoption and Fostering 104 at 107.
149 Marshall, Human Rights Law and Personal Identity (2014) at 125.
150 Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (2003) at 383.
151 Ibid.
152 Sants, ‘Genealogical bewilderment in children with substitute parents’ (1964) 37 British
Journal of Medical Psychology, 113-141.





not preserved, creating this empty genealogical space may well lead to prob-
lems for the child regarding their identity preservation.
Brodzinsky et al highlight that many adoptees not only lack information
about and a relationship with their birth parents, but are also negatively
impacted by their perception of the circumstances surrounding the
‘relinquishment decision’.154 This may bear out in the experience of children
born through ICS too, who may seek answers to questions such as ‘why didn’t
my birth mother and my genetic parents want me?’ or ‘why did they choose
to be involved with creating me, only for me to be given away?’. On the other
hand, while it may be relatively common for children who were voluntarily
placed for adoption to feel they were rejected or unwanted by their birth
parents155 and for this to have an impact on the preservation of their identity,
this may actually be less likely or be experienced differently by ICS children.
Unlike adopted children, children in ICS are intentionally conceived for the
commissioning parents on the basis of their desire to have a child.
Contrastingly, when a child is voluntarily placed for adoption, the child may
in fact, for various reasons, be unwanted by his or her birth parents. In adop-
tion, the child’s ability to preserve a ‘stable and consolidated identity’156 in
part relies on the manner in which adoptive parents ‘portray the birth family
and the circumstances of the relinquishment’.157
The importance and impact of origin and biological narratives has also
been highlighted in the adoption context. Regarding the concept of a bio-
genetic narrative, Lifton asserts that this ‘is as much a part of them [a person]
as their shadow; it develops with them over the years and cannot be torn away.
Unless, of course, they are adopted.’158 Lifton says that this not only removes
a personal sense of identity, but also a sense of connection to the narratives
of other people to whom that person is related.159 Research has found that
biological narratives are complicated by adoption; often constructed upon
partial truths, speculation and regarding intercountry adoption, cultural
assumptions.160 The experience of adopted children also shows that such
children may face challenges in preserving and developing personal identity
given that they perceive themselves and are perceived as different.161 For
example, in the context of intercountry adoption (the form of adoption drawing
the closest parallels to ICS given the common transnational element) children
can find themselves in an ‘ambiguous’ position, ‘both inside the family and
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid. at 100.
156 Ibid. at 104.
157 Ibid.
158 Lifton, Journey of the Adopted Self: A Quest for Wholeness (1994) at 37.
159 Ibid.
160 Richards, supra n 148 at 106.
161 Brodzinsky et al, supra n 153 at 104.
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nation and outside it – as culturally and racially different.’162 Even once
children receive the nationality of their adoptive country, such children often
have a complicated experience in terms of their perceptions of self from
cultural, social and ethnic perspectives.163 Children born through ICS may
also find it is beyond their grasp to preserve their origins from a biological,
cultural, language and ethnic perspective, given the transnational dislocation
they may experience.
As already highlighted in section 4.3 of this paper, the significance of the
issue of identity preservation for intercountry adoptees is made clear in the
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption.164 Guidance from the Hague Conference Permanent
Bureau165 on Articles 16 and 30 of the Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption characterises
the process of adoption as lifelong, and ‘When a child grows up and seeks
information about his or her origins the report [concerning the child’s back-
ground] will be an important resource. If items such as photographs of the
biological family and their home or community are included in the report,
they will be treasured by an adopted person who is searching for his or her
origins.’166 Furthermore, the Permanent Bureau notes ‘There are benefits in
trying to gather as much information on the child’s background as possible:
it is in the child’s best interests to have all relevant information in the social
and medical reports; it improves matching for families; it allows prospective
adoptive parents to make an informed decision about accepting the proposed
child; it becomes a future resource for that specific child.’167 It also states
that the child, as well as their adoptive parents, has an interest in ‘obtaining
a full and accurate medical report on the child’,168 and steps should be taken
by states parties to ensure the information gathered and included in the wider
report about the child is as accurate as possible.169 Completeness of informa-
tion is important, given ‘The demand by adult adoptees for information about
their origins is significant. Those whose background information is incomplete
or non-existent may never find the answers they seek.’170
Whilst children born through ICS will face many of these challenges to
identity preservation highlighted by the Permanent Bureau regarding inter-
162 Yngvesson, Belonging in an Adopted World: Race, Identity and Transnational Adoption (2010)
at 9.
163 Howell, The Kinning of Foreigners: Transnational Adoption in a Global Perspective (2006) at 124.
164 Supra n 42.
165 Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Implementation and Operation of the
1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention: Guide to Good Practice, Guide No. 1 (2008).
166 Ibid. at 84 para 340.
167 Ibid. at 84-85 at para. 342
168 Ibid. at 85 at para 346.
169 Ibid at 85 at para 345.




country adoption – including in relation to their cultural identity elements –
no system of identity preservation and protection exists for children born
through ICS. Yet the very fact of the existence and coverage of such a system
in intercountry adoption is a strong signal that a system of identity information
preservation, protection and access is necessary in the context of ICS, to uphold
the child’s Article 8 right under the CRC.
6.3 Domestic surrogacy and lessons for the child’s right to preserve identity
in ICS
Golombok observes that surrogacy presents some additional and sometimes
different challenges to adoption or donor-conception; for example, ‘it is not
known how children will feel when they discover that their gestational mother,
who may also be their genetic mother, had conceived them with the specific
intention of relinquishing them to the commissioning parents.’171 However,
unlike with adoption and donor-conception, little research exists regarding
child identity in surrogacy. One longitudinal study has been conducted includ-
ing the perspective of children born through domestic surrogacy.172 It
presents limited findings regarding child identity; the authors acknowledge
further research is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn, noting ‘It
is essential to explore how these children feel as they enter adolescence when
issues relating to identity become of prime concern.’173 However, the most
recent findings from this study focus on the child’s understanding of their
surrogacy, parental disclosure decisions, and relationships between the sur-
rogate mother, the child and their commissioning parents. Regarding dis-
closure, at age 10, 30 of 33 children had been informed of their birth circum-
stances; the parents of three children were still planning to disclose this.174
All 19 children who were genetically related to their surrogate mother had
been informed about their surrogacy and 11 of them had been informed their
surrogate mother is their genetic mother.175 Commissioning parents of six
children still planned to disclose this fact to the child;176 two children’s
171 Golombok, ‘Families created by reproductive donation’ (2013) 7 Child Development Perspect-
ives 61-65 at 62.
172 Jadva et al, ‘Surrogacy families 10 years on: relationship with the surrogate, decisions over
disclosure and children’s understanding of their surrogacy origins’ (2012) 27 Human
Reproduction 3008-3014.
173 Ibid. at 3013.
174 Ibid. at 3011.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid. However, at 3013 the study’s authors note that ‘it remains to be seen whether parent’s
intention to tell their child will translate to actual disclosure in the future. By withholding
this information, parents are creating a potentially difficult situation whereby they feel they
have disclosed the nature of the child’s birth but the child does not know the full story.’
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parents’ decided not to disclose this to them.177 The study’s authors state
‘the fact that most parents who used a genetic surrogate mother had not yet
disclosed the use of the surrogate mother’s egg is notable, as children who
later find out may wonder why this information was deliberately withheld
from them.’178
By the age of seven, the study found most children who know about their
birth through surrogacy are able to show some understanding of this, and
by age 10, 67 percent of the participant children felt neutral or indifferent about
their birth through surrogacy.179 This contrasts with seven year old donor-
conceived children, who have been shown to have little understanding of their
birth circumstances.180 Considering the issue of contact with the surrogate
mother, despite many families maintaining contact, it decreases over time;181
this is especially the case where the surrogate is the child’s genetic mother
but was unknown to the family prior to the surrogacy.182 However, children
‘spoke of the surrogate’s altruistic motivations for helping parents, which raises
questions about how children will feel in situations where their surrogate
mothers was (sic) reimbursed financially.’183 One other study involving
children born through domestic surrogacy is worth briefly mentioning in this
connection.184 It found at age seven, surrogate children experienced higher
levels of adjustment problems than children conceived by gamete donation,
‘suggesting that the absence of a gestational connection between parents and
their child may be more problematic for children than the absence of a genetic
relationship.’185 In ICS too, for some children the absence of both a genetic
and gestational connection, together with the overlay of the potential trans-
national disconnection imposed on the child, has potential to cause similar
challenges to the child’s Article 8 right.
***
177 Ibid. at 3011. One of the commissioning mothers said this information was irrelevant, and
the other said the child would only be told in the future if they asked themselves.
178 Ibid. at 3013.
179 Ibid. at 3012.
180 Blake et al, ‘Daddy ran out of tadpoles: how parents tell their children that they are donor
conceived, and what their 7-year olds understand’ (2010) 25 Human Reproduction 2527-2534.
181 Jadva et al supra n 172 at 3012.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid. at 3013.
184 Golombok et al, ‘Children Born Through Reproductive Donation: A Longitudinal Study
of Psychological Adjustment’ (2013) 54 Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 653-660.The
study focuses on parenting and children’s adjustment, examining 30 surrogacy families,
as well as 31 egg donation families, 35 donor insemination families, and 53 families with
naturally conceived children.




The key lessons highlighted in this section regarding identity preservation
in donor-conception, adoption and domestic surrogacy signal that a cautionary
approach is necessary in ICS to enable children to exercise their Article 8 right.
The experiences of these three methods of alternative family formation
emphasise the importance of children being able to preserve their identity,
and show that the genetic and biological, personal narrative and cultural
elements of identity are particularly important for children in these situations.
Some direct parallels can be drawn with the child’s identity preservation
situation in ICS arrangements, given that ICS brings together these challenges
to the child’s identity right under Article 8 of the CRC, placing it in peril.
7 PROPOSING PRACTICAL MEASURES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 8 FOR
CHILDREN IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
Article 8(1) CRC refers to ‘the right of the child to preserve his or her identity’,
but because the child lacks agency to preserve their own identity during
infancy (at least), and given that in ICS it is during the child’s infancy that
crucial steps to preserve the child’s identity must be taken, the child is es-
sentially reliant on others to safeguard and give effect to their Article 8 right.
Indeed, children cannot remember elements of their identity at this time of
their lives. For these reasons, this section focuses on actions for implementing
Article 8 in ICS to be taken by persons other than the child themselves. These
are framed drawing on the preceding discussion in section 6 regarding lessons
from donor-conception, adoption and domestic surrogacy, and applying this
to the specific context and challenges regarding the child’s right to preserve
their identity raised by ICS. The ideas outlined below centre around three
actors: commissioning parents, medical professionals and the state.
Whilst these measures focus on enabling children to preserve their identities
to the fullest extent possible in ICS, it is acknowledged that because of the
nature of their conception and birth and the ways in which ICS is currently
sometimes practised (involving anonymity), preserving some elements of
identity will remain beyond the reach of some children in ICS, breaching their
Article 8 right. However, through the commentary below, an ideal state is
indicated regarding protection of the child’s Article 8 right in ICS, thereby
outlining what could constitute best practice.
7.1 Commissioning parents and medical professionals: a first line of defence
in preserving child identity in International Commercial Surrogacy
A crucial first step in ensuring the child’s Article 8 right is protected is educat-
ing commissioning parents and medical professionals about this aspect of the
child’s rights in ICS, and the role they can play in ensuring the child’s Article
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8 right is upheld. In ICS, commissioning parents and medical professionals
are ideally placed to take actions contributing towards the child’s ability to
preserve their identity. In doing so, both parties can ensure actions and de-
cisions relating to the child are consistent with the child’s best interests.
Prior to a child’s conception in ICS and prior to and following their birth,
commissioning parents can advocate and take actions for the preservation of
all elements of the child’s identity. In doing so, commissioning parents will
act in line with their responsibility under Article 18(1) to treat the best interests
of the child as their basic concern.186 If commissioning parents are educated
about the child’s Article 8 right, understand the importance of identity pre-
servation for the child and the role they can play to enable this, they are
powerfully positioned to ensure their ICS arrangement will uphold rather than
risk breaching the child’s Article 8 right. In practice, this ideally means:
- commissioning parents only enter into ICS arrangements enabling preserva-
tion of all elements of the child’s identity, namely ICS arrangements involv-
ing the use of identifiable gamete donors, an identifiable surrogate mother,
and medical professionals/surrogacy clinics with systems established and
functioning to collect, store and protect information regarding elements
of the child’s identity, consistent with the child’s Article 8 right; and
- commissioning parents advocate for all elements of the child’s identity
to be preserved through the collection, storage and protection of all ident-
ity-related information pertaining to the child, and wherever possible take
steps to do this themselves.
Once a child is born through ICS, commissioning parents have an extremely
influential role to play in preserving the child’s identity in an on-going manner,
in accordance with the child’s evolving capacities.187 As Lansdown states,
‘The concept of evolving capacities is central to the balance embodied in the
Convention between recognising children as active agents in their own lives,
entitled to be listened to, respected and granted increasing autonomy in the
exercise of rights, while also being entitled to protection in accordance with
their relative immaturity and youth.’188 Therefore, at times appropriate in
line with the child’s evolving capacities, commissioning parents can support
186 Article 18(1) CRC: “States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the
principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and develop-
ment of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary respons-
ibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will
be their basic concern.”
187 Article 5 CRC: “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents
or, where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for
by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate di-
rection and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present
Convention.”




the child in developing, understanding and thereby preserving their own
identity. This can be done by sharing identity information with them or
supporting the child to access this information. This may be a gradual process;
for example, non-identifying information may in the first instance be the most
important to protect for the child, if it relates to their health status in relation
to their genetic parents. However, sharing identity information with the child
should include informing the child about the nature of their conception and
birth through ICS at a time when the child has the capacity to begin to under-
stand this information, and supporting the child to understand this aspect of
their identity. As Lansdown observes, direction and guidance provided to the
child by their parents ‘must be directed towards promoting respect for the
rights of the child, and parents must respect the extent to which the child is
capable of exercising those rights on his or her own behalf.’189
Similar to commissioning parents, in ICS arrangements medical professionals
occupy a powerful position regarding the child’s right to identity preservation.
Medical professionals should contribute their services and expertise to ICS
arrangements in ways enabling, not precluding, the child’s Article 8 right to
be upheld. In ICS arrangements, aside from surrogacy brokers and agencies,
medical professionals are likely to be the first point of potential collection of
identity-related information about third parties relating to the child. How
medical professionals involved in ICS collect, protect and store such information
has long-term implications for the preservation of the child’s identity and
therefore their best interests.
To ensure all elements of the child’s identity are preserved, medical pro-
fessionals should only facilitate ICS arrangements involving the use of gametes
and embryos from identifiable (that is, non-anonymous) donors who are
willing to have contact with the child in future and identifiable surrogate
mothers (acting non-anonymously and willing to be contacted by the child).
This will mean the child’s genetic identity and biological identity elements
are preserved. Medical professionals should take the further steps of collecting,
storing and facilitating the child’s access190 to the following information to
enable the child to preserve their identity:
- Regarding the child’s genetic parents (gamete donors/embryo donors):
· Full name
· Date of birth
· Ethnicity and language spoken
· Current physical address, phone number, email address where available
· Significant health history (pertaining directly to the third party in
question and their family history)
· The age and sex of any pre-existing genetic children
189 Ibid. at 6.
190 Access to such information would only be available for the child, on a confidential basis.
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- Regarding the child’s birth mother:
· Full name
· Date of birth
· Ethnicity and language spoken
· Current physical address, phone number, email address where available
· Significant health history relating to term of pregnancy and child-birth,
insofar as it could impact the child’s health, as well as any significant
health history of pre-existing serious disease or medical condition
Whilst gamete and embryo donors and women acting as surrogate mothers
have a right to privacy,191 in order for the child’s right to preserve their ident-
ity to be upheld consistent with their best interests, ideally ICS arrangements
should only take place on the basis that all donors and surrogates are involved
having agreed to provide the above mentioned information to the medical
professional/surrogacy clinic as well as directly to the commissioning parents,
and to keep this update in future so it remains accurate for the child. The
balance of competing rights in this respect will, consistent with protecting the
child’s rights, largely tip in favour of protecting the child’s identity right over
the privacy rights of adult parties involved in ICS.
Medical professionals should also collect, store and facilitate the child’s
access to all identity information available which is directly about the child
themselves. A formal record should be created and made available to the child
reflecting the particulars of their circumstances of birth, such as the place, time,
date and the full names of every person present at their birth; the details of
the child’s genetic make-up and the medical procedures undertaken to conceive
the child (for example, IVF, embryo implantation); and the particulars or a
description of the child’s health status at birth. This may be more comprehens-
ive information than what a child born in non-ICS circumstances may have
collected and protected on their behalf. However, the preservation of this kind
of information about children born through ICS may be particularly important
in helping preserve their identity, as they may face challenges in preserving
their identity given their circumstances of conception and birth through ICS.
Medical professionals/surrogacy clinics should compile all the above
information pertaining to the child’s identity in an identity dossier for them,
providing a copy to the child’s commissioning parents as soon as practicable
following the child’s birth. A full copy of this identity dossier should be stored
in perpetuity (or until such time that it is accessed by the child) at the
surrogacy clinic/by the medical professional overseeing the ICS arrangement,
in order to allow the child the opportunity to be able to access this information
in future in order to preserve their identity in instances where this information
is not made available to them by their commissioning parents. The medical




professional/surrogacy clinic should facilitate the child’s access to this informa-
tion.
By undertaking the actions outlined above, commissioning parents and medical
professionals involved in ICS can significantly contribute to helping the child
preserve their identity. Acting as a first line of defence, the actions they take
could be the difference between elements of the child’s identity being preserved
or not, with implications for the child’s best interests and lifelong impact.
However, whilst commissioning parents and medical professionals can take
steps to enable the preservation of a child’s identity in ICS consistent with their
Article 8 right, such actions will be difficult to universally implement. What
has been discussed above is a best practice blueprint. For example, without
an international regulatory system covering surrogacy clinics and medical
professionals (including monitoring and enforcement measures), it is unlikely
that protective measures of the nature outlined above will be taken in the ICS
industry. This is given the unfortunate reality that the incentive of protecting
the child’s rights pales against the financial gains to be made through the ICS
industry. Therefore, as long as the absence of international agreement and
regulation of ICS persists, an important role remains for the state, in order to
protect the Article 8 right of children conceived and born through ICS.
7.2 The state’s role in protecting the child’s right to preserve their identity
in International Commercial Surrogacy
It is clear that under Article 8(1) CRC, the state is obliged to respect the child’s
right to preserve their identity. Furthermore, under Article 8(2), the state is
obliged to provide children with appropriate assistance and protection to assist
them in re-establishing their identity speedily in situations where they are
illegally deprived of some or all the elements of their identity. Although an
argument can be made that a child conceived and born through ICS who is
unable to exercise their right to preserve their identity is subject to an illegal
deprivation of some or all elements of their identity, it is a longbow to draw.
However, the state does have a significant role to play in ICS situations to
ensure that all elements of the child’s identity are preserved. After all, ‘The
State is empowered to intervene to protect the rights of the child, in recognition
that the best interests of children are not always identical with those of parents,
and will not always be protected by parents.’192 It is wholly appropriate to
interpret Article 8 in a dynamic manner taking into consideration the current-
day context of ICS; in this respect, considering Article 8(2), it is not difficult
envisage the possibility of persons currently being conceived and born through
ICS mounting a legal challenge in 20 years’ time against the states involved,
192 Supra n 188.
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
Answering the “Who am I?” Question 249
on the basis that they were unable to preserve their identity and deprived of
some or all the elements of their identity. Such a challenge may have merit
in ICS situations where the state omits to take actions to assist and protect the
child’s re-establishment of their identity.193
To have the best possible chance of enabling the full preservation of the
identity of all children born through ICS, building on the best practice blueprint
discussed above regarding commissioning parents and medical professionals/
clinics, ideally this would also involve individual state action outlawing the
conception of children in ICS through the use of gametes or embryos from
anonymous donors, as well as outlawing ICS arrangements involving anonym-
ous surrogate mothers. If such laws are implemented and enforced through
active monitoring of the ICS industry at the domestic and international levels,
they will help ensure ICS occurs on the basis that children will, at a minimum,
have the ability to know the identity of their genetic parents and the person
who biologically brought them to term. However, realistically it must be ack-
nowledged that this currently remains an unlikely prospect. Given the con-
tinued demand for ICS and the economic benefits to supply states, some states
will continue to allow the practice of ICS to continue in their territory involving
both the use of anonymous gametes and embryos and anonymous surrogate
mothers. Therefore given the persisting status quo in the practice of ICS,
ensuring the preservation of other aspects of the child’s identity becomes even
more important; the role to be played by the state in upholding the child’s
Article 8 right through the actions suggested below is essential.
7.2.1 Facilitating an identity dossier for every child born through International
Commercial Surrogacy as an interim measure of protection
Continuing to build on the suggested blueprint actions for medical pro-
fessionals/surrogacy clinics in ICS as discussed above, the state can play a role
related to the creation, storage and access to an identity dossier for every child
born through ICS. Supply-states should work with medical professionals and
surrogacy clinics to ensure that an identity dossier including the identity
related information discussed in the previous section above is compiled in
relation to and for the child. The state’s primary role here is to monitor and
enforce implementation of these requirements; as discussed above, the obliga-
tion on medical professionals and surrogacy clinics involved in ICS situations
to compile, store and protect this information should be established in legis-
lation and policy at the state level in supply-states.
193 Whilst not writing on ICS, Doek, supra n 15 at 13 observes that ‘para 2 of Article 8 of the
CRC has not been written with artificial procreation in mind. But the obligation to respect
the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, requires the State Party to undertake
all legislative, administrative or other measures (Article 4 of the CRC) to implement that




In ICS arrangements where anonymity is involved, supply-states should
ensure that a base level of non-identifying information should be made avail-
able and collected by medical professionals and surrogacy clinics as a mandat-
ory minimum requirement of donors’ and surrogates’ involvement in and the
practice of ICS. Where ICS arrangements take place involving gamete or embryo
donors or surrogate mothers acting anonymously, and in the absence of an
overarching state policy and legislation prohibiting such practice, supply-states
should at the minimum require that an identity dossier is compiled, stored
and protected for all children born through ICS, including all available non-
identifying information regarding gamete/embryo donors and surrogate
mothers, as well as any other information of the kind outlined in the list above.
The protection of such information will be important in preserving elements
of the child’s identity which may still be able to be preserved without identify-
ing information about the donors and/or surrogate involved. Moreover, birth
certificates should be issued for all children born through ICS by their birth-
state, including accurate and complete information as far as possible regarding
the child’s parentage and circumstances of birth. In order to provide the child
with as accurate as possible record of their birth, states should explore whether
they might include a note on the birth certificates of children born through
ICS arrangements which reflects this fact. In situations where one or both
parents are unknown, such an annotation may be of particular importance
given there will always be persistent gaps in the child’s personal narrative.
However, this action could in practice lead to discrimination, on the basis of
birth status and through implications arising from the disclosure of such birth
certificates to third parties. In light of these risks, such an action requires
further consideration in future. On the other hand, it does remain a possibility
that an annotation on the child’s birth certificate that they were born as a result
of ICS could have a protective effect for the child of enabling them to preserve
one aspect of this element of their identity.
Regardless of whether ICS operates on the basis of anonymity or not, at
the same time as it is given to the child’s commissioning parents, supply-states
should require that a copy of a child’s identity dossier is provided by the
medical professionals/surrogacy clinics to the state itself in order for it to be
stored in a state-level, centralised repository system, especially designed for
storing and protecting these dossiers for the future access of children conceived
and born through ICS in that state. A system of monitoring and enforcement
would need to be established to support this mechanism to work, which would
require long-term commitment from states and clear and transparent guidance
in legislation and/or policy. Storing identity dossier at state-level will also
act as a backstop in the event of closure of surrogacy clinics, ensuring the
continuity and availability of this information to children who seek it. The
state should ensure information about the existence of such a system is avail-
able to donors and surrogates and encourage them to update their contact
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information so children can identify and know them in the future should they
wish to.
7.2.2 Facilitating a long-term, inter-state system of protection of identity information
in the context of ICS
Beyond the interim measure of state protection for child identity preservation
through the steps suggested above, ideally a hybrid public international human
rights law and private international law inter-state cooperation system of
identity protection should be established in future, giving all children con-
ceived and born through ICS the best possible chance of preserving their
identity. Under such a future system, at the same time as the supply-state
stores a copy of an identity dossier of a child born in that state, the supply-
state should transmit a copy of the identity dossier to a formally designated
state-level agency in the demand-state (the home state of the child’s commis-
sioning parents). The demand-state should receive, store and protect these
identity dossier at the state-level and establish a system facilitating access to
the identity dossier by the children they pertain to.
Such a system of identity information storage, protection and facilitated
access is similar to systems established by many states over recent years
regarding identity information of children conceived through domestic donor
ART.194 However, under the ideal system of identity information protection
and facilitation suggested for future use in ICS, state responsibility for uphold-
ing the child’s Article 8 right would rest on both the supply and demand states
in individual ICS arrangements. In the first instance, this responsibility rests
with the supply-state, which has the obligation to ensure that the identity
information relating to the child is preserved through collection and creating
a record of that information (the child’s identity dossier) and storing it. To
fully exercise its responsibility, it is envisaged that the supply-state must then
ensure that this record is properly transmitted to the demand-state. It is at
this point that responsibility also rests with the demand-state to store that
information and to facilitate the child’s access to it. Such information should
ideally be stored by both states in perpetuity, given the variable nature of when
and where a child may seek to find and access such information.
In order to ensure that such an inter-state system of identity protection
for children in ICS is adequately established and regulated in both states, an
international agreement would need to be concluded, setting out exact require-
ments and parameters of the system.195 This should make provision for the
194 E.g. Some states in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway,
Switzerland, Sweden.
195 Currently, the forum through which the only such work in this regard is taking place is
the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the prospect of an international




balancing of privacy rights of genetic and biological parents in ICS (that is,
genetic donor parents and surrogate mothers) with the child’s Article 8 right
and best interests, and should be framed with reference to the concept of the
evolving capacities of the child. Both demand and supply states that ratify
such an international agreement should further enact domestic legislation
reflecting their obligations pursuant to the international agreement, the rules
under which information can be accessed within its jurisdiction and the limita-
tions on sharing or amending the information contained in ICS identity dossier.
As with the experience of adoption and domestic donor-conception, such
a system will only work in practice for children born through ICS if they know
about their conception and birth through ICS. Otherwise, such a system of
identity information protection and access will have little practical meaning
for the children it aims to protect. In this connection it is important to once
again acknowledge the powerful position occupied by commissioning parents
in ICS arrangements; a choice by commissioning parents to share or not share
identity related information with the child as their capacities evolve will likely
have lifetime implications for the child’s preservation of their identity.
8 CONCLUSION: ANSWERING THE “WHO AM I?” QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY SITUATIONS
As discussed in this paper, the child’s right to preserve their identity under
Article 8 of the CRC is a right of central and heightened importance to all
children conceived and born through ICS. Identity is a concept built from a
range of elements, some evolving over time. The child’s right to identity
preservation is one of the child’s rights most at-risk in the context of ICS, as
illustrated through this paper by honing in on particularly at-risk elements
of the child’s identity: genetic and biological, personal narrative and cultural.
Despite this, it is a right which has significant, lifetime implications for children
and their understanding of their place in the world and how they make sense
of who they are. For these reasons, we should understand the child’s Article
8 right as being at the heart of the child’s best interests when conceived and
born through ICS. Although the practice of ICS was not foreseen by the CRC
framers, the possibility of ICS being dealt with under the CRC was left open;
we must interpret the CRC as living document, applying its safeguards to the
Conference has undertaken comprehensive work providing a platform for Hague Conference
Member States to begin discussing the feasibility and viability of further work towards
a possible international convention regarding international surrogacy. See Hague Conference,
‘The private international law issues surrounding the status of children, including issues
arising from international surrogacy arrangements’ available at: www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=178 [last accessed 01 June 2015].
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child in the context of the contemporary practice of family formation through
ICS.
Such an interpretative approach ensures we view the child’s identity
preservation rights holistically, with identity comprised of multifaceted
elements spanning, for example, the genetic, biological, cultural, ethnic and
social. Importantly, Article 8 of the CRC is about the preservation of identity;
it seeks to ensure that pathways are open for the child to form their whole
identity, through preserving all elements of their identity. Indeed, this approach
is child rights-consistent, as has been signalled by the Committee on the Rights
of the Child in its limited comments regarding ICS to date. In ICS, the ex-
perience of each child regarding identity preservation will be different and
highly personal. To address the challenges of ensuring protection for the child’s
identity preservation right in ICS, there is a long-term need for a system of
international regulation; this is a necessary goal given the challenges to the
child’s Article 8 right in ICS are international in nature, often with three or
more states involved in ICS arrangements, requiring an ultimately international
solution.
However, drawing on lessons from adoption, donor-conception and
domestic surrogacy, it is clear that certain actions can be taken now, despite
the current lack of a system of international regulation, through a range of
actors in ICS taking steps contributing towards upholding the child’s Article
8 right. Such actions can help to ensure that as many pathways as possible
to the child’s full preservation of identity remain open through the collection,
storage of and access to identity related information. This will ensure such
children are able to preserve their identity as far as possible at any time
following their birth, should they wish to. A particular focus should rest on
actions directed towards ensuring that children can know about and under-
stand the reality of their childhood and how they came into existence, as
elements of identity are established and forged during this time which can
impact and influence the child’s future. Such an approach seeks to protect the
child’s best interests; after all, children born through ICS have, as one judge
observes, ‘done nothing wrong’.196 They did not choose the means of their
conception and birth. Yet the reality remains that children conceived and born
through ICS are intentionally conceived and born this way. The corollary of
this intentional adult action should be that intentional, comprehensive steps
are taken by those directly involved in ICS arrangements consistent with the
best interests of the child and the evolving capacities of the child, as well as
CRC States Parties, to uphold the child’s Article 8 right in all ICS arrangements.
Already, children have been born through ICS who will never be able to
preserve the genetic element of their identity; time will reveal the impact of
this reality on these children, unable to know their family relations pertaining
to their genetic parents and half-siblings. Now however, at the very least, we




should be taking steps along the lines suggested in this paper to ensure that
all future children born through ICS have their right to preserve their identity
respected and given effect to in practice. Taking actions and decisions consist-
ent with Article 8 of the CRC will give children born through ICS the opportun-
ity to live lives built on an informed understanding of how they came to be,
who they are, and how this has and may continue to shape their place in the
world. Not taking such steps will lead to a globally-dispersed generation of
children born through ICS who may find themselves asking “Who am I?” for




Children’s Rights to the Fore in the European Court of
Human Rights’ First International Surrogacy
Judgments
Abstract
As the world’s foremost regional human rights court, it was only a matter
of time before the European Court of Human Rights would confront applica-
tions concerning ICS situations. The Court did so in its first international
surrogacy judgments: Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France. Given the
treatment of the rights of the children involved in those cases and the findings
therein, this Chapter spotlights these judgments and provides analysis of the
findings of the Court. By taking a strong child-centred approach, the Court
highlighted the vulnerability of children in ICS arrangements. Significantly,
the Court’s judgments focus on the child’s rights to nationality and identity;
therefore, the discussion presented in the case analysis builds on the previous
two chapters of this study, providing a further opportunity through which
to view these rights of the child in the practical ICS context. This Chapter
discusses the impact of these judgments in Europe and internationally, as
Governments grapple with the complexities and impacts of ICS arrangements,
in particular relating to the rights of children born through this new method
of family formation. Although the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights has dealt with subsequent applications concerning ICS since
passing the judgments this Chapter focuses on, the discussion presented in
this Chapter provides insight into the reasoning of a judicial body grappling
with ICS as a novel issue. It highlights the roots of the Court’s approach in
relation to some of the child rights dimensions raised by ICS.
Main Findings
- The findings of the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in
the Mennesson and Labassee judgments emphasise that the child’s right to
identity is of central importance to the right to respect for private life under
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
- The Court observed that nationality is an important element of identity,
and that uncertainty regarding ones’ ability to acquire nationality can
negatively impact on identity formation.
- In the judgments, the Court attached significant weight to the biological




saying this is another element of identity and that it was not in the
children’s best interests to deny legal recognition of this link.
- The Court held that the balance struck between the children’s best interests
and the other interests at stake – including the public interests that the
French Government argued it was seeking to protect – was incorrect,
because the children’s best interests were not satisfactorily upheld.
- These judgments can be understood as strong children’s rights judgments,
owing to the Court’s approach to examining the practical reality of the
children’s situations, and considering their circumstances in relation to
their commissioning parents, with the Court placing a primary focus on
what was in the children’s best interests.
Contextual notes
- Since the time of writing this Chapter, in January 2017 the Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights issued its first ICS judgment, in
Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy.
- Given the significance of the Grand Chamber’s judgment in the develop-
ment of ICS jurisprudence, an Addendum to Chapter Nine is included as
part of this doctoral thesis, presenting an overview of the Grand Chamber’s
decision and brief analysis of the judgment from a child rights perspective.
This Chapter was originally published in the European Human Rights Law
Review, Issue 6, 2014, pp. 638-646.
1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of ‘family’, including how it is formed and structured continues
to change and evolve in the twenty-first century, largely facilitated through
scientific and technological advances and enabled by shifting attitudes and
greater societal acceptance of new versions of what it means to have and be
part of a family. Sitting within this wider context, international commercial
surrogacy (ICS) has developed over the past decade as a significant issue in
international family law. Increasingly however, it demands recognition as a
complex human rights challenge. This is particularly the case regarding the
rights of children in ICS arrangements, given that their rights are acutely at
risk due to the circumstances of their conception and birth in this manner.
The human rights of women are also jeopardised through ICS, given the central
role they play as surrogate mothers in such situations. Their involvement is
often by virtue of their own economic marginalisation and in the context of
a supply and demand situation whereby commissioning parents from more
developed countries (as is the tendency) are reliant on the reproductive func-




jurisdictions world-wide have been wading into ICS cases for some years now,
albeit largely reluctantly given the abundance of ethical, legal and rights-based
issues involved, and the associated difficulties in applying out-moded national
legislation, ill-suited to the complexities of such matters.
However, the human rights issues raised by ICS situations have been
notably absent amongst cases reported from regional human rights systems
and courts. Given this, the recent judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights in the joint Chamber applications of Mennesson v. France (Application
No.61592/11)1 and Labassee v. France (Application No.65941/11)2 represent
a turning point in international surrogacy jurisprudence. For the first time,
the Court has adjudicated applications concerning ICS; in dealing with these
applications under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,3 the Court has taken some
initial steps towards confronting the human rights issues faced by many of
the parties involved in ICS arrangements. Yet with its first international
surrogacy judgments, the Court has resolutely established a strong platform
for the significance and importance of the rights of the child in ICS situations.
In relation to the issues before it, notably the Court’s judgments in both
Mennesson and Labassee place a clear focus on the rights of the child. In doing
so, the Court has upheld the best interests and broader rights of the child in
the context of the right to respect for private life under the Convention in
forthright and commendable fashion, which will have an impact in France,
Europe and beyond.
2 CHILDREN IN LIMBO FOR OVER TEN YEARS
Both the Mennesson and Labassee applications concerned children born in the
United States as a result of married, heterosexual French couples commission-
ing (separate) international commercial surrogacy arrangements with American
birth mothers. In the Mennesson’s case, the surrogacy arrangement with a
surrogate mother in California resulted in twin girls; the Labassee’s arrange-
ment with a surrogate mother in Minnesota led to the birth of a female child.
In both cases, the children are genetically related to their commissioning father,
but not to their commissioning mother (the conception of the children was
enabled through the use of donor oocytes). The applicants to the European
Court of Human Rights in each case were the commissioning parents together
with the children themselves.
1 Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment of June 26, 2014.
2 Labassee v. France (App. No.65941/11), judgment of June 26, 2014.
3 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950; CETS
No.005; ECHR). The articles of the ECHR referred to in this Case Analysis refer to the ECHR




In France, all surrogacy, whether altruistic or commercial, is illegal under
Article 16-7 of the code civil. This provision is one of public order (l’ordre
public), aimed towards preserving and protecting the fundamental values and
morals of French society. Regarding surrogacy, this is directed towards preven-
ting the exploitation of women and their reproductive functions, and the
commodification of children among other things. Breaching the French ban
on surrogacy is a criminal offence, subject to imprisonment and fines. Both
the Mennesson and Labasee couples experienced infertility, leading them to
pursue international surrogacy. What they did not foresee was the extremely
uncertain legal status that the children born through such arrangements would
experience, due to the nature of their conception and birth in another state
which allows surrogacy under law. In fact, these children have been in a state
of legal limbo since birth: for 14 years (Mennesson twins) and 13 years (La-
bassee child) respectively.
‘How and why did the children’s uncertain legal status persist?’ one may
well ask. Put simply, the French Government refused to register the children’s
births in the French civil register (l’état civil français), blocking them from
being recognised as French citizens, and leading to the children not being
afforded a number of other rights and entitlements. Although the children
(all of whom hold American nationality) have been allowed to enter and live
in France with their commissioning parents, no legal parental relationship has
been able to be established under French law. This occurred despite the exist-
ence of American court judgments (from the Supreme Court of California and
the Court of the State of Minnesota) finding both sets of commissioning parents
always intended to care for and raise the children as their own; that the birth
mothers involved both consented to their parental rights ending with the Court
judgments; and recognising the filial relationship of the commissioning parents
in relation to their children under the applicable American state laws. Due
to the French failure to recognise the children’s relationship with their commis-
sioning parents under French law, the odd situation has existed whereby the
children have been living and growing up in France with and cared for by
their commissioning parents, yet without any filial link to these people, who
have been their parents – in the social sense, and in respect of the fathers, in
a genetic sense – since their birth.
3 ARGUMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
On the basis of this refusal to register the children’s births in the French civil
register, the applicants in Mennesson and Labassee claimed breaches of Article
8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (ECHR), which establishes the right to respect for family and
private life. The arguments supporting these claims focussed strongly on the




obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC).4 The applicants argued the deprivation of filiation left the children
without legal protection regarding their status in their family units, and that
this filiation was legitimate, based not only on the genetic link to their fathers,
but also the recognition under United States law of the relationship between
the children and their commissioning parents (both the fathers and mothers).
The applicants pointed to the practical realities of the children being without
French legal recognition, including having no certificate of French nationality,
no French passport, restricted freedom of movement, lack of a valid residence
permit, inferior inheritance rights, the impossibility of gaining the right to vote
in France, and the burden of dealing with administrative matters related to
schooling and social security as non-French children, without filial links to
their commissioning parents. Along with other difficulties they faced, these
things hindered their ability to have a normal family life and caused heavily
disproportionate repercussions for the children.
Moreover, the applicants said the decision to refuse registration ignored
the concrete circumstances of the parent-child relationship, both socially and
biologically. Here, the applicants relied on the Court’s Chamber judgment in
Wagner and J. M. W. L. v. Luxembourg5 pointing to a government failure to
take into account the ‘social reality’ of the situation in relation to legal pro-
tection of the children. Whilst the applicants acknowledged the State benefited
from a wide margin of appreciation regarding surrogacy, they argued that
the requirement to take into account the best interests of the child effectively
restricts the margin of appreciation. The applicants argued the refusal to
register the children in the French civil register was therefore a decision not
in the best interests of the child under the CRC.
In response, the French Government’s arguments rested heavily on the
aims underlying the prohibition of surrogacy in France, including guarding
against the commodification of the human body and protecting the best
interests of the child. The Government posited that surrogacy is a matter of
moral order and ethics, and in the absence of consensus amongst Council of
Europe High Contracting Parties, States have a wide margin of appreciation.
In an argument that neatly encapsulates the legal bind that many countries
are finding themselves in relating to the question of how to approach inter-
national commercial surrogacy, the French Government asserted that given
the illegality of surrogacy in France, recognising the legal status of the practice
outside France would amount to de-facto acceptance of an intentional circum-
vention of French law. This would lead to an inconsistent and therefore unten-
able position. The code civil must be upheld in order to prevent criminal
offences against the public order; in this regard, the Government noted the
genetic link between the children and their French fathers could not be
4 UNTS vol. 1577, p.3, entry into force September 2, 1990.




recognised as amounting to paternity under French law, given the evasion
of the code civil which had occurred.
Regarding the practical situation of the children arising through their lack
of filiation, the Government put forward the view that the commissioning
parents (that is, both Mr and Mrs Mensseson and Mr and Mrs Labassee)
exercise full parental authority based on the American court judgments, and
administrative hurdles have been overcome satisfactorily, with family life
taking place in a ‘normal’ manner. Moreover, the Government said the commis-
sioning parents should not have ignored French law in the first place; in doing
so, they should have been aware of the difficulties they would likely face as
a result. The response of the French Government in not registering the children
was therefore, according to the French Government itself, proportionate in
light of the aims pursued through the law.
4 JUDGMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Court of Human Rights, faced with decision-making in the first
applications concerning international commercial surrogacy before it, interest-
ingly found that although an interference with the applicant’s right to respect
for their family life existed, there had not been a violation of Article 8 in this
respect.6 The Court’s rationale for not finding a violation of any of the applic-
ant’s right to respect for family life is clear through the Court’s weighing of
the fact that the practical difficulties the families faced were not insurmount-
able, and the impact of the lack of filiation under French law against the State’s
margin of appreciation (which was wide, based on the comparative law
analysis undertaken by the Court, highlighting a lack of consensus amongst
Council of Europe members around surrogacy). The Court said all the children
were in practice able to live as a family with their commissioning parents,
from quite soon after birth; the lack of French nationality for the children did
not threaten the stability of the family unit; there was no apparent risk of the
authorities separating them due to the absence of filiation under French law.
It was on this basis that the Court was able to find that although there was
an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for family life under Ar-
ticle 8, there was no violation in this respect; ultimately, the Cour de Cassation
had struck a fair balance in its decisions, between the interests of the applicants
and the State regarding respect for family life.
Regarding the right to respect for private life under Article 8 however,
the Court found a violation of the children’s rights (but not their parent’s right
6 For the Court’s reasoning for its finding that there was no violation of Article 8 regarding
the right to respect for family life, see Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment





to respect for private life) in both cases. In making this finding, the Court
placed heavy emphasis on the overriding importance of the rights of the
children (albeit concerning their relationships with their parents). Costs were
awarded, along with compensation to the children for moral damage (C= 5000
each).
5 MULTIFACETED CONCEPT OF IDENTITY CENTRAL TO PRIVATE LIFE
Significantly, especially given none of the applicants in either case argued a
violation of Article 8 connected to uncertainty around the children’s identity,
the Court’s finding of a violation of the right to respect for the children’s
private lives turned heavily on the issue of their right to identity and what
this entails. The Court stated that respect for private life under Article 8 of
the ECHR requires that a person can establish their identity as a human being,
an essential aspect of this being their filiation.7 The denial of filiation under
French law in the situations of the Mennesson and Labassee children had led
to a situation of legal uncertainty for those children. The lack of legal recogni-
tion they endured amounted to an infringement on their right to identity, given
its impact on their very ability to establish their identity. Furthermore, the
Court importantly observed that nationality is an aspect of identity; the
children faced indeterminate uncertainty regarding their ability to acquire
French nationality, which the Court said was likely to negatively affect the
formation of their identities.8
Linked to the impairment of identity through lack of filial recognition under
French law, the Court found the children would be treated less favourably
regarding their succession rights vis-à-vis their parents. In practice, the children
would only be able to inherit from their parents as third parties, which the
Court viewed as a deprivation linking to their inability to fully establish their
identities.9 The existence of a biological link between the children and their
commissioning (and therefore their genetic) fathers was another significant
consideration for the Court in reaching its decision that France had violated
the children’s rights to respect for private life. Finding that biological filiation
is a further important aspect of identity, the Court said it is not in the child-
ren’s best interests to deny recognition of this under law, given it is not reflect-
ive of the biological reality of the children’s situation.10 The consequences
7 Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 at [80] and [96]; Labassee
v. France (App. No.65941/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 at [75].
8 Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 at [97]; Labassee v. France
(App. No.65941/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 at [76].
9 Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 at [98]; Labassee v. France
(App. No.65941/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 at [77].
10 Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 at [100]; Labassee v. France




of this serious restriction on identity in this respect meant the Court found
France had exceeded its margin of appreciation.
Overall regarding the right to respect for private life, the lack of filial
connection established under French law and the bearing this had on the
substance of the children’s identity (and therefore their right to preserve their
identity under Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child11) left
them in a position incompatible with their best interests, which the Court
stated must guide any decision concerning them (as per Article 3 of the CRC,
which establishes the ‘Best Interests’ principle12).13 The Court, in balancing
the interests at stake, found the balance reached by the State was incorrect,
as it did not uphold the best interests of the children satisfactorily.
6 CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO THE FORE
Although the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Mennesson
and Labassee can be read as continuing the potentially concerning trend in the
international commercial surrogacy context of law-making through judicial
intervention – which is already happening in some domestic jurisdictions –
the judgments should first and foremost be understood in large part as a ‘win’
for children’s rights. Whilst the Court did not engage (and indeed, did not
need to in order to rule on the matters at hand) in any issues related to the
wider ethics and legality of the practice of ICS (for example, commodification
and sale of children; the potential for child trafficking; coercion and exploita-
tion of women acting as surrogates; reproductive rights, autonomy and health
of women; issues of global injustice between more and less-developed states),
it reached its decision with the rights of the child top-of-mind. In adopting
an unambiguous, child-centred approach in its judgments in both Mennesson
and Labassee, the Court’s Chamber has planted a stake in the ground; in matters
of ICS, the rights of the child should be a central concern for all those involved
in making decisions pertaining to children born through such arrangements.
11 UNTS vol. 1577, p.3, entry into force September 2, 1990. Article 8(1) establishes that “States
Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including
nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.”
12 UNTS vol. 1577, p.3, entry into force September 2, 1990. Article 3(1) establishes that “In
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Adherence to the best interests of the child
is one of the four general or guiding principles of the CRC (which form general require-
ments for all rights under the CRC), the others being non-discrimination (Article 2), the
child’s right to life, survival and development (Article 6), and respect for the views of the
child (Article 12). See U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58 at section III, pp.9-13 (1996).
13 Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 at [99]-[101]; Labassee




The strength of the judgments lies in the fact that the Court examined the
children’s situations in relation to their commissioning parents with regard
to what was in the children’s best interests. By necessity, this required the
Court to take a view of the children’s situation grounded in practical reality;
the Court did not shy away from this. It is important to remember that the
Mennesson and Labassee children had been living with their commissioning
parents since birth, for well over a decade; they are the genetic children of
their commissioning fathers (who are, therefore, both their social and genetic
parents). Significantly, the central thrust of the Court’s reasoning, focussing
on the substantive right to identity, points towards an urgent need for greater
efforts by all those involved in dealing with ICS situations to give effect to
Article 8 of the CRC (protecting the child’s right to preserve their identity),
and by extension, Article 7 of the CRC (protecting birth registration, nationality
and filiation).14
Moreover, the emphasis the Court placed on the importance of establishing
filiation in these ICS cases highlights the criticality of the child-parent nexus
to identity formation, and its role in fulfilling the right to respect for private
life. Had the children and parents involved in these applications not been able
to live together as a family unit in France, it seems very likely the Court may
well have been open to finding a violation of the right to respect for family
life too (and this may well have extended to a finding of a violation regarding
not only the children, but their parents as well).
Despite the European Court of Human Rights’ strong focus on the right
to identity in deciding these cases – and indeed, the importance it placed on
the existence of a biological link between the children and their commissioning
fathers – it is a shame the Court did not make any mention (in obiter dicta
or otherwise) of the full picture concerning their genetic and biological makeup.
Although not necessary to decide the applications, the judgments would have
been strengthened through the Court at least observing that the children’s
genetic relationship with their genetic mothers (oocyte donors), and biological
relationship with the women who carried them to term and gave birth to them
(through acting as their surrogate mothers), forms another significant aspect
of their identity, and one which steps should be taken to protect and preserve
knowledge of. Judicial discussion by the Court of this aspect of identity would
have highlighted this reality, relevant for all children born through ICS. Further-
more it would have led to a more holistic approach in considering the rights
of the child in cases such as these, and extended understanding of what is
required in order to fully uphold a child’s best interests in ICS situations,
consistent with their rights under the CRC.
14 UNTS vol. 1577, p.3, entry into force September 2, 1990. Article 7(1) provides that “The
child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a
name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be




In the future, the Court may well be confronted with a factual scenario
requiring it to confront the broader human rights issues at play in international
commercial surrogacy situations, including the intersection of the rights and
interests of the various parties involved in such situations. The Court should
be applauded placing such strong emphasis on children’s rights in its judg-
ments in the Mennesson and Labassee matters. In doing so, it has brought sharp
focus to the reality of ICS that it is a phenomenon driven towards producing
a child, that the child is the person at the centre of such arrangements and
yet often it is the child’s rights which are least considered and protected in
the course of their conception, birth and life thereafter. However, in future
the Court may have to deal more explicitly with the rights of the other parties
involved in international commercial surrogacy arrangements, or at least
consider them. Although the most likely other parties in international com-
mercial surrogacy situations whose rights the Court will need to examine more
closely are the commissioning parents, the rights of gamete donors (and
therefore genetic parents) and of surrogate mothers are likely to also be of
relevance and importance. This will present the Court with a complex web
of rights issues to untangle, requiring a delicate balancing assessment on the
basis of specific circumstances.
For example, regarding the rights of women in international commercial
surrogacy, these intersect at a number of points with the rights of the child
and may well present a clash of rights.15 Women acting as surrogates in ICS
may not do so of their own free will, and may be pressured or in extreme cases
coerced into ceding their reproductive autonomy. Such situations can involve
the commissioning parents of the surrogate herself wishing to abort the foetus,
bringing the surrogate woman’s rights into conflict with the commissioning
parent’s interests or in direct conflict with the rights of the future child.
Moreover, as in a traditional domestic surrogacy situation, the actions of the
surrogate in ICS during the pregnancy (in particular regarding personal health
and lifestyle decisions) may have a bearing on the health and development
of the future child, again bringing rights into potential conflict.
Finally in terms of women’s rights in relation to the rights of the child born
through ICS, as much as the child has a right to preserve their identity and
therefore know the identity of their birth mother, it is arguable that the surrog-
ate woman herself has a claim to know the child she carries to term and births,
despite the intention and understanding that she will provide that child to
the commissioning parent(s) upon birth. From a genetic identity perspective,
this may also be the case for women who act as oocyte donors in ICS, and are
therefore the genetic mothers of international surrogate children. Here, the
realisation of the child’s identity rights is intimately linked to and will in part
15 The preamble of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women, UNTS vol. 1249, p.13, entry into force September 3, 1981




be reliant on the decisions made by donor mothers as to whether they are
willing to be known to their genetic offspring. In this connection, it will be
interesting to see whether the European Court of Human Rights is presented
in future with the opportunity to not only extend its jurisprudence relating
to ICS, but also its wider body of decisions relating to reproductive rights and
assisted human reproduction under Article 8 of the ECHR, and the right to
become or not become a parent, as well as the significance of the genetic
parent-child relationship.16 Indeed, there is certainly potential for these issues
to dovetail in applications involving children born to European commissioning
parents through ICS arrangements involving European surrogate mothers and/
or oocyte donors.17
7 FRENCH GOVERNMENT REACTION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
MENNESSON AND LABASSEE JUDGMENTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
Following publication of the judgments, the French Minister for Families
announced France will not appeal the Court’s decisions, meaning the decisions
will be incorporated into French law, and children born outside of France to
French commissioning parents through surrogacy will be recognised as French
citizens. Furthermore, the judgments have now become final, given that no
request was received by the Court for referral of the judgments to the Grand
Chamber within the request for referral period following the Chamber’s
judgments.18 The immediate impact of the judgments will not be restricted
16 Within the Court’s pre-existing body of jurisprudence in this respect, see for example Evans
v. United Kingdom (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 34; Dickson v. United Kingdom (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 41;
SH and others v. Austria (App. No.57813/00), judgment of November 03, 2011 [GC]; Costa
and Pavan v. Italy (App. No.54270/10), judgment of August 28, 2012; Knecht v. Romania (App.
No.10048/10), judgment of October 02, 2012; and the pending application Nedescu v. Romania
(App. No.70035/10).
17 In fact, the pending application of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy (App. No. 25358/12) may
provide such an opportunity, given the matter involves Italian commissioning parents and
a surrogate mother in Russia (the nationality of both the genetic mother and father remain
unclear on the facts before to the Court to date).
18 Article 43-44 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950; CETS No.005; ECHR). Article 43(1) states that “Within a period of three months from
the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases,
request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber.” Article 44(2)(b) states that the
judgment of a Chamber shall become final “three months after the date of the judgment,
if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested”. The ECHR Press
Unit confirmed to the author of this Case Analysis (via email on October 01, 2014) that
Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 and Labassee v. France
(App. No.65941/11), judgment of June 26, 2014 became final on 26 September, 2014, as





to the three children in the Mennesson and Labassee cases; one estimate says
children in similar situations born as a result of French parents undertaking
international surrogacy now number some 2000.19 Extrapolating out to wider
Europe, the impact is potentially much greater, given the expectation on other
Council of Europe members to adhere to the Court’s judgments (erga omnes
character of judgments), consistent with the principle of subsidiarity underlying
the Court. Other members upholding the res interpretata effect of the Court’s
decisions in regard to the Court’s decisions in Mennesson and Labassee may
at least prevent a future stream of international surrogacy situations relating
to filiation from clogging the Court’s docket.
In terms of the future implications of these decisions, it will be interesting
to see what approach the Court will take in an application concerning children
born through ICS with no biological link to either of their commissioning
parents. Such a factual scenario is currently pending before the Court in the
application of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy (App. No. 25358/12). The applica-
tion presents an extremely complex ICS situation involving a child born to
Italian commissioning parents and a surrogate mother in Russia; DNA tests
show neither of the commissioning parents are genetically related to the child,
despite the commissioning parents intending there would be a genetic link
between the child and the commissioning father (therefore the child’s genetic
identity remains unknown). Pursuant to an Italian Court order, the child was
removed from the commissioning parents and is residing in a child welfare
institution; the applicants are prevented from having contact with the child.
Their application is brought in reliance on Articles 6, 8, and 14 of the ECHR
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. Notably however, in its
Mennesson and Labassee judgments, whilst emphasising the importance of the
genetic link between the children and the fathers, the Court did not explicitly
state that the existence of a genetic link between a child and a commissioning
parent is so critical that it must be present for filial recognition in law in ICS
situations.
Whether this is an intentional door left open, or simply something the
Chamber did not wrestle with in reaching its decision is hard to say. However,
it appears that the Court will very likely have to deal with this issue explicitly
in Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, given it is faced with a child who has no
genetic link to its commissioning parents, and a claim by those commissioning
parents that the refusal to recognise parentage under Italian law violates their
and the child’s Article 8 rights (in conjunction with other ECHR rights).20 A
19 James Brooks, ‘France to recognise children born via surrogates abroad’, BioNews 761, July
07, 2014, available from http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_434635.asp [Accessed September
20, 2014).
20 Moreover, the Court may find itself in a situation where a finding of a violation of Article
8 in terms of right to respect for family life (as well as private life) is more likely, given
that unlike in the Mennesson and Labassee situations, Paradiso and Campanelli concerns a child




further difficult test for the Court would be the extent to which it would apply
similar lines of reasoning to applications regarding potential future (conceived
but as yet unborn, or simply planned) children commissioned through ICS,
as distinct from already existing children who are born this way. Again, should
applications come before the Court on the basis of such situations,
opportunities may exist for the Strasbourg jurisprudence relating to ICS to
grow, and to for its jurisprudence relating to wider issues of reproductive
rights, the unborn child and the right to life to be extended.
More widely, the Mennesson and Labassee decisions are emblematic of the
fact that the status of the child and legal parentage is in an evolutionary phase,
due to the rise of ICS. Increasingly, the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government in countries around the world are being confronted
with complex issues arising out of ICS situations. Some, such as Ireland, are
currently grappling with these issues through both the Courts and the legislat-
ive development process.21 The European Court of Human Rights, in reaching
these decisions has highlighted the paramountcy of the best interests of the
child in ICS situations. Helpfully, the Court has also provided clear direction
as to what it views as essential to the substance of the child’s right to identity,
which will deepen understanding of this concept from a legal perspective.
In this vein, the Court’s judgments in Mennesson and Labassee are important
given their role in clarifying the significance of the nexus between the child’s
right to identity and to nationality. Given that the spectre of statelessness is
a reality for children born through ICS, the Court’s emphasis on nationality
as an element of identity underscores the obligation on states to ensure children
are able to acquire a nationality, and are not rendered stateless in ICS situations.
contact. However, the Court’s determination regarding the significance of a genetic link
could be the first crucial issue that the other subsequent issues raised in the application
will then turn on.
21 The Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014 is a landmark piece of draft legislation
setting out fundamental reforms to Irish family law, including provisions relating to
international commercial surrogacy and children conceived and born through assisted repro-
ductive technology. At the time of time of writing this Case Analysis, the Bill is under
consideration by the Irish Government. The Irish Ombudsman for Children published
Advice on the General Scheme of the Children and Family Relationships Bill 2014 in May
2014. Among other things, the Ombudsman emphasised the need for clear laws on inter-
national commercial and altruistic surrogacy consistent with the best interests of the child,
as well as the importance of the child’s right to preserve their identity when born through
international surrogacy or via assisted reproductive technology. The Ombudsman’s advice
isavailablefromhttp://www.oco.ie/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/OCOAdviceonChildand
FamilyRelBill2014.pdf [Accessed September 20, 2014). The Irish Courts have been actively
dealing with cases of both domestic and international surrogacy over recent years; a
landmark appeal is pending before the Supreme Court of Ireland which may have significant
implications for parties to surrogacy arrangements with a connection to Ireland (case on
appeal: M.R & Anor -v- An tArd Chlaraitheoir & Ors [2013] IEHC 91, judgment of Abbott




Outside Europe, the Court’s judgments in Mennesson and Labassee should
be of interest to all States which find themselves on the demand or supply-side
of ICS as it continues to grow internationally. Given the recent supply-side
growth of the ICS market in Asian countries (and the demand flowing from
within the Asia-Pacific region as well as from Europe and North America),
human rights issues in ICS are likely to continue to come before national courts
in the Asia-Pacific region for adjudication.22 Given the lack of a regional
human rights court in this region of the world, the judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights on this subject may therefore play an important role
in national judicial determination of ICS cases, based on their persuasive value.
The judgments will also be of particular interest to the Members of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, as its Permanent Bureau continues
work at the request of its Members into the viability of a private international
law convention addressing child status and parentage in international
surrogacy situations.23 Perhaps, however, it is the audience that the judgments
are least likely to reach, namely prospective commissioning parents around
the world, who the Court’s findings could have the most important impact
on. The legal limbo and associated consequences experienced by the Mennesson
and Labassee children is surely a cautionary example of the potential risks
involved in international commercial surrogacy arrangements. One would hope
it is a clarion call for prospective commissioning parents to rigorously consider
the likely impact on their potential future children, before taking a leap into
this brave new world of human reproduction to create them.
22 Indeed, among others, the recent case of Baby Gammy, born to Australian commissioning
parents and a Thai surrogate mother in Thailand is illustrative of the human and children’s
rights issues being raised in the Asia-Pacific region through international commercial
surrogacy. The case received international media attention in August/September 2014 due
to the fact that Baby Gammy, born with Down syndrome, was left in Thailand with his
surrogate mother whilst his twin sister was taken to Australia by the twin’s commissioning
parents. The commissioning father’s past child abuse convictions came to light as a result
of media attention and an investigation was launched by Australian child welfare authorities
into the welfare of the baby girl. The Thai government reacted with plans to outlaw
international commercial surrogacy in Thailand.
23 This work is being dealt with as a project entitled “The private international law issues
surrounding the status of children, including issues arising from international surrogacy
arrangements”. See for further information http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.




ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER 9:
BRIEF CASE COMMENTARY – PARADISO AND CAMPANELLI V. ITALY, GRAND CHAMBER
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Introduction
Chapter 9 of this doctoral thesis presented a case analysis of the first European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments concerning ICS, both issued by the Chamber of
the Court’s Fifth Section. However, in January 2017, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR
issued its first ICS judgment, in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy.24 Given
the landmark nature of this judgment, this Addendum to Chapter 9 is included as
part of the present doctoral thesis, to provide an overview of the Grand Chamber’s
decision and a short analysis of the case from a child rights perspective.
2. The circumstances of the case
The circumstances of the case are complex and are comprehensively outlined by the
Grand Chamber in Section I of its judgment.25 To summarise the most pertinent
facts, after being approved to adopt a child in Italy but not having been offered a
child to adopt,26 the applicants had commissioned a child through ICS via a clinic
in Russia. The male applicant’s sperm was provided to create the embryos which
were implanted into the surrogate for the purposes of the surrogacy,27 and the use
of his sperm was certified by the surrogacy clinic.28 The surrogate gave birth to a
child on 10 March 2011 and provided her written consent to the child being registered
as the applicants’ child.29 The child was registered in Russia and a Russian birth
certificate was issued, listing the applicants as the child’s parents.30 In the days
following the child’s birth, the female applicant and the child moved to live together
in a rented flat in Moscow (she had travelled to Moscow, however, the male applicant
had remained in Italy).31
The female applicant and the child travelled to Italy (arriving on 30 April 2011)32
after having obtained documentation from the Italian Consulate in Moscow allowing
her to travel to Italy with the child.33 Subsequently, criminal proceedings were
initiated by the Italian authorities against the applicants, on the grounds that by
bringing the child to Italy they had acted in violation of the Italian Criminal Code
24 Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, Application no. 25358/12, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 24
January 2017.
25 Ibid, at [8]-[56].
26 Ibid, at [9]-[10].
27 Ibid, at [11].
28 Ibid, at [12].
29 Ibid, at [14].
30 Ibid, at [16].
31 Ibid, at [15].
32 Ibid, at [18].




and the Adoption Act.34 Concurrently, proceedings were initiated by the Public
Prosecutor to have the child made available for adoption because he was determined
to be in a state of abandonment under the law; a guardian ad litem was appointed
for the child.35
The applicants challenged the authorities’ measures to place the child under
guardianship;36 the Italian authorities’ social workers reported the applicants were
caring for the child to the highest standards.37 DNA testing of the child and male
applicant revealed that no genetic link existed between them,38 and the applicants’
request to register the particulars of the child’s birth certificate in the Italian civil
status register was refused.39
The Campobasso Minors Court subsequently ordered the child be removed from
the applicants’ care and be taken into social services’ care and placed in a children’s
home;40 the applicants said the decision was enforced the same day as the order
was made, without advance notice.41 At the time of his removal, the child had been
in the applicants’ care for approximately eight months.42 The applicants appealed
this decision; the Campobasso Appeal Court dismissed their appeal, finding the child
was in a state of abandonment given the applicants were not his parents.43
Ultimately, the child never returned to the care of the applicants; he lived in a
children’s home for approximately 15 months and all contact between the child and
the applicants was prohibited.44 Later he was formally adopted into another
family.45
3. The central issues before the Grand Chamber
As previously noted in Chapter Eight of this doctoral thesis, the Chamber of the ECtHR
held in its 2015 judgment in the case46 that de facto family life existed between the
applicants and the child under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),47 and that there had been
an interference with the applicants’ de facto family life48 and the male applicant’s
private life.49 The Chamber further held that the interference amounted to a violation
34 Ibid, at [21].
35 Ibid, at [22].
36 Ibid, at [23]-[33].
37 Ibid, at [25].
38 Ibid, at [30].
39 Ibid, at [32].
40 Ibid, at [36]-[37].
41 Ibid, at [38].
42 Ibid, at [152].
43 Ibid, at [40].
44 Ibid, at [49].
45 Ibid, at [50]-[55].
46 Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, Application No 25358/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27
January 2015.
47 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950; CETS
No.005; ECHR).
48 Supra n.23, at [67]-[69].




of Article 8, because by removing the child, the authorities had not struck an
appropriate balance between the interests at stake.50 However, due to the child
having developed an attachment with his foster family, the Chamber ruled the State
was not obliged to return the child to the applicants.51
At appeal, the central issues before the Grand Chamber were a) the applicability
of Article 8 to the case; b) whether the measures taken by the Italian authorities
resulting in the child’s removal amounted to an interference with the applicants’
Article 8 rights; and c) whether those measures were taken consistently with Article
8(2) of the ECHR.
N.B. In its judgment in Paradiso, the Grand Chamber for the most part dis-
tinguishes its judgments in Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France. It does so
largely on the basis that in those cases, a genetic link existed between the children
involved and at least one of their commissioning parents.52 Furthermore, in Paradiso,
the child was not an applicant before the Court.53
4. The main findings of the Grand Chamber
a) Applicability of Article 8
The Grand Chamber overturned the Chamber’s view regarding family life, holding
that no family life had existed between the applicants and the child – it said the child
was not and had never been a member of the applicants’ family.54 The reasons the
Grand Chamber gave for its conclusion that no family life existed between the
applicants and the child were: because a genetic link did not exist between the child
and the applicants; the length of time of their relationship with the child (eight
months) was viewed as being short; and the fact of the lack of legal basis to their
relationship with the child. The Grand Chamber reached this view regarding family
life despite acknowledging the quality of the emotional bond between the applicants
and the child, and the applicants’ demonstrated ‘parental project’.55
b) Interference with the applicants’ Article 8 rights
However, the Grand Chamber said that the applicants were affected by the judicial
decisions which led to the child’s removal into social services’ care with a view to
adoption. The Grand Chamber found that the removal of the child, his placement
in a children’s home without any contact with the applicants, and his subsequent
placement under guardianship with a view to his adoption amounted to an interfer-
ence with the applicants’ Article 8 right to respect for their private life.56
50 Ibid, at [75]-[87].
51 Ibid, at [88].
52 Supra n.1, at [133]; [195].
53 Ibid, at [135]; [195].
54 Ibid, at [157]-158].
55 Ibid, at [151].




c) Measures consistent with Article 8(2) of the ECHR
The Grand Chamber (by a majority of eleven to six) held that the Italian authorities
had acted consistently with Article 8(2) of the ECHR, and therefore, there was no
violation of Article 8.57 The Grand Chamber said that the measures taken culminating
in the child’s removal from the applicants had been in accordance with law and in
pursuance of a legitimate aim (preventing disorder; to protect the rights and freedoms
of others; the State had exclusive competence to recognise parent-child relationships
in order to protect children).58 Regarding proportionality, the Grand Chamber found
the Italian Courts had struck a fair balance between the public and private interests
at stake.59
The Grand Chamber emphasised that the child was not an applicant in the appeal
but that “[T]his does not mean however, that the child’s best interests and the way
in which these were addressed by the domestic courts are of no relevance.”60 (The
Court went on to cite Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child). However, the Grand Chamber observed that “the Court does not consider
in the present case that the domestic courts were obliged to give priority to the
preservation of the relationship between the applicants and the child. Rather, they
had to make a difficult choice between allowing the applicants to continue their
relationship with the child, thereby legalising the unlawful situation created by them
as a fait accompli, or taking measures with a view to providing the child with a family
in accordance with the legislation on adoption.”61 The Grand Chamber said the
Italian Courts had appropriately considered the best interests of the child and found
that his removal from the applicants’ care would not cause him grave or irreparable
harm.62 The Grand Chamber also emphasised the illegality of the applicants’ actions
and that their relationship with the child was always precarious from the time they
brought him to Italy to live with them, and that the negative DNA test results had
rendered the relationship even more tenuous.63
5. Analysing the Grand Chamber judgment from a child rights perspective
The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy is problematic from
a child rights perspective in a number of respects, which are relevant to outline given
the context of this doctoral thesis.
a) The (non)existence of family life
The Grand Chamber’s view that the child was not a member of the applicants’ family
and that no family life existed between the child and the applicants takes an overly
restrictive view of what constitutes family life. The Court does not seem to attach
any weight to the fact that had it not been for the applicants, the child would not
57 Ibid, at [215]-[216].
58 Ibid, at [168]-[174]; and [175]-[178].
59 Ibid, at [200]ff.
60 Ibid, at [208].
61 Ibid, at [209].
62 Ibid, at [210].




exist. This fact remains, regardless that due to a clinical error, their intention to have
a child through ICS with a genetic link to the male applicant was not borne out in
practice. On the facts available, only the applicants had cared for the child (or indi-
cated any interest in caring for the child) from the time he was born until the time
he was removed from their care; therefore, no one but the applicants can be said
to have parented the child during that period.
The first year of life is a formative time for a child, during which children form
attachment(s) to persons caring for them, and these attachments can be important
throughout childhood and into adulthood. Based on the Italian authorities’ social
worker’s report, evidence existed that such attachments had and were continuing
to form between the child and the applicants, and that his welfare needs were being
met through the care and family environment provided by the applicants. Moreover,
the child had been in the applicants’ care for eight months, which amounted to most
of his life; in terms of a baby’s life, this was tantamount to a lifetime.
b) The best interests of the individual child
In its statement of the international law relevant in the case,64 the Grand Chamber
provides a sound overview of the relevant provisions of the CRC, including the best
interests of the child principle, and also cites relevant provisions of the Committee
on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 7 on implementing child rights
in early childhood.
The Grand Chamber only limitedly follows through on these provisions relating
to the child’s rights and best interests in its decision in Paradiso. Because of the view
taken by the Grand Chamber concerning family life (N.B. the dissenting judges took
the view that family life did exist between the applicants and the child65), the
Paradiso judgment is problematic from the outset from a child rights perspective. In
its judgment, the Grand Chamber provides relatively little reasoning that seeks to
apply the relevant provisions of the CRC and the best interests of the child principle.
This stems from the Grand Chamber’s view that because it found family life did not
exist between the applicants and the child, its role was not to examine the case from
the perspective of preserving a family unit, “but rather from the angle of the applic-
ants’ right to respect for their private life, bearing in mind that what was at stake
was their right to personal development through their relationship with the child.”66
On this basis, with respect to the child’s best interests, the Grand Chamber was,
therefore, satisfied that the Italian courts had based their decisions on relevant reasons
that served to protect the individual child in the case and children in general.67 The
Grand Chamber also held the view that these reasons were sufficient, given their
focus on the illegality of the situation created through the actions taken by the
applicants, and the child’s situation as a result.68
64 Ibid, at [76]-[77].
65 Joint dissenting judgment of Judges Lazarova Trajkovska, Bianku, Laffranque, Lemmens
and Grozev, at [2]-[5].
66 Supra n.1, at [198].
67 Ibid, at [196]-[197].




Similarly, the Grand Chamber did consider the child’s best interests in is reasoning
concerning proportionality in Paradiso, but placed greater weight on the general
interests of children rather than the best interests of the individual child involved
in the case at hand. Again, this owed to the fact the Grand Chamber was considering
the matter in the context of the right to respect for private life, not family life, and
only that of the applicants (not the child). However, in relation to the individual
child’s best interests, the Grand Chamber was satisfied with the domestic courts
consideration of the child’s best interests,69 and in particular attached importance
to the fact that the court which had made the determination that the child’s removal
from the applicants’ care would not cause him grave or irreparable harm was a
specialised Minors Court.70 Given its view of the domestic courts’ treatment of the
child’s best interests, and the significant weight attached to the public interests the
impugned measures were seeking to protect, the Grand Chamber found the actions
taken in interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life were
proportionate within the States’ margin of appreciation.
From a child rights perspective, the alternative provision of care for the child
imposed by the State in the Paradiso case – namely removal of the child and placement
into State care – was arguably a disproportionate measure for the State to take in
the case of this one particular child. Disproportionate, because of the evidence before
the domestic Courts reflecting that the child was being well-cared for; the applicants
clearly wanted to continue caring for the child and provide him with a family environ-
ment, (and had been assessed by the Italian authorities’ social workers as providing
such an environment);71 and in light of these facts, placing the child into the uncer-
tainty of the State care system should not have been the State’s action of first resort.72
Rather, a more proportionate course of action would have been to impose measures
69 See [202]ff.
70 Ibid, at [212].
71 It is unclear to what extent relevant developmental brain science research informed the
view that the child would not suffer grave or irreparable harm as a result of his separation
and removal from the applicants’ care; it is now understood as a result of scientific research
that “[a]ttachment patterns develop over the first few years of life and can influence mental
health and psychological functioning throughout childhood and the adult years (See: Center
on the Developing Child at Harvard University, The Foundations of Lifelong Health are Built
in Early Childhood, 2010, p.8); and that early childhood development is in part fuelled by
reciprocal ‘serve and return’ interaction between children and the adults who care for them,
and that taking this away can have detrimental impacts on the child’s developing brain,
as well as later in life. (See: Center on the Developing Child at Harvard University, Applying
the Science of Child Development in Child Welfare Systems, 2016, p.5). Given the young age
of the child at the time of his removal from the applicants’ care, it would have been of
great importance to consider these kinds of factors, which are grounded in developmental
brain science.
72 Indeed, it is generally recognised that family care settings are to be preferred to institutional
care settings; N.B. Part II, A[3] UN Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children: “The
family being the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth,
well-being and protection of children, efforts should primarily be directed to enabling the
child to remain in or return to the care of his/her parents, or when appropriate, other close
family members.” Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, [on the report of the Third




to monitor the welfare and care of the child over a reasonable period of time through
regular visits and reporting by State social workers, to build up a broader picture
of the child’s situation in the care of the applicants. This would have more
comprehensively enabled future steps regarding the child’s care situation to be
informed and made in a well-reasoned and proportionate manner. This would have
been preferable from a child rights perspective, rather than the State prematurely
taking what amounted to an extreme action, arguably affecting both the child and
the applicants.
However, the Grand Chamber, by stating in its judgment that “[A]ny measure
prolonging the child’s stay with the applicants, such as placing him in their temporary
care, would have carried the risk that the mere passage of time would have deter-
mined the outcome of the case”73 does not seem to give satisfactory consideration
to the alternatives which could have been employed by the Italian authorities, while
still enabling the intent and spirit of the relevant domestic laws to be upheld. Indeed,
the Grand Chamber was right to emphasise that the laws that the applicants contra-
vened existed to protect “very weighty public interests.”74 However, the measures
taken by the Italian authorities did not appear to attach enough weight to the evidence
before them about the individual child’s situation. Based on the information before
them, the child was safe and well-cared for, in the care of adults who – had it not
been for the mistake of the Russian surrogacy clinic – would have shared one genetic
link with the child. Furthermore, it was not the child’s fault that the applicants had
acted in contravention of Italian law by commissioning his conception and birth
through ICS in a foreign jurisdiction; the Grand Chamber did not appear to consider
this point in its reasoning.
Yet by declaring the child to be in a state of abandonment and removing him
from the applicants’ care without any further contact, the child’s first eight months
of life were essentially wiped out of existence. This raises fundamental questions
regarding the child’s right to identity preservation under Article 8 of the CRC, and
Article 7 CRC concerning his right to, as far as possible, know and be cared for by
his parents. Although the question of who can be said to be the child’s parents in
this particular case is fraught, arguably the applicants were the only people who could
be said to be his parents at the time of his removal into State care. It is worth noting
here that in its General Comment No. 14 on the best interests of the child, the Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child states that in decisions concerning the best interests
of an individual child, that child’s interests should not be understood as being the
same as the interests of children in general, but rather the particular child’s best
interests must be individually assessed.75 This indicates that when a child’s situation
is before a decision-making body, that body should give due consideration to the
child’s best interests in light of the child’s individual circumstances in which the
decision-making body finds him or her.
73 Supra n.1, at [213].
74 Ibid, at [204].
75 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14 on the right of the child to





Because the best interests principle is one of the guiding principles of the CRC,
it thereby necessitates a holistic consideration of the child’s CRC rights. The CRC
Committee elaborates that “[F]or individual decisions, the child’s best interests must
be assessed and determined in light of the specific circumstances of the particular
child.”76 It is difficult to see, based on the facts of the case, how the protection of
the best interests of children in general outweighed the best interests of the individual
child concerned, on the basis of the evidence available. Indeed, the dissenting
judgment in Paradiso argues – based on the Grand Chamber’s judgments in Neulinger
and Shuruk v. Switzerland77 and R. and H. v. the United Kingdom78 – that two con-
siderations are crucial in identifying what is in the child’s best interests in a particular
case: namely that it is in the child’s best interests that his or her family ties are
maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit; and it
is in the child’s best interests to ensure his or her development in a safe and secure
environment.79 However, due to the majority judgment in Paradiso that no family
life existed, these factors appear to have been not considered relevant by the Grand
Chamber majority judges.
c) Treatment of competing interests at stake
While the Grand Chamber judgment certainly raises valid concerns regarding the
importance of upholding the general public interest, arguably the Grand Chamber
attached too much weight to these considerations, leading it to gloss over the import-
ance of considering the best interests of the individual child in a more holistic manner.
However, this is connected to the view the Grand Chamber took at the outset, namely
that no family life existed in this case, and also the fact that the child was not an
applicant before the Court in this case. Based on the Grand Chamber’s decision in
Paradiso, it will be interesting to see how the ECtHR continues to navigate the terrain
of balancing children’s rights at the general public interests level and the individual
level in future jurisprudence. Especially in future cases where the facts occur in the
context of ICS, and given the lack of consensus among the High Contracting Parties
to the ECHR on surrogacy as a practice, jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this area is likely
to remain a significant source of interest for child rights legal scholars, among
others.80
6. Concluding remarks
CRC States Parties have an obligation to ensure that decisions concerning individual
children consider comprehensively their particular circumstances and what would
76 Ibid, at [32].
77 Application no. 41615/07, Judgment (Grand Chamber), 06 July 2010, at [136].
78 Application no. 35348/06, Judgment (Court, Fourth Section, 31 May 2011, at [73]-[74].
79 Supra n. 42, at [6].
80 N.B. The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Paradiso has already been the subject of some legal
commentary and analysis, see e.g. A.G. Barnett, ‘Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy: Application
no 25358/12: European Court of Human Rights’, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, vol.6:2
(2017) 412–413; and L. Bracken, ‘Assessing the best interests of the child in cases of cross-
border surrogacy: inconsistency in the Strasbourg approach?’, Journal of Social Welfare and




serve the child best in light of those circumstances. This remains the case regardless
of the individual States Party’s position, taken within its margin of appreciation (in
the European context) regarding sensitive ethical issues such as surrogacy as a method
of family formation. The fact remains that children are continuing to be born through
ICS. This will mean that courts and other competent authorities will continue to be
confronted with situations where individual children have formed an attachment
with those persons who have been responsible for them coming into existence, and
in whose care they have lived for differing lengths of time and with whom they have
formed a de facto family life.
In cases where the individual child has been born through situations contrary
to applicable domestic laws, once that individual child’s situation is before a court
or competent authority, the child’s individual best interests should be the primary
consideration. If remaining in the care of their commissioning parents (despite those
persons’ illegal action) is found to be in the child’s individual best interests, that
child’s best interests should outweigh any competing interests (such as the general
public interest). Of course, this is not to say that individual States should not remain
free to establish their own legislation and policies which take a more or less restrictive
position on surrogacy and other sensitive ethical matters; but rather, to say that when
an individual child is involved, that individual child’s best interests must be accorded





10 Multiple Potential Parents But a Child
Always at the Centre
Balancing the Rights and Interests of the Parties to
International Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements
Abstract
As has been demonstrated throughout the preceding chapters of this study,
due to the nature of ICS, this method of family formation often brings the rights
and interests of the child into conflict with those of the other core parties to
ICS arrangements. As a result, rights need to be balanced against each other
in the ICS context, to establish the balance to be struck amongst competing
rights and interests. This Chapter hones in on the balancing of rights and
interests of the child with those of other core parties to ICS: surrogate mothers,
genetic donor parents and commissioning parents in ICS. This Chapter argues
that rights balancing exercises will be necessary in relation to these core parties
throughout the course of ICS arrangements, and that the child’s rights and best
interests must be accorded priority once born, given their particular stage in
life and their vulnerability in comparison to the other core parties. In keeping
with the preceding chapters in this study, while recognising the indivisible,
interdependent and interrelated nature of children’s rights, this Chapter draws
attention to the child’s rights most at risk in ICS, focusing on the need to respect
the best interests of the child in all ICS situations. It proposes that along with
this approach, the principle of human dignity must guide rights balancing
in ICS, to strike an overall balance between the child’s rights and best interests
and the rights and interests of other core parties where necessary.
Main Findings
- ICS is a method of family formation bringing the rights and interests of
children born through ICS into conflict with other core parties to ICS, namely
surrogate mothers, genetic donor parents and commissioning parents. The
rights and interests of surrogate mothers and commissioning parents can
also clash. Therefore, rights balancing exercises are necessary throughout
ICS arrangements.
- In balancing competing rights and interests between unborn children and
surrogate mothers in ICS, the surrogate mother’s rights and interests will
likely outweigh those of the child she carries. This is especially so when




- In ICS, protecting and giving effect to the child’s identity preservation and
health rights and best interests should outweigh genetic donor parents’
rights to privacy.
- A right to be a parent does not exist under international human rights law.
In balancing the rights and interests of children born through ICS with those
of their commissioning parents, the child’s rights and best interests should
be treated as paramount.
- In balancing the rights and interests of surrogate mothers and commission-
ing parents, in the prenatal stage of ICS arrangements, the surrogate
mother’s rights to reproductive autonomy, health and survival will likely
outweigh the commissioning parents interests; however, once a child is
born in ICS, the child’s best interests should be paramount in the balancing
of rights and interests.
- Overall, the concept of human dignity should guide all actions and de-
cisions in ICS. However, once a child is born in ICS, their rights and best
interests should be accorded most weight in the balancing of rights.
Contextual notes
- Little scholarly work exists on rights balancing in the ICS context; this
Chapter is relevant to judicial decision-makers, executive government
decision-makers, legislators and policy-makers.
- This Chapter will remain relevant as long as ICS continues to be practiced,
and in particular in the absence of any international regulation governing
ICS or any international consensus on ICS.
1 INTRODUCTION
An alternative method of family formation in the 21st Century, international
commercial surrogacy (ICS) raises profound questions relating to the balancing
of competing human rights, given the involvement of multiple parties with
rights and interests at stake. By their nature, ICS arrangements always involve
multiple potential ‘parents’, but most significantly from a child rights perspect-
ive, there is always a child (or children, when multiple births occur) at the
centre. After all, ICS arrangements are founded on the common intention of
commissioning parents to create a child with the involvement of a surrogate
in a different state from that which commissioning parents themselves reside
in.1
1 For a discussion of the drivers of ICS and the parties involved in ICS, see C. Achmad,
‘Understanding international commercial surrogacy and the parties whose rights and
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Given their conception and birth through ICS, the child is inherently vulner-
able to potential violations of their rights under the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC)2 which can be triggered before and after
birth.3 The child’s rights in ICS can also conflict with the rights and interests
of other core parties to ICS. As Gerards notes, “the dilemma of deciding ‘hard
cases’ has become even more relevant in recent decades – the growing import-
ance of fundamental rights and the increasing complexity and ‘multi-levelness’
of modern legal orders has resulted in ever greater numbers of ‘hard cases’
to be brought before the courts.”4 Certainly, ICS cases can and should be
understood as ‘hard cases’, in large part due to the complexity of the conflict-
ing rights and interests involved. This conflict presents a challenge to protect-
ing children’s rights and a practical challenge for decision-makers dealing with
ICS on a case-by-case basis (such as judges and government ministers) in the
absence of international agreement on or regulation of ICS; for policy-framers
developing national approaches to ICS; and for actors at the international level
devising long-term or best-practice international approaches to ICS.5
1.1 Focus and scope of this paper
This paper focuses on the core parties to ICS (the child; surrogate mother;
commissioning parents) and considers how the competing rights and interests
of children conceived and born through ICS arrangements, women acting as
surrogates, genetic donor parents and commissioning parents can be balanced
and weighed against each other. As Bainham notes, “It now seems clear that
both children and parents possess rights and that the task for any legal system
is to achieve a proper balance between them.”6 However, rights balancing
is not a precise art; it is an area of human rights law and practice lacking
comprehensive tools assisting with and applying to weighing competing rights
and interests in situations such as ICS. Although the author’s body of work
2 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3.
3 For discussion of the ways in which challenges to the child’s rights can be triggered pre-
birth and pre-conception, see: C. Achmad, ‘Unconceived, Unborn, Uncertain: Is Pre-birth
Protection Necessary in International Commercial Surrogacy for Children to Exercise and
Enjoy Their Rights Post-birth?’, (2016) submitted for publication to International Journal of
Children’s Rights; appearing as Chapter 6 of this doctoral thesis.
4 J.H. Gerards, ‘‘Hard cases’ in the law’, in A. in ‘t Groen, H. Jan de Jonge and E. Klasen
et al (eds.), Knowledge in Ferment: Dilemmas in Science, Scholarship and Society (2007), 121 at
123.
5 E.g. the Expert Group appointed by the Hague Conference on Private International law
appointed to explore solutions to the private international law issues surrounding the status
of children, including issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements, and the
Expert Group appointed by the International Social Service preparing principles for protect-
ing children in international surrogacy.




does not focus on research specifically concerning rights balancing in ICS (this
is a topic deserving of a doctoral study of its own), it is an important issue
to be highlighted as a component of the author’s doctoral thesis concerning
the child’s rights in ICS. Therefore, this paper is not a comprehensive study
of rights balancing in ICS, but instead aims to introduce the concept of rights
balancing as important in all ICS situations. In doing so, this paper draws on
the author’s research throughout the course of her doctoral study. It does not
deal exhaustively with the issue of rights balancing in ICS; in some respects,
it raises questions relating to this aspect of ICS which will require future
attention, outside of the doctoral thesis.
Drawing on the public international human rights law framework, this
paper particularly focuses on the child’s CRC rights, given the child’s
heightened vulnerability in ICS situations. Recognising that the child’s rights
are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated in nature,7 ICS raises particular
risks to the child’s rights to identity preservation, family environment, national-
ity, health and their safety and wellbeing.8 Where relevant, this paper draws
on opinions of UN treaty bodies and jurisprudence from domestic courts and
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).9 Consideration of such juris-
prudence assists in analysing how competing rights and interests in ICS might
be balanced. The case-law referenced in this paper is either directly relevant
given it addresses a situation involving surrogacy, or, given the fact-dependent
nature of decisions in the human rights field, the decision’s relevance by
analogy to ICS.
The concept of the best interests of the child10 is also of particular import-
ance to this paper’s discussion. As the Committee on the Rights of the Child
states in its General Comment on the best interests of the child, “[T]he child’s
best interests shall be applied to all matters concerning the child or children,
and taken into account to resolve any possible conflicts among the rights
enshrined in the Convention or other human rights treaties. Attention must
be placed on identifying possible solutions which are in the child’s best inter-
ests.”11
Bearing the above in mind, this paper discusses rights balancing in ICS in
relation to the following four aspects:
7 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No.14 (2013) on
the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art.
3, para 1), UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/14 (2013) at [16](a).
8 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis, and elaborated on in Chapter 7 (nationality)
and Chapter 8 (identity).
9 Because the ECtHR remains the supranational human rights court with the most advanced
jurisprudence on rights balancing. The ECtHR is required to assess applications to determine
if a fair balance has been struck between the competing rights and interests at play. See
J.H. Gerards, ‘Fundamental Rights and Other Interests: Should it Really Make a Difference?’,
in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts between Fundamental Rights, (2008), 680.
10 Art. 3, CRC, supra note 2.
11 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra, note 7 at [33].
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- Balancing the rights and interests of the unborn child with those of the
surrogate mother;
- Balancing the rights and interests of the child with those of non-commis-
sioning parent gamete donors (genetic parents);
- Balancing the rights and interests of the child with those of the commission-
ing parents; and
- Balancing the rights and interests of the surrogate mother with those of
the commissioning parents.
The balancing of the child’s rights with those of their commissioning parents
forms the central discussion of this paper, given the reality that this is often
one of the main points of conflict in ICS situations. While placing a central focus
on the child, this paper concludes by assessing the prospects for an overall
balancing of rights and interests between the four core parties as rights-holders
in ICS. In doing so, it considers how best in practice to strike a balance between
the range of competing – and often irreconcilable – rights and interests in this
fraught and burgeoning area of family formation.
2 BALANCING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE UNBORN CHILD WITH
THOSE OF THE SURROGATE MOTHER
The question of whether an unborn child can be said to have rights or interests
is an ambiguous area of law.12 Strong arguments exist in support of and
against human rights attaching to children before birth. For example, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Grand Chamber has consistently
held (since Evans v. United Kingdom13) that an embryo has no right to life
under Article 2 of the ECHR;14 the majority of states recognise human rights
as attaching from birth onwards. However, preambular paragraph nine of the
CRC leaves open the possibility of pre-birth human rights protection, despite
not requiring it.15 Many of the child’s CRC rights are at risk before birth in
ICS, vulnerable to decisions and actions taken by other core parties to an ICS
arrangement16 while the child is in utero and before conception.17 The main
12 See discussion in Achmad, supra note 3, at 135ff of this thesis.
13 Evans v. United Kingdom, Decision of 10 April 2007, Judgment (Merits), Court (Grand
Chamber), App. No. 6339/05.
14 Ibid., at [56].
15 Preambular para. 9, CRC, supra note 2 imports the following wording from the Declaration
of the Rights of the Child: “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity,
needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well
as after birth.”
16 E.g. commissioning parent(s), surrogate mother.
17 For discussion of the ways in which the child’s rights are made vulnerable as a result of
the actions and decisions of other core parties to ICS before the child’s conception and once




CRC rights at risk due to actions and decisions occurring during these pre-birth
stages in ICS are the child’s right to preserve identity,18 to as far as possible
know and be cared for by his or her parents,19 health rights,20 and the right
to be free from discrimination21 and not to be sold or trafficked.22 Therefore,
it is necessary to consider how the situation of an unborn child in ICS may
be balanced with the rights and interests of his or her surrogate mother. For
example, to what extent does a surrogate’s rights and interests outweigh the
fact she is carrying an unborn child with the potential to become a human
being? This is relevant in ICS situations where the surrogate decides she no
longer wants to carry the child and might harm the child, or seeks an abortion;
where the surrogate’s health is endangered during pregnancy; and where the
surrogate engages in risky behaviour (for example, alcohol or drug abuse)
during pregnancy which might harm the unborn child.
2.1 Leading decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and United
Nations Human Rights Committee concerning abortion relevant by
analogy to rights balancing in ICS
Analysis of some leading case-law concerning abortion is illustrative of the
balancing of rights and interests which can be extended by analogy to rights
balancing between the unborn child and surrogate in ICS situations. The
balancing of rights and interests has occurred in a number of non-ICS cases
where pregnant women have been prevented from accessing abortion. In Tysiąc
v. Poland23 (ECtHR), a woman was prevented from having a legal abortion
despite a medical condition which meant that through pregnancy, her already
partial blindness greatly deteriorated to near complete blindness.24 It was
18 Art. 8(1), CRC, supra note 2: “States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to
preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognised
by law without unlawful interference.”
19 Art. 7(1), CRC, supra note 2: “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall
have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible,
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.” (emphasis added)
20 Art. 24, CRC, supra note 2.
21 Art 2(1), CRC, supra note 2 stipulates that States Parties to the CRC shall ensure the rights
set forth in the CRC to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any
kind.
22 Art. 35, CRC, supra note 2: “States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and
multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any
purpose or in any form.” The sale of children is defined by Art. 2(a) as “any act or trans-
action whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for
remuneration nor any other consideration.” See United Nations General Assembly, Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitu-
tion and child pornography, UN Doc. A/RES/54/263 (2000).
23 Tysiąc v. Poland, Decision of 20 March 2007, Fourth Section Judgment, App. No. 5410/03.
24 Ibid., at para. [65].
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because of this risk to her health that she sought an abortion.25 On the facts,
the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on the
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (ECHR),26 as “[T]he refusal
to terminate the pregnancy had exposed her to a serious health risk”.27 The
Court thus recognised the health of the mother as paramount, with her rights
and interests outweighing the existence of the unborn child she carried and
its potentiality to become a human being.
Following Tysiąc, the ECtHR Grand Chamber held in A., B. and C. v. Ireland
that there is no absolute right to abortion (and that this is not conferred by
Article 8 ECHR).28 This decision concerned three women who had become
unintentionally pregnant. Irish law prohibits abortion for health and well-being
reasons, but allows a woman to travel overseas for abortion in instances where
she risks being directly affected by this prohibition29 and there is a constitu-
tional right to abortion in situations where a real and substantial risk exists
to the woman’s life. The Grand Chamber applied Vo v. France30 in A., B. and
C. v. Ireland, holding that “[S]ince the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus
and those of the mother are inextricably interconnected, the margin of appreci-
ation accorded to a State’s protection of the unborn necessarily translates into
a margin of appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting
rights of the mother.”31 However, the Grand Chamber said this margin of
appreciation is not unlimited and a “prohibition of abortion to protect unborn
life is not therefore automatically justified under the Convention on the basis
of unqualified deference to the protection of prenatal life or on the basis that
the expectant mother’s right to respect for her private life is of a lesser
stature.”32
The Grand Chamber therefore held that in instances where real and sub-
stantial risk to the pregnant woman exists, lack of access to lawful abortion
in Ireland amounted to a State failure to implement this constitutional right.33
One of the three applicants seeking an abortion in A., B. and C. v. Ireland was
in remission from a rare form of cancer and feared for her life because of the
risk pregnancy could trigger relapse. The Grand Chamber found a violation
of this applicant’s Article 8 ECHR right to respect of private and family life,
25 Ibid., at para. [77].
26 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, Art.
8, right to respect of private and family life.
27 Ibid.
28 A, B and C v. Ireland, Decision of 16 December 2010, Judgment (Merits), Court (Grand
Chamber), App. No. 25579/05, at [214].
29 Ibid., at [239].
30 Vo v. France, Decision of 8 July 2004, Judgment (Merits), Court (Grand Chamber), App.
No. 53924/00.
31 A, B and C v. Ireland, supra note 28, at [237].
32 Ibid., at [238].




as she was unable to establish her right to a legal abortion via the medical
services available in Ireland or through the Courts.34 In assessing whether
there had been an appropriate balancing of competing interests involved in
relation to the other applicants, the Grand Chamber found no violation of their
rights, holding that “the impugned prohibition in Ireland struck a fair balance
between the right of the first and second applicants to respect for their private
lives and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn.”35 The ECtHR sub-
sequently applied its decision in A., B. and C. v. Ireland in P. and S. v Poland.36
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is the United Nations treaty body
that has issued the leading views on situations involving the balancing of rights
and interests between pregnant women and unborn children. Although this
body of decisions remains small, among those communications it has con-
sidered on their merits is that of a young rape victim who was refused an
abortion.37 The HRC said the failure to provide the abortion constituted a
violation of Article 7 ICCPR,38 causing her mental and physical suffering.39
Another communication considered on its merits by the HRC concerned refusal
of a therapeutic abortion on an adolescent according to her wishes (the foetus
having been diagnosed with anencephaly, inevitably meaning its death upon
birth), in circumstances where the pregnancy constituted a medically certified
life threatening risk.40 The Committee said refusal was unjustified, violating
Article 17 ICCPR.41
2.2 Striking a balance between the rights and interests of the unborn child
and the surrogate in ICS
The ECtHR and UN treaty body decisions discussed above demonstrate that
in situations which may arise in ICS – such as a surrogate mother seeking an
abortion for medical (including psychological) reasons – the balance of rights
34 Ibid., at [263].
35 Ibid., at [241].
36 Confirming the view that Article 8, ECHR does not confer the right to abortion, but the
prohibition of abortion when sought on health and/or well-being grounds falls within the
scope of Article 8. (at para 96)
37 UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1608/2007 of 28 April 2011, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007.
38 No one shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
39 UN Human Rights Committee, supra note 38 at [9.2].
40 UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1153/2003 of 22 November 2005, UN
Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003.
41 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. One
Committee member dissented, asserting Article 6, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (right to life) was also violated given the girl’s life was gravely endangered.
See: United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
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and interests is likely to weigh heavily towards the surrogate. This will mean
the unborn child’s future rights and interests will be subordinated to the
surrogate’s rights and interests, in order to protect her health and wellbeing,
and potentially, her right to life.42 In ICS situations where a surrogate does
not seek an abortion but a risk to her health or life presents during pregnancy,
weighing the rights and interests at play between the surrogate and the unborn
child in favour of the surrogate is also an appropriate balance to strike. This
will be especially the case when the risks to the surrogate mother’s health are
serious and pose long-term detrimental effects to her health and well-being
(as was the case in Tysiąc v. Poland). Such a balance upholds the mother’s right
to health43 and safeguards her reproductive autonomy44 and right to life
recognising that she is a living rights-holder.
To not strike a balance in favour of the surrogate in such ICS situations
would in effect prioritise the potentiality of an unborn human being and its
associated future rights and interests over the life of an existing human being
with rights and interests. This would be inconsistent with fundamental human
rights principles and concepts, including human dignity.45 As will be dis-
cussed below shortly, in ICS situations where the surrogate wants to take
particular actions concerning the unborn child, her rights and interests are
likely to also conflict with those of the commissioning parents. Therefore, a
further layer of rights balancing will be required, for example, in cases of
surrogate-proposed abortion in ICS. Additionally (as discussed below in Sec-
tion 5), this may occur in reverse, where commissioning parents seek to abort
a child in ICS.
An alternative set of circumstances in which the rights and interests of
the surrogate mother may require balancing in relation to the existence of the
unborn child in ICS is where the surrogate engages in behaviour which may
be harmful to the unborn child’s health. Such circumstances can be envisaged
where a surrogate decides she is not going to follow through with the ICS
42 Under Article 6, ICCPR, every human being has the inherent right to life.
43 Article 12, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Everyone has
the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
See: United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3.
44 E.g. as safeguarded by Art. 16(1)(e), United Nations General Assembly, Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, 1249
UNTS 13.
45 As made clear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see: preamble; Art. 1). See:
United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. The principle of human
dignity is re-stated in the other core international human rights treaties, e.g. the preamble
of CEDAW: “Recalling that discrimination against women violates the principles of equality




arrangement and becomes harmful towards the unborn child she carries46
or in instances where the surrogate engages in practices during pregnancy
recognised as harmful to foetal health. A leading case relevant by analogy
is Winnipeg Family and Child Services v. G,47 in which the Canadian Supreme
Court considered the case of a pregnant woman with various substance
addictions; two of her previous three children were born brain damaged as
a result of her substance abuse. Canadian child protection authorities sought
to have the woman admitted to drug therapy to prevent further damage to
the unborn child. However, despite the potential damage to the foetus, the
Court held authorities could not force her to undergo treatment to prevent
foetal harm.48 The balance is clearly struck in favour of the woman in this
case, with the judgment upholding her right to reproductive autonomy, even
in situations where there is evidence of harm or likely harm to an unborn child
being carried in that woman’s body.
This focus on the autonomy of the woman is consistent with the abortion
case law already discussed. Yet the motivation underlying the balance is quite
different; in the abortion jurisprudence, the motivation for striking a balance
favouring the woman derives from seeking to protect her and uphold her right
to health, reproductive autonomy and human dignity. However, Winnipeg v. G
appears to favour the woman’s rights and interests squarely on the basis of
her autonomy rights. In doing so, such an approach fails to take a step towards
preventing harm not only to the unborn child, but to the woman herself.
It is questionable whether this balance would be struck similarly in the
case of an ICS surrogate who either actively tries to harm the child she carries,
or who engages in behaviour which may cause harm to the unborn child. Akin
to the abortion situation already discussed, this may be particularly question-
able given the added layer of competing rights and interests of the commission-
ing parents in ICS arrangements. Indeed, unless a guardian is appointed to
advocate for the future rights and best interests of the unborn child in an ICS
arrangement, the unborn child does not have any personal agency to advocate
for his or her future rights and best interests. However, in instances where
commissioning parents view the surrogate as acting in a way potentially
harmful to the unborn child she is carrying for them (either by omission or
direct actions), they could, for example, argue for enforced measures in relation
the surrogate on the basis that there are particular actions she should be
46 L.B. Andrews notes however from her interviews with (non-ICS) surrogates, that this is
highly unlikely to occur, given the great care that surrogates demonstrate towards the
surrogate child: “There is thus no reason to believe that surrogacy inevitably, or even in
a significant minority of cases, would lead to the child being harmed by the surrogate’s
lack of concern for the child’s well-being.” See L.B. Andrews, ‘Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries:
A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood’, (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review 2343, at 2354.
47 Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925.
48 Ibid., at [4].
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undertaking or activities she should refrain from in order to protect the unborn
child intended for them.
3 BALANCING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE CHILD WITH THOSE OF
GENETIC DONOR PARENTS
The rights and interests of children and their genetic donor parents may also
conflict in ICS in one main respect, due to the privacy rights of genetic donor
parents49 and the identity50 and health51 rights of children conceived and
born. Not all ICS arrangements will involve genetic donor parents (as some-
times commissioning parents are able to use their own gametes to create an
embryo). However, when genetic donor parents are involved (i.e. who are
not also commissioning parents), this rights conflict only becomes a rights
balancing issue in instances where they act anonymously, or do not want to
be contacted by or know their genetic children created through ICS.
3.1 A conflict between the genetic donor parents’ privacy right and the
rights and best interests of the child in ICS
In such instances, can genetic donor parents legitimately maintain their right
to privacy? Although in the context of gamete donation for non-ICS assisted
reproductive technology (ART), donors have in the past been able to maintain
their right to privacy, there is now general acceptance that anonymous gamete
donation is to be avoided in ART given the evidence of negative impacts for
children of not knowing their genetic origins, in particular on their identity
formation and understanding,52 and their ability to know their genetic health
49 Art. 12, UDHR, supra note 45; Art. 17, ICCPR, supra note 41.
50 Art. 8, CRC, supra note 2.
51 Art. 24, CRC, supra note 2.
52 See for discussion: Clark, ‘A Balancing Act? The Rights of Donor-Conceived Children to
Know Their Biological Origins’ (2012) 40(3) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative
Law, 619; M. Cowden, ‘No Harm, No Foul: A Child’s Right to Know Their Genetic Parents’,
(2012) 26(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 102; and S. Golombok and F.
Tasker, ‘Socioemotional Development in Changing Families’, in M.E. Lamb and R.M. Lerner
(eds.), Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science, Vol 3: Socioemotional Processes
(7th ed.), (2015), 419 at 441. Golombok and Tasker also note at 446 that “Children whose
parents disclose their donor conception at an early age seem to integrate this information
into their developing sense of self, whereas some donor offspring who find out about their
donor conception in adolescence or adulthood report enduring psychological distress. Those
who are aware of their donor conception may wish to search for their donor and donor
siblings. Their main motivation is curiosity and the wish to incorporate information about
their family background into their life story in order to develop a more complete sense




history.53 Indeed, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has been clear
that anonymous gamete donation is inconsistent with the child’s rights and
best interests and should be avoided in the context of ART.54
It is worth considering that some contemporary legislative frameworks
governing donor conception – such as that in the Netherlands55 – establish
a system of phased or gradual provision of donor information to donor con-
ceived children. Under the Dutch legislation, non-identifying donor information
including the donor’s physical characteristics, education, occupation, and some
information on social background and personal characteristics56 can be pro-
vided to the child once they are 12 years of age and upon their request;57
to the child’s legal parents (at their request) before the child reaches 12 years
of age; and medical data important to the healthy development of the child
can be provided at the request of the child’s doctor (no restriction specified
concerning the child’s age).58 Identifying information (first and surnames,
date of birth and place of residence59) is not available to the child until they
reach 16 years, and only with the donor’s written consent.60 The Dutch legis-
lation places the burden of requesting identifying information on the child,61
and in instances where the donor does not want to disclose information, a
balancing exercise is required to consider whether serious reasons exist for
non-disclosure that outweigh the consequences for the child of not knowing
the identifying information.62
However, even such a system of phased provision of identity information
about genetic donor parents such as that established by the Dutch legislation
does ultimately recognise that donor conceived children should have access
to identifying information about their genetic parents. It remains difficult to
envisage circumstances where the child’s right to preserve their identity would
not outweigh a donor’s interests in non-disclosure. This is especially so given
the significant, lifelong impact that not knowing full, identifying information
about their genetic parent(s) may have on the child both in child and adult-
hood. Indeed, as the ECtHR has acknowledged, “an individual’s interest in
53 M. Cowden, ‘No Harm, No Foul: A Child’s Right to Know Their Genetic Parents’, (2012)
26(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 102 at 107.
54 See e.g. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding
Denmark, 15 February 1995, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.33, at [11].
55 Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting 2002 (Artificial Insemination (Donor Informa-
tion) Act 2002.
56 Ibid., Arts. 2(1)(a) and (b).
57 Ibid., Art. 3(1)(b).
58 Ibid., Art. 3(1)(1).
59 Ibid., Art. 2(1)(c).
60 Ibid., Art. 3(2).
61 Ibid., Art. 3(2).
62 Ibid., Art. 3(2).
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discovering his or her parentage does not disappear with age, quite the
reverse.”63
3.2 Striking a balance between the rights and interests of the child and
genetic donor parents in ICS
It is, therefore, difficult to maintain that genetic donor parents should have
an absolute right to privacy in relation to the children who are born in ICS
through their gamete donations. The involvement of genetic donor parents
in ICS is clearly based on their own choice to donate gametes. In doing so, they
are aware that their gametes may lead to the existence of a child through ICS,
and as such permanently connect themselves into the child’s life by virtue
of the establishment of a genetic bond. Arguably, they cede their privacy right
on this basis, with the awareness of the consequence that the child may wish
to have contact with and know them as their genetic parent. The child’s rights
to preserve their identity and to attain the highest standard of health have
a potentially large impact on the child’s own lifetime outcomes; knowing their
genetic origins and their genetic health history will likely positively impact
their life in many ways. They will be able to form a full view of their personal
narrative and understand where they came from. Consequently, they will have
the opportunity to form their own identity informed by the genetic element,
and will also be able to have the choice to proactively act on any genetic health
history information indicating genetic disorder.
Knowing identifying information about their genetic donor parents will
enable the child to at least attempt to know these people if the child wishes
to do so, in order to preserve this aspect of their identity and gain a full under-
standing of their identity concerning its genetic aspect. Protecting the child’s
rights by ensuring they can know the identity of their genetic donor parent(s)
is therefore consistent with a holistic approach to their rights and is in their
best interests;64 as a result, the balance should weigh in favour of the child’s
rights, rather than upholding the genetic donor parents’ right to privacy.
63 Godelli v. Italy, Decision of 25 September 2012, Second Section Judgment (Merits and Just
Satisfaction), App. No. 33783/09. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 8, ECHR on the
basis that the applicant, who was abandoned at birth and subsequently adopted, had been
unable to find out the identity of her birth mother (who had declined to have her identity
disclosed). At the time of the judgment, the applicant was 69 years old and argued she
had suffered severe damage because she was unable to know her personal history through
accessing identifying or non-identifying information about her birth mother; she argued
that as a result, a balance had been struck entirely in favour of her birth mother’s interests.
The Court found that by preventing the applicant from accessing any identity related
information, Italy had not struck a fair balance to achieve proportionality between the
applicant’s right to identity (and therefore access information about her origins) and her
birth mother’s right to remain anonymous.




Recognising this, ideally anonymous genetic donors should not involve them-
selves in ICS (and future regulation of ICS should guard against this). However,
in instances where they do anonymously become genetic parents in ICS or seek
to maintain anonymity (that is, refusing the disclosure of identifying informa-
tion), decision-makers should take active steps wherever possible to uphold
and enforce the child’s rights to identity and health (consistent with their
overall best interests) and recognise these as outweighing the genetic donor
parents’ privacy right.
4 BALANCING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE CHILD WITH THOSE OF
THE COMMISSIONING PARENTS
As already alluded to above, in ICS situations, the rights and best interests of
the child will, in some instances, need to be balanced with the rights and
interests of the commissioning parents. This may seem contradictory, given
that it is the commissioning parents who seek to bring the child into the world
and if commissioning parents did not take steps to undertake an ICS arrange-
ment, the child would not come into existence. Regardless of whether or not
the child is genetically related to their commissioning parents, it is important
to remember that the whole enterprise of ICS is premised on the wishes of
commissioning parents to build a family with children or to add more children
to their family. However, in considering these two groups, it is quickly appar-
ent that the child’s rights and interests may in fact conflict with those of the
commissioning parents in ICS; indeed, it is this conflict that presents the central
balancing exercise necessary in ICS.
4.1 The rights and best interests of the child in conflict with the rights and
interests of the commissioning parents in ICS
Given the deliberate, planned nature of creating a child through ICS, Davis’
observation regarding parenthood becomes particularly apt: “The decision
to have a child is never made for the sake of the child, for no child then exists.
We choose to have children for myriad reasons, but before the child is con-
ceived, those can only be self-regarding. The child is a means to our ends.
[…] But morally the child is first and foremost an end in herself.”65 However,
often, it is the wishes of commissioning parents and how these manifest in
practice in ICS arrangements through their decisions and actions that cause
a conflict with the child’s rights and best interests. In most ICS arrangements,
this conflict arises without any negative intention from commissioning parents,
65 D.S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas: Reproductive Technology, Parental Choices and Children’s Futures
(2nd ed.), (2010), at 43.
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but as a result of the decisions and actions they take. For example, the commis-
sioning parents may use anonymous donor gametes to conceive a child through
ICS, thus placing their interest in having a child in conflict with the child’s
right to preserve their identity. This exemplifies what Davis describes as a
parental decision that limits choices for the child as they grow up into adult-
hood,66 “insufficiently attentive to the child as an end in herself. By closing
off the child’s right to an open future, they define the child as an entity who
exists to fulfil parental hopes and dreams, not her own.”67 A further example
of a possible conflict is whether or not the commissioning parents are com-
mitted to caring for any child born through their ICS arrangement, regardless
of whether the child is male or female, born with a disability or serious health
condition, and if there are multiple births through the arrangement.
From a child rights perspective, the core focus when balancing the rights
and interests of these groups should be on ensuring the paramountcy of the
child’s rights and best interests, to ensure they are upheld and not sub-
ordinated to the rights or interests of their commissioning parents. In addition
to what the Committee on the Rights of the Child has stated regarding how
the child’s best interests principle should be taken into account in resolving
rights conflicts and to reach solutions, the Committee makes clear that the
child’s special situation based on their dependency, maturity, legal status and
voicelessness68 necessitates treating the child’s best interests as a primary
and sometimes paramount consideration, beyond being treated as being at
the same level as all other considerations.69 Therefore, in instances where
the child’s rights and best interests conflict with the rights of other persons,
as is the case in the scenarios raised in this paper, the Committee says that
these conflicts must be “resolved on a case-by-case basis, carefully balancing
the interests of all parties and finding a suitable compromise.”70 Moreover,
where harmonisation of these conflicting rights and interests is not possible,
the Committee asserts that “authorities and decision-makers will have to
analyse and weigh the rights of all those concerned, bearing in mind that the
right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary considera-
tion means that the child’s interests have high priority and not just one of
several considerations. Therefore, a larger weight must be attached to what
serves the child best.”71
However, before considering how the competing rights and interests of
the child and commissioning parents might be balanced in ICS, it is useful to
consider whether there is a right to be a parent or to have children, as well
66 Ibid., at 5.
67 Ibid., at 44.
68 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, at [37].
69 Ibid., at [37]-[38].





as the concept of involuntary childlessness. These present two factors some-
times underlying the actions and decisions of commissioning parents in ICS
and bringing them into conflict with the child’s rights and best interests.
4.2 Is there a right to have a child?
This question is analysed below from two key angles, namely whether a right
to a genetic child or to adopt exists.
4.2.1 Is there a right to a genetic child?
The aforementioned case of Evans v. United Kingdom is arguably the leading
authority on this question. Ms. Evans desired genetic children but required
surgery to remove her ovaries, so she and her then-partner had embryos
created and stored. However, they subsequently separated; Ms Evans wished
to proceed to undergo embryo implantation (no eggs were separately frozen)
but her ex-partner withdrew his consent to use of the embryos, seeking their
destruction. Ms Evans sought to prevent their destruction but her claims were
rejected by the UK courts.72 The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that Article
8 ECHR encompasses the right to respect for an individual’s decision to become
or not become a parent,73 and moreover held that the right to respect for the
decision to become a genetic parent falls within the scope of Article 8.74
Balancing the competing rights and interests of the parties to the IVF treatment
(Ms Evans and her ex-partner) was therefore required. As White and Ovey
note, “There was a clash of rights here: between respect for the private life
of the woman who chose to become pregnant, and the private life of the man
to choose not to become a parent with a woman with whom his relationship
had ended.”75
The Grand Chamber said that the interests must be balanced fairly; hers
should not carry greater weight than his.76 It held that a fair balance had been
struck and that the applicable UK legislation requiring continuing consent for
use by every person donating gametes was not inconsistent with Article 8 ECHR
(there was no Article 8 violation).77 However, the joint dissenting opinion
propounds the view that there was a failure to strike a fair balance between
the parties, as upholding the ex-partner’s view effectively cancelled out Ms
72 For discussion, see N. Hammond, Case Commentary: Evans v the United Kingdom, 1-2 (2007),
available at http://www.ccels.cardiff.ac.uk/archives/issues/2007/hammond.pdf
73 Evans v. United Kingdom, supra note 13, at [71].
74 Ibid., at [72].
75 C. Ovey and R.C.A. White, Jacobs & White The European Convention on Human Rights, 2014,
at 400.
76 Ibid., at [90].
77 Ibid., at [79].
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Evan’s view, and it was impossible under the legislation to strike a balance
between the competing interests.78 Indeed, despite Evans v. UK standing for
the principle that there is no absolute right to become a parent to a genetic
child (even in a situation such as this, where there is no other chance of a
person becoming a genetic parent), what the dissenting opinion highlights
is the acute complexity in striking balance in these types of cases where
competing rights and interests collide.
An earlier case from the English jurisdiction, R v. ex parte Blood79 (UK Court
of Appeal) involved a similar situation, however, Mrs Blood’s husband was
in a coma and she sought permission to use his semen via ‘artificial insemina-
tion by husband’ (AIH) to have a child genetically related to her and her
husband. The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority refused per-
mission; Warnock notes the Authority was strongly of the view that “post-
humous children were bound to suffer psychological trauma”.80 The UK Court
of Appeal further ruled Mrs Blood could not seek AIH in the UK as written
consent from her husband was required under the relevant legislation and
this did not exist. However, the Court considered Ms Blood could have the
sperm exported for AIH outside the UK (within the European Union).81 There-
fore, she underwent AIH in Belgium and successfully had a child, fulfilling
her desire to have a child who was genetically related to both her and her
husband.82 Similarly in Australia, in Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late
Mark Edwards83 the New South Wales Supreme Court granted a woman per-
mission to use her dead husband’s sperm to enable a genetic child to be born,
in the absence of his written consent. The Court struck this balance even
though the regular requirement under NSW law is written consent from the
donor for the use of their gametes.84
The governing law in both Edwards and Blood also required written consent
of the donor. Despite this, in both cases there was an absence of consent but
the Courts, to differing extents, facilitated an avenue whereby the woman could
be enabled to have a child genetically related to her husband. In both cases
there had been a long-term marital relationship, and the husband was unable
to consent – in Blood due to him being comatose, and in Edwards due to him
78 Evans v. United Kingdom, supra note 7, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Turmen, Tsatsa-
Nikolovska, Spielmann and Ziemele, at [7].
79 R v. ex parte Blood,[1997] 2 All ER 687.
80 M. Warnock, Making Babies: Is there a right to have children?, (2002), at 4.
81 BBC News, Widow Allowed Dead Husband’s Baby, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/6/newsid_2536000/2536119.stm
82 J. Laurance, Diane Blood Tells of Joy at Dead Husband’s Child, The Independent, 29 June 1998,
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/diane-blood-tells-of-joy-at-dead-hus-
bands-child-1168283.html Mrs. Blood had a second child using her late husband’s sperm
in 2002, also through a Belgian clinic. See: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/feb/09/
health.healthandwellbeing and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/2139525.stm
83 Jocelyn Edwards; Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards, [2011] NSWSC 478.




being deceased. However in the Evans case discussed earlier, one of the living
adults who had donated material to create the embryo had withdrawn consent;
the balancing exercise in Evans was therefore different to that in Edwards and
Blood (refusal to consent, not absence of consent). The balance in Evans was
equally weighed between the man and the woman, with the outcome being
that consent from both parties was required for the use of the embryos. How-
ever, something not comprehensively considered by the ECtHR in Evans is the
rights balancing exercise regarding how allowing use of the embryos by one
genetic parent against the express wishes of the other could negatively impact
on any child born as a result. Such a child could potentially grow up believing
they were unwanted by one genetic parent, and may also not have a chance
to know that parent, which would be inconsistent with the child’s best inter-
ests. Given the impact that the decision in Evans would have had on any future
child born as a result of use of the embyros, more comprehensive consideration
of the future child’s situation would have led to a holistic rights balancing
approach.
Since its decision in Evans, the ECtHR has largely maintained a consistent
position concerning the issue of respect for decisions to have genetic children:
this is an issue falling under Article 8 ECHR and although it falls within the
state’s margin of appreciation, the appropriate balance must be struck. In
Dickson v. United Kingdom,85 the Grand Chamber held that the refusal of access
to artificial insemination facilities to a prisoner and his wife amounted to a
violation of Article 8; in a matter of such significance to the applicants, the
Grand Chamber held the UK had not struck a fair balance between the compet-
ing private and public interests involved.86 In assessing whether the appropri-
ate balance had been struck, the Grand Chamber found it important that this
was the couple’s only realistic opportunity to have a child together.87 In
making this assessment, the Grand Chamber said the state’s margin of appreci-
ation will be restricted “where a particularly important facet of an individual’s
existence or identity is at stake (such as the choice to become a genetic
parent)”.88 Regarding the potential birth of a child through the provision of
access to artificial insemination facilities to the applicants, the Grand Chamber
said “the State has a positive obligation to ensure the effective protection of
children. However, that cannot go so far as to prevent parents who so wish
from attempting to conceive a child in circumstances like those of the present
case, especially as the second applicant was at liberty and could have taken
care of any child conceived until such time as her husband was released.”89
85 Dickson v. United Kingdom, Decision of 4 December 2007, Grand Chamber Judgment, App.
No. 44362/04.
86 Ibid., at [85].
87 Ibid., at [72]
88 Ibid., at [78].
89 Ibid., at [76].
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Therefore, in the Grand Chamber’s view, any potential concerns for the future
child’s welfare was not a factor preventing access to artificial insemination
to enable the applicants to exercise their decision to try to become genetic
parents.
In Australia, a similar case to Dickson was the subject of a decision on
appeal in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. In ABY & ABZ v.
Secretary to the Department of Health & Anor (Human Rights),90 ABY and his
partner alleged a breach of their human rights as they were denied ART treat-
ment based on his status as a convicted, sentenced child sex offender.91 What
makes this decision particularly interesting is the Tribunal’s consideration of
the risk of harm to a child born through ART treatment being made available
to the applicants. The legislation governing decisions regarding access to ART
treatment includes the guiding principle that “the welfare and interests of
persons born or to be born as a result of treatment procedures are para-
mount”;92 the Tribunal articulated the test to be applied as follows:
‘This decision will be based on all the evidence that comes before it, including any
evidence of factors potentially adverse to the well-being or best interests of the
child […] A consideration of what constitutes the best interests of a child could
include the physical, sexual, emotional and developmental well-being of a child.
The part of the decision which pertains to considering the best interests of the child
will first involve recognising, on the evidence before the decision-maker, any
potential identifiable and established risk factors as supported by research and
expertise in the field. Secondly, it must be decided either that these factors present
a real risk of harm when applied to all of the circumstances in an individual case,
and therefore a barrier to treatment arises, or that they do not, and therefore no
barrier exists’.93
Therefore, the Tribunal stated that “The best interests and welfare of a child
born as a result of a treatment procedure extend beyond the question of
whether any such child would be at risk of sexual harm at the hands of ABY”94
and said that it “must be satisfied that approving treatment is in the best
interest of any child that will be born as a result”.95 The Tribunal was explicit
that this requirement for the treatment to be consistent with the best interests
of any child born as a result of the treatment and the welfare and interests
of such children must be paramount.96 It said it must “determine whether
90 ABY & ABZ v. Secretary to the Department of Health & Anor (Human Rights) [2013] VCAT
625.
91 Ibid., at [4].
92 s.5(a), Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Victoria).
93 ABY & ABZ v. Secretary to the Department of Health & Anor, supra note 90, at [31].
94 Ibid., at [32].
95 Ibid.




the treatment procedure is in the best interests of the child to be born.”97
Through a comprehensive analysis of the potential identifiable and established
risk factors (including, for example, those associated with the offences for
which ABY was convicted and sentenced), considering the opinions of expert
witnesses, and taking into account protective and mitigating factors and “all
matters relevant to the welfare and interests of the child”98 the Tribunal
reached the view that “to the extent that we have found that there are identifi-
able or established risk factors, […] there is no real risk of harm to a child
to be born to ABY and ABZ as should constitute a barrier to treatment.”99
Ultimately, the Tribunal found that “there is no barrier to treatment, and that
the carrying out of a treatment procedure is consistent with the best interests
of a child who would be born as a result of the treatment procedure.”100
A more recent ECtHR decision encompassing consideration of whether there
is a right to a genetic child is the Grand Chamber’s decision in S.H. and Others
v. Austria.101 The applicants were two couples experiencing infertility in
different ways (both spouses were infertile in the situation of the first
couple,102 whereas in that of the second couple, only the woman was infert-
ile103). Both couples were unable to access in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) in Austria,
given applicable Austrian law prohibits donor sperm use in IVF, only allows
the use of artificial insemination when introducing sperm into the reproductive
organs of a woman,104 and absolutely prohibits ovum donation.105 The
applicants claimed these prohibitions, which effectively barred them from being
able to have a child who was genetically related to at least one of them,
amounted to a breach of their Article 8 ECHR right to respect for private and
family life.
The Grand Chamber confirmed that Article 8 encompasses “the right of
a couple to conceive a child and to make use of medically assisted procreation
for that purpose”, as such a choice to do so is an expression of private and
family life.106 In reaching this view, the ECtHR applied Dickson (the notions
of private and family lives incorporate the right to respect for the decision
to become genetic parents107). The Grand Chamber said the margin of
97 Ibid., at [124].
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., at [127].
100 Ibid., at [128].
101 S.H. and Others v. Austria, Decision of 3 November 2011, Judgment (Merits and Just Satis-
faction), Court (Grand Chamber), App. No. 57813/00.
102 Ibid., at [11].
103 Ibid., at [12].
104 The prohibition exists under s3(1) Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzof 1992 (Austrian Artificial
Procreation Act), with the only exceptions provided under s3(2) of the Act.
105 s3(1) Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzof 1992: ova may only be used for the woman from whom
they originate.
106 S.H. and Others v. Austria, supra note 101, at [82].
107 Ibid., at [81], citing Dickson v. United Kingdom.
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appreciation afforded to the State concerning gamete donation IVF is wide,
based on lack of consensus among Member States and that IVF raises “sensitive
moral and ethical issues against a background of fast-moving medical develop-
ments”.108 It held the margin of appreciation had not been exceeded in
respect of either couple; there had been no breach of Article 8 (overturning
the earlier decision of the First Section).109 In his separate opinion, Judge
de Gaetano asserted that “While there is no doubt that a couple’s decision
to conceive a child is a decision which pertains to the private and family life
of that couple (and, in the context of Article 12, to the couple’s right to found
a family), neither Article 8 nor Article 12 can be construed as granting a right
to conceive a child at any cost. The “desire” for a child cannot, to my mind,
become an absolute goal which overrides the dignity of every human life.”110
With S.H. and Others, the ECtHR reinforces the view that a desire to have genetic
children does not equate to a stand-alone right to have children, but that
respect for a decision to try to have genetic children is encompassed in the
Article 8 right to respect for private and family life, although States are free
to regulate ART treatment under their margin of appreciation. As such, the
right to respect for a decision to try to have genetic children can be limited.
Applying the case law discussed on whether there is a right to a genetic
child to the ICS context, there cannot be understood to be a right to a genetic
child per se. Therefore, arguments that ICS should be available at all costs in
order to ensure access to genetic children are weak. Moreover, the best interests
and rights of the child must be safeguarded. As ICS is not a practice provided
or funded by governmental authorities, it is unlikely that claims of discrimin-
atory treatment or availability of ICS will hold up if brought before the Courts
or other adjudicative bodies; essentially, the current ICS market is governed
by market forces, meaning those who can afford ICS can access the market.
4.2.2 Is there a right to adopt?
Turning to consider whether to be a right to adopt to become a parent exists,
leading jurisprudence is again found in the ECtHR. The ECtHR declared in-
admissible early applications concerning a right to adopt;111 however, more
recently the ECtHR has considered the merits of a number of cases addressing
108 Ibid., at [97].
109 In its decision of 1 April 2010, the First Section found that the fulfilment of the wish for
a child should not be precluded by ART that is provided on a discriminatory basis (at [93]).
It found that the different treatment was disproportionate and without justification, amount-
ing to a violation of Art. 14, ECHR (prohibition of discrimination) read in conjunction with
Art. 8, ECHR (at [85] and 94]).
110 S.H. and Others v. Austria, supra note 101, Separate opinion of Judge de Gaetano, at [2].
111 E.g. X v. Belgium and the Netherlands, Decision of 10 July 1975, Commission DR 7, 75, App.





this issue. Lestas posits that the ECtHR’s willingness to assess this issue goes
to the general ambit of rights protected under the ECHR.112 In a number of
instances, this line of cases has concerned claims of discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation (applicants arguing their sexual orientation has prevented
them adopting). For example, in E.B v. France,113 the Grand Chamber found
the applicant had been discriminated against based on her sexual orientation
as a lesbian, which interfered with her application to adopt a child.114 How-
ever, in making this finding the ECtHR noted the Conseil d’Etat had appropriate-
ly taken into consideration whether being brought up by the applicant was
consistent with the child’s best interests (and this was found to be the case).115
As Lestas elaborates, the significance of E.B. v. France is that it affirmed that
adoption issues fall within the ambit of Article 8, when undertaking an ex-
amination of alleged discrimination under Article 14.116 It is also worth noting
that in the earlier decision in Fretté v. France,117 the ECtHR’s Former Third
Section restated the importance of remembering that adoption is “providing
a child with a family, not a family with a child”,118 thereby highlighting
adoption as a means of child protection, and one that must only be pursued
if it is in the best interests of the child, as made clear under Article 21 of the
CRC.
The Grand Chamber has since dealt with this issue in X and Others v.
Austria.119 This was an application from two unmarried women living in
a long-term relationship and the child of one of the applicants. It concerned
the Austrian courts’ decision to refuse granting the woman who was not the
child’s biological mother the right to adopt the child without severing the
child’s relationship with his biological mother (second-parent adoption). The
Grand Chamber found a violation of Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with
Article 8, based on the different treatment of the applicants compared with
unmarried heterosexual couples seeking adoption of the other partners’ child.
It said that “[…] the Government has failed to adduce particularly weighty
and convincing reasons to show that excluding second-parent adoption in a
same-sex couple, while allowing that possibility in an unmarried different-sex
couple, was necessary for the protection of the family in the traditional sense
112 G. Letsas, ‘No Human Right to Adopt?’, (2008), 1 UCL Human Rights Review 151-152.
113 E.B. v. France, Decision of 22 January 2008, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), Court
(Grand Chamber), App. No. 43546/02.
114 Ibid., at [98].
115 Ibid., at [95].
116 G. Letsas, supra note 112, at 152.
117 Fretté v. France, (2002) 38 EHRR 438.
118 Ibid., at [42].
119 X and Others v. Austria, Decision of 19 February 2013, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction)
Court (Grand Chamber), App. No. 19010/07.
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or for the protection of the interests of the child. The distinction is therefore
incompatible with the Convention.”120
However, the ECtHR made clear that Member States are not obliged under
the ECHR to extend the right to second-parent adoption to unmarried
couples,121 and moreover explicitly stated that there is no guaranteed right
to adopt under Article 8 ECHR.122 In reaching its decision, regarding the rights
of the child the ECtHR highlighted Articles 3 and 21 of the CRC, asserting “[…]
the existence of de facto family life between the applicants, the importance of
having the possibility of obtaining legal recognition thereof, the lack of evid-
ence adduced by the Government in order to show that it would be detrimental
to the child to be brought up by a same-sex couple or to have two mothers
and two fathers for legal purposes, and especially their admission that same-
sex couples may be as suited for second-parent adoption as different-sex
couples – cast considerable doubt on the proportionality of the absolute pro-
hibition on second-parent adoption in same-sex couples […] the considerations
[…] would seem rather to weigh in favour of allowing the courts to carry out
an examination of each individual case. This would also appear to be more
in keeping with the best interests of the child”.123 Despite this statement,
the joint partly dissenting opinion strongly criticised the majority judgment
for not giving centrality to the child’s best interests in its judgment.124
Like S.H. and Others v. Austria regarding genetic children, the leading
jurisprudence on adoption therefore confirms that where the possibility to
adopt is made available, this opportunity should be offered without discrimina-
tion, but regardless, the ECtHR line of cases discussed in this section underscores
that there is no right to adopt. Extending this position by analogy to the ICS
context, the argument that there can be said to be no absolute right to have
a child via ICS is a strong one. Furthermore, drawing on the adoption juris-
prudence, by extension it is clear that in ICS too, the child’s rights and best
interests must always be taken into consideration in decisions affecting them.
4.3 The concept of ‘involuntary childlessness’
The consideration of the two lines of case law above demonstrates that there
cannot be understood to exist a right to be a genetic parent or to be an adopt-
ive parent. However, some people view ICS as their best (and perhaps final
120 Ibid., at [151].
121 Ibid., at [136].
122 Ibid., at [135].
123 Ibid., at [146].
124 X and Others v. Austria, supra note 119, joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Casadevall,




or only) chance to become a parent,125 and this can be identified as a core
motivator for ICS commissioning parents who genuinely seek this.126 Thus
a further issue which must be briefly touched upon regarding whether there
can be said to be a right to become a parent is the concept of ‘involuntary
childlessness’, a term used to describe the state of affairs that leads commis-
sioning parents to turn to ICS.127 Smith-Cavros uses the term to describe indi-
viduals who are “unwillingly childless”,128 noting that with ICS, “Scenarios
to achieve parenthood that were once impossible are made a possibility.”129
Palattiyl describes involuntary childlessness as the inability to conceive when
individuals want to, and identifies ICS as a method addressing infertility and
involuntary childlessness.130
Do individuals have a right not to be in a state of involuntary childlessness,
and therefore to have a child and be a parent? Arguably, a broad interpretation
of the right to found a family under Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights covers building a family with children. However, it would
be stretching the limits of such a broad interpretation to extend this to equate
to an absolute right to have genetic or biologically related children, especially
when there are other means available to found a family with children, such
as adoption.
General Comment 19 of the UN Human Rights Committee131 provides
some guidance on this issue, in relation to Article 23 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (which builds on Article 16(1) UDHR).132
The Human Rights Committee states that “The right to found a family implies,
in principle, the possibility to procreate and live together.”133 Based on this
statement, it is clear that the possibility of procreation should be respected
125 Australia is reported to have the largest number of commissioning parents who are engaging
in ICS. See: M. Cooper et al (eds.), Current Issues and Emerging Trends in Medical Tourism,
(2015) at 147.
126 However, it should not be ignored that some commissioning parents enter into ICS arrange-
ments motivated by intentions which run directly counter to international human rights
law norms and standards, e.g. to create a child for the purpose of sexual exploitation, sale
or trafficking, as discussed later in this paper at section 4.4.
127 E.g., E. Smith-Cavros, ‘Fertility and Inequality Across Borders: Assisted Reproductive
Technology and Globalization’, (2010) 4:7 Sociology Compass 466, at 468; G. Palattiyil, E.
Blyth et al., ‘Globalization and cross-border reproductive services: Ethical implications of
surrogacy in India for social work’, (2010) 53:5 International Social Work 686, at 688.
128 Smith-Cavros, supra 127 at [468].
129 Ibid.
130 Palattiyil and Blyth et al, supra note 127, at 688.
131 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 19: Protection of the family, the right
to marriage and equality of the spouses (Art. 23) 27 July 1990.
132 Article 23(1), ICCPR, supra note 41: “The Family is the natural and fundamental group unit
of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”; Article 23(2), ICCPR: “The
right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and found a family shall be recog-
nised.”
133 UN Human Rights Committee, supra note 131, at [5].
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and protected (and this aligns with other provisions in international human
rights law establishing the right to reproductive autonomy and health134),
but this does not correlate with an absolute right to have a child. Although
reproductive health and freedom must be respected and protected,135 and
where it is made available by states, access to medical treatment to achieve
the end of having a child should be made available without discrimination,
there is nothing in international human rights law establishing an absolute
right to have a child. Despite this, the desire of many involuntarily childless
individuals to have a child and become parents will continue to motivate them
to choose to undertake ICS, regardless of whether or not there is a right to do
so.
4.4 Inserting the child’s rights into the picture
The desire of commissioning parents to have a child is the key driver behind
ICS arrangements. As this desire can sometimes obscure the focus on upholding
the child’s rights in ICS and undertaking decisions in the child’s best interests,
steps must be taken to ensure these are safeguarded. The child’s rights and
best interests must be balanced against any rights and interests of the commis-
sioning parents; however, the child’s rights and interests – as the most vulner-
able party of the two, lacking agency to advocate for their own interests during
infancy and early years, and given the special nature of childhood136 – must
be inserted into the centre of the picture, especially given the range of potential
rights violations that children are vulnerable to within ICS. As Michael Freeman
asserts, “Children easily become victims”,137 and further, “Children are parti-
cularly vulnerable and need rights to protect their integrity and dignity.”138
134 E.g. Art. 16(1)(e), CEDAW, supra note 44; Art. 11(1)(f), CEDAW: protection of health and
safety in working conditions, including safeguarding of reproductive function; also N.B.
the right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art. 12, ICESCR) includes “the right
to control one’s health and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom”. See Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), (2000), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, at [8].
N.B. the World Health Organisation defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” Constitution
of the World Health Organisation, Preamble, (1946).
135 Among other things, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that
“Reproductive health means that women and men have the freedom to decide if and when
to reproduce”. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment
No. 14, ibid., at fn. 12.
136 As noted in preambular para. 4, CRC, supra note 2, and UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child, supra note 7, at [37].
137 M. Freeman, “Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously”, (1992) 6 International Journal of
Law and the Family 54.




In ICS, it is crucial that the following statement by the Committee on the
Rights of the child is at the forefront of all decisions and actions concerning
the child: there must be “a consciousness about the place that children’s
interests must occupy in all actions and a willingness to give priority to those
interests in all circumstances, but especially when an action has an undeniable
impact on the children concerned.”139 Furthermore, as the ECtHR has observed
in a judgment concerning adulterine children, a key principle when balancing
the rights and interests of children with adults is that children cannot be
blamed for circumstances for which they are not responsible, but for which
their parents are.140
It is crucial therefore in ICS to acknowledge that adults do not necessarily
always have children’s best interests at heart.141 In extreme ICS cases, adults
may not act consistently with the best interests of the children they commis-
sion, for example in cases where those children are created for the purpose
of sale, illegal adoption, trafficking or with other sinister intentions in mind
(for example, sexual exploitation or other forms of child abuse). Decision-
makers in ICS must remain alert to this possibility, and weigh rights and
interests with this in mind. But in the more usual run of ICS cases, the commis-
sioning parents may simply not think to place the interests and rights of the
child they commission at the forefront of their concerns, given their own
overriding wish for a child. Furthermore, commissioning parents may not
realise their own interests will not always align with the child’s rights and
best interests in ICS, and they may not know actions are necessary to be taken
or avoided in order to ensure the protection of the child’s rights, consistent
with their best interests. Due to such a lack of foresight or focus, issues such
as statelessness and identity preservation may become problematic and lead
to violations of the child’s rights under the CRC and other international human
rights instruments.
4.5 Striking a balance between the rights and interests of the child and the
commissioning parents in the specific situation of ICS
A balance must be struck between these competing rights and interests, bearing
in mind the primacy of the best interests of the child. It may be necessary for
a balancing of competing rights and interests between commissioning parents
and children in ICS situations to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis by key
decision-makers such as social workers, government ministers and judges.
When framing future policies and legislation governing ICS or applicable to
139 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, at [40].
140 Mazurek v. France, Decision of 1 February 2000, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction),
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ICS situations, policy-makers and legislators will also need to consider the
appropriate balance to be struck between commissioning parents and children
born through ICS. Analysis of selected jurisprudence relevant by extension to
some of the rights and interests of children born from ICS arrangements is
helpful when considering rights balancing between commissioning parents
and children. This is presented below in section 4.5.1, before examining how
the child’s rights and best interests have been balanced with commissioning
parents’ rights and interests in leading ICS jurisprudence (section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Selected jurisprudence relevant to the balancing of commissioning parents’
and children’s rights and best interests in ICS
Firstly, on issues of welfare and best interests, the UK High Court decision
In the Matter of TT (a Minor),142 considered a traditional domestic surrogacy
arrangement which broke down with the surrogate refusing to give up the
child, T, following birth. T is the genetic child of the commissioning father
and the surrogate. The commissioning father contested the surrogate’s actions
in the UK High Court, at which time T was 5 months old. The Court refused
granting a residence order to the commissioning father, instead ordering T
reside in the surrogate’s (genetic mother) care. Baker J. accepted the surrogate’s
submission that during the course of her pregnancy, she changed her mind
about handing over the baby,143 and said that in considering the case, the
Court’s paramount consideration was the child’s welfare.144 Baker J. adopted
the approach previously applied in Re P (Surrogacy: Residence);145 the ques-
tion to be asked was “which home is T most likely to mature into a happy
and balanced adult and to achieve her fullest potential as a human?”146 Baker
J. said
‘On balance, I have reached the clear conclusion that T’s welfare requires her to
remain with her mother. In my judgment, there is a clear attachment between
mother and daughter. To remove her from her mother’s care would cause a measure
of harm. It is the mother who, I find, is better able to meet T’s needs, in particular
her emotional needs. […] I am less confident that Mr. and Mrs W would respect
the relationship between T and her mother were they to be granted residence.’147
The Court’s reasoning places central focus on what was in T’s best interests,
weighing these in relation to her commissioning/genetic father’s interest in
having T in his full-time care. In doing so, the Court held that preserving the
142 In the Matter of TT (a Minor), [2011] EWHC 33 (Fam).
143 Ibid., at [34].
144 Ibid., at [54].
145 Re P (Surrogacy: Residence), [2008] 1 FLR 177.
146 In the Matter of TT (a Minor), supra note 142, at [57].




child’s attachment with the surrogate/genetic mother, and preventing the harm
that might have been caused by removing her from this relationship out-
weighed the interests of the commissioning father. A number of factors con-
cerning the father’s behaviour were considered by the Court, and seen to
indicate that he and his wife were less equipped to protect T’s needs,148
especially her emotional needs.149 Taking a holistic, lifetime approach to the
balancing exercise, the Court not only considered in whose care T’s best
interests would be best protected in the short-term, but also attached import-
ance to the question of in whose care T would be more likely to achieve her
full human potential as she developed from childhood to adulthood. This
judgment is a clear example of a decision-maker prioritising the child’s best
interests over those of their commissioning parents (and in particular in this
instance the commissioning/genetic father) on the basis of reasoning weighing
in favour of T remaining in the care arrangement that was already established
with her surrogate/genetic mother. As Gerards notes, individual rights can
be restricted if good (that is, convincing) reasons exist to do so;150 this de-
cision demonstrates how a balancing of rights can result in a restriction of
a commissioning parent’s rights in favour of prioritising the child’s rights and
best interests. Lastly, it is important to note that the Court safeguarded T’s
right to preserve her identity in relation to her genetic father by making a
contact order in his favour.
Leading ECtHR child abduction jurisprudence is also worth highlighting
in relation to balancing the child’s rights and interests with their commission-
ing parents’ interests in ICS. President Costa notes, “In the Strasbourg case-law,
the principle of giving priority to safeguarding the best interests of the child
is firmly established”,151 and the best interests of the child must be considered
on a case-by-case basis as part of a balancing exercise.152 Indeed, in many
judgments, the ECtHR has been explicit regarding this balancing exercise; for
example, in Yousef v. The Netherlands,153 the ECtHR reiterated that “in judicial
decisions where the rights under Article 8 of parents and those of a child are
at stake, the child’s rights must be the paramount consideration. If any balanc-
ing of interests is necessary, the interests of the child must prevail.”154
148 Ibid., at [35]-[52].
149 Ibid., at [69]-[70].
150 Gerards, supra note 4, at 132.
151 J.P. Costa, The Best Interests of the Child in the Recent Case Law of the European Court of Human
Rights, Speech to the Franco-British-Irish Colloque on Family Law, (14 May 2011), at 2.
152 Ibid., at 5.
153 Yousef v. The Netherlands, Decision of 5 November 2002, Judgment (Merits), Court (Second
Section), App. No. 33711/96.
154 Ibid., at [73]. This application concerned the claim of a genetic father to be recognised as
a child’s legal parent; the Court ultimately found that the correct balance had been struck
between the rights of the applicant and the child, holding that the Netherlands had not
violated Article 8, ECHR in refusing to recognise the applicant as the child’s legal father.
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In this respect, ECtHR child abduction jurisprudence is perhaps the most
relevant line of case law with relevance to the balancing of the child’s rights
and interests with their commissioning parents’ interests in ICS. In Neulinger
and Shuruk v. Switzerland,155 the Grand Chamber was not convinced it would
be in the best interests of the abducted child who was at the centre of the
application to return to Israel from Switzerland. The child was highly in-
tegrated into Swiss society with his mother; removing him to Israel would
cause him significant disturbance, a fact which in the Grand Chamber’s view,
needed to be weighted heavily in the balancing of rights and interests.156
The Grand Chamber said it had to weigh any benefit that the child would
receive from being returned to Israel against any disturbance it might cause
him;157 it found that return to Israel would not provide circumstances con-
ducive to the child’s well-being.158 Also relevant in this balancing exercise
was the fact that the child’s father’s right of access had been subject to restric-
tions before the child’s abduction; furthermore, if the child’s mother was made
to return to Israel, this would trigger disproportionate interference with her
right to respect for family life. In reasoning consistent with the CRC, the Grand
Chamber said “there is currently a broad consensus – including in international
law – in support of the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their
best interests must be paramount”.159 Thus whilst balancing and striking
a fair balance between competing interests, the child’s best interests must be
protected and upheld and treated as the most important consideration.
In another leading child abduction judgment, X v. Latvia,160 the Grand
Chamber stated the best interests of the child “do not coincide with those of
the father or the mother”,161 and it again held that the best interests of the
child must be the primary consideration in the decision-making process on
whether the child should be returned, in this instance from Latvia to Australia.
It observed that “The decisive issue is whether the fair balance that must exist
between the competing interests at stake – those of the child, of the two
parents, and of public order – has been struck, within the margin of appreci-
ation afforded to States in such matters, taking into account, however, that
the best interests of the child must be of primary consideration and that the
objectives of prevention and immediate return correspond to a specific concep-
tion of ‘the best interests of the child’.”162 In a concurring opinion, Judge
155 Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, Decision of 6 July 2010, Judgment (Grand Chamber),
App. No. 41615/07.
156 Ibid., at [151].
157 Ibid., at [148].
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., at [135].
160 X v. Latvia, Decision of 26 November 2013, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), Court
(Grand Chamber), App. No. 27853/09.
161 Ibid., at [100].




Pinto de Albuquerque significantly asserted that there is “universal acknow-
ledgement of the paramountcy of the child’s best interests as a principle of
international customary and treaty law, and not a mere ‘social paradigm’”.163
Issues relating to the child’s right to preserve their identity (Article 8 CRC)
require significant attention in the rights balancing exercise in ICS situations,
given the range of ways in which this right is open to violation.164 The third
party submissions by the German Government in S.H. and Others v Austria
argued the concept of “split motherhood” that may eventuate for children
born from some ART arrangements was contrary to the child’s welfare,165
leading to identity-related difficulties for the child.166 The German Govern-
ment asserted “Splitting motherhood into a genetic and a biological mother
would result in two women having a part in the creation of a child. […] the
resulting ambiguousness of the mother’s identity might jeopardise the develop-
ment of the child’s personality and lead to considerable problems in his or
her discovery of identity.167 Applying this to the ICS situation, this view high-
lights that the child’s right to preserve identity must be weighed against the
rights and interests of the commissioning parents who seek a child through
ICS, to establish whether on balance the child’s right to preserve their identity
will be protected. As it is in the child’s best interests to be able to enjoy and
exercise their identity preservation right, significant weight must attach to this
in the rights balancing exercise. For example, it should be assessed if the
commissioning parents plan to, or are taking active steps to protect the child’s
right to identity preservation and to ameliorate any potential negative impacts
of ICS on this right. If commissioning parents do take active steps such as
ensuring that information about the child’s genetic parents (in ICS situations
involving gamete donors) and surrogate mother is collected and preserved,
and if they intend to share this with the child as they grow up, this may weigh
in favour of the commissioning parents. This could be seen to evidence that
they have actively sought to protect the best interests of the child, by ensuring
their right to preserve their identity is upheld, as opposed to not having
considered nor sought to protect the child’s identity preservation right.
163 X v. Latvia, supra note 160, concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque.
164 As discussed in sections 2 and 5 C.Achmad ‘Answering the “Who am I?” Question: Protect-
ing the Right of Children Born Through International Commercial Surrogacy to Preserve
Their Identity Under Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’,
submitted for publication to Human Rights Law Review; appearing as Chapter 8 of this
doctoral thesis.
165 S. H and Others v. Austria, supra note 101, at [53].
166 Ibid., at [53].
167 Ibid., at [53].
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4.5.2 Selected ICS jurisprudence balancing commissioning parents’ and children’s
rights
Moving beyond jurisprudence which is helpful by analogy in the ICS context,
some ICS judgments issued by domestic courts and the ECtHR are instructive
regarding approaches to balancing the rights and best interests of the child
in relation to commissioning parents in ICS.
In dealing with a number of ICS cases which have come before them in
order to regularise the parental relationship between children born through
ICS and their commissioning parents, domestic courts in demand-side ICS states
have largely focused on the welfare and best interests of the child as the factor
to be given the most weight in balancing the competing rights and interests
of the child and their commissioning parents. For example, in X and Y (Foreign
Surrogacy), the UK High Court held that the welfare of the child was of para-
mount importance in considering whether to make a parental order in favour
of UK commissioning parents who commissioned twins through ICS in Ukrai-
ne.168 This approach has been characteristic of the UK High Court in ICS cases
since,169 as well as in domestic ICS decisions of courts other jurisdictions
which have dealt with applications concerning ICS, such as in Australia.170
This highlights that the child’s rights must be given precedence when com-
peting with those of commissioning parents, in order to reach a balance that
is consistent with the child’s best interests.
In the ECtHR jurisdiction, in its first decision concerning ICS, Mennesson v.
France, the ECtHR (Fifth Section, Chamber) reiterated that in determining
whether a fair balance has been struck between the competing interests
involved, “it must have regard to the essential principle according to which
whenever the situation of a child is in issue, the best interests of that child
are paramount”.171 Furthermore, the ECtHR emphasised “the importance to
be given to the child’s interests when weighing up the competing interests
at stake”.172 Although the commissioning parents’ and children’s rights and
interests were in direct conflict in this case, the ECtHR found that the twins
(born through ICS in the USA) and their commissioning parents had experienced
a range of impacts on their right to respect for family life as a result of the
168 X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), at [24].
169 E.g. Re L (A Minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 at [9]-[10]; Re X and Y (Children) [2011] EWHC 3147
(Fam) at [40]; Re C (A Child) [2013] EWHC 2413 (Fam) at [30]ff; Re WT [2014] EWHC 1303
(Fam) at [38]ff; R and S v T (Surrogacy: Service, Consent and Payments) [2015] EWFC 22 at
[42]; A and B (No 2 – Parental Order) [2015] EWHC 2080 (Fam) at [85]ff.
170 E.g. the Family Court of Australia in Ellison v Karnchanit [2012] Fam CA 602 was clear to
point out that “irrespective of how State law views the applicant’s actions, the children
have done nothing wrong” (at [90]). The Court discusses the principle of the child’s best
interests throughout the judgment and applies this principle as central to its reasoning.
171 Mennesson v. France, Decision of 26 June 2014, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), Court
(Fifth Section), App. No. 65192/11, at [81].




lack of recognition in French law of the legal parent-child relationship (thereby
not recognising the twins as French citizens and not recognising the legal
parent-child relationship lawfully established in the USA).173 However, despite
this, as the twins’ were able to live in the care of their commissioning parents
in France, and as it had not been impossible for them to overcome the practical
obstacles arising from the lack of French recognition,174 the ECtHR found no
violation of their right to respect for family life.
However, the twins’ right to respect for their private life had been violated.
The ECtHR said that
‘the effects of non-recognition in French law of the legal parent-child relationship
between children thus conceived and the intended parents are not limited to the
parents alone, who have chosen a particular method of assisted reproduction
prohibited by the French authorities. They also affect the children themselves, whose
right to respect for their private life – which implies that everyone must be able
to establish the substance of his or her identity, including the legal parent-child
relationship – is substantially affected. Accordingly, a serious question arises as
to the compatibility of that situation with the child’s best interests, respect for which
must guide any decision in their regard.’175
The ECtHR found the fact that the commissioning father was the twins’ genetic
father was of particular significance, as genetic parentage is an element of
identity.176 As such, “it cannot be said to be in the interests of the child to
deprive him or her of a legal relationship of this nature where the biological
[genetic] reality of that relationship has been established and the child and
parent concerned demand full recognition thereof”;177 the uncertainty faced
by the twins as to the possibility of being recognised as French nationals would
likely have negative impacts on the “definition of their personal identity”.178
Overall, while the ECtHR said that there was “a serious restriction on the
[twins’] identity and right to respect for private life”179 amounting to a viola-
tion of their Article 8 ECHR right to respect for private life, there was no
corresponding violation of their commissioning parent’s rights.
In Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy,180 the ECtHR (Second Section, Chamber)
again dealt with an application concerning ICS. Unlike in Mennesson, in this
case, the commissioning parents, not the child born through ICS, were the
applicants to the ECtHR (with the ECtHR finding they did not have standing
173 Ibid., at [87]-[89].
174 Ibid., [92].
175 Ibid., at [99].
176 Ibid., at [100].
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid., at [97].
179 Ibid., at [100].
180 Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, Decision of 27 January 2015, Judgment (Merits and Just
Satisfaction) Court (Second Section), App. No. 25358/12.
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to bring applications on behalf of the child181), and there was a clearer conflict
of rights and interests between the commissioning parents and child. The child
was born through ICS in Russia; the Italian authorities had refused to recognise
his Russian birth certificate and register his birth in the Italian civil register.
He had no genetic link to either commissioning parent,182 (despite the applic-
ants having intended a genetic link with the commissioning father183) and
had remained in their care for his first six months of life, creating “de facto
family life between the applicants and the child.”184 However, given these
facts and the large amount of money paid by the applicants in relation to the
ICS arrangement, the child was removed from the applicants and placed in
state care,185 with contact between the child and the applicants prohibited.186
Like in Mennesson, the ECtHR stated that in considering whether a fair balance
has been struck between the competing interests involved, “it must have regard
to the essential principle according to which whenever the situation of a child
is in issue, the best interests of that child are paramount”.187
Ultimately, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 ECHR in relation to the
action of the Italian authorities to remove the child from the applicants and
place him in state care. The Article 8 violation rested on the ECtHR’s view that
the action was not proportionate, namely, the child’s interests were not suffi-
ciently taken into account by the Italian authorities.188 In making this finding,
the ECtHR noted with particular concern that “the child received a new identity
on April 2013, which means that he had no official identity for more than two
years. It is necessary, however, to ensure that a child is not disadvantaged
on account of the fact that he or she was born to a surrogate mother, especially
in terms of citizenship or identity, which are of crucial importance (see Ar-
ticle 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child).”189
Paradiso has been referred to the Grand Chamber; in this respect, it is
important to highlight the joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Raimondi
and Spano. The dissenting judges found that there had been no violation of
Article 8. They said the applicants’ de facto family life was based on a tenuous
link – without a genetic connection, and with possible illegal conduct
underpinning de facto family life.190 Moreover, they asserted “When the youth
court decided to remove the child from the applicants, it took into account
the harm that he would undoubtedly sustain but, given the short period that
181 Ibid., at [50].
182 Ibid., at [70].
183 Ibid., at [76]-[77].
184 Ibid., at [69].
185 Ibid., at [22]-[23].
186 Ibid., at [23].
187 Ibid., at at [75].
188 Ibid., at [81]-[87].
189 Ibid., at [85].




he had spent with them and his young age, it considered that the child would
surmount this difficult stage in his life. Having regard to those factors, we
have no grounds to doubt the adequacy of the elements on which the author-
ities relied in concluding that the child ought to be taken into the care of the
social services. It follows that the Italian authorities acted in accordance with
the law, with a view to preventing disorder and protecting the rights and
health of the child, and maintained the fair balance that should be struck
between the interests at stake.”191
5 BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE WITH THE RIGHTS AND INTER-
ESTS OF THE COMMISSIONING PARENTS
Another nexus where competing rights and interests require balancing in ICS
is when there is a conflict between the surrogate and the commissioning
parents before the child is born. Despite the different views which exist con-
cerning whether ICS amounts to commodification of women who act as sur-
rogates,192 commissioning parents are in part paying for a surrogate (who
is sometimes also genetically related to the child) to carry and bring a child
to term for them; this may lead to a power imbalance and raise conflicts over
actions and decisions concerning the pregnancy and future child.
5.1 A power imbalance in favour of commissioning parents in ICS
Given that the commissioning parents are paying the surrogate to bring a child
to term, to some extent the commissioning parents hold a concentration of
power in the relationship. This may manifest in commissioning parents exerting
pressure over the surrogate to act in accordance with their interests prior to
and during pregnancy and post-birth. They may want the surrogate to undergo
certain medical procedures or treatments whilst pregnant, or they may seek
to dictate her lifestyle and wider health choices (such as her diet) during her
pregnancy. The interests of commissioning parents can therefore impinge on
the surrogate’s rights to reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity. In
instances where commissioning parents or one commissioning parent is gen-
etically related to the child, this may also cause the commissioning parents
to argue that they have certain rights regarding the child while he or she is
in utero and following birth, based on this genetic link. They may use the
191 Ibid., at [12].
192 Strong arguments exist in this respect, see e.g. K. Schanbacher, ‘India’s Gestational Surrogacy
Market: An Exploitation of Poor, Uneducated Women’, (2014) 25 Hastings Women’s Law
Journal 21; and S. Reddy and T. Patel, ‘“There are many eggs in my body”: Medical markets
and commodified bodies in India’, (2015) 26.3-4 Global Bioethics 218.
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existence of this link to support their view that the surrogate should take or
avoid particular actions during her pregnancy.
Another potential conflict which may arise is that the commissioning
parents may seek to have a foetus terminated if prenatal testing indicates the
child is likely to be born with a disability or serious health condition, or in
instances where there is a multiple pregnancy and commissioning parents do
not want a multiple birth. Another course of action commissioning parents
might seek to take in such instances is that they may end up reneging on the
ICS arrangement and abandoning the child following birth. An example of
commissioning parents seeking an abortion arose in a domestic surrogacy in
Canada. Prenatal testing detected the foetus (who was genetically related to
the commissioning parents) would likely be born with Down Syndrome.193
The surrogate initially refused abortion, but later acquiesced to the commission-
ing parents’ request.194 In this situation, the surrogate’s acquiescence was
likely triggered by a clause in the contract signed by the parties stating that
if she made such a decision in the event that the commissioning parents sought
abortion, the commissioning parents would be absolved from all responsibility
in relation to the child.195 Whether such a contractual clause is legally defens-
ible is questionable, given that it arguably breaches rights safeguarded under
both CEDAW and the CRC. Further, given the surrogate’s own family situation,
she was unable to entertain the prospect of raising the child herself.196 As
Baylis comments on this case, “The child is seen by the commissioning parents
as a product, and in this case a substandard product because of a genetic
condition”.197
It is also important to recognise that the effect of the stance taken by the
commissioning parents in this case reduced the surrogate to a commodified
carrier, whose reproductive autonomy they sought to curtail based on the
child’s health status. Therefore, the surrogate’s reproductive autonomy and
right to health was arguably infringed, as her choice over whether to abort
the child or continue the pregnancy appears to have been largely removed.
Weighing the competing human rights and interests at stake, the surrogate’s
reproductive autonomy should not be completely subordinated to the views
and wishes of the commissioning parents, but rather, should carry greater
weight as the most vulnerable party (aside from the child) in comparison with
the commissioning parents.198 Galloway is correct in observing that here,
193 T. Blackwell, ‘Couple urged surrogate mother to abort foetus because of defect’, National






198 K. Galloway, ‘Theoretical Approaches to Human Dignity, Human Rights and Surrogacy’,




the surrogate has the least power and the most at stake regarding human
dignity, and therefore a balancing of rights should weigh to protect her.
However, it is true that in such situations if the surrogate’s rights and interests
were found to outweigh those of the commissioning parents, the question of
who would care for the child would come into sharp focus, without a clear
answer. This reality would be particularly difficult from a practical perspective
if upon birth, the commissioning parents and the surrogate all refused to
assume responsibility for the child. In such a situation, the child would be
left completely vulnerable without any parental protection from the people
directly responsible for bringing him or her into the world, inconsistent with
their best interests and wider rights under the CRC (for example, to know and
be cared for by their parents and to preserve their identity).
5.2 A power imbalance in favour of the surrogate in ICS
Conversely, a concentration of power may lie with the surrogate in ICS. This
can stem from the position that in many jurisdictions, because she is the
woman who carries and gives birth to the child, she is recognised as the child’s
legal mother. The case of Paton v. United Kingdom199 highlights that in the
context of abortion, the balance is usually struck in favour of pregnant women
in instances when another party, for example the legal father of the unborn
child (in ICS situations, this would more likely be the commissioning parents)
opposes the abortion. In Paton, the then European Commission on Human
Rights held that the legal father of an unborn child could not interfere with
the decision of its mother to have an abortion if she chose to.200 In dismissing
the application made by the would-be father, the Commission said
‘having regard to the right of the pregnant woman, [the Commission] does not
find that the husband’s and potential father’s right to respect for his private and
family life can be interpreted so widely as to embrace such procedural rights as
claimed by the applicant, i.e. a right to be consulted, or a right to make applications,
about an abortion which his wife intends to have performed on her.’201
The concentration of power with the surrogate is strongly rooted in the reality
that she carries the child(ren) that the commissioning parents greatly desire
to have and parent. As Baroness Hale observed regarding gestational parent-
hood in the case of Re G (Children),202 the conceiving and bearing of a child
“brings with it, in the vast majority of cases, a very special relationship
199 Ibid.
200 Paton v. United Kingdom (1980) 2 EHRR, at [26].
201 Ibid., at [27].
202 Re G (Children) [2006] UKHL 43.
519570-L-sub01-bw-Achmad
Processed on: 28-5-2018
Multiple Potential Parents But a Child Always at the Centre 315
between mother and child, a relationship which is different from any
other.”203 Building on this notion, Mr Justice Baker asserted in the English
ICS case of D and L (Surrogacy)204 that “[T]he act of carrying and giving birth
to a baby establishes a relationship with the child which is one of the most
important relationships in life.”205 Indeed, in ICS the commissioning parents
rely completely on the surrogate to bring the child to term and to relinquish
the child to them upon birth. Given this, the surrogate may be able to make
demands of the commissioning parents to take certain actions or provide her
with certain things while she carries the child, and she may seek to make
relinquishment of the child contingent upon certain demands being met.
Further, the surrogate might have particular views about actions relating
to the child while in utero and once born. For example, she may want parti-
cular medical testing of the child in utero, as occurred in the case of In the
Matter of TT (a Minor)206 (domestic surrogacy), where commissioning parents
opposed an amniocentesis as they feared it may detrimentally affect foetal
health;207 the surrogate proceeded with the test which led to a major break-
down in her relationship with the commissioning parents.208 In instances
of ICS where the pregnancy does not go as planned or if the surrogate has a
disagreement with the commissioning parents, she may seek to terminate the
pregnancy. Equally, the surrogate may refuse to terminate the pregnancy if
she disagrees with the wishes of commissioning parents in instances where
they seek termination. Given the fact that she carries the child within her body,
the surrogate’s reproductive autonomy and right to bodily integrity and health
will, before the child’s birth, carry more weight when balanced with the
commissioning parents’ interests in having the child, even in instances where
the child is genetically related to one or both commissioning parents, or in
instances where the child has no genetic link to the surrogate or the commis-
sioning parents. This is because the surrogate’s human rights as living, auto-
nomous person will very likely outweigh the commissioning parents’ interests
relating to the potential future child that the surrogate carries within her body.
Before the child’s birth through ICS, the greatest concentration of power
arguably sits with the surrogate, in light of the fact that she may decide not
to relinquish the child or children to the commissioning parents following
birth. This is always a risk faced by commissioning parents in ICS, even if the
parties have signed an agreement or contract stating that the child is to be
provided to the commissioning parents following birth. The child is always
in a position of risk in this respect, given the potential of the child being used
203 Ibid., at [34].
204 D and L (Surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 231 (Fam).
205 Ibid., at [25].
206 In the Matter of TT (a Minor), supra note 142.





as a bargaining chip or being caught in a custody battle in their first weeks
and months of life, and even before birth.
5.3 Domestic jurisprudence relevant to the balancing of commissioning
parents’ and surrogates’ rights and interests in ICS
Although many ICS arrangements occur without a conflict between the rights
and interests of the surrogate and commissioning parents manifesting, some
ICS cases heard in domestic courts to date illustrate that these issues can arise
through ICS. Some further judicial decisions concerning domestic surrogacy
arrangements are also worth highlighting in relation to the balancing of rights
and interests between commissioning parents and surrogates in ICS. These
decisions show that following a child’s birth, the balance between the sur-
rogate’s and commissioning parents’ competing rights and interests will shift
in ICS, with the existence of the child meaning the best interests of the child
must become the paramount consideration in striking the balance between
the rights and interests of these parties.
In Re W and B and H (Child abduction: surrogacy) (No. 2),209 the UK High
Court dealt with the breakdown of an ICS arrangement between a British
surrogate (no genetic link) and US commissioning parents. The surrogate
changed her mind about the arrangement and left the US, returning to the UK
where she gave birth to twins, refusing to provide them to the commissioning
parents. This case is significant as it shows that despite the reality that in ICS
surrogates are not usually genetically related to the child or children they carry,
this does not necessarily mean surrogates always relinquish children following
birth. The UK High Court held the twins should be returned to the US where
the commissioning parents lived, and where it had always been intended the
children would live and grow up. Moreover, they were genetically related
to their commissioning father. Therefore, the intention of the commissioning
parents, and the genetic link to the commissioning father were factors out-
weighing the surrogate’s wish to retain the children in her care. Similarly, in
the case of Re N (a Child)210 concerning a domestic surrogacy situation, the
UK Court of Appeal said the central question to be addressed was which one
of the two possible residential upbringings available to the child – with the
commissioning parents, or with the surrogate and her husband – would deliver
the best outcomes for the child and be most beneficial to him, where he would
be “most likely to mature into a happy and balanced adult and to achieve
his fullest potential as a human”.211 Therefore, the child’s best interests were
the central arbiter, not the rights and interests of the adult parties.
209 In the Matter of W and W v H (Child Abduction: Surrogacy) (No 2), [2002] 2 FLR 252.
210 Re N (a Child), [2007] EWCA Civ 1053.
211 Ibid., at [12].
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Two landmark US cases in which surrogates have failed to relinquish a
child to commissioning parents require brief mention. In the Matter of Baby M,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that on the basis of the child’s best inter-
ests, custody of the child should go to the commissioning parents.212 How-
ever, the Court noted with concern that the surrogate’s interests were largely
subordinated to the interests of those it viewed as being in control of the com-
mercial surrogacy transaction, namely the commissioning parents.213 In the
later case of Johnson v Calvert, the Supreme Court of California held that in
the case of a gestational surrogate who refused to surrender the child to the
commissioning parents, the intent of the parties had to be assessed in order
to balance rights and interests appropriately. As the Court said regarding the
commissioning parents, “But for their acted-on intention, the child would not
exist”,214 and if the surrogate had manifested her own intent to be the child’s
mother after birth, she would not have been used as a surrogate.215 Therefore,
quite a different approach can be said to be taken by the US courts when it
considers situations such as these, in contrast to the UK judgment In the Matter
of TT (A Minor) (previously discussed in section 4.5.1). In TT, the Court, in
finding the child should remain with the surrogate who refused to relinquish
the child, placed its full focus on the rights and best interests of the child. It
is implicit, however, in the TT ruling that the child had already formed an
attachment to the surrogate mother, that the surrogate had also formed an
attachment to the child. Therefore, the Court found that the surrogate’s rights
and interests outweighed those of the commissioning parents, and that her
interests aligned with the child’s best interests. Furthermore, the Court in TT
found that the surrogate mother would be better able to fulfil the child’s needs
and interests when balanced against what the commissioning parents would
be able to provide.216
5.4 The surrogates’ right not to be exploited through ICS
Considering the balancing of rights and interests between the surrogate and
commissioning parents, the rights and interests of the surrogate not to be
exploited through ICS (including respect for her right to health and reproduct-
ive autonomy), must be weighed against the interests of the commissioning
parents in having a child. For example, it is arguable that the Indian practice
of implanting up to five embryos at one time into a surrogate (in many states,
212 In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
213 Ibid., at [276]-[280].
214 Johnson v Calvert, S023721, 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993), at 13.
215 Ibid., at [10].




embryo implantation is limited to one per time)217 to increase the chances
of conception through ICS to meet the desires of commissioning parents and
‘guarantee’ a child is exploitative.218 The outcome of such a large number
of embryos being implanted is a higher likelihood of multiple births, which
can increase medical risks to mother and child.219 However, it may be the
case that Indian surrogates do not know, or are not routinely informed that
this is a potential outcome of multiple embryo implantation.220 Even in
instances where surrogates are made aware of this practice and provide their
consent in an ICS setting, it arguably still amounts to exploitation of the sur-
rogate given the health risks it exposes her to.
A balancing of rights and interests may also come into play when the
surrogate’s life is endangered because of an ICS pregnancy. In such cases, a
rights-based approach requires that the surrogate must have the ultimate say
in whether she wants to terminate the pregnancy, in order to protect her own
life. This is because she is a living human being and her rights and human
dignity must be protected, despite the existence of the unborn child she carries
and the interests of the commissioning parents in ensuring that child is born.
In such situations, commissioning parents – whose main interest is in the
survival of the child – may seek to prevent the surrogate from exercising such
a choice. Such actions would arguably lead to a breach of the surrogate’s right
to health and reproductive autonomy.
6 CONCLUSION: OVERALL BALANCING OF RIGHTS IN ICS
6.1 A general approach to rights balancing in ICS according priority to the
child’s rights and best interests
Bainham makes the following observation which can be applied to the ICS
context:
‘It is quite impossible to evaluate the claims of children without considering their
interaction with the claims of others, whether parents or others in the community.
The very notion of children possessing rights implies the existence of legal or moral
217 H. Brenhouse, ‘India’s Rent-a-Womb Industry Faces New Restrictions’, Time, June 5, 2010,
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1993665,00.html
218 Ibid. Indeed, under s.23(2) of the Draft Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation)
Bill 2010, it is stipulated that the number of embryos allowed to legally be implanted will
be limited by regulations under the Bill.
219 P. Singer and H. Khuse (eds.), Bioethics: An Anthology (2nd ed.), (2006), at 86.
220 W. Chavkin and J. Maher (eds.), The Globalization of Motherhood: Deconstructions and Recon-
structions of Biology and Care, (2010), at 11.
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duties in someone, or indeed everyone, and this raises immediately the issue of the
interests of the adult world which can often clash with children’s interests.’221
This paper has highlighted the various friction points in ICS which may necessi-
tate a balancing of competing rights and interests. Key decision-makers in ICS
such as social workers, medical professionals, government decision-makers
and judges will need to undertake rights balancing exercises on a case-by-case
basis, considering the particular facts involved. Rights balancing exercises may
be required at numerous points in time, in order to decide the appropriate
course of action in relation to the child’s rights and best interests vis-à-vis the
core adult parties to the ICS arrangement. It is due to the nature of ICS as a
method of family formation involving multiple potential parents, and the
reality that rights and interests will potentially conflict throughout the course
of ICS arrangements (prior to conception and pregnancy; during pregnancy;
post-birth), that rights balancing will always be required in ICS situations.
What is apparent from the discussion presented in this paper, including
in particular, much of the jurisprudence from the ECtHR and domestic courts
discussed, is that where a child is concerned – as is the case in all ICS situations
– the rights and interests of that child, once they are born, should be accorded
the most weight in balancing competing interests. This is due to the child’s
vulnerable position in comparison to the other core parties to ICS, and the
child’s need for protection in order for their rights and interests to be given
effect. The child is the one core party in ICS arrangements who can definitively
be said to have come to the situation without any underlying motivation.
Children born through ICS do not choose to be born through ICS. On the other
hand, commissioning parents are motivated to instigate ICS arrangements by
their desire for a child; if it was not for commissioning parents, there would
be no ICS arrangement. The surrogate also generally makes a choice to become
involved in the ICS arrangement, perhaps motivated by a desire to help others
or by the potential for monetary gain.
Unlike the core adult parties to ICS arrangements, the child cannot protect
or advocate for their own rights and interests. However, the rights and prin-
ciples established by the CRC have near universal endorsement from states,
including the best interests of the child principle. Taking an approach to rights
balancing in ICS which places priority on the child’s rights and best interests
is not only consistent with the CRC, but arguably required pursuant to the best
interests of the child principle. Placing priority on the child’s rights in the
balancing of rights and interests in ICS will help to ensure that actions and
decisions taken in the course of these arrangements will have a positive impact
on the child’s situation, consistent with their rights and best interests, both
in the immediate short-term in their infancy, as well as into the future as they
grow up.




Therefore, in terms of rights balancing in ICS, the below approach succinctly
captured by Bainham is appropriate in ICS:
‘Increasingly, it is likely that the trend will be to admit the co-existence of inde-
pendent rights and interests for children and parents whilst emphasising the primacy
of the rights and interests of children.’222
Importantly however, as has also been illustrated through the discussion in
this paper, Bainham notes that this approach should not presuppose that
children’s interests should always necessarily be given precedence over adult
interests. He says there should be an assessment of which rights and interests
should be regarded as more significant or serious, and they might be desig-
nated as the primary rights and interests, therefore to be accorded priority.223
In the ICS context, this means according priority to the child’s rights to preserve
their identity, to health, to know and be cared for by their parents as far as
possible, to grow up in a family environment, and to be free from discrimina-
tion and any form of abuse or exploitation. Taking such an approach is also
consistent with the non-exhaustive, non-hierarchical list of elements suggested
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child that “could be included in a best
interests assessment by any decision-maker having to determine a child’s best
interests.”224 The Committee says that determining the child’s best interests
must be aimed at ensuring the full and effective enjoyment of CRC rights and
the holistic development of the child;225 it is also important to recognise the
evolving capacities of the child, and that “decisions should assess continuity
and stability of the child’s present and future situation.”226 As Gerards further
observes, in conflicts between fundamental individual rights (such as those
safeguarded by the ECHR) and other individual interests, often more weight
will be placed on the fundamental right, despite the importance of the other
competing interests.227 Gerards herself notes such a distinction is essentially
artificial.228 Therefore, it may well be that in many ICS situations, such an
exploration of competing rights and interests will lead to the child’s rights
and best interests being accorded priority in reaching an appropriate balance.
But they must first be viewed and balanced on a case-by-case basis against
the rights and legitimate interests of the commissioning parents and particular-
222 Ibid., 124.
223 Ibid.
224 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, supra note 7, at [50]. The elements included by
the Committee are: the child’s views; the child’s identity; preservation of the family environ-
ment and maintaining family relations; care, protection and safety of the child; situation
of vulnerability; the child’s right to health; and the child’s right to education. See [52]-[79].
225 Ibid., at 82.
226 Ibid., [84].
227 J.H. Gerards, ‘Fundamental Rights and Other Interests: Should it Really Make a Difference?’,
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ly the surrogate mother, whose rights and interests may in some cases be
accorded priority.
6.2 Striking an overall balance in the four situations of competing rights
and interests in ICS discussed in this paper
While acknowledging that rights balancing must occur on a case-by-case basis
in each individual ICS situation, addressing the particular circumstances and
facts involved, some final comments can be made concerning the possible
balance to be struck in the four situations of competing rights and interests
discussed in this paper. These final comments are made bearing in mind the
general approach outlined in section 6.1, of taking the child’s rights and best
interests as the key arbiter in ICS rights balancing.
Where genetic donor parents’ privacy rights and children’s identity and
health rights conflict in ICS, the balance should weigh in favour of protecting
the child’s rights. This is consistent with the best interests of the child given
the likely positive lifetime impact of preserving the child’s identity and health
rights, as has been recognised by the Committee on the Rights of the Child
and reflected in the broad international consensus concerning past experiences
of anonymous donor conception. It is thus important that these rights of the
child (Article 8 and 24 CRC rights) are accorded priority and significant weight
in the balancing of competing rights and interests between ICS genetic donor
parents and children born through ICS. Moreover, there is a strong argument
that in becoming an ICS genetic donor parent, donors cede their privacy right
to maintaining their anonymity in relation to their genetic offspring born
through ICS. This is due to the choice that ICS genetic donor parents make to
contribute their genetic material to creating a child with whom they will share
a genetic link, and who is entitled to exercise and enjoy their rights and have
their best interests protected.
It is also clear that although a decision to try to become a parent and found
a family is one which must be respected and those who make it treated without
discrimination, no absolute right to a child or to become a parent exists under
international human rights law. Therefore, the rights and interests of commis-
sioning parents in ICS cannot be held to automatically outweigh those of the
children conceived and born through ICS resulting from their desires, decisions
and actions. It must also be remembered that all ICS arrangements are based
on the choice and intention of commissioning parents to have a child through
ICS, and that they have a responsibility under Article 18(1) CRC to treat the
best interests of the child as their basic concern. As such, when making de-
cisions and taking actions in ICS that will affect the child or the future child
once he or she is born, commissioning parents should ensure that the child’s
actual or future best interests guide any decision that will affect him or her.




interests and consistent with the child’s rights. In instances where the commis-
sioning parents’ interests do not coincide with the child’s rights and best
interests, it is the child’s rights and best interests which must be the paramount
consideration in balancing a conflict of rights and interests with those of their
commissioning parents. For example, even in situations where one or both
commissioning parents share a genetic link with the child, if there are factors
weighing negatively against the commissioning parents regarding protection
of the child’s rights and best interests – such as if safety and welfare concerns
exist regarding the care and family environment the commissioning parents
will provide – the child’s rights and best interests must be the determining
factor, outweighing the rights and interests of the commissioning parents.
In situations concerning unborn children in ICS, the rights and interests
of the surrogate mother should, however, be accorded precedence when
balanced against those of the potential future child and the commissioning
parents, in order to ensure her rights to health – including reproductive
autonomy – and life are not violated. Whilst the rights and best interests of
the future child must be considered, along with respect for the interests of
the commissioning parents (such as their desire for a child), in balancing the
rights and interests of future children and commissioning parents against those
of the surrogate in ICS, they should not be accorded greater weight in situations
where the surrogate’s rights and interests are at risk. In such situations, the
protection of the surrogate’s health and life must outweigh the other rights
and interests at stake, especially in contrast to the child in-utero, who does
not fully attract human rights until birth.
Despite this, in situations where the pregnant surrogate engages in actions
or decisions unnecessarily endangering the foetus and therefore, the potential
future child (that is, without a medical reason necessitating her action or
decision), the balance is likely to switch in favour of the commissioning parents
and future child. Appointing a guardian representing the unborn future child
is a mechanism which could usefully give voice to the future child and ensure
their rights and best interests are inserted into any rights balancing exercise
in ICS.229 Once a child is born through ICS, in instances where there is a
conflict of rights and interests between the surrogate and commissioning
parents, the child’s rights and best interests must be treated as the paramount
concern. Again, it is likely that ensuring the involvement of a guardian repres-
enting the child’s rights and best interests in ICS following the child’s birth
could be a mechanism with a protective effect for the child, especially in
instances where there is a conflict of rights and interests between any of the
parties.230
Any rights balancing exercise in ICS requires contending with a complex
web of intertwined and overlapping competing rights and interests. However,
229 Achmad, supra note 3, at 164-165 of this thesis.
230 Ibid., at 165 of this thesis.
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there is always a child at the centre of ICS arrangements. Despite the competing
rights of core parties to ICS, all actions and decisions in ICS must be guided
by the principle of human dignity, and wherever possible uphold and protect
the child’s rights and ensure that the child’s best interests are the key arbiter.
By focusing on the vulnerability of the child and other core parties where
appropriate and striking a balance to achieve decisions and take actions that
best serve the child both presently and into the future, it is likely that this will






1 FOCUSING ON CHILD RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
International Commercial Surrogacy is one of the most complex ways to build
a family with children. It is a site of social practice at which profound ethical,
moral, philosophical and legal questions converge. As such, ICS has emerged
as a 21st century human rights challenge. ICS continues around the world in
the absence of international agreement concerning the practice from ethical,
moral and legal perspectives. It is crucial to acknowledge that ICS as it is
currently practised does not place children at the centre of these arrangements,
and their rights are often left unprotected in practice.
This doctoral study is the first study to place a comprehensive focus on
the children’s rights most at risk in ICS, and to do so through a child rights
approach under public international human rights law. By focusing on the
rights of the child most at risk in ICS, and presenting recommendations for
the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) so it can have a holistic, protective effect for children in ICS, this
study makes a novel scientific contribution to both international child rights
legal scholarship and to international child rights practice. It deepens the focus
on children and their rights in ICS, and progresses approaches for the protection
of children in ICS, grounded in the standards and norms established by the
CRC and other relevant sources of public international human rights law.
Over the course of this study being undertaken1 and the course of time
through which the articles which make up this thesis have been written – and
in most cases, published – the practice of ICS has both evolved and functioned
in a state of flux. At times, this has posed a challenge for research, given the
rapid rate of change occurring world-wide. However, this study has remained
dynamic and responsive over the time it has been researched and written,
and the findings and recommendations have had and can continue having
practical, real-world application, to help improve the contemporary situation
of children’s rights in ICS internationally. Already, throughout the course of
this study being undertaken, its research and findings have at various stages
been presented to and taken into consideration by various decision-making




bodies developing national and international approaches to ICS.2 The con-
tinuing relevance of this study is underscored by the author’s involvement
as a member of the Core Expert Group convened by International Social Service
to develop and draft ‘Principles for better protection of children’s rights in
the context of international surrogacy’.3 Moreover, given the ongoing nature
of work regarding international surrogacy amongst international fora and at
the domestic level, this doctoral study is timely.
2 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY: A COMPLEX METHOD OF
FAMILY BUILDING IN A CHANGING LANDSCAPE
The ICS landscape has changed over the course of this study in many respects.
This has especially been the case in the less-developed states where ICS supply
has emerged over the past decade, which this study has largely been concerned
with in relation to the child rights challenges arising. For example, the period
during which this study has been undertaken has witnessed the rise of India
as a global ICS giant where the ICS market has been allowed to grow rapidly,
unregulated, and without any governing legislation.4 Yet more recently, the
Indian government has taken measures aimed at significantly limiting the
practice and availability of ICS in India.5 Also during the course of this study,
2 E.g. the Parliament of Australia House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social
Policy and Legal Affairs Inquiry into the regulatory and legislative aspects of international
and domestic surrogacy arrangements (2015); the Staatscommissie herijking ouderschap
(Dutch Government Committee on the Reassessment of Parenthood); and the Hague
Conference on Private International Law Parentage/Surrogacy project.
3 See: International Social Service, Call for Action 2016: Urgent need for regulation of international
surrogacy and artificial reproductive technologies, January 2016, available at: http://www.iss-
ssi.org/index.php/en/what-we-do-en/surrogacy (accessed 29 July 2016).
4 The Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill 2008 has been on the Indian parliamentary
agenda for nine years but has not been adopted. The Bill has now been reframed as the
Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016, and seeks to establish a complete ban on commercial
surrogacy in India, meaning foreign citizens will not be able to access ICS in India and
Indian citizens will only be able to undertake altruistic surrogacy in India. See A. Tandon,
“Rent-a-womb may well become illegal”, The Tribune, 2 July 2016, available at: http://www.
tribuneindia.com/news/nation/rent-a-womb-may-well-become-illegal/260012.html (accessed
29 July 2016). For a helpful overview of the ICS situation in India up until 2015, see N.
Witzleb and A.Chawla, “Surrogacy in India: Strong Demand, Weak Laws”, in P. Gerber
and K. O’Byrne (eds.), Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights, (2015), 167-192. For discussion
of developments in India concerning ICS 2015-2016, see S. Kusum, “Public interest litigation
PIL challenging commercial, overseas, same sex, single surrogacy in India – contemporary
legal judicial developments” (2016), available at http://www.familiesthrusurrogacy.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Indian-Surrogacy-Bill-Background-latest-developments.pdf
(accessed 29 July 2016).
5 The most significant measure has been the directive issued in November 2015 by the Indian
Ministry of Home Affairs stating that foreign nationals are not allowed to commission




other international supply-side hubs proffering ICS markets have subsequently
taken steps to close down the practice within national borders. Thailand is
the prime example in this respect, where legislation was passed in 2015 out-
lawing and criminalising ICS in the country.6
Despite this somewhat boom-and-bust nature of the ICS market in some
states, another development observed over the course of this doctoral study
is the dynamic nature of the global ICS market to continue catering to commis-
sioning parents’ ongoing demand for ICS. This is largely based on the actors
behind the ICS industry – such as surrogacy clinics, companies and brokers,
and medical professionals – remaining agile and responsive to maximise this
demand and meet it with ICS supply.7 In an effort to sustain ICS practice, this
responsiveness has been evident in the way these actors have taken advantage
of loopholes and gaps in domestic laws and the vacuum persisting at the
international level concerning ICS. For example, in response to the Indian
government’s initial steps to restrict ICS supply,8 the ICS industry developed
a workaround to ensure demand from unmarried and same-sex couples did
not go unmet. This involved Indian women who were acting as surrogates
crossing the border to Nepal,9 where (at that time) although acting as a surro-
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, “Commissioning of surrogacy – instructions
regarding”, 4 November 2016, available at: http://www.dhr.gov.in/latest%20Govt.%20
instructions%20on%20ART%20Surrogacy%20Bill.pdf (accessed 29 July 2016). For discussion,
see A. Rabinowitz, “The trouble with renting a womb”, The Guardian, 28 April 2016,
availableat:https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/apr/28/paying-for-baby-
trouble-with-renting-womb-india (accessed 29 July 2016). Also N.B. the Surrogacy (Regula-
tion) Bill 2016, which would outlaw all commercial surrogacy in India; however, although
this Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 21 November 2016, this Bill has not yet been
officially passed into law. Consistent with the Bill, the Indian Government is reported to
have stated in an affidavit to the Indian Supreme Court in March 2017 that it does not
support commercial surrogacy in India. See: “No commercial surrogacy, only for needy
Indian couples, Government tells SC”, The Indian Express, 06 March 2017, http://
indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/govt-to-make-commercial-surrogacy-
illegal-panel-to-decide-on-cases-of-infertile-couples/
6 Protection of Children Born from Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act 2015. The law
came into effect in July 2015.
7 This aspect of the practice of ICS is the subject of social and cultural anthropology doctoral
research currently being undertaken by Elo Luik, University of Oxford. Luik’s research
explores how ICS is responding to attempts to regulate it, and the specific role of inter-
mediaries facilitating ICS.
8 The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs did so by issuing a directive restricting ICS in India
to foreign married (heterosexual) couples, and requiring foreign citizens seeking ICS in
India to apply for medical visas, supported by a letter from their home government that
the country recognises surrogacy and that any children born will be permitted entry to
that country. See: Ministry of Home Affairs (India), File No.25022/74/2011-F-1. The text
of this directive is available at: http://blog.indiansurrogacylaw.com/india-clarifies-stand-
surrogacy-visa-regulation/ (accessed 29 July 2016).
9 J. Drennan, “The Future of Wombs for Rent”, Foreign Policy, 2 March 2015, available at:





gate was deemed an illegal activity for Nepali women, it remained legal for
foreign women to act as surrogates within Nepal.10 Although this meant same-
sex couples could initially continue accessing ICS largely on the same basis
they would have in India, concern arose regarding the situation of both the
surrogates involved and the children born as a result. After some time, the
Nepali Supreme Court ruled that ICS should not continue to be undertaken
in Nepal; a Cabinet decision to completely ban the practice was adopted in
September 2015.11
However, ICS supply continues springing up in new places, in response
to measures to tighten or ban ICS in some of the less-developed supply-side
states. For example, currently a new ICS market has been developing in Cam-
bodia, largely as a result of some Thai and Indian ICS operations relocating
there to take advantage of the unclear legal regime governing the practice of
surrogacy in Cambodia.12 Meanwhile, other states such as Georgia continue
to quietly cater to the demand of commissioning parents for children through
ICS in a largely under-the-radar manner. However, the spotlight is beginning
to turn on these ICS supply states, and they will not be able to avoid scrutiny
much longer.13
Therefore, although the ICS market remains fragile in some ways, in others
it continues to thrive and recalibrate, demonstrating its adaptability to new
circumstances. This is despite the increased attention from international media
over the period this study has taken place, to expose situations of ICS ‘gone
10 As discussed in the UK High Court Family Division case Re X (Foreign Surrogacy: Child’s
Name) [2016] EWHC 1068 (Fam), at [20].
11 See Embassy of the United States, Kathmandu Nepal, “Surrogacy services are banned in
Nepal”, available at: http://nepal.usembassy.gov/service/surrogacy-in-nepal.html (accessed
29 July 2016). For discussion, see R. Abrams, “Nepal Bans Surrogacy, Leaving Couples With
Few Low-Cost Options”, The New York Times, 2 May 2016, available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/05/03/world/asia/nepal-bans-surrogacy-leaving-couples-with-few-low-cost-
options.html?_r=0 (accessed 29 July 2016).
12 N. Bhowmick, “After Nepal, Indian surrogacy clinics move to Cambodia”, Al Jazeera, 28
June 2016, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/06/nepal-indian-
surrogacy-clinics-move-cambodia-160614112517994.html (accessed 29 July 2016). The
development of the ICS market in Cambodia has not been without controversy. See B.
Sengkong and W. Jackson, “As surrogacy industry expands, legal and ethical issues mulled”,
The Phnom Penh Post, 23 June 2016, available at: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/
surrogacy-industry-expands-legal-and-ethical-issues-mulled (accessed 29 July 2016).
13 E.g. see End of mission statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children,
child prostitution and child pornography, Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, on her visit to Georgia, 18
April 2016, in which the Special Rapporteur highlighted comprehensive concerns about
the practice of ICS in Georgia, in particular the protection gap surrounding children created
through ICS in Georgia and that this places children at risk of being exploited, having their




wrong’. The strongest example of this was the case of baby Gammy in 2014.14
Gammy was born with Down Syndrome as a twin to his Thai surrogate mother
and abandoned in Thailand by his Australian commissioning parents, who
returned to Australia with Gammy’s twin sister, Pipah. Furthermore, it later
came to light that Gammy and Pipah’s commissioning father was a convicted
child sex offender. Regardless of the international outcry this case engendered,
Australia reportedly continues to have the largest number of ICS users (com-
missioning parents) per capita.15
Increased public awareness of the practice of ICS has meant this is a social
phenomenon which has gone from relative obscurity to dinner-table discussion
in some countries, especially those which are involved in ICS from the supply
and demand perspectives and which have been embroiled in ICS controversies
as a result. ICS is also now the subject of much legal scholarship and re-
search.16 However, despite there now being increased attention from scholars
towards the child’s situation in ICS within this body of scholarship, scholarship
focusing closely on the rights of the child from a public international human
rights law perspective remains fairly limited.
Furthermore, over the course of this study, government decision-makers
and courts in both ICS supply and demand states have been increasingly
contending with the challenges and problems arising from the practice, and
intervening to resolve ICS situations on a case-by-case basis. In the last three
years, as well as steps taken by some supply-side states to tighten their
approaches to ICS, some demand-side states have begun explicitly recognising
ICS as a human rights challenge with implications for their citizens and resid-
ents and for the operation of their national laws and policies. Examples of
this are the national inquiries undertaken in The Netherlands17 and Austra-
14 The judgment of the Family Court of Western Australia in this matter provides a compre-
hensive overview of the facts of this case. See: Farnell & Anor and Chanbua [2016] FCWA
17, at 8-40. For commentary, see: C. Achmad, “When baby comes last”, The Dominion Post,
12 August 2014, A7; S. Howard, “Taming the international commercial surrogacy industry”,
British Medical Journal, 23 October 2014, 349.
15 M. Cooper et al (eds.), Current Issues and Emerging Trends in Medical Tourism, (2015) at 147.
16 E.g. P. Gerber and O’Byrne, K., Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights (2015); Koffeman, N.,
Morally Sensitive Issues and Cross-Border Movement in the European Union: The cases of reproduct-
ive matters and recognition of same-sex relationships (2015); Van Beers, B., ‘Is Europe ‘Giving
in to Baby Markets?’: Reproductive Tourism in Europe and the Gradual Erosion of Existing
Legal Limits to Reproductive Markets’, 23:1 Medical Law Review (2015), 103-134; Wells-Greco,
M., Status of Children Arising from Inter-country Surrogacy Arrangements (2016).
17 Staatscommissie herijking ouderschap, established 2014. The Statscommissie reported in
December 2016. See Rapport van de Staatscommissie Herijking ouderschap, Kind en ouders in




lia18 concerning ICS, which may lead to new legislative or policy approaches
being developed.
At the international level too, ICS is receiving increased recognition as a
global problem which must be addressed at the international level, if those
it makes vulnerable are to be comprehensively protected. Since 2010, inter-
national discussion and work on international surrogacy (including ICS) has
been undertaken through the Hague Conference on Private International
Law.19 This work has gradually increased over the past three years in par-
ticular, to the point where an international ‘Experts’ Group on Parentage/
Surrogacy’ has now been convened, and is discharging a mandate to “explore
the feasibility of advancing work on the private international law issues
surrounding the status of children, including issues arising from international
surrogacy arrangements.”20 Meanwhile, in the public international law arena,
during the course of this study being undertaken the Committee on the Rights
of the Child has taken its first steps towards recognising ICS as a child rights
challenge and indicating it is on its agenda as a problem in children’s rights.
Over the past three years, the Committee has made its first comments on the
practice of ICS and expressed concern regarding the rights and best interests
of children conceived and born as a result of ICS arrangements.21 These
international efforts to contend with and address some of the challenges posed
by ICS are now further complemented by the aforementioned international
project being undertaken by International Social Service (ISS) and a global
group of multidisciplinary experts, to develop principles to protect children
in international surrogacy;22 the author of this doctoral study is a member
of the Core Expert Group leading the drafting of these principles with ISS.
18 Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs
Inquiry into the Regulatory and Legislative Aspects of Surrogacy Arrangements, established
2015. The Inquiry reported in May 2016. See: Surrogacy Matters: Inquiry into the regulatory
and legislative aspects of international and domestic surrogacy arrangements, tabled 4 May 2016.
19 See: https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy (accessed
29 July 2016).
20 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the
Hague Conference of March 2015, at [5]. The reports of the Expert’s Group are available
at: https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy (accessed
29 July 2016).
21 In its Concluding observations on the second to fourth periodic reports of Israel, (2013),
CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, at [33]-[34]; and Concluding observations on the consolidated third
and fourth periodic reports of India, (2014), CRC/C/IND/CO/3-4, at [57](d) and [58](d).






3 A CHILD ALWAYS AT THE CENTRE, BUT OFTEN UNPROTECTED
Despite the changing landscape of the practice of ICS over the course of this
study being undertaken, a feature which has remained constant is that ICS
arrangements exist to create children, and in doing so, in some instances ICS
endangers the rights and best interests of children conceived and born as a
result. Indeed, this has been reflected in the caseload of domestic courts and
in the regional sphere, the European Court of Human Rights, of matters
concerning ICS arrangements and associated implications for children’s rights
and best interests. Blyth, in his study of the welfare of children conceived
through new reproductive technologies, asks “Can bringing children into the
world ever be regarded as contrary to their interests?”23 Although this thesis
has not considered this question, it has shown that as new children deliberately
brought into existence deliberately through ICS, they can face particular
challenges to their rights and best interests, heightening their vulnerability.
As a result, and remembering that “in a contemporary context, [the concept
of human] dignity underpins the human rights framework”,24 if safeguards
to protect their rights and best interests are not established and implemented,
ICS presents an affront to the human dignity of children born this way. There-
fore, this study has made the case for children conceived and born through
ICS as the most vulnerable party to ICS arrangements, and who must be better
protected throughout this practice, to ensure their rights and best interests
are upheld and given effect to.
The challenge of dealing with situations of ICS is made more complex by
the lack of an international regulatory regime governing the practice, the lack
of international agreement on how to approach the practice, and the variation
amongst national legislation and policy concerning ICS. This can lead to conflict
of laws situations when national laws of multiple states are applied to any
one ICS arrangement, with no common legal approach between states and no
international regime to specifically guide and regulate the practice of ICS. As
Chief Justice Susan Denham observed in a landmark surrogacy ruling in the
Irish Supreme Court in November 2014, “Any law on surrogacy affects the
status and rights of persons, especially children: it creates complex relationships
and has a deep social content.”25 Arguably it is because of this effect and
the tensions involved in arriving at such laws, that we are left with the unsatis-
factory position in many domestic jurisdictions that there is simply no law
or policy clarifying the national position on the practice of ICS specifically.
23 E. Blyth, “To Be or Not to Be? A Critical Appraisal of the Welfare of Children Conceived
Through New Reproductive Technologies”, International Journal of Children’s Rights, (2008),
16(4), at 506.
24 K. Galloway, “Theoretical Approaches to Human Dignity, Human Rights and Surrogacy”,
in P. Gerber and K. O’Byrne (eds.), Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights, (2015), at 25.
25 M.R. and D.R. (suing by their father and next friend O.R.) & ors v An t-Ard-Chláraitheoir & ors




Despite this, the challenges to the rights of children conceived and born
through ICS persist and require attention.
4 A FOCUS ON THE CHILD, THE MOST VULNERABLE PERSON IN INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS
Given that ICS is a practice which has emerged and is continuing as a modern
method of family formation, this thesis has traversed the most pressing child
rights challenges faced by children conceived and born through ICS, such as
the risks to their rights to nationality and identity preservation. In doing so,
it has proven the hypothesis that children are particularly vulnerable to having
their rights endangered by being conceived and born through ICS, especially
given the lack of international agreement on and regulation of ICS, and a lack
of concerted efforts to uphold the standards and norms of the CRC in ICS
arrangements. This study has shown that in general, the fact that the child
is often the person in ICS whose rights are most at risk is due to:
- The child’s lack of personal agency to advocate for his or her own rights
and interests (especially in infancy and early years), and that by the time
they can exercise this agency, actions and decisions will have been taken
by the adults involved that might have undercut the child’s ability to
exercise and enjoy some of his or her CRC rights;
- The child’s ambiguous legal status when born in many situations of ICS;
- The involvement of multiple parties with potential claims to parenthood
in relation to the child and a lack of clear and certain legal parentage;
- The child’s birth in a state different to the one that the commissioning
parents intend to reside and raise the child in; and
- The overall uncertainty of the child’s situation when born through ICS.
By exploring the situation of the child in ICS through a child rights perspective
under public international human rights law, this study has placed necessary
and comprehensive focus on the child, advanced understanding of the child’s
rights situation in ICS, and contributed to filling a gap in scholarship. This has
been achieved whilst clearly acknowledging throughout the study the existence
and importance of the rights and interests of other parties to ICS arrangements,
and highlighting these where appropriate in relation to the child’s situation.
In particular, the human rights situation of surrogate mothers in ICS remains
fraught; as SAMA observes, “The entry into surrogacy ushers the surrogates
into a process full of challenges and difficulties.”26 Although placing central
focus on the child, by remaining conscious of the wider human rights picture
in ICS, this study is complementary to scholarship addressing the rights of other
parties involved in ICS, such as surrogate mothers.




5 A MULTIFACETED CHILD RIGHTS CHALLENGE
This study has shown that the challenge to the rights of children conceived
and born through ICS is multifaceted in nature. Chapters Two to Four illus-
trated that the child’s rights and best interests are at risk in a number of ways
in ICS and that these rights intersect with the situation, rights and interests
of the other core parties to ICS, namely surrogate mothers, commissioning
parents and genetic donor parents. Chapter Four demonstrated this complexity
through a close examination of the child and their multiple ‘mothers’ in ICS,
giving insight into the fragmented parentage27 often present in ICS and the
problems this can trigger for children born through ICS.
Chapters Five to Eight then built on this contextual underpinning of the
study, by presenting a comprehensive picture of the child’s rights most at risk
when conceived and born through ICS. Chapter Five developed the idea of
the child as the central locus of vulnerability in ICS, and assessed
jurisprudential trends and non-judicial responses to the contemporary challenge
of ICS in selected ICS demand states. Here, this study began exploring more
deeply the idea that taking practical measures to protect the child and place
their rights and best interests at the heart of ICS is achievable, and that the
public international law human rights framework (in particular the CRC)
provides a mechanism by which to do so. It also assessed the extent to which
the CRC was considered in ICS cases from national courts, drawing on case
law from a sample of demand-side jurisdictions.
Following on from this, by contending with the sensitive issue of the
preconception and prenatal situation of the child, Chapter Six ensures that
this study’s treatment of the child’s rights situation in ICS is holistic. The central
argument put forward in Chapter 6 is that in order for children born through
ICS to enjoy and exercise their rights as far as possible post-birth, attention
must be given to protecting these rights of the future child during the pre-
conception and prenatal phases of ICS, so the child can exercise and enjoy their
rights in the event that he or she is born. A range of actors have a role to play
to make this a reality, with their various roles traversed in Chapter Six. The
Chapter makes clear that this is not about attributing rights pre-birth, but
rather protecting potential rights preconception and pre-birth, so the child
is able to claim those rights post-birth.
Chapters Seven and Eight illustrate that although the child’s rights are
interrelated, indivisible and interdependent in nature,28 two of the child rights
most significantly at risk in ICS are the rights of the child to nationality and
27 H. Watt, The Ethics of Pregnancy, Abortion and Childbirth: Exploring Moral Choices in Child-
bearing (2016), at X.
28 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 14 on the right of the child to





to preserve their identity, under Articles 7 and 8 CRC. Key practical solutions
proposed in Chapter Seven to uphold the child’s right to nationality and
prevent statelessness are that a State which is the intended State of residence
of a child born through ICS should grant nationality to the child if a genetic
link with one commissioning parent is able to be proven and the child would
otherwise be stateless; and that in instances of ICS where this does not occur
and the child would otherwise be stateless, the child should acquire the nation-
ality of their birth state. As Chapter Eight makes clear, the fundamental bearing
that identity can have on a person means that the child’s right to identity
preservation is one of the most significant and pressing child rights challenges
raised by ICS. The main argument advanced in Chapter Eight is that the child’s
Article 8 CRC right must be proactively and strongly safeguarded in ICS, in
particular by commissioning parents, medical professionals, surrogacy clinics
and states, in order for children to be able to preserve their genetic, biological,
personal narrative and cultural elements of their identity. Through this study’s
treatment of the child’s rights to nationality and identity preservation, the
positive lifetime impact of protecting these rights for children is emphasised.
Both Chapters provide detailed recommendations to achieve this in practice.
Although this thesis does not include a chapter focusing exclusively on
legal parentage, the importance of establishing legal parentage for children
born through ICS has been emphasised throughout the study; indeed, the case
law analysed in Chapters Three, Four, Five and Nine demonstrates the import-
ance of establishing a legal parent-child relationship for children in ICS. It is
important for legal parentage to be established in a timely manner following
the birth of the child in ICS; this can have a positive impact on the child’s
situation both in terms of certainty and stability regarding their care and
protection and family environment. However, the process of decision-making
to establish the child’s legal parentage must consider the best interests of the
child, as well as the rights and interests of the multiple potential ‘parents’
involved, including the surrogate’s rights and interests. The ICS case law
traversed throughout this study further emphasises the importance of establish-
ing legal parentage for children in ICS, due to the positive impact that this can
have on the child’s rights to education, health and social security.
Chapter Nine presented a case analysis of the first landmark ICS judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights.29 This served to place the analysis
and recommendations of Chapters Seven and Eight in context, given the
ECtHR’s focus on the child’s nationality and identity rights. Furthermore, these
cases were important to highlight as part of this thesis, as they prioritise the
rights of the children involved and take an approach to balancing of rights
29 Mennesson v. France (App. No.61592/11), judgment of June 26, 2014; Labassee v. France (App.




which protects the children’s best interests.30 However, as noted in the
Addendum to Chapter Nine, the approach since taken by the Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights in its first ICS judgment raises ques-
tions concerning the Court’s approach to children’s rights and best interests
in ICS cases, and it remains to be seen the extent to which the Court seeks to
30 N.B. However, as outlined in the Addendum to Chapter Nine, since the time of writing
Chapter Nine of this thesis, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
has published its first judgment concerning international surrogacy. See: Paradiso and
Campanelli v. Italy, Application no. 25358/12, Judgment, 24 January 2017. In this judgment,
the Grand Chamber (by a majority of 11:6) reversed the earlier findings of the Court (Second
Section). The Grand Chamber held that the measures taken by the Italian authorities
(removal of a child from the applicants who shared no genetic link with the child, who
was born through a surrogacy arrangement in Russia) had pursued the legitimate aims
of preventing disorder and protecting the rights and freedoms of children; therefore, these
amounted to relevant and sufficient reasons. (see [196]-[199]) With regard to proportionality,
the Grand Chamber held that the Italian Courts, by concluding the child would not suffer
grave or irreparable harm as a result of his removal from the applicants’ care (at [206])
(and also considering the absence of any genetic link between the child and the applicants,
and the fact that they had breached Italian domestic adoption and ART laws through their
actions), had struck a fair balance between the different interests at stake and within the
State’s margin of appreciation. (see [200]ff) The Grand Chamber observed that to let the
child remain in the care of the applicants would have been tantamount to legalising a
situation they had intentionally created in breach of domestic law. (at [215]) Interestingly
therefore, through Paradiso Campanelli v. Italy, the Grand Chamber has re-emphasised the
weight attached to the existence of a genetic link between a child born through international
surrogacy and his or her commissioning parent(s) (as was emphasised in both the Mennesson
and Labassee judgments), but it has given new weight to the actions taken by commissioning
parents to obtain a child through international surrogacy in violation of the domestic law
they circumvent through their actions. The judgment indicates that in such instances, even
where an emotional and/or social connection has formed between the applicants and the
child, if removal of the child will result in trauma which will not be irreparable, such a
course of urgent action will be seen to be justified and proportionate in not only upholding
national law and public interest, but also to protect the rights and freedoms of the child
(such as their safety and welfare and protection against illicit practices, and the certainty
of their legal relationship with their caregivers/parents). Of course, the exact factual matrix
of the situation will be determinative to an extent; e.g. in Paradiso, the Grand Chamber noted
the relatively short duration of the relationship between the child and the applicants as
one of the factors taken into account when considering whether or not there was an
existence of family life between the child and the applicants. (at [151]-[157]) The joint
dissenting judgment of Judges Lazarova Trajkovska, Bianku, Laffranque, Lemmens and
Grozev is worth noting, especially regarding its consideration of the child’s best interests.
The dissenting judges stated that in identifying the child’s best interests in a particular case,
two considerations are crucial, namely that it is in the child’s best interests that his or her
family ties are maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit;
and it is in the child’s best interests to ensure his or her development in a safe and secure
environment. (at [6]) The dissenting judges argued the majority attached too much weight
to the need to put an end to an illegal situation and to discourage Italian citizens from
circumventing domestic law in foreign jurisdictions, and stated that the Italian Courts had
not adequately considered the impact of removal on the child’s well-being, nor the impact




prioritise the rights of children in future ICS cases, taking into consideration
their individual circumstances in contrast to the overall public interests at stake.
Chapter Ten illustrated the importance of rights balancing in ICS, given
the conflicting rights and interests of the child with the other core parties to
ICS. The importance of rights balancing in ICS has been engaged with through-
out the thesis, for example, in Chapters Three, Four, Eight and Nine. Chapter
Ten brought these strands together, arguing for rights balancing to take place
throughout ICS arrangements on a case-by-case basis, guided overall by the
concept of human dignity. This Chapter further argued that especially once
a child is born through ICS, the child should be prioritised in actions and
decisions in ICS affecting them, to ensure outcomes that are clearly focused
on protecting the child’s rights and which are consistent with the child’s best
interests.
Chapter Eleven forms the final chapter of this thesis, serving as an overall
conclusion to the doctoral study, placing it in contemporary context and
distilling the main findings of the study into a comprehensive framework of
recommendations (see Section 6 of this Conclusion). If implemented, these
recommendations would serve to protect the child’s rights and best interests
in ICS, while also guiding the balancing of core parties’ rights and interests
where these clash in ICS arrangements. The following schematic outlines how
the chapters of the thesis connect to the study’s research questions, and
summarises the main contribution each chapter has made to addressing the
research questions.
Ch. Title Research question(s) Main contribution to addressing research
question(s)
2 Contextualising a 21st Century
Challenge: Part One – Under-
standing International Com-
mercial Surrogacy and the
Parties whose Rights and
Interests are at Stake in the




Analyses why ICS is a twenty-first
century human rights challenge and
the parties whose rights and interests
are at risk in ICS.
3 Contextualising a 21st Century
Challenge: Part Two – Public
International Law Human
Rights Issues: Why Are the
Rights and Interests of Women









Focuses on the rights of children con-
ceived and born through ICS and
surrogate mothers in ICS, identifying
the main risks to their rights and how
women and children in ICS experience
some common human rights
challenges in ICS.
4 Multiple ‘Mothers’, Many
Requirements for Protection:
Children’s Rights and the
Status of Mothers in the Con-







Demonstrates the complexity of the
mother-child relationship in ICS and
presents analysis regarding the balanc-
ing of rights and interests of the child

















Argues the child is the locus of vul-
nerability in ICS, and analyses how
and the extent to which international
child rights standards and norms are
being utilised in ICS decision-making,
and the further scope that exists to do
so, to protect and promote children’s
rights in practice.
6 Unconceived, Unborn, Un-
certain: Is Pre-Birth Protection
Necessary in International
Commercial Surrogacy for









Argues decisions and actions taken in
the preconception, prenatal and post-
birth stages of ICS can impact on the
rights of the child in ICS, and that in
order to preserve the child’s ability to
exercise and enjoy his or her rights in
the event he or she is born through
ICS, decisions and actions taken pre-
conception and prenatally should
safeguard the child’s rights and best
interests, but that rights balancing
exercises will be necessary.
7 Securing children’s right to a
nationality in a changing









Examines how children can become
stateless through ICS and argues Art. 7
CRC right to a nationality is one of the
children’s rights most significantly at
risk, but that the CRC and public inter-
national human rights law standards
provide practical mechanisms which
can be implemented to uphold the
child’s nationality right in ICS.
8 Answering the “Who am I?”
Question: Protecting the Right
of Children Born Through
International Commercial
Surrogacy to Preserve Their
Identity Under Article 8 of the
United Nations Convention on







Examines how children face challenges
to preserving their identity in ICS and
argues Art. 8 CRC right to identity
preservation is one of the children’s
rights most significantly at risk in ICS,
but that there are practical steps which
can be taken by a range of CRC duty-
bearers to uphold Art. 8 for children
in ICS.
9 Case Analysis: Children’s
Rights to the Fore in the Euro-









Case analysis illustrating judicial de-
cision-making considering the child’s
rights to nationality and identity in
ICS, and the importance of the
principle of the best interests of the
child in decision-making and rights
balancing in ICS situations.
10 Multiple Potential Parents But
a Child Always at the Centre:
Balancing the Rights and Inter-








Exploration of the rights balancing
exercises necessary in ICS between the
child and other core ICS parties, and
between surrogate mothers and com-
missioning parents; proposes an
approach to rights balancing in ICS
consistent with the CRC and with





Ch. Title Research question(s) Main contribution to addressing research
question(s)





Demonstrates the role of public inter-
national human rights law in protect-
ing and reinforcing the rights of
children in ICS (and how the standards
and norms of the CRC can be brought
to bear in practice), by presenting
recommendations proposed as a
framework for a General Comment of
the Committee on the Rights of the
Child on protecting the rights of
children in ICS, including how these
can be balanced with competing rights
and interests of other parties to ICS.
6 THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AS THE FRAMEWORK FOR
PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE CHILD’S RIGHTS IN ICS
6.1 The role of the CRC in protecting and reinforcing the rights of children
in ICS
The main research question of this study sought to explore two things. Firstly,
it asked “What is the role of international human rights law (especially the
norms and standards established by the CRC) in protecting and reinforcing
the rights of children in ICS?” This study has shown that the risks to the child’s
rights and best interests in ICS amount to a 21st century human rights challenge.
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the rights of the child most at risk
in ICS require better protection than they are currently receiving, in order for
children conceived and born this way to be able to enjoy and exercise their
rights. By examining the international human rights standards and norms of
particular relevance to the child’s situation in ICS – and indeed, the rights
which are most at risk in ICS – this study has demonstrated that the CRC
provides a strong framework for promoting and protecting the child’s rights
in ICS. Providing this insight into the foundational importance of public inter-
national law human rights norms and standards in this context has highlighted
that any approach to ICS at the national and international levels must begin
with the rights of the child as the most vulnerable party in ICS. The standards
and norms of the CRC and wider public international human rights law provide
a platform upon which to develop responses to ICS which are child-centric,
balancing the rights and best interests of the child with those of other core
parties to ICS. Moreover, a dynamic interpretation of the CRC as a living instru-
ment, in light of ICS as a contemporary development is warranted, to ensure





Taken together, these factors have demonstrated that public international
human rights legal norms and standards – especially the CRC – have a very
important role to play in protecting and reinforcing the rights of children in
ICS. In the absence of international agreement concerning ICS nor an agreed
international regulatory regime governing ICS practice; and in the face of a
divergence of domestic law and policy and persisting child rights challenges
arising through ICS, the norms and standards established by the CRC:
- serve to bring the focus of key actors in ICS (including States) onto the child
as the person whose rights are most at risk in ICS;
- provide a near-universally agreed framework for human rights protection
which can be implemented in practice to protect and reinforce the rights
of children in ICS; and
- can guide decisions and actions in ICS, including to resolve contentious
situations arising through ICS, thereby functioning as an arbiter and touch-
stone for child rights protection in ICS.
6.2 Understanding and approaching the rights of children in ICS from a
public international human rights law, child rights perspective, and
balancing competing rights in ICS
The second part of the main research question of this study asked “How
should the rights of children involved be understood and approached from
a public international human rights law, child rights perspective in relation
to the other parties and rights-holders involved in ICS?” Taking a child rights
perspective rooted in and informed by the CRC has served to maintain an
underlying focus throughout the study on the inherent dignity of the child
and their status as rights-holders, entitled to enjoy and exercise their full range
of CRC rights, to outcomes consistent with their best interests, and to protection
by duty-bearers. This study has shown that public international human rights
law – and in particular the CRC – provides a tool which can help to ensure
that the competing rights of the core parties to ICS can be navigated and
balanced throughout the course of ICS arrangements, consistent with the
concept of human dignity, whilst placing primary importance on the child’s
rights and best interests. This study has demonstrated that the balance to be
struck between competing rights and interests in ICS needs to be considered
on a case-by-case basis taking into account the specific circumstances involved,
and that the balance to be struck between the parties rights and interests will
likely differ depending on at what stage of an ICS arrangement (preconception,
prenatal, post-birth) the rights balancing exercise takes place.
Throughout the chapters of this thesis, findings and recommendations have
been presented, focusing on how CRC standards and norms can be better
harnessed to increase protection of the child’s rights and best interests in ICS.




study and presented in the preceding chapters of this thesis provide guidance
for promoting and protecting the rights of children in ICS. The findings and
recommendations cover both general approaches for promoting and protecting
child rights in ICS, as well as providing detailed guidance for implementing
protection of the child’s rights most at risk in ICS and balancing the child’s
rights with the rights and interests of other rights-holders in ICS. Where rel-
evant, the findings and recommendations specify which of the core parties
and wider actors involved in ICS should bear responsibility for implementation
and protection measures.
Taken together, the 40 recommendations which can be distilled from this
doctoral study are presented below in this Conclusion, in the form of a pro-
posed framework for a Committee on the Rights of the Child General Com-
ment on protecting and promoting the rights of children in ICS. The recom-
mendations are grouped into four main categories:
- Overarching recommendations to promote and protect the rights of children
in ICS;
- Safeguarding the rights of future children before conception and birth in
ICS;
- Protecting the child’s rights once born through ICS; and
- Balancing rights and interests in ICS.
It is noted that some of the recommendations proposed go beyond what may
be politically palatable to States in the context of ICS. However, the recom-
mendations are intended to indicate practical steps to leverage existing public
international law child rights standards and norms which would and could
have a protective effect on the rights of the child in ICS if implemented, as well
as minimising harm to children and their rights in the continuing practice of
ICS. Some of the recommendations can be implemented on an immediate time-
scale, and others over a longer time horizon, dependent on increased inter-
national agreement concerning ICS. Following the framework of recommenda-
tions set out below, Section 6.3 of this Conclusion outlines the rationale for
why a General Comment would help to protect and reinforce children’s rights
in ICS and why a General Comment is a sound and useful public international




Framework of recommendations for promoting and protecting the rights of children
in International Commercial Surrogacy
(proposed for use as a framework for a General Comment of the United Nations Committee
on the Rights of the Child)
A. Overarching recommendations to promote and protect the rights of children in Inter-
national Commercial Surrogacy
Taking a child rights approach in ICS
1. Given the child rights and human rights issues raised by ICS, a public inter-
national human rights law perspective, in particular a child rights approach,
should guide and be a central feature of any approach addressing ICS at
domestic, regional and international levels.
2. All efforts must be taken by the core parties and all actors involved in ICS to
ensure that when ICS arrangements occur, they are child-centric, meaning that
the child’s rights, best interests and human dignity are promoted and protected.
3. The standards and norms established by the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC) must be comprehensively observed and imple-
mented throughout the course of all ICS arrangements. In the absence of inter-
national agreement concerning ICS and/or international regulation of ICS, the
CRC should guide all decisions relating to ICS, both at a general level and in
relation to specific ICS arrangements.
4. The Committee on the Rights of the Child should require all CRC States Parties
to report on the treatment of children in ICS in their jurisdiction as part of their
periodic reporting obligation under the CRC.
5. In the long-term, States should develop domestic legal frameworks addressing
ICS; work in cooperation to reach international agreement on ICS; and develop
an international regulatory framework to govern any future practice of ICS.
These should be grounded in international child rights standards and norms,
to ensure the child’s rights and best interests are paramount in ICS. This may
necessitate the prohibition under law of some current aspects of the practice
of ICS, for example, the use of anonymous gametes.
Guarding against sale and trafficking of children in ICS
6. Any new legislative or policy approaches concerning ICS at the domestic,
regional and international levels should reflect and reinforce the international
human rights norm that no child should be bought or sold.
7. All CRC States Parties and states involved in ICS in any way must remain alert
to the potential of the trafficking and sale of children through ICS. As a first
step, states should review their child trafficking and sale prevention and
detection measures and systems, to ensure they safeguard children born




The impact of domestic legislation on children in ICS
8. Courts and governments should ensure that where changes to laws impacting
on ICS are introduced, these changes are undertaken in a manner that does not
negatively impact on the rights and best interests of children already born
through ICS in the affected jurisdiction, or the rights and best interests of future
children already conceived in that jurisdiction through ICS.
9. Governments should make public in a transparent and timely manner any
changes to laws impacting on ICS arrangements, or changes to government
positions regarding ICS (both in their own and other states), so that prospective
commissioning parents can be advised as early as possible of any impact of
these changes on future or existing children born through ICS. One possible
method of making this information available is via regularly updated fact-sheets
on government websites.
10. States involved in ICS should advise each other in a transparent and timely
manner of any changes to the legal status of ICS in their territory. States receiv-
ing this information should communicate this publicly through channels that
will reach prospective commissioning parents who are citizens or residents
in their jurisdiction, to provide them with as much certainty and clarity as
possible to make informed decisions about ICS.
B. Safeguarding the rights of future children before conception and birth in ICS
11. The CRC should be applied by all core parties and ICS actors before a child is
conceived and before a child is born in ICS, to take an in eventu approach to
preserve the future child’s ability to enjoy and exercise their CRC rights once
born. Taking such an approach in ICS is not attributing rights before birth, but
rather can have a protective lifetime impact on the child in the event that they
are born. It is consistent with the principles of human dignity and the best
interests of the child.
12. CRC States Parties should implement key safeguards to encourage an in eventu
approach to protecting the future child’s rights in ICS at the pre-conception
and pre-natal stages, namely:
12.1 Educate medical professionals, legal advisors and prospective commis-
sioning parents about the CRC rights most at risk for children in ICS as a result
of preconception and prenatal actions and decisions, and how they can take
decisions and act to uphold these rights for a future child; and
12.2 Develop, establish, implement and monitor professional codes of
practice/best practice guidance applying to processes used in ICS (including
those in medical clinical settings) which raise preconception and prenatal risks
to the future child’s rights and best interests, particularly their rights under
Articles 7 and 8 CRC.
13. In every ICS arrangement, from the time a pregnancy is confirmed, the intended
state of birth (that is, the ICS supply-side state) should appoint an independent
guardian for the future child.
13.1 The guardian should have the mandate to represent the future child’s




and are a central focus of the actions and decision-making processes of the
adult parties to ICS during the prenatal phase; and
13.2 The guardian’s mandate should remain in place until either:
a) the child’s legal parentage is established; or
b) until after the child’s legal parentage is established and a post-parentage
monitoring period is concluded, and the child’s rights and best interests
are assessed as being protected to the satisfaction of the relevant authorities
or court.
C. Protecting the child’s rights once born through ICS
Decision-making by commissioning parents
14. When making decisions and taking actions in ICS that will affect the child (or
the future child once he or she is born), commissioning parents should ensure
that the child’s actual or future best interests guide any decision that will affect
him or her.
The child’s right to non-discrimination
15. Children born through ICS must not be subjected to discrimination on the basis
of their birth status (i.e. their conception and birth through ICS), or any other
prohibited grounds of discrimination, such as disability, sex and the status of
their parents.
15.1 Children born through ICS with a mental or physical disability are entitled
to conditions ensuring dignity, and which promote self-reliance and facilitate
the child’s active participation in the community.
The child’s right to nationality
16. Children born through ICS must be able to acquire a nationality from birth.
Any grant of nationality to a child born through ICS must be made in a non-
discriminatory manner and in accordance with the child’s best interests.
17. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in cooperation
with the Committee on the Rights of the Child, should issue non-binding
guidance to States to apply to children in ICS situations who would otherwise
be stateless, reflecting the following clauses:
17.1 A State which is the intended State of a child’s residence will, either prior
to the birth of that child through ICS or as soon as possible following birth,
grant nationality to the child if he or she would otherwise be stateless, as long
as a genetic link between the child and one of his or her ‘commissioning
parents’ is proved.
17.1.2 In order to ensure that the child is able to acquire nationality as soon
as possible after birth through ICS, DNA testing will be made available imme-




17.2 States will grant nationality to an otherwise stateless child born on their
territory through ICS. The child should be assumed to be stateless if he or she:
a) has no genetic link to either of their ‘commissioning parents’ on the basis
of DNA testing; or
b) is abandoned pre- or post-birth by their ‘commissioning parents’ in the
territory of the birth State, regardless of whether or not he or she has a
genetic link to his or her ‘commissioning parents’.
Decision-making to determine legal parentage
18. Decisions determining the legal parentage of a child born through ICS should
be made in as timely a manner as possible, to provide the child with certain
and secure legal and family status, and protect their rights to education, health
and social security.
19. Decision-making concerning the child’s legal parentage in ICS should:
a) treat the child’s best interests and rights as paramount;
b) consider the rights and interests of the child’s multiple potential ‘mothers’;
and
c) be consistent with the child’s right to preserve the genetic, biological (birth)
and social elements of their identity.
The child’s right to know and be cared for by their parents and to grow up in a family
environment
20. All children born through ICS should:
a) be able to know all those people who may be interpreted as their ‘parents’
in some respect (genetic; biological (surrogate); social);
b) be cared for by the people determined at law to be their legal parents;
c) grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love
and understanding, directed towards the full and harmonious development
of their personality; and
d) be protected from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse,
neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual
abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person
whose care they are in.
The child’s right to preserve their identity
21. Children conceived and born through ICS must be able to enjoy and exercise
their right to preserve their identity, including the genetic and biological
elements of identity.
22. All states should outlaw the use of gametes and embryos from anonymous
donors in ICS arrangements.
23. All states should outlaw the involvement of surrogates who act on an ano-
nymous basis in ICS arrangements.
24. To uphold the child’s Article 8 CRC right, commissioning parents should:
a) only enter into ICS arrangements involving identifiable gamete and embryo




b) only enter into ICS arrangements with medical professionals/surrogacy
clinics with systems established and functioning to collect, store and protect
information about all elements of the child’s identity;
c) advocate before and after birth for the preservation of all elements of the
child’s identity, and wherever possible, take steps to do this themselves;
d) once the child is born, support him or her to develop, understand and
thereby preserve his or her own identity, for example by sharing identity
information with the child or supporting him or her to access identity informa-
tion, in line with his or her evolving capacities; and
e) support the child and provide him or her with opportunities to know,
understand and enjoy their ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background,
including his or her background connected to his or her genetic parentage and
biological heritage.
25. To uphold the child’s Article 8 CRC right, medical professionals/surrogacy
clinics should:
a) only facilitate ICS arrangements involving the use of gametes and embryos
from identifiable donors who agree to be contacted by the future child;
b) only facilitate ICS arrangements involving identifiable surrogates (acting
non-anonymously) who agree to be contacted by the future child;
c) collect, store and facilitate the child’s access to specific information1 about
his or her genetic parents and birth mother (surrogate);
d) create, store and facilitate the child’s access to a formal record of the
particulars and circumstances of the child’s birth;2 and
e) compile the information specified under 25(c) and (d) in an identity dossier
for the child, and provide a copy to the child’s commissioning parents as soon
as practicable following the child’s birth; and store a copy in perpetuity (or
until such time that it is accessed by the child) at the surrogacy clinic/by the
medical professional overseeing the ICS arrangement.
26. ICS supply-states should take the following steps to uphold the child’s Article 7
and 8 CRC rights:
a) legislate and implement policy placing a duty on medical professionals
and surrogacy clinics to collect, store, protect and facilitate access to identity
dossier for children born through ICS, and monitor and enforce the implementa-
tion of these requirements;
1 In relation to the child’s genetic parents (gamete/embryo donors), this includes: full name;
date of birth; ethnicity and language spoken; current physical address, phone number and
email address where available; significant health history (pertaining directly to the donor
and regarding their family history); and the age and sex of any pre-existing genetic children.
In relation to the child’s birth mother (surrogate), this includes: full name; date of birth;
ethnicity and language spoken; current physical address, phone number and email address
where available; significant health history relating to the term of pregnancy and childbirth,
insofar as it could impact the child’s health; and any significant health history of pre-existing
serious disease or medical condition.
2 Including, but not limited to: place of birth; date and time of birth; full names of every
person present at the birth; details of the child’s genetic make-up; details of the medical
procedures undertaken to conceive the child (e.g. IVF; embryo implantation); and the





b) in cases of children born via the use of anonymous gametes or embryos
in ICS, or to an anonymous surrogate, require, at the minimum, that an identity
dossier is compiled, stored and protected for the child’s access, including all
available non-identifying information available about the donor(s) and the
surrogate, along with information about the particulars and circumstances of
the child’s birth;
c) require that a copy of each identity dossier pertaining to a child born
through ICS is provided to the State itself, for storage in a national, centralised
repository system designed for storing and protecting these dossier for future
access by the children to which they pertain to;
d) actively publicise the existence of the system collecting, storing and facilitat-
ing access of children born through ICS to their identity dossier, and facilitate
a process whereby donors and surrogates can update their contact details in
this system;
e) ensure all children born through ICS are registered immediately after birth
and issued with a birth certificate following birth, including accurate and
complete information as far as possible concerning the child’s parentage and
particulars of birth, including the names of the child’s birth mother and genetic
parents; and
f) explore whether for children born through ICS with anonymous genetic
parents, annotation of birth certificates to reflect this fact would have a protect-
ive effect for children, or whether it may have a discriminatory or stigmatising
impact on them.
27. In the long-term, it is advisable that States explore the feasibility of cooperating
to establish and facilitate an inter-state system to protect identity information
in the context of ICS;3 under such a system, at the same time as the supply-state
stores a copy of an identity dossier of a child born in that state, the supply-state
should transmit a copy of the identity dossier to a formally designated state-
level agency in the demand-state (the home state of the child’s commissioning
parents). That demand-state agency should receive, store and protect the
identity dossier and establish a system facilitating access by the children they
pertain to.
Care and protection of child victims in ICS
28. In situations where none of the core adult parties to an ICS arrangement take
responsibility for the care and protection of the child born through the arrange-
ment, the supply-side state (child’s state of birth) and the demand-state (home
state of the commissioning parents) should work closely together to reach
agreement on where and how the child will receive alternative care; in taking
such a decision, both states must act in accordance with their CRC obligations
3 Similar, e.g., to the system operating between Central Authorities of Contracting States
to the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-
country Adoption (concluded 29 May 1993, entry into force 1 May 1995) in relation to the
transmission of reports between States of Origin and Receiving States under Arts. 15 and
16 of that Convention (pertaining to the identity and background of prospective adoptive




and establish alternative care that is consistent with the child’s rights and best
interests.
29. Supply and demand states should take all appropriate measures to promote
the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of any child
born through ICS who experiences any form of neglect, exploitation or abuse
(for example, children who are trafficked, abused or abandoned through ICS),
in an environment fostering the child’s health, self-respect and dignity.
Participation and protection of the child in ICS cases before judicial decision-making bodies
30. A lawyer for the child should be appointed in all ICS cases coming before courts
of law or judicial decision-making bodies,4 including for children in early
infancy;5 the lawyer for the child should have a mandate to advocate for and
represent the child’s rights and best interests under the CRC and applicable
domestic law. The lawyer for the child should ensure the child can express
their views to judicial decision-makers on matters affecting them, in line with
the child’s evolving capacities.6
31. Judicial decision-makers should place the child at the centre of all ICS cases,
by:
a) taking a holistic and lifetime-outcomes view of the child’s situation, in
particular paying attention to the care, safety and development of the child,
and the enduring stability and sustainability of the relationships which are
foundational to the child’s on-going care, well-being and identity preservation;
b) applying the best interests of the child principle on a case-by-case basis
and considering all relevant CRC rights in judicial reasoning; and
4 Ideally, this lawyer for child should represent the child as an independent party to proceed-
ings, rather than expounding the law on the rights and best interests of the child impartially
as a lawyer for child appointed on an independent ‘counsel to assist the Court’/amicus
curiae basis. As a party to proceedings represented by a lawyer, the child would have
arguments presented on their behalf. However, in ICS situations this may not be practically
feasible given it may not be possible to reach agreement on who would pay the child’s
legal fees for representation as a party to proceedings (and States may be unwilling to fund
the child’s legal representation). Therefore, appointing a lawyer for child on an amicus curiae
basis – but on the understanding that lawyer would advance legal arguments on the child’s
behalf as an un-represented party to proceedings – may be a more workable approach in
practice and State funding may be more accessible on this basis.
5 N.B. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child observes “By virtue of their relative
immaturity, young children are reliant on responsible authorities to assess and represent
their rights and best interests in relation to decisions and actions that affect their well-being,
while taking account of their views and evolving capacities.” UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child, General Comment no. 7 on implementing child rights in early childhood (2005)
at [13]. The Committee urges all States Parties to “make provisions for young children to
be represented independently in all legal proceedings by someone who acts for the child’s
interests”. General Comment no. 7 at [13](a).
6 This has also been emphasised by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in the
context of implementing child rights in early childhood, urging States Parties to ensure
that “children [are] heard in all cases [legal proceedings] where they are capable of express-
ing their opinions or preferences”. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General




c) reflecting this focus on the child’s rights and best interests in written
judgments, including giving consideration to how written judgments may be
important documents for the child in future to understand how their rights
and best interests were treated.
D. Balancing rights and interests in ICS
32. Rights balancing is necessary throughout the course of ICS arrangements on
a case-by-case basis to balance the competing rights of the core parties to ICS
(child, surrogate, commissioning parents); the principles of human dignity and
the best interests of the child must guide all rights balancing exercises in ICS.
The child’s best interests
33. In assessing the child’s best interests in ICS, priority should be accorded to the
child or future child’s rights to: preserve their identity; health; know and be
cared for by their parents as far as possible; grow up in a family environment;
be free from discrimination; and be free from any form of abuse or exploitation.
34. Assessing the best interests of the child in ICS must be aimed at ensuring the
child’s full and effective enjoyment of CRC rights and the holistic development
of the child. All decision-making which will affect the child should assess
continuity and stability of the child’s present and future situation.
35. Once a child is born through an ICS arrangement, the child’s rights and best
interests should be treated as the paramount consideration by all private and
public actors, and accorded the most weight in balancing competing rights
and interests.
Balancing the rights and interests of the surrogate with those of the child and commission-
ing parents
36. In situations of competing rights in ICS occurring once the child is in utero but
before the child is born, the surrogate’s health, reproductive autonomy and
human dignity must be accorded priority, however, the future child’s rights
and best interests should be protected wherever possible to safeguard their
exercise and enjoyment once born.
37. Despite paragraph 36, in situations where the pregnant surrogate engages in
actions or decisions unnecessarily endangering the foetus and therefore, the
potential future child (that is, without a medical reason necessitating her action
or decision), the balance of rights and interests will generally shift in favour
of the commissioning parents and future child.
38. It is important to acknowledge the particular role that a surrogate undertakes
in ICS arrangements, carrying the child to term and giving birth to the child,
facts which cannot be displaced and which create a biological link to the child
regardless of whether the surrogate shares a genetic link to the child or not.





Balancing the rights and interests of genetic donor parents with those of the child
39. The child’s Article 8 and 24 CRC rights should be accorded priority and signi-
ficant weight in the balancing of competing rights and interests between ICS
genetic donor parents and children born through ICS, given the positive lifetime
impact of these child rights being protected. Where genetic donor parents’
privacy rights conflict with children’s identity and health rights in ICS, the
balance should weigh in favour of protecting the child’s rights.
Balancing the rights and interests of the commissioning parents with those of the child
40. In balancing a conflict between the rights and interests of the child and their
commissioning parents in ICS, the child’s rights and best interests must be
treated as the paramount consideration.
6.3 Arguments for the Committee on the Rights of the Child to issue a
General Comment on the rights of children in International Commercial
Surrogacy
As noted earlier in this Chapter, through its statements in some of its recent
Concluding Observations, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has
already indicated its concern regarding the promotion and protection of the
rights of children born through ICS. By issuing a General Comment based on
the framework of recommendations presented above, the Committee can send
a strong message to CRC duty bearers that as long as ICS continues being
practised, the rights and best interests of children conceived and born through
ICS can and must be better protected and more assiduously upheld. A General
Comment based on this framework is comprehensively rooted in the standards
and norms established by the CRC, emphasising the interconnected and inter-
dependent nature of the child’s rights in practice in ICS. By explicitly requiring
States Parties to report on the treatment of children in ICS in their jurisdiction
via their CRC periodic reporting,31 the Committee will impose a higher level
of scrutiny on practices which are inconsistent with child rights.
Crucially, the General Comment can serve as a roadmap for States Parties
to guide their implementation of the CRC for the promotion and protection
31 N.B. The Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child porno-
graphy made the following recommendation in her Study on Illegal Adoptions, appearing
as Part III of Report of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child
pornography, A/HRC/34/55, 22 December 2016, at [99]: “The Committee on the Rights of
the Child and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women should
request States parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography to provide information
about concerns related to illegal adoptions and international commercial surrogacy arrange-




of the rights of children in ICS, taking a holistic view of their rights and balanc-
ing them in relation to the other core parties to ICS. The framework of recom-
mendations outlined above makes clear that there are steps which can be taken
now, by States, the core parties to ICS and the wider actors involved in ICS,
which can have a protective effect on children, without having to wait for
international agreement on the practice of ICS. A General Comment built on
the framework would likely prove helpful to the work underway at the inter-
national level concerning international surrogacy, both under the auspices of
the International Social Service and the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, and should, therefore, be viewed as complementary to these
ongoing international efforts.
While focused squarely on protecting the child in ICS, the framework of
recommendations reflects a broad perspective regarding the possible audience
to whom they may be helpful. They are intended to be of use in guiding the
decisions and actions of all the core parties to ICS (children, surrogates, commis-
sioning parents, genetic donor parents), as well as to the wider actors involved
in ICS (for example, medical practitioners, lawyers, surrogacy brokers), and
to decision-makers in ICS (for example, State-based actors including social
workers, government ministers and judges). Beyond their use as a practical
tool to promote, protect and prioritise the child’s rights in ICS on a case-by-case
basis, the framework of recommendations should also assist policy-makers
and legislators at the national and international levels, in future efforts to frame
new laws and policies pertaining to ICS.
Of course, the framework of recommendations put forward as a result of
this study will, even if incorporated in a Committee on the Rights of the Child
General Comment, remain soft law; therefore, it will largely remain a choice
for States Parties whether or not and to what extent they implement the
recommendations. However, many states directly involved with ICS are current-
ly grappling with the human rights, child rights and protection issues arising
from the practice of ICS. For some such states, guidance of this kind from an
authoritative body such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child will likely
be welcomed given its effect of clarifying how the CRC’s standards and norms
can be implemented in practice. It may well prove helpful to those states as
they seek to determine how they approach ICS at the legislative, policy and
case-by-case levels, and how they work in cooperation with other states. By
acting consistently with the framework of recommendations in ICS, states will
help to foster a culture of understanding and commitment to the protection
of the child’s rights in ICS amongst the international community of states (States
Parties as the principal CRC duty bearers), as well as amongst private actors
involved in ICS, most importantly commissioning parents (given their particular
role as non-State duty bearers under the CRC).
Indeed, it is important to recall in this respect that CRC States Parties have




known, by appropriate and active means, to adults and children alike.”32
Given the responsibility of all parents under Article 18(1) CRC to make the
best interests of the child their basic concern, commissioning parents will
certainly need to play an instrumental role in ensuring children conceived
and born through ICS can realise their rights as outlined under the framework
recommendations. However, the relationship between States Parties and
commissioning parents is symbiotic in this respect. Commissioning parents
will need to know about the recommendations and understand the role that
they have to play as commissioning parents in protecting the child’s rights
and best interests in ICS, in order to be able to actively implement the recom-
mendations to ensure the child is prioritised in actions and decisions concern-
ing them. States Parties can play a significant role in encouraging such action,
by promoting the recommendations to commissioning parents.
7 ENVISAGING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS
THAT PROTECT THE CHILDREN AT THEIR CENTRE
Taking into account the examination of the child’s rights in ICS presented in
this thesis and the protection framework rooted in the CRC which has been
proposed, it is possible to discern a minimum ‘ideal state of affairs’ to strive
for regarding the child’s rights in ICS, as long as the practice continues. If the
recommendation framework proposed above is implemented, this would lead
to a minimum ideal state of affairs whereby:
- It is recognised that some child rights risks in ICS begin before conception
and birth and that these manifest once the child is born, but can be safe-
guarded against by taking an in eventu approach to protecting child rights
in both the preconception and prenatal phases of ICS;
- Children born through ICS preserve their identities to the greatest extent
possible, as a result of systematic safeguarding of identity information and
the avoidance of the use and involvement of anonymous gametes and
anonymous surrogates;
- Children born through ICS have a clear and secure child-parent relationship
recognised by law at the earliest possible stage;
- Children born through ICS are registered immediately after birth and are
able to acquire a nationality;
- All decisions and actions relating to children born through ICS are guided
by the principle of the best interests of the child, leading to outcomes for
the child consistent with, and giving effect to, their CRC rights;




- Children conceived and born through ICS are treated in a manner which
is non-discriminatory, regardless of the circumstances of their conception
and birth through ICS or any other prohibited grounds of discrimination;
- All states are actively engaged in considering the impact of their laws,
policies and practices on the rights of children born through ICS, and
whether specific proactive steps need to be taken in order for the child’s
rights under the CRC to be upheld and safeguarded in the context of ICS;
and
- Any legislation, regulation and policy pertaining to ICS is informed by a
human rights-based approach, reflecting international human rights stand-
ards and norms, with the child’s rights and best interests being of foremost
importance, balanced with the rights of others in ICS, guided by the concept
of human dignity.
8 PROSPECTS FOR A LONG-TERM APPROACH TO PROTECTING THE CHILD’S
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
In 2012, I stated that
‘ICS arrangements tend to be complex given their international dimension and the
matter they deal with: human life. Whilst there is a strong argument for inter-
national regulation, international agreement remains a distant possibility. This is
due to the complexity of the issue, especially the minefield of ethical issues (related,
but not limited to, aspects of ICS such as human dignity, commodification of human
reproductive functions and bodily matter and commodification of children), and
divergent State positions.’33
This remains an accurate assessment regarding the prospects for a long-term
approach to protecting the child’s rights in ICS. The drafting and conclusion
of any international instrument governing the practice of ICS will, ideally, need
to be informed by comprehensive (and no doubt difficult) discussion at the
international level around the larger issues of the value society places on
human life, children and human reproduction. Indeed, it is clear from this
study and the many cases of ICS which have been analysed, that in part it is
because of the lack of international consensus on these matters of public
interest in relation to ICS that ICS has become such a problematic practice from
a human rights perspective. As part of such discussions preceding any inter-
national consensus as to the approach to be taken regarding ICS, further con-
tentious issues will likely require resolution, such as whether ICS constitutes
33 I first presented this statement in 2012 at the World Social Work and Social Development
Conference, 8-12 July 2012. It was later published as: C. Achmad, International Commercial
Surrogacy: 21st Century Global Families in Transition’, in S. Hessle (ed.), Global Social




the sale of children (noting that the Committee on the Rights of the Child has
now stated that ICS can lead to sale, but has not yet gone so far as to say it
is sale);34 whether it is in fact possible to ‘buy’ a child with whom one shares
a genetic link; and whether or not the existence of a genetic link between
commissioning parents and children in ICS is a decisive factor in international
acceptance or rejection of the practice in the long-term.
Of these contentious issues, it is likely that reaching a definitive view on
whether or not ICS is tantamount to the sale of children under international
law – regardless of how it is practised – will be the most difficult. This study
has not explored the legality or otherwise of ICS; rather, this study has acknow-
ledged the reality of the existence of the practice of ICS and focused on pro-
tection and promotion of child rights through envisaging practical implementa-
tion of the CRC. However, it has become clear through research undertaken
to inform this study that although not all instances of ICS amount to sale of
children, in some instances ICS arrangements are being undertaken in ways
that fall within the definition of ‘sale of children’ under public international
law.35 However, whether a specific ICS arrangement amounts to sale of
children under public international law depends on the facts of the situation
involved, in particular the payment structure of the ICS arrangement in relation
to the transfer of the child. More work outside of the scope of this thesis is
needed to identify more clearly when and how ICS amounts to the sale of
children. This is an issue which the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography should continue
focusing on, under her mandate to consider matters relating to the sale of
children to analyse the root causes of sale of children, addressing all the
contributing factors, especially the demand factor, and to make associated
recommendations.36
34 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the consolidated third
and fourth periodic reports of India, (2014), CRC/C/IND/CO/3-4, at [57](d).
35 Art. 2(a), Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 25 May 2000, United Nations Treaty
Series, vol. 2171, 227.
36 Human Rights Council, Res. 7/13, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children,
child, prostitution and child pornography (27 March 2008). N.B. the Special Rapporteur’s
Study on surrogacy and sale of children, A/HRC/37/60, p.3ff. Previously too, the Special
Rapporteur has indicated her concern about the practice of ICS; see, e.g. the Rapporteur’s
Study on Illegal Adoptions, appearing as Part III of Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, A/HRC/34/55, 22 December
2016, pp.4-24. Importantly, the Special Rapporteur she has noted that “The international
regulatory vacuum that persists in relation to international commercial surrogacy arrange-
ments leaves children born through this method vulnerable to breaches of their rights, and
the practice often amounts to the sale of children and may lead to illegal adoption. Indeed,
several countries do not recognize such arrangements and, in order to establish a parent-
child relationship, national laws often require parents to legally adopt the child born through




Although international consensus on ICS will be difficult to achieve, the
now on-going proactive work at the international level to address some of
the challenges arising through ICS is a very positive development. The frame-
work of recommendations proposed in this thesis from a child rights perspect-
ive could be used to help inform this work insofar as it relates to children in
ICS, for example by the Hague Conference Experts’ Group on Parentage/
Surrogacy. The framework of recommendations could serve as a base document
and useful guiding tool to ensure that a human rights approach, with a focus
on the person at the centre of all ICS arrangements and most at risk – the
child – is a primary consideration, as the Hague Conference Experts’ Group
continues to explore the feasibility of an international instrument to address
ICS.
As work continues concerning possible long-term approaches to ICS, it is
also important to bear in mind the observation made by Keyes and Chisholm
that efforts to discourage surrogacy could have the effect of driving the practice
underground.37 International policy-makers and legislators must therefore
remain conscious of the potential (unintended) consequences which may be
triggered if ICS was in future subjected to a global ban, and ensure adequate
consideration is directed towards how such consequences may be mitigated.
Thought will also need to be given to how states share responsibility regarding
ICS; even if a global ban is imposed, ICS will still continue to be practised to
some extent. Therefore, states will need to consider how they will cooperate
in such instances, especially regarding the protection of the rights of children
born this way, who should not be penalised or discriminated against on the
basis that they were conceived and born through an illegal practice, something
which is beyond their control.
Moreover, international efforts to increase protection and safeguards for
those most vulnerable in ICS – especially the child – should be founded on
the impetus reflected in the statement by Biggs and Jones that “[u]ntil a
dedicated international convention on surrogacy is devised to establish an
appropriate framework for inter-jurisdictional cooperation, akin to the Adop-
tion Convention, these vulnerabilities [of the child] will continue.”38 Based
on the findings of this doctoral study, it is also clear that a “differential em-
phasis [emphasising the rights of children as most vulnerable] seems justifiable
37 M. Keyes and R. Chisholm, “Commercial Surrogacy – Some Troubling Family Law Issues”,
(2013), available at https://www.ag.gov.au/FamiliesAndMarriage/FamilyLawCouncil/
Documents/flc-submission-professor-mary-keyes-griffith-university-16july2013.pdf (accessed
29 July 2016), at 37.
38 H. Biggs and C. Jones, ‘Legally Vulnerable: What is Vulnerability and Who is Vulnerable?’,
in M. Freeman, S. Hawkes and B. Bennett (eds.), Law and Global Health: Current Legal Issues
(2014), Vol. 16, at 146. For further discussion regarding prospects for an international
convention addressing ICS, see S. Mohapatra, “Adopting an International Convention on





in a global surrogacy context where we need to consider whose vulnerabilities
matter most in devising appropriate legal responses and regulation.”39 This
study has demonstrated that a framework exists under international human
rights law that should not only be implemented in practice to ensure respect,
protection and fulfilment of the child’s rights in ICS, but which should be
utilised to inform any new approach to ICS at the domestic and international
levels. By focusing on the particular rights of the child and the principles of
the CRC most at risk in ICS, a human rights approach can be taken to frame
future regulation, legislation and policy at the international and domestic levels
in a manner that will prioritise the rights of the child but also benefit all core
parties to ICS.
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite Dickensen’s assertion in early 2016 that “The global trade in babies
born through commercial surrogacy is slowly being shut down”,40 children
are continuing to be conceived and born through ICS. Given that the technology
is now available to make this possible and the fact that globalisation has made
the world a much smaller place, and due to the ongoing demand for this
method of family-building, ICS looks set to continue to some extent. This is
despite the continuing evolution of new methods of family-building grounded
in technological and scientific advances, such as the conception of children
using DNA from three parents through mitochondrial transfer (now legal in
some jurisdictions),41 and extrauterine foetal incubation of human beings in
artificial wombs.42 Currently, ICS remains a much more accessible alternative
method of family-building. Its continued use does not mean that we cannot
do more to protect those most at risk in ICS: children. This study has demon-
strated that these children are being created through and born into risk-laden
39 Ibid.
40 D. Dickensen, “The End of Cross-Border Surrogacy?”, Project Syndicate, 25 February 2016,
available at https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/crackdown-on-international-
surrogacy-trade-by-donna-dickenson-2016-02 (accessed 29 July 2016).
41 The United Kingdom was the first state in the world to legislate to make this practice legal,
via The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015.
42 Children who are born through these methods should also be able to enjoy and exercise
their full range of rights under the CRC; some of the child rights issues traversed in this
thesis will also arise as child rights challenges in these other new contexts, e.g. the child’s
right to preservation of identity when multiple parents are involved (mitochondrial transfer)
and when there is no foetal-maternal link through pregnancy and childbirth (artificial
wombs). For preliminary discussion of the potential impact of gestation in artificial wombs
on children, see J.A. Robertson, ‘Other women’s wombs: uterus transplants and gestational
surrogacy’, 3(1) Journal of Law and the Biosciences (2016), available at: https://
academic.oup.com/jlb/article/3/1/68/1751311/Other-women-s-wombs-uterus-transplants-




circumstances. At best, many of their CRC rights are jeopardised by virtue of
being born through ICS. At worst, they are breached as a result of the circum-
stances of their conception and birth, through actions and decisions being taken
that do not align with what is in their best interests.43
This study is unique as it provides an examination of the practice of ICS
from a child-centred perspective, using a child rights framework. In doing
so, it has demonstrated the important role of public international law human
rights standards and norms in addressing this 21st century human rights
challenge. By translating the CRC’s standards and norms into a framework
of recommendations, this study presents a practical framework for protecting
the child’s rights in ICS, something which has not been done before with this
focus. Indeed, many of the recommendations can be implemented in a relative-
ly straightforward manner by a range of actors involved in ICS, without need-
ing to wait for new international or domestic regulation of ICS to be established.
These recommendations harness existing child rights and international human
rights standards and norms to shine a light on the obligations that states, as
well as private actors involved in ICS, bear in relation to the children conceived
and born through this practice.
By taking up the framework of recommendations in a General Comment
on the rights of children in ICS, the Committee on the Rights of the Child
would provide guidance that is needed by a range of child rights duty-bearers
internationally. Implementing the protection framework devised through this
thesis in the face of the on-going regulatory lacunae concerning ICS holds the
promise of the CRC’s “protective shadow”44 being cast over this group of
children. Granted, some of the recommendations will be more straightforward
to implement than others; for example, appointing a guardian for the child
in all instances of ICS from the time a pregnancy is confirmed is a measure
that states may well be reticent towards, given the administrative and financial
resource required. However, the reality is that such a measure is likely to help
to reduce conflicts arising in ICS arrangements, which is not only in the future
child’s interests, but also in the interests of the other core parties to ICS. With
a particular focus on the child’s rights relating to identity, nationality,
parentage and the principles of non-discrimination and best interests under
the CRC, and by implementing the framework of recommendations proposed,
a minimum ideal state for the child’s rights and best interests can be achieved,
with children conceived and born through ICS at least having their rights and
best interests more routinely considered and better protected.
43 C. Achmad, “Protecting the Locus of Vulnerability: Preliminary Ideas for Guidance on
Protecting the Rights of the Child in International Commercial Surrogacy”, in T. Liefaard
and J. Sloth-Nielsen (eds.), The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Taking
Stock after 25 Years and Looking Ahead (2017).




Although this study has delivered on its aims and been successful in
answering the research questions established at the outset, there is still much
more to be researched and learnt about the long-term impacts for children
conceived and born through ICS and their families. To follow-up on the founda-
tion set by this thesis, a major piece of work to be undertaken (by the author,
preferably in collaboration with multidisciplinary researchers, and drawing
on the experience of those working with children in ICS, such as social work
professionals45) is to explore the lived experience of children born through
ICS.46 This would examine how children experience their CRC rights and the
extent to which the actions and decisions taken preconception, pre-birth and
post-birth in relation to their creation through ICS impacts on their enjoyment
and exercise of their CRC rights. Such a research project could most usefully
focus on issues relating to identity preservation, family environment, health,
ethnic and cultural background and commodification. Ideally, the research
would concurrently focus on the experiences of children born through altruistic
surrogacy, to provide a comparative perspective. To take a child participatory
approach so that the perspectives and voices of children conceived and born
through ICS fully inform this future research project, it would preferably take
an empirical research methodology, via a longitudinal study with a group
of children born through ICS, benchmarked against the core rights at risk in
ICS. This would enable the mapping of the impact on specific child rights in
practice. Such research would have the aim of examining the children’s lived
experiences in line with their evolving capacities as they grow older, to build
a picture and understanding of their enjoyment and exercise of rights. How-
ever, the sensitivities and ethical challenges involved in such a research project
are acknowledged as likely being difficult to surmount, especially in relation
to issues such as identity and commodification.
Other pieces of work identified through the course of this doctoral study
as being ripe for further exploration from a child rights perspective are:
- Analysis and research regarding whether or not ICS definitively amounts
to the sale of children;
- Research into the situation of children abandoned following birth through
ICS in their state of birth. Little is known about this group of children, and
it would be helpful to explore issues such as whether they are recognised
as existing under national systems; more generally the situation of their
45 The significant insight of social work professionals into the situation of the child in ICS
is reflected in K.S. Rotabi et al, “International private law to regulate commercial global
surrogacy practices: Just what are social work’s practical policy recommendations?”,
International Social Work, 58 (2015) 4.
46 Such a study would be complementary to empirical research already undertaken to develop
understanding of the situation of surrogate mothers in ICS (including their relationships
with commissioning parents and the children they give birth to through ICS), e.g. A. Pande,
Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India, (2014); and A. Majumdar, Kinship




care and protection following abandonment; and whether responsibility
for such children should rest with the supply-side or demand-side state;
- Research into the impacts of ICS on the rights and best interests of the pre-
existing children of women who act as surrogates, as well as the rights
of genetic siblings of children born through ICS, and whether a global
network of ICS siblings will exist as a result of the involvement of gamete
donors in multiple ICS arrangements;
- Research into the weight to be attached to the genetic link between children
and their commissioning parent(s) in ICS, and the importance to be
attributed to this factor in determining legal parentage for children born
through ICS; and
- Consideration of the likelihood of class actions being taken by ICS children
in future against CRC States Parties in domestic jurisdictions and through
the CRC complaints procedure,47 on the basis of arguments such as ‘I
should not have been allowed to have been born this way’ and ‘steps
should have been taken to protect my identity preservation right so I can
understand where I come from and who I am’; and the viability of such
claims.
Even if one does not accept that ICS can ever be a child rights-consistent
method of family building, this does not displace the fact that while the
practice continues, legal obligations exist under the CRC to ensure protection
of the rights and best interests of children who are conceived and born this
way. Ultimately, ICS presents a global human rights challenge necessitating
an internationally agreed approach. To this end, international cooperation
mechanisms and initiatives focusing on possible multilateral approaches to
ICS should be actively supported.48 In the long-term, how we choose to
approach ICS will reflect the value society places on human life, human repro-
duction, and children. This study has shown that until such a time that inter-
national agreement can be reached on ICS, in the face of its continued practice,
it is imperative that we choose to place the child at the heart of ICS. By protect-
ing the child’s rights and upholding their best interests, this will have the
wider effect of protecting the rights of other vulnerable parties (such as surro-
gates), and reaching appropriate balances concerning the competing rights
and interests of core ICS parties, maximising protection of the rights of the most
vulnerable parties at stake. The framework of recommendations proposed
through this study form a touchstone for ensuring the practice of ICS, where
it continues to occur, does so consistently with the child’s rights and best
interests. Protecting the child’s rights should lead to more positive family
47 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications
procedure, A/RES/66/138 19 December 2011, entry into force 14 April 2014.
48 E.g. the work ongoing under the auspices of the Hague Conference, ISS, and the Special




outcomes, with the potential for interconnected, cross-cultural children growing
up in supportive families where the child has an understanding of their
multifaceted parentage.
Children are at the centre of all ICS arrangements, but we must do more
to accord priority to their rights and best interests. To do so will send a clear
message to this group of children that they are valued, they are equal rights-
holders, and that their human dignity must be respected and protected. To
not do so will mean the possibility of a generation of children dispersed
around the globe who are faced with a lifetime of rights-related challenges
as they grow into adulthood. By actively harnessing the CRC’s protection
framework, many of the child rights challenges triggered through ICS can be
guarded against, in the best interests of children who did not choose to be






International Commercial Surrogacy (ICS) has emerged over the past decade
as a new method of family formation, occurring across borders in response
to demand from prospective parents and supported by technological advances
in medical science and global interconnectedness. It raises human rights
challenges to the core parties to ICS who are most vulnerable, namely the
women who act as surrogate mothers and the children who are born as a
result. No international consensus exists regarding the practice of ICS; this is
reflected in the diverse legal positions taken by states regarding ICS and the
divergence in state approaches to ICS in domestic legislation and policy.
Furthermore, ICS is being practiced in the absence of any international regula-
tion, involving a number of core parties with different motivations, rights and
interests at stake in ICS arrangements. As a result, the rights and interests of
different parties to ICS can clash.
Therefore, ICS raises profound ethical, moral and legal questions, which
remain largely unresolved. However, in the face of this reality, children are
continuing to be born through ICS, and as a result are at a heightened risk of
their rights being infringed. A child is at the centre of all ICS arrangements,
and like all other children, children born through ICS are entitled to exercise
and enjoy their full range of rights under the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC). In practice though, children who are born
through ICS are in some instances experiencing significant challenges to – and
in some cases violations of – a number of their CRC rights. Therefore, ICS
presents not only a twenty-first century human rights challenge, but a con-
temporary child rights challenge, in need of attention from a child rights
perspective under public international human rights law.
This thesis is comprised of a collection of articles which have been written
over a period of time during which ICS has been rapidly developing. The
majority of the articles included as part of this thesis have been submitted for
publication and published in a range of journals and edited volumes. They
are brought together in this thesis to present a comprehensive exploration of
the children’s rights most at risk in ICS and the practical ways that the CRC
can be brought to bear to ensure children’s rights are protected, promoted




The main research question this thesis is concerned with is:
What is the role of international human rights law (especially the norms and
standards established by the CRC) in protecting and reinforcing the rights of
children in ICS, and how should the rights of children involved be understood and
approached from a public international human rights law, child rights perspective
in relation to other ICS parties and rights-holders?
The subsequent research questions which are analysed are:
- How does ICS present a challenge to children’s rights?
- What rights of the child are most at risk in ICS?
- How can international human rights law norms and standards (especially
those established by the CRC) be utilised to protect the rights of children in
ICS situations?
- How should the various competing rights and interests of children and others
in ICS situations be balanced using an approach consistent with, and drawing
on, public international law human rights norms and standards?
Limited scholarship exists on ICS from a child rights perspective under public
international human rights law; this thesis seeks to help address this gap in
scholarship. In addition, this thesis seeks to:
- explore and better understand the ways in which the child is vulnerable
and how child rights are at risk in ICS;
- provide insight into how the public international human rights law frame-
work – especially the CRC – provides a protective framework for children
conceived and born through ICS, and how this can be harnessed to ensure
children can exercise and enjoy their CRC rights, regardless of their con-
ception and birth through ICS; and
- provide practical suggestions for how the child and their rights can be
better protected in ICS.
Chapter 1 provides an overarching introduction to the thesis as a body of work.
It sets out the research questions which the doctoral study explores; outlines
the methodological approach and scope of the study; and explains the place
of the thesis in the ‘state of the art’. The Chapter introduces ICS as a pheno-
menon and explains how ICS is being practiced, as well as outlining the ratio-
nale for a focus on the rights of the child in the context of ICS through a public
international human rights law lens. A clear overview of the structure and
outline of the thesis is provided.
Chapter 2 discusses the emergence and development of the ICS market and
predominantly focuses on introducing the parties whose rights and interests
are at stake in ICS, the ‘core parties’ to ICS arrangements, namely the child,
the surrogate and the commissioning parents. The main bioethical and moral
challenges raised by ICS are briefly touched upon and provide important




also foreshadows some of the issues triggered in ICS by the existence of com-
peting rights and interests of the core parties to ICS arrangements.
Chapter 3 focuses on the rights of children conceived and born through
ICS and the rights of surrogate mothers in ICS. Primary emphasis is placed on
the rights of the child at stake, with a secondary focus on the rights of surro-
gate women in ICS. Central challenges to the child’s rights in ICS are identified
and discussed, in the context of and with reference to the relevant provisions
of the CRC. This begins building a picture of the potential negative impacts
of conception and birth through ICS on the rights of children. This Chapter
also provides an overview of some of the key human rights issues pertaining
to women in the ICS context, and discusses some of the human rights challenges
common to both surrogate women and children in ICS, namely the risks of
commodification and human trafficking. In doing so, this highlights the
broader human rights picture at play, again emphasising the intersecting nature
of many of the rights and interests at stake in ICS.
Chapter 4 demonstrates the complexity of the mother-child relationship
in ICS and presents analysis regarding the balancing of rights and interests
of the child with those of his or her multiple ‘mothers’ in ICS. This Chapter
brings a unique focus from an international human rights law perspective to
one of the central relationships in all ICS arrangements, between the child and
their potential multiple ‘mothers’. It discusses the construct of ‘mother’ as
inherently related to ‘child’, and analyses the different ‘mothers’ involved in
ICS: surrogate (the only person with a foetal-maternal link through the bio-
logical act of carrying to term and giving birth to the child); genetic (the only
woman with a DNA link with the resulting child); and commissioning (where
a woman is involved, the woman or women who want(s) to parent the child).
This discussion illustrates that establishing the status of the various potential
mothers in ICS is both socially and legally complex. In doing so, this Chapter
draws attention to the contestable nature of the notion of ‘mother’ in ICS and
traverses the corresponding implications for the rights of children. The po-
tential interests of each of the ’mothers’ in ICS vis-à-vis the child are examined,
and attention is given to how such rights and interests might be balanced with
the rights of the child.
Chapter 5 deepens the focus on the child’s rights in ICS and develops the
idea of the child as the locus of vulnerability in ICS arrangements. As part of
this analysis, this Chapter presents an extended discussion of the ethics and
economics of the commercialisation of the conception of children. Specific CRC
rights which are at the most significant risk in ICS are highlighted: the child’s
right to nationality and to preserve identity, to grow up in a family environ-
ment, and to education, health and social security. This Chapter also highlights
jurisprudential trends (through case law analysis) and non-judicial responses
(especially national guidelines/government guidance as quasi-policy
approaches to ICS) in three ICS ‘demand’ states (Australia, New Zealand and




framework, to assess the extent to which child rights are being promoted,
protected and upheld through these responses to ICS. This Chapter illustrates
that the clash of rights involved in ICS between the child and the other core
parties is difficult to avoid, but that increased efforts and measures to place
the child’s rights and best interests at the heart of the practice of ICS is both
necessary and possible.
Chapter 6 ensures that this study’s treatment of the child’s rights situation
in ICS is holistic, by considering how decisions and actions taken during the
preconception and prenatal phases of ICS can impact on the rights of children
once they are born through ICS. Indeed, certain CRC rights may be negatively
impacted once children are born through ICS, by actions and decisions taken
prior to their conception and birth. This Chapter focuses exclusively on this
issue. It identifies and examines these preconception and prenatal challenges
to the child’s rights in ICS and contends that due to the intentional, planned
nature of ICS and the involvement of multiple possible parents, steps should
be taken to protect the future child’s rights both preconception and prenatally
in all ICS arrangements. Analysis presented in this Chapter illustrates that no
international consensus exists regarding pre-birth rights protection, as reflected
in domestic jurisprudence, regional human rights jurisprudence, national
constitutions and international human rights law. However, the CRC leaves
open the option of its application to the pre-birth context; jurisprudence reflects
that it is possible for some protection to be afforded before birth to a future
child, without conferring rights pre-birth. A suggested approach to pre-
conception and prenatal protection of the future child’s rights in ICS is outlined,
including three basic safeguards that can be practically implemented to ensure
children can exercise and enjoy their CRC rights in the event that they are born
through ICS. A range of actors have a role to play to support this, and their
various roles are discussed. The Chapter makes clear that this is not about
attributing rights pre-birth, but rather protecting potential rights preconception
and prenatally in ICS, so the child is able to claim those rights post-birth.
Chapter 7 analyses one of the main children’s rights challenges in ICS:
securing the child’s right to a nationality under Article 7 CRC. Children born
through ICS are sometimes born stateless and stranded in their birth state. This
Chapter provides an overview of the child’s Article 7 right and discusses why
and how child statelessness arises in ICS. As evidenced by case law, children
born through ICS may face difficulties in acquiring nationality in three scenarios
in the context of ICS, namely a) when a lack of recognition of the child’s
parentage prevents nationality acquisition; b) when nationality laws of the
child’s birth state and their commissioning parents’ state of nationality conflict;
and c) when a child is abandoned in his or her birth state by his or her com-
missioning parents. The intersecting nature of the child’s right to a nationality
with other CRC rights is emphasised in this Chapter, as well as drawing
attention to state responses to the issue of child statelessness in ICS. It argues




not need to be a barrier to cooperation between States to prevent child
statelessness in ICS. Drawing on existing public international human rights
law standards and child rights principles, this Chapter proposes practical
solutions to the problem of child statelessness in ICS, to prevent further children
from being precluded from enjoying their right to a nationality. Specifically,
Chapter 7 recommends that international guidance should be issued reflecting
that a State which is the intended State of a child’s residence in ICS will grant
the child nationality if he or she would otherwise be stateless, as long as a
genetic link between the child and at least one commissioning parent is proved;
and that States will grant nationality to an otherwise stateless child born on
their territory through ICS.
Chapter 8 examines the child’s right to identity preservation as established
by Article 8 CRC, in the context of ICS. Like the child’s right to nationality, the
right to identity preservation is one of the child’s rights most at risk in ICS
and is at the heart of the child rights challenges arising through ICS, given the
wider impact identity has on the child’s lifetime outcomes. Although national-
ity is an element of identity, it is just one of many elements in this respect.
This Chapter therefore identifies other elements of child identity endangered
in ICS (genetic and biological (including the health rights implications for the
child); personal narrative; and cultural), as well as examining why identity
preservation is so important in the ICS context. This discussion is grounded
in Article 8 CRC, regional human rights jurisprudence, and draws on lessons
from adoption, donor-conception and domestic surrogacy. The central argu-
ment advanced in Chapter Eight is that the child’s Article 8 CRC right should
be proactively and strongly safeguarded in ICS, in particular by commissioning
parents, medical professionals, surrogacy clinics and states, in order for
children to be able to preserve their genetic, biological, personal narrative and
cultural elements of their identity. Chapter 8 makes the case that in instances
where this right is not protected and upheld, it will have a lifetime impact
on the child. This is illustrated with reference to case examples in which
children conceived and born through ICS have had their Article 8 right end-
angered, and in some cases, violated. This Chapter makes clear that safeguard-
ing the right to identity preservation must be treated as a matter of central
importance for all children conceived and born through ICS.
Chapter 9 presents a case analysis of the landmark European Court of
Human Rights judgments in Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France. These
cases are significant in the context of this study given they were the first
judgments concerning ICS issued by a regional human rights court; furthermore,
they warrant analysis as they indicate an approach to ICS emphasising the
rights of the children involved. This Chapter examines the rights situation of
the children concerned in the two cases, outlines the main arguments in the
European Court of Human Rights and analyses the judgments of the Fifth
Section of the Court. By taking a strong child-centred approach, the Court




the Court’s judgments focus on the child’s rights to nationality and identity;
therefore, the discussion presented in the case analysis builds on the previous
two chapters of this study, providing a further opportunity through which
to view these rights of the child in the practical ICS context. This Chapter
discusses the impact of these judgments in Europe and internationally, as
Governments grapple with the complexities and impacts of ICS arrangements,
particularly relating to the rights of children born through this new method
of family formation. Although the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights has dealt with subsequent applications concerning ICS since
passing the judgments this Chapter focuses on, the discussion presented in
this Chapter provides insight into the reasoning of a judicial body grappling
with ICS as a novel issue. However, to place the Court’s jurisprudence concern-
ing ICS in contemporary context, an Addendum to Chapter Nine is included,
providing a brief analysis from a child rights perspective of the first ICS judg-
ment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, in the
case of Paradiso Campanelli v. Italy.
Chapter 10 addresses the importance of rights balancing in ICS. As has been
demonstrated throughout the preceding chapters of this study, due to the
nature of ICS, this method of family formation often brings the rights and
interests of the child into conflict with those of the other core parties to ICS
arrangements. Chapter Ten brings these strands together, arguing that rights
need to be balanced against each other in the ICS context, to establish the
balance to be struck amongst competing rights and interests. This Chapter
discusses the balancing of rights and interests of the child with those of other
core parties to ICS: surrogate mothers, genetic donor parents and commission-
ing parents in ICS. It argues that rights balancing exercises will be necessary
in relation to these core parties throughout the course of ICS arrangements,
and that the child’s rights and best interests should be accorded priority once
born, given their particular stage in life and their vulnerability in comparison
to the other core parties. In keeping with the preceding chapters in this study,
while recognising the indivisible, interdependent and interrelated nature of
children’s rights, this Chapter draws attention to the child’s rights most at
risk in ICS, focusing on the need to respect the best interests of the child in
all ICS situations. It proposes that along with this approach, the principle of
human dignity must guide rights balancing in ICS, to strike an overall balance
between the child’s rights and best interests and the rights and interests of
other core parties where necessary.
Chapter 11 serves as the overall conclusion to the thesis. It reiterates the
complex and internationally unregulated nature of ICS and the fact that children
are continuing to be born through ICS, and as a result, their rights are in some
instances at risk. Chapter 11 traverses the ways in which the ICS landscape
has changed over the course of the doctoral study, highlighting, for example,
the supply-side states which have developed and closed down ICS markets




of closing down ICS within their jurisdictions. It also draws attention to the
various initiatives underway at the international level which have developed
over recent years, seeking to bring public international human rights law
standards and norms to bear in ICS, and to explore the potential for inter-
national agreement regarding ICS.
As well as placing the doctoral study in the current-day context, significant-
ly, Chapter 11 distills the central findings of the thesis into a comprehensive
framework of recommendations. These are drawn from and based on the
preceding chapters of the thesis, presented in Chapter 11 as a ‘Framework
of recommendations for promoting and protecting the rights of children in
International Commercial Surrogacy’, proposed for use as a framework for
a United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment.
The recommendations indicate practical steps to leverage existing international
child rights standards and norms which would and could have a protective
effect on the rights of the child in ICS if implemented, as well as minimising
harm to children and their rights in the continuing practice of ICS. Some of
the recommendations can be implemented on an immediate time-scale, and
others over a longer time horizon, dependent on increased international
agreement concerning ICS. Chapter 11 presents concluding remarks identifying
future research opportunities from a child rights perspective in the ICS context,
and discusses the prospects of reaching international consensus on ICS in the
long-term. Finally, this concluding chapter of the doctoral study re-emphasises
that as long as children continue being born through ICS, it is essential that
CRC duty-bearers take decisions and actions that protect and promote the
rights, best interests and inherent human dignity of all children who come







KINDERRECHTEN IN DE CONTEXT VAN INTERNATIONAAL COMMERCIEEL DRAAG-
MOEDERSCHAP
Een onderzoek naar de uitdagingen vanuit een international kinder- en mensenrechten-
perspectief
Internationaal Commercieel Draagmoederschap (International Commercial
Surrogacy – hierna ICS) heeft zich de afgelopen decennia gemanifesteerd als
een nieuwe methode van gezinsvorming met een grensoverschrijdend karakter
ontstaan vanuit een combinatie van een toenemende vraag van potentiële
ouders enerzijds en voortschrijdende ontwikkelingen op medisch gebied in
combinatie met verregaande globalisering anderzijds. ICS roept vragen op met
betrekking tot de mensenrechten van de meest kwetsbare betrokkenen, namelijk
de vrouwen die als draagmoeder optreden en de kinderen die als gevolg
hiervan geboren worden. Er bestaat geen internationale consensus over ICS;
dit blijkt uit de verschillende posities die staten hebben ingenomen met betrek-
king tot het al dan niet reguleren van ICS in hun nationale wetgeving en beleid.
Bovendien is er geen regeling op internationaal niveau terwijl de kernpartijen
in een ICS-traject uiteenlopende bedoelingen, rechten en belangen hebben. Als
gevolg daarvan kunnen de rechten en belangen van de verschillende partijen
met elkaar botsen.
ICS werpt complexe ethische, morele en juridische vragen op die tot nu
toe grotendeels onbeantwoord zijn gebleven. Desalniettemin, worden er kinde-
ren geboren door middel van ICS; kinderen die een verhoogd risico lopen op
een schending van hun rechten. Alle ICS-trajecten draaien om de wens tot het
krijgen van een kind. Net als ieder ander kind, heeft een kind dat via ICS
geboren is, het recht om het hele scala aan rechten te genieten en uit te oefenen
dat hem toekomt op grond van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten
van het Kind (IVRK). In de praktijk is het echter een grote uitdaging om de
rechten van kinderen geboren door ICS te waarborgen en in sommige gevallen
worden deze rechten dan ook geschonden. Daarom vormt ICS niet alleen een
uitdaging vanuit de mensenrechten bezien, maar is er ook behoefte aan een
kinderrechtenperspectief binnen het kader van de internationale mensenrech-
ten.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een aantal artikelen dat is geschreven in een
tijdsperiode waarin ICS zich razendsnel heeft ontwikkeld. De meerderheid van
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de artikelen in dit proefschrift zijn reeds gepubliceerd (of liggen ter beoordeling
voor) in tijdschriften en bundels. De artikelen in dit proefschrift vormen samen
een uitgebreide verkenning van de kinderrechten die door ICS het meest onder
druk komen te staan. Daarnaast bevat dit proefschrift praktische aanbevelingen
op basis van het IVRK die gebruikt kunnen worden om deze kinderrechten
te beschermen, te bevorderen en te waarborgen.
De hoofdvraag van dit onderzoek is de volgende:
Wat is de rol van internationale mensenrechten (in het bijzonder de normen en
standaarden die in het IVRK zijn neergelegd) bij het beschermen en versterken
van de rechten van kinderen in ICS en hoe moeten de rechten van deze kinderen
worden verstaan en benaderd vanuit een internationaal kinder- en mensenrechten-
perspectief in relatie tot de andere partijen en rechthebbenden?
Vervolgens worden de volgende onderzoeksvragen geanalyseerd:
- Op wat voor manier vormt ICS een uitdaging voor kinderrechten?
- Welke kinderrechten staan het meest onder druk bij ICS?
- Hoe kunnen normen en standaarden uit het internationale mensenrechtenkader
(in het bijzonder die welke zijn neergelegd in het IVRK) worden gebruikt om
de rechten van kinderen in ICS situaties te beschermen?
- Hoe moeten de met elkaar botsende rechten en belangen van kinderen en
anderen in ICS tegen elkaar worden afgewogen op een manier die in overeen-
stemming zijn met en gebaseerd zijn op de normen en standaarden van het
internationaal mensenrechtenkader?
Er is nog weinig wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar ICS voorhanden vanuit een
kinderrechtenperspectief binnen het internationaal mensenrechtenkader; in
dit onderzoek wordt gepoogd dat gat te dichten. Daarnaast zal in dit onder-
zoek worden getracht:
- de kwetsbaarheid van het kind en de manieren waarop kinderrechten
onder druk staan in ICS inzichtelijk te maken;
- te laten zien hoe het internationaal mensenrechtenkader – in het bijzonder
het IVRK – een beschermend kader kan bieden voor kinderen die zijn
verwekt en geboren via ICS en hoe dit kan worden versterkt om zo te
waarborgen dat deze kinderen hun IVRK-rechten kunnen genieten en
uitoefenen, ongeacht het feit dat ze via ICS ter wereld zijn gekomen; en
- praktische voorstellen te doen hoe kinderen en hun rechten beter be-
schermd kunnen worden bij ICS.
Hoofdstuk 1 biedt een brede introductie op het onderwerp van dit proefschrift.
Het zet de onderzoeksvragen uiteen, beschrijft de onderzoeksmethode en de
reikwijdte van het onderzoek en plaatst het proefschrift binnen de huidige
state of the art op dit onderzoeksgebied. Het hoofdstuk introduceert ICS als
fenomeen, legt uit hoe het in de praktijk voorkomt, en legt uit waarom het
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noodzakelijk is om de focus te leggen op kinderrechten in de context van ICS
door de lens van de internationale mensenrechten bezien. Bovendien bevat
het hoofdstuk een helder overzicht van de structuur en inhoud van het proef-
schrift.
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de ontwikkeling van de ICS-markt en richt zich met
name ook op de partijen wiens rechten en belangen onder druk staan in ICS,
de ‘kernpartijen’ in een ICS-traject, namelijk het kind, de draagmoeder en de
wensouders. De belangrijkste bio-ethische en morele uitdagingen van ICS
worden kort besproken en bieden daarmee belangrijke achtergrondcontext
voor de kinderrechten focus van dit proefschrift. Dit hoofdstuk is ook een
voorbode van sommige van de problemen die door het bestaan van conflicte-
rende rechten en belangen van de kernpartijen bij een ICS-traject worden
veroorzaakt.
Hoofdstuk 3 zet de rechten van kinderen die worden verwekt en geboren
via ICS en de rechten van de draagmoeder centraal. De primaire focus ligt op
de rechten van de kinderen en de secondaire focus op de rechten van de
draagmoeder. De meest essentiële uitdagingen voor kinderrechten in ICS
worden aangewezen en besproken binnen de context van en met verwijzing
naar de relevante bepalingen van het IVRK. Dit is de aanzet voor een completer
beeld van de potentiële negatieve gevolgen voor kinderrechten bij ICS. Dit
hoofdstuk bevat ook een overzicht van de meest in het oog springende poten-
tiële mensenrechtenschendingen die betrekking hebben op de vrouwen in de
context van ICS, en bespreekt een aantal van de mensenrechtenuitdagingen
die zowel de kinderen als de draagmoeder betreffen in de ICS, namelijk het
risico van commodificatie en mensenhandel. Hiermee wordt het bredere
mensenrechtelijk kader waarin ICS plaatsvindt, belicht, waarmee ook de inter-
sectionele aard van veel van de rechten en belangen die onder druk staan in
ICS wordt benadrukt.
Hoofdstuk 4 laat de complexiteit zien van de moeder-kind relatie in de
context van ICS en biedt een analyse van de manier waarop de rechten en
belangen van het kind en die van zijn meerdere ‘moeders’ tegen elkaar kunnen
worden afgewogen. Dit hoofdstuk belicht op unieke wijze een van de centrale
relaties binnen alle ICS-trajecten, namelijk tussen het kind en de meerdere
potentiële ‘moeders’. Het bespreekt het construct van de ‘moeder’ als inherent
verbonden aan ‘kind’, en analyseert de verschillende ‘moeders’ die bij ICS
betrokken zijn: de draagmoeder (de enige met een moeder-foetus band door
het dragen en het baren van het kind); de genetische moeder (de enige vrouw
die door DNA met het kind verbonden is); en de wensmoeder (als er een vrouw
bij het traject is betrokken, de vrouw of vrouwen die de het kind wil(len)
opvoeden). Deze discussie laat ziet dat het bepalen van de status van de
verschillende potentiële moeders zowel sociaal als juridisch ingewikkeld is.
Hiermee legt het hoofdstuk de betwistbare aard van het concept ‘moeder’ in
ICS bloot en legt de link met de bijbehorende implicaties voor de rechten van
kinderen. De mogelijke belangen van elk van deze potentiële ‘moeders’ in ICS
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ten opzichte van het kind worden bekeken en er wordt aandacht besteed aan
de vraag hoe die rechten en belangen kunnen worden afgewogen tegen de
rechten van het kind.
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat dieper in op de kinderrechten in het kader van ICS en
ontwikkelt de idee van het kind als de locus van kwetsbaarheid in ICS-trajecten.
Als onderdeel van deze analyse bevat dit hoofdstuk een uitgebreide bespreking
van de ethische en economische aspecten van het vercommercialiseren van
de conceptie van kinderen. Daarnaast worden de kinderrechten die het meest
onder druk staan in de context van ICS nader belicht; het recht van het kind
op nationaliteit en op behoud van identiteit, het recht om in een gezinsomge-
ving op te groeien, op onderwijs, gezondheid en sociale zekerheid. Dit hoofd-
stuk bespreekt ook ontwikkelingen in de jurisprudentie (door de analyse van
rechterlijke uitspraken) en niet-juridische reacties (in het bijzonder nationale
richtlijnen/richtlijnen uitgegeven door de overheid als een quasi-beleidsmatige
benadering van ICS) in drie ‘verzoekende’ staten (Australië, Nieuw-Zeeland
en het Verenigd Koninkrijk). Deze ontwikkelingen worden onderzocht in het
licht van het kinderrechtenkader, om te bezien in hoeverre kinderrechten
worden bevorderd, beschermd en nageleefd door deze juridische en niet-
juridische reacties op ICS. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat een botsing tussen de
rechten van het kind en de andere kernpartijen in ICS moeilijk te voorkomen
is, maar dat een grotere inzet van maatregelen die de belangen en rechten van
kinderen centraal plaatsen in de ICS-praktijk, zowel noodzakelijk als mogelijk
is.
Hoofdstuk 6 zorgt dat er een holistische kijk op kinderrechten in ICS aan
deze studie ten grondslag ligt door te overwegen hoe beslissingen en handelin-
gen tijdens de fase voor de conceptie van het kind en tijdens de zwangerschap
invloed kunnen hebben op de rechten van kinderen na hun geboorte via ICS.
Sommige IVRK-rechten zullen inderdaad negatief worden beïnvloed door
beslissingen die voor de conceptie van het kind zijn genomen. Dit hoofdstuk
identificeert en bestudeert deze kinderrechtenuitdagingen die al voor de
conceptie of tijdens zwangerschap kunnen ontstaan en stelt dat vanwege het
internationale, geplande karakter van ICS en de betrokkenheid van meerdere
potentiële ouders, er stappen genomen moeten worden om de rechten van
het toekomstige kind zowel voor de conceptie als tijdens de zwangerschap
te beschermen in alle ICS-trajecten. De analyse in dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat
er geen internationale consensus bestaat met betrekking tot de rechtsbescher-
ming van het ongeboren kind, zoals blijkt uit nationale jurisprudentie, regionale
mensenrechteninstrumenten, nationale grondwetten en internationale mensen-
rechteninstrumenten. Het IVRK laat de mogelijkheid echter open om enige
bescherming te verlenen voor de geboorte van een toekomstig kind; jurispru-
dentie laat ook zien dat het mogelijk is het kind enige bescherming te bieden
voor de geboorte, zonder het daarbij rechten voor de geboorte toe te kennen.
In dit hoofdstuk wordt een voorstel gedaan voor bescherming van de IVRK-
rechten van het toekomstige kind voor de conceptie en de geboorte; dit voorstel
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omvat drie basiswaarborgen die praktisch geïmplementeerd kunnen worden
om zo te verzekeren dat kinderen hun IVRK-rechten ook kunnen genieten als
ze via ICS geboren worden. Een veelheid aan actoren hebben hierin een rol
te spelen en hun verschillende rollen worden in dit hoofdstuk besproken. Het
gaat hierbij niet om het toekennen van rechten aan ongeboren kinderen, maar
om het beschermen van potentiële rechten voorafgaand aan conceptie en
geboorte, zodat het kind die rechten na de geboorte ook daadwerkelijk kan
uitoefenen.
Hoofdstuk 7 analyseert één van de belangrijkste kinderrechtenuitdagingen
in ICS: het waarborgen van het recht van het kind op nationaliteit onder arti-
kel 7 IVRK. Kinderen die via ICS worden geboren, zijn soms stateloos en stran-
den in de staat van hun geboorte. Dit hoofdstuk bevat een overzicht van de
rechten van het kind onder artikel 7 IVRK en bespreekt waarom en op welke
manier staatloosheid zich kan voordoen in het kader van ICS. Uit jurisprudentie
blijkt dat kinderen die via ICS zijn geboren soms maar moeilijk een nationaliteit
kunnen verkrijgen, met name in de volgende drie ICS scenario’s: a) wanneer
het onmogelijk is voor een kind een nationaliteit te verwerven omdat het
ouderschap van het kind niet wordt erkend; b) wanneer het nationaliteitsrecht
van het geboorteland van het kind en van de staat van de nationaliteit van
de wensouders elkaar tegenspreken; en c) wanneer een kind door de wens-
ouders wordt achtergelaten in de geboortestaat. Het feit dat het recht van een
kind op een nationaliteit samenhangt met andere IVRK rechten, wordt in dit
hoofdstuk benadrukt. Bovendien wordt aandacht besteed aan de verschillende
manieren waarop staten met dreigende staatloosheid van kinderen in ICS
omgaan. Er wordt beargumenteerd dat het gebrek aan internationale consensus
op het gebied van ICS geen barrière hoeft te vormen voor samenwerking tussen
staten om staatloosheid van de betrokken kinderen te voorkomen. Op basis
van bestaande internationale mensenrechtenstandaarden en kinderrechtenprin-
cipes worden praktische oplossingen aangedragen om te voorkomen dat
kinderen in de toekomst hun IVRK-recht op een nationaliteit niet kunnen
uitoefenen. In het bijzonder wordt in hoofdstuk 7 voorgesteld om een inter-
nationale richtlijn op te stellen die weerspiegelt dat de staat van de van gewone
verblijfplaats van de wensouders een nationaliteit moet verlenen aan het kind
indien dit anders stateloos zou zijn op voorwaarde dat er een genetische band
bestaat tussen het kind en minstens één van de wensouders. Daarnaast zou
een dergelijke richtlijn moeten weerspiegelen dat staten een nationaliteit
verlenen aan een kind dat via ICS op hun grondgebied is geboren als dit kind
anders stateloos zou zijn.
Hoofdstuk 8 richt zich op het recht van het kind op het behoud van identiteit
zoals neergelegd in artikel 8 IVRK, in de context van ICS. Net als het recht op
nationaliteit, is het recht op behoud van identiteit één van de rechten die het
meest onder druk staat in de context van ICS en vormt daarmee het hart van
de kinderrechtenuitdaging die uit ICS voortvloeit, gegeven de levenslange
gevolgen voor het kind van schending van dit recht. Alhoewel nationaliteit
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een element is van de identiteit van een kind, is het slechts een van de vele
elementen in dit opzicht. Daarom worden in dit hoofdstuk de andere elemen-
ten van identiteit die in ICS onder druk staan geïdentificeerd (genetisch en
biologisch identiteit (waaronder het recht op gezondheid van het kind); per-
soonlijke geschiedenis; en culturele identiteit). Daarnaast wordt ook gekeken
waarom het behoud van identiteit zo belangrijk is in de context van ICS. Deze
discussie is gegrond op artikel 8 IVRK en regionale mensenrechtenjurispruden-
tie, maar trekt ook lering uit kennis over adoptie, donorconceptie en nationaal
draagmoederschap. Het centrale argument dat in dit hoofdstuk naar voren
wordt gebracht, is dat het kinderrecht van artikel 8 IVRK op een proactieve
en solide manier moet worden beschermd in ICS, in het bijzonder door de
wensouders, medici, draagmoederschapsklinieken en staten, om te waarborgen
dat kinderen de genetische, biologische en culturele elementen van hun identi-
teit en hun persoonlijke geschiedenis kunnen behouden. Hoofdstuk 8 maakt
duidelijk dat het niet beschermen van dit recht, levenslange gevolgen voor
het kind zal hebben. Dit wordt geïllustreerd aan de hand van voorbeelden
waarin de artikel 8 rechten van kinderen die via ICS zijn verwekt en geboren
in gevaar zijn gebracht en in sommige gevallen zelfs zijn geschonden. Uit dit
hoofdstuk blijkt dat het waarborgen van het recht op behoud van identiteit
van wezenlijk belang is voor alle kinderen die via ICS ter wereld komen.
Hoofdstuk 9 bevat een analyse van de baanbrekende uitspraken van het
Europese Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens in de zaken Mennesson v. France
en Labassee v. France. Deze zaken zijn belangrijk voor deze studie omdat het
de eerste uitspraken zijn over draagmoederschap van een regionaal mensen-
rechtenhof; bovendien zijn ze belangrijk omdat ze het begin lijken te zijn van
een benadering van ICS waarbij de rechten van de berokken kinderen centraal
staan. In dit hoofdstuk worden deze twee zaken geanalyseerd, de hoofdargu-
menten van het EHRM uiteengezet en wordt een analyse gemaakt van deze
uitspraken. Door een sterke kinderrechtengerichte benadering, benadrukt het
EHRM de kwetsbaarheid van kinderen die zijn geboren uit ICS-trajecten. De
uitspraken van het EHRM zijn gefocust op nationaliteit en identiteit, daarom
bouwt de discussie in dit hoofdstuk voort op de twee vorige hoofdstukken
en biedt daarmee een mogelijkheid om de rechten van het kind in de alledaag-
se praktijk van ICS te beschouwen. Dit hoofdstuk bespreekt de impact van deze
beslissingen op Europees en op internationaal niveau, in een wereld waarin
overheden worstelen met de complexiteit en de gevolgen van ICS-trajecten,
in het bijzonder waar het de rechten van kinderen in deze situaties betreft.
Alhoewel de Grote Kamer van het EHRM sindsdien andere zaken met betrek-
king tot ICS heeft behandeld, geeft dit hoofdstuk inzicht in de redeneringen
van een gerechtelijke instantie die met ICS worstelt als een nieuw fenomeen.
Om deze uitspraken in de context van vandaag de dag te plaatsen, bevat het
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In Hoofdstuk 10 staat het belang van een belangenafweging in ICS centraal.
Zoals in voorgaande hoofdstukken is aangetoond, komen de rechten en belan-
gen van kinderen in ICS, door de aard van deze manier van gezinsvorming,
vaak in conflict met die van de andere kernpartijen bij een ICS-traject. In
hoofdstuk 10 komen deze verschillende lijnen samen, en wordt gesteld dat
de rechten tegen elkaar moeten worden afgewogen in de context van ICS om
tot een balans te komen tussen de rechten en belangen van het kind en die
van de ander kernpartijen bij ICS: draagmoeders, eicel- en spermadonoren en
de wensouders. Dit balanceren van rechten van de verschillende kernpartijen
moet tijdens het hele ICS traject plaatsvinden, waarbij zodra het kind geboren
is de rechten en belangen van het kind prioriteit moeten hebben, gezien zijn
levensstadium en kwetsbaarheid vergeleken met de andere kernpartijen. Net
als in de vorige hoofdstukken, wordt hier vooral aandacht besteedt aan de
kinderrechten die het meest onder druk staan in ICS, zonder daarbij de ondeel-
bare, onderling afhankelijke en vervlochten aard van kinderrechten te misken-
nen, met focus op de noodzaak de rechten van kinderen in alle ICS situaties
te respecteren. In dit hoofdstuk wordt voorgesteld om, naast deze benadering,
het principe van menselijke waardigheid te gebruiken als leidraad voor het
wegen. Hierdoor kan, , waar nodig, een volledige afweging worden gemaakt
van de belangen en rechten van kinderen enerzijds en de belangen en rechten
van andere kernpartijen anderzijds.
Hoofdstuk 11 dient als de algemene conclusie van het proefschrift. Het
benadrukt nogmaals de complexe aard van ICS en het gebrek aan internationale
regelgeving en het feit dat kinderen desalniettemin via ICS geboren worden
en daardoor het risico lopen dat hun rechten worden geschonden. Het hoofd-
stuk bevat een dwarsdoorsnede van de veranderingen die tijdens het schrijven
van dit proefschrift op het gebied van ICS hebben plaatsgevonden. Zo is er
bijvoorbeeld aandacht voor aanbodstaten die toegang hun groeiende ICS markt
al hebben geblokkeerd door middel van wetgeving of beleidsinterventies of
daarmee bezig zijn. Ook is er aandacht voor internationale initiatieven die
zich de afgelopen jaren hebben ontwikkeld om internationale mensenrechten
en normen een plek te geven binnen ICS, en de mogelijkheden voor internatio-
nale overeenstemming met betrekking tot ICS te onderzoeken.
Dit afsluitende hoofdstuk plaatst het proefschrift niet alleen in een heden-
daagse context, maar zet daarnaast de centrale conclusies van dit onderzoek
om in een breed raamwerk van aanbevelingen. Deze aanbevelingen komen
voort uit en zijn gebaseerd op de eerdere hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift en
worden gepresenteerd als een ‘Framework of recommendations for promoting
and protecting the rights of children in International Commercial Surrogacy’.
Ze kunnen dienen als een raamwerk voor een General Comment van het Kinder-
rechtencomité van de Verenigde Naties. De aanbevelingen bevatten praktische
stappen die ondernomen kunnen worden om bestaande internationale kinder-
rechtenstandaarden en -normen te verstevigen, om zo de rechten van kinderen
beter te beschermen bij de mogelijke implementatie van ICS, waardoor schade
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aan kinderen en hun rechten in de praktijk van ICS zou kunnen worden gemini-
maliseerd. Sommige van de aanbevelingen kunnen direct worden geïmplemen-
teerd, en andere over een langere tijdspanne, afhankelijk van de toenemende
internationale overeenstemming over ICS. Daarnaast worden in dit hoofdstuk
nieuwe onderzoeksvragen voor toekomstig onderzoek naar kinderrechten in
de context van ICS geïdentificeerd en worden mogelijkheden voor internationale
consensus met betrekking tot ICS op lange termijn besproken. Ten slotte bena-
drukt dit afsluitende hoofdstuk dat zo lang er kinderen via ICS worden gebo-
ren, het van het grootste belang is dat de plichtendragers op grond van het
IVRK beslissingen nemen die de rechten, belangen en de inherente menselijke
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Exploring the challenges from a child rights, 
public international human rights law perspective
International Commercial Surrogacy (ICS) has emerged over
the  past  decade  as  a  modern  method  of  family  formation.
ICS is unregulated internationally and domestic laws are
struggling to keep pace with ICS. However, a child is at the
centre of every ICS arrangement, and children conceived and
born through ICS are at a heightened risk of their rights being
infr inged.
Comprised of a collection of articles written over the course
of time when ICS has been rapidly developing, this book
explores why and how the child's rights are at risk in ICS, and
seeks to apply the standards and norms of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child to the ICS context.
This book proposes approaches for balancing the competing
rights and interests of the child and other par ties in ICS. It
presents a framework for protecting  the  r ights  of  children
born  through  ICS,  i l lustrating that this is achievable in
practice, in the absence of international consensus on ICS as
a phenomenon. 
This book is relevant for child r ights practitioners and
academics, and useful for policy-makers, leg islators and
national and international decision-makers grappling with the
children’s and human r ights issues presented by this 21st
century human rights challenge.
This is a volume in the ser ies of the Meijer s Research Institute and
Graduate School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This
study  is  par t  of  the  Law  School’s  research  programme  ‘Effective
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